1 | =head1 NAME |
1 | =head1 NAME |
2 | |
2 | |
3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol |
3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol handler |
4 | |
4 | |
5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
6 | |
6 | |
7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
8 | |
8 | |
9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
10 | |
10 | |
11 | This is the superclass for MP transports, most of which is considered an |
11 | This implements the actual transport protocol for MP (it represents a |
12 | implementation detail. |
12 | single link), most of which is considered an implementation detail. |
13 | |
13 | |
14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
15 | this protocol. |
15 | this protocol. |
16 | |
16 | |
17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
… | |
… | |
111 | |
111 | |
112 | =cut |
112 | =cut |
113 | |
113 | |
114 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
114 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
115 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
115 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
116 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(hex_secret)); # auth types we accept |
116 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(cleartext)); # auth types we accept |
117 | |
117 | |
118 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
118 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
119 | #}; |
119 | #}; |
120 | |
120 | |
121 | sub new { |
121 | sub new { |
… | |
… | |
141 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
141 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
142 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
142 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
143 | |
143 | |
144 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
144 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
145 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
145 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
146 | rbuf_max => 64 * 1024, |
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147 | autocork => 1, |
146 | autocork => 1, |
148 | no_delay => 1, |
147 | no_delay => 1, |
149 | on_error => sub { |
148 | on_error => sub { |
150 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
149 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
151 | }, |
150 | }, |
… | |
… | |
158 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
157 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
159 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
158 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
160 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
159 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
161 | |
160 | |
162 | # send greeting |
161 | # send greeting |
163 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" # version, min |
162 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
164 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
163 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
165 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
164 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
166 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
165 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
167 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
166 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
168 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
167 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
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168 | |
169 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
169 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
170 | |
170 | |
171 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
171 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
172 | |
172 | |
173 | # expect greeting |
173 | # expect greeting |
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174 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (4 * 1024); |
174 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
175 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
175 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
176 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
176 | |
177 | |
177 | my ($aemp, $version, $version_min, $uniq, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
178 | my ($aemp, $version, $uniq, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
178 | |
179 | |
179 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
180 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
180 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
181 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
181 | } elsif ($version_min > $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
182 | } elsif ($version != $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
182 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version_min .. $version)"); |
183 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version)"); |
183 | } |
184 | } |
184 | |
185 | |
185 | my $s_auth; |
186 | my $s_auth; |
186 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
187 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
187 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
188 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
… | |
… | |
226 | # auth |
227 | # auth |
227 | require Digest::MD6; |
228 | require Digest::MD6; |
228 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
229 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
229 | |
230 | |
230 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 ($secret); |
231 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 ($secret); |
231 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
232 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
232 | |
233 | |
233 | my $rauth = |
234 | my $rauth = |
234 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
235 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
235 | : $s_auth eq "hex_secret" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
236 | : $s_auth eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
236 | : die; |
237 | : die; |
237 | |
238 | |
238 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
239 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
239 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
240 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
240 | |
241 | |
241 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
242 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
242 | |
243 | |
243 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (64); # enough for 44 reply bytes or so |
244 | # reasd the authentication response |
244 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
245 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
245 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
246 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
246 | |
247 | |
247 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
248 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
248 | |
249 | |
… | |
… | |
255 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
256 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
256 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
257 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
257 | |
258 | |
258 | $self->connected; |
259 | $self->connected; |
259 | |
260 | |
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261 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
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262 | |
260 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
263 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
261 | for @$queue; |
264 | for @$queue; |
262 | |
265 | |
263 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
266 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
264 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
267 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
265 | |
268 | |
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269 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
266 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject ($_[1]); |
270 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
267 | }; |
271 | }; |
268 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
272 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
269 | }); |
273 | }); |
270 | }); |
274 | }); |
271 | }); |
275 | }); |
… | |
… | |
323 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
327 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
324 | |
328 | |
325 | =head2 GREETING |
329 | =head2 GREETING |
326 | |
330 | |
327 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
331 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
328 | characters. The first seven strings are fixed by the protocol, the |
332 | characters. The first even ixtrings are fixed by the protocol, the |
329 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
333 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
330 | characters themselves. |
334 | characters themselves. |
331 | |
335 | |
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336 | All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, including delimiter. |
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337 | |
332 | The seven fixed strings are: |
338 | The fixed strings are: |
333 | |
339 | |
334 | =over 4 |
340 | =over 4 |
335 | |
341 | |
336 | =item C<aemp> |
342 | =item C<aemp> |
337 | |
343 | |
338 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
344 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
339 | |
345 | |
340 | =item protocol version |
346 | =item protocol version |
341 | |
347 | |
342 | The (maximum) protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. |
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343 | |
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344 | =item minimum protocol version |
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345 | |
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346 | The minimum protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. |
348 | The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
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349 | versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
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350 | are supposed to be handled by addign additional key-value pairs. |
347 | |
351 | |
348 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
352 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
349 | |
353 | |
350 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
354 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
351 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
355 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
… | |
… | |
399 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
403 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
400 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
404 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
401 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
405 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
402 | characters. |
406 | characters. |
403 | |
407 | |
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408 | I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
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409 | B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
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410 | |
404 | Example of the two lines of greeting: |
411 | Example of the two lines of greeting: |
405 | |
412 | |
406 | aemp;0;0;e7d.4a76f48f;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,hex_secret;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
413 | aemp;0;fec.4a7720fc;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0 |
407 | XntegV2Guvss0qNn7phCPnoU87xqxV+4Mqm/5y4iQm6a |
414 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
408 | |
415 | |
409 | =head2 TLS handshake |
416 | =head2 TLS handshake |
410 | |
417 | |
411 | If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
418 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
412 | connection I<must> use TLS, or fail. |
419 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail.>> |
413 | |
420 | |
414 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
421 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
415 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
422 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
416 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
423 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
417 | |
424 | |
… | |
… | |
428 | |
435 | |
429 | =item the authentication method chosen |
436 | =item the authentication method chosen |
430 | |
437 | |
431 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
438 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
432 | |
439 | |
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440 | The currently supported authentication methods are: |
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441 | |
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442 | =over 4 |
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443 | |
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444 | =item cleartext |
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445 | |
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446 | This is simply the shared secret, lowercase-hex-encoded. This method is of |
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447 | course very insecure, unless TLS is used, which is why this module will |
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448 | accept, but not generate, cleartext auth replies. |
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449 | |
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450 | =item hmac_md6_64_256 |
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451 | |
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452 | This method uses an MD6 HMAC with 64 bit blocksize and 256 bit hash. First, the shared secret |
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453 | is hashed with MD6: |
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454 | |
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455 | key = MD6 (secret) |
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456 | |
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457 | This secret is then used to generate the "local auth reply", by taking |
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458 | the two local greeting lines and the two remote greeting lines (without |
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459 | line endings), appending \012 to all of them, concatenating them and |
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460 | calculating the MD6 HMAC with the key. |
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461 | |
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462 | lauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012" |
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463 | |
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464 | This authentication token is then lowercase-hex-encoded and sent to the |
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465 | other side. |
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466 | |
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467 | Then the remote auth reply is generated using the same method, but local |
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468 | and remote greeting lines swapped: |
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469 | |
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470 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
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471 | |
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472 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
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473 | |
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474 | =back |
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475 | |
433 | =item the authentication data |
476 | =item the authentication data |
434 | |
477 | |
435 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data. |
478 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
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479 | above. |
436 | |
480 | |
437 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
481 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
438 | |
482 | |
439 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
483 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
440 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
484 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
441 | |
485 | |
442 | =back |
486 | =back |
443 | |
487 | |
444 | Example (the actual reply matching the previous example): |
488 | Example: |
445 | |
489 | |
446 | hmac_md6_64_256;wIlLedBY956UCGSISG9mBZRDTG8xUi73/sVse2DSQp0;json |
490 | hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
447 | |
491 | |
448 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
492 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
449 | |
493 | |
450 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
494 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
451 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
495 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |