| 1 | =head1 NAME |
1 | =head1 NAME |
| 2 | |
2 | |
| 3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol |
3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol handler |
| 4 | |
4 | |
| 5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
| 6 | |
6 | |
| 7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
| 8 | |
8 | |
| 9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
| 10 | |
10 | |
| 11 | This is the superclass for MP transports, most of which is considered an |
11 | This implements the actual transport protocol for MP (it represents a |
| 12 | implementation detail. |
12 | single link), most of which is considered an implementation detail. |
| 13 | |
13 | |
| 14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
| 15 | this protocol. |
15 | this protocol. |
| 16 | |
16 | |
| 17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
| … | |
… | |
| 22 | |
22 | |
| 23 | package AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
23 | package AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
| 24 | |
24 | |
| 25 | use common::sense; |
25 | use common::sense; |
| 26 | |
26 | |
| 27 | use Scalar::Util; |
27 | use Scalar::Util (); |
|
|
28 | use List::Util (); |
| 28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
29 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
| 29 | use Storable (); |
30 | use Storable (); |
| 30 | use JSON::XS (); |
31 | use JSON::XS (); |
| 31 | |
32 | |
|
|
33 | use Digest::MD6 (); |
|
|
34 | use Digest::HMAC_MD6 (); |
|
|
35 | |
| 32 | use AE (); |
36 | use AE (); |
| 33 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
37 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
| 34 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
38 | use AnyEvent::Handle 4.92 (); |
| 35 | |
39 | |
| 36 | use base Exporter::; |
40 | use base Exporter::; |
| 37 | |
41 | |
| 38 | our $VERSION = '0.0'; |
|
|
| 39 | our $PROTOCOL_VERSION = 0; |
42 | our $PROTOCOL_VERSION = 0; |
| 40 | |
43 | |
| 41 | =item $listener = mp_listener $host, $port, <constructor-args>, $cb->($transport) |
44 | =item $listener = mp_listener $host, $port, <constructor-args>, $cb->($transport) |
| 42 | |
45 | |
| 43 | Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
46 | Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
| … | |
… | |
| 109 | peername => $peername, # for verification |
112 | peername => $peername, # for verification |
| 110 | ; |
113 | ; |
| 111 | |
114 | |
| 112 | =cut |
115 | =cut |
| 113 | |
116 | |
|
|
117 | sub LATENCY() { 3 } # assumed max. network latency |
|
|
118 | |
| 114 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
119 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
| 115 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
120 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
| 116 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(hex_secret)); # auth types we accept |
121 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(cleartext)); # auth types we accept |
| 117 | |
122 | |
| 118 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
123 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
| 119 | #}; |
124 | #}; |
| 120 | |
125 | |
| 121 | sub new { |
126 | sub new { |
| … | |
… | |
| 126 | $self->{queue} = []; |
131 | $self->{queue} = []; |
| 127 | |
132 | |
| 128 | { |
133 | { |
| 129 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
134 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
| 130 | |
135 | |
| 131 | $arg{tls_ctx_disabled} ||= { |
|
|
| 132 | sslv2 => 0, |
|
|
| 133 | sslv3 => 0, |
|
|
| 134 | tlsv1 => 1, |
|
|
| 135 | verify => 1, |
|
|
| 136 | cert_file => "secret.pem", |
|
|
| 137 | ca_file => "secret.pem", |
|
|
| 138 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
|
|
| 139 | }; |
|
|
| 140 | |
|
|
| 141 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
136 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
| 142 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
137 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
| 143 | |
138 | |
|
|
139 | $arg{timeout} = 30 |
|
|
140 | unless exists $arg{timeout}; |
|
|
141 | |
|
|
142 | $arg{timeout} = 1 + LATENCY |
|
|
143 | if $arg{timeout} < 1 + LATENCY; |
|
|
144 | |
|
|
145 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
|
|
146 | |
|
|
147 | if ($secret =~ /-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----.*-----END CERTIFICATE-----/s) { |
|
|
148 | # assume TLS mode |
|
|
149 | $arg{tls_ctx} = { |
|
|
150 | sslv2 => 0, |
|
|
151 | sslv3 => 0, |
|
|
152 | tlsv1 => 1, |
|
|
153 | verify => 1, |
|
|
154 | cert => $secret, |
|
|
155 | ca_cert => $secret, |
|
|
156 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
|
|
157 | }; |
|
|
158 | } |
|
|
159 | |
| 144 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
160 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
| 145 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
161 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
| 146 | rbuf_max => 64 * 1024, |
|
|
| 147 | autocork => 1, |
162 | autocork => 1, |
| 148 | no_delay => 1, |
163 | no_delay => 1, |
| 149 | on_error => sub { |
164 | on_error => sub { |
| 150 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
165 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
| 151 | }, |
166 | }, |
|
|
167 | rtimeout => $AnyEvent::MP::Base::CONNECT_TIMEOUT, |
| 152 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
168 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
| 153 | ; |
169 | ; |
| 154 | |
170 | |
| 155 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
|
|
| 156 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
171 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
|
|
172 | |
|
|
173 | $self->{local_node} = $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE; |
|
|
174 | |
| 157 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
175 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
| 158 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
|
|
| 159 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
176 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$AnyEvent::MP::Base::VERSION"; |
| 160 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
177 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
|
|
178 | $greeting_kv->{timeout} = $arg{timeout}; |
| 161 | |
179 | |
| 162 | # send greeting |
180 | # send greeting |
| 163 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" # version, min |
181 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
| 164 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
182 | . ";$self->{local_node}" |
| 165 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
|
|
| 166 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
183 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
| 167 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
184 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
| 168 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
185 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
|
|
186 | |
| 169 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
187 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
| 170 | |
188 | |
| 171 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
189 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
| 172 | |
190 | |
| 173 | # expect greeting |
191 | # expect greeting |
|
|
192 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (4 * 1024); |
| 174 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
193 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 175 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
194 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
| 176 | |
195 | |
| 177 | my ($aemp, $version, $version_min, $uniq, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
196 | my ($aemp, $version, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
| 178 | |
197 | |
| 179 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
198 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
| 180 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
199 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
| 181 | } elsif ($version_min > $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
200 | } elsif ($version != $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
| 182 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version_min .. $version)"); |
201 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version)"); |
| 183 | } |
202 | } |
| 184 | |
203 | |
| 185 | my $s_auth; |
204 | my $s_auth; |
| 186 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
205 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
| 187 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
206 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
| … | |
… | |
| 204 | } |
223 | } |
| 205 | |
224 | |
| 206 | defined $s_framing |
225 | defined $s_framing |
| 207 | or return $self->error ("$framings: no common framing method supported"); |
226 | or return $self->error ("$framings: no common framing method supported"); |
| 208 | |
227 | |
| 209 | $self->{remote_uniq} = $uniq; |
|
|
| 210 | $self->{remote_node} = $rnode; |
228 | $self->{remote_node} = $rnode; |
| 211 | |
229 | |
| 212 | $self->{remote_greeting} = { |
230 | $self->{remote_greeting} = { |
| 213 | map /^([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?/ ? ($1 => $2) : (), |
231 | map /^([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?/ ? ($1 => $2) : (), |
| 214 | @kv |
232 | @kv |
| … | |
… | |
| 216 | |
234 | |
| 217 | # read nonce |
235 | # read nonce |
| 218 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
236 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 219 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
237 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
| 220 | |
238 | |
|
|
239 | "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2" ne "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2" # echo attack? |
|
|
240 | or return $self->error ("authentication error, echo attack?"); |
|
|
241 | |
|
|
242 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 $secret; |
|
|
243 | my $lauth; |
|
|
244 | |
| 221 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
245 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
| 222 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
246 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
| 223 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
247 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
|
|
248 | $s_auth = "tls"; |
|
|
249 | $lauth = ""; |
|
|
250 | } else { |
|
|
251 | # we currently only support hmac_md6_64_256 |
|
|
252 | $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256; |
| 224 | } |
253 | } |
| 225 | |
|
|
| 226 | # auth |
|
|
| 227 | require Digest::MD6; |
|
|
| 228 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
|
|
| 229 | |
|
|
| 230 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 ($secret); |
|
|
| 231 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
|
|
| 232 | |
|
|
| 233 | my $rauth = |
|
|
| 234 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
|
|
| 235 | : $s_auth eq "hex_secret" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
| 236 | : die; |
|
|
| 237 | |
|
|
| 238 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
|
|
| 239 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
|
|
| 240 | |
254 | |
| 241 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
255 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
| 242 | |
256 | |
| 243 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (64); # enough for 44 reply bytes or so |
257 | # read the authentication response |
| 244 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
258 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 245 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
259 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
| 246 | |
260 | |
| 247 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
261 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
|
|
262 | |
|
|
263 | my $rauth = |
|
|
264 | $auth_method eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256 |
|
|
265 | : $auth_method eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
266 | : $auth_method eq "tls" ? ($self->{tls} ? "" : "\012\012") # \012\012 never matches |
|
|
267 | : return $self->error ("$auth_method: fatal, selected unsupported auth method"); |
| 248 | |
268 | |
| 249 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
269 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
| 250 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
270 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
| 251 | } |
271 | } |
| 252 | |
272 | |
| 253 | $self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
273 | $self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
| 254 | |
274 | |
| 255 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
275 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
| 256 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
276 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
| 257 | |
277 | |
|
|
278 | $self->{hdl}->rtimeout ($self->{remote_greeting}{timeout}); |
|
|
279 | $self->{hdl}->wtimeout ($arg{timeout} - LATENCY); |
|
|
280 | $self->{hdl}->on_wtimeout (sub { $self->send (["", "devnull"]) }); |
|
|
281 | |
| 258 | $self->connected; |
282 | $self->connected; |
| 259 | |
283 | |
| 260 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
284 | # send queued messages |
|
|
285 | $self->send ($_) |
| 261 | for @$queue; |
286 | for @$queue; |
| 262 | |
287 | |
|
|
288 | # receive handling |
|
|
289 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
|
|
290 | |
| 263 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
291 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
| 264 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
292 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
| 265 | |
293 | |
|
|
294 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
| 266 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject ($_[1]); |
295 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
| 267 | }; |
296 | }; |
| 268 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
297 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
| 269 | }); |
298 | }); |
| 270 | }); |
299 | }); |
| 271 | }); |
300 | }); |
| … | |
… | |
| 276 | |
305 | |
| 277 | sub error { |
306 | sub error { |
| 278 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
307 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
| 279 | |
308 | |
| 280 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
309 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
|
|
310 | #TODO: store error, but do not instantly fail |
|
|
311 | $self->{node}->fail (transport_error => $self->{node}{noderef}, $msg); |
| 281 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
312 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
| 282 | } |
313 | } |
| 283 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
314 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
| 284 | $self->destroy; |
315 | $self->destroy; |
| 285 | } |
316 | } |
| 286 | |
317 | |
| 287 | sub connected { |
318 | sub connected { |
| 288 | my ($self) = @_; |
319 | my ($self) = @_; |
| 289 | |
320 | |
|
|
321 | if (ref $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SLAVE) { |
|
|
322 | # first connect with a master node |
|
|
323 | my $via = $self->{remote_node}; |
|
|
324 | $via =~ s/,/!/g; |
|
|
325 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE .= "\@$via"; |
|
|
326 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE{$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE} = $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE{""}; |
|
|
327 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SLAVE->(); |
|
|
328 | } |
|
|
329 | |
|
|
330 | if ($self->{local_node} ne $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE) { |
|
|
331 | # node changed its name since first greeting |
|
|
332 | $self->send (["", iam => $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE]); |
|
|
333 | } |
|
|
334 | |
| 290 | my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Base::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
335 | my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Base::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
| 291 | Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
336 | Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
| 292 | $node->set_transport ($self); |
337 | $node->set_transport ($self); |
| 293 | } |
338 | } |
| 294 | |
339 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 322 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
367 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
| 323 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
368 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
| 324 | |
369 | |
| 325 | =head2 GREETING |
370 | =head2 GREETING |
| 326 | |
371 | |
|
|
372 | All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, |
|
|
373 | including delimiter. Afterwards there is no limit on the packet size that |
|
|
374 | can be received. |
|
|
375 | |
|
|
376 | =head3 First Greeting Line |
|
|
377 | |
|
|
378 | Example: |
|
|
379 | |
|
|
380 | aemp;0;fec.4a7720fc;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0 |
|
|
381 | |
| 327 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
382 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
| 328 | characters. The first seven strings are fixed by the protocol, the |
383 | characters. The first even ixtrings are fixed by the protocol, the |
| 329 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
384 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
| 330 | characters themselves. |
385 | characters themselves. |
| 331 | |
386 | |
| 332 | The seven fixed strings are: |
387 | The fixed strings are: |
| 333 | |
388 | |
| 334 | =over 4 |
389 | =over 4 |
| 335 | |
390 | |
| 336 | =item C<aemp> |
391 | =item protocol identification |
| 337 | |
392 | |
| 338 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
393 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
| 339 | |
394 | |
| 340 | =item protocol version |
395 | =item protocol version |
| 341 | |
396 | |
| 342 | The (maximum) protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. |
|
|
| 343 | |
|
|
| 344 | =item minimum protocol version |
|
|
| 345 | |
|
|
| 346 | The minimum protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. |
397 | The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
| 347 | |
398 | versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
| 348 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
399 | are supposed to be handled through additional key-value pairs. |
| 349 | |
|
|
| 350 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
|
|
| 351 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
|
|
| 352 | no meaning of the contents are assumed. |
|
|
| 353 | |
400 | |
| 354 | =item the node endpoint descriptors |
401 | =item the node endpoint descriptors |
| 355 | |
402 | |
| 356 | for public nodes, this is a comma-separated list of protocol endpoints, |
403 | for public nodes, this is a comma-separated list of protocol endpoints, |
| 357 | i.e., the noderef. For slave nodes, this is a unique identifier. |
404 | i.e., the noderef. For slave nodes, this is a unique identifier of the |
|
|
405 | form C<slave/nonce>. |
| 358 | |
406 | |
| 359 | =item the acceptable authentication methods |
407 | =item the acceptable authentication methods |
| 360 | |
408 | |
| 361 | A comma-separated list of authentication methods supported by the |
409 | A comma-separated list of authentication methods supported by the |
| 362 | node. Note that AnyEvent::MP supports a C<hex_secret> authentication |
410 | node. Note that AnyEvent::MP supports a C<hex_secret> authentication |
| … | |
… | |
| 391 | =item tls=<major>.<minor> |
439 | =item tls=<major>.<minor> |
| 392 | |
440 | |
| 393 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
441 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
| 394 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
442 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
| 395 | |
443 | |
|
|
444 | =item timeout=<seconds> |
|
|
445 | |
|
|
446 | The amount of time after which this node should be detected as dead unless |
|
|
447 | some data has been received. The node is responsible to send traffic |
|
|
448 | reasonably more often than this interval (such as every timeout minus five |
|
|
449 | seconds). |
|
|
450 | |
| 396 | =back |
451 | =back |
|
|
452 | |
|
|
453 | =head3 Second Greeting Line |
| 397 | |
454 | |
| 398 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
455 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
| 399 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
456 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
| 400 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
457 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
| 401 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
458 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
| 402 | characters. |
459 | characters. |
| 403 | |
460 | |
| 404 | Example of the two lines of greeting: |
461 | I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
|
|
462 | B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
| 405 | |
463 | |
| 406 | aemp;0;0;e7d.4a76f48f;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,hex_secret;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
464 | Example of a nonce line: |
| 407 | XntegV2Guvss0qNn7phCPnoU87xqxV+4Mqm/5y4iQm6a |
465 | |
|
|
466 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
| 408 | |
467 | |
| 409 | =head2 TLS handshake |
468 | =head2 TLS handshake |
| 410 | |
469 | |
| 411 | If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
470 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
| 412 | connection I<must> use TLS, or fail. |
471 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail. >> |
| 413 | |
472 | |
| 414 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
473 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
| 415 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
474 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
| 416 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
475 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
| 417 | |
476 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 428 | |
487 | |
| 429 | =item the authentication method chosen |
488 | =item the authentication method chosen |
| 430 | |
489 | |
| 431 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
490 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
| 432 | |
491 | |
|
|
492 | The currently supported authentication methods are: |
|
|
493 | |
|
|
494 | =over 4 |
|
|
495 | |
|
|
496 | =item cleartext |
|
|
497 | |
|
|
498 | This is simply the shared secret, lowercase-hex-encoded. This method is of |
|
|
499 | course very insecure, unless TLS is used, which is why this module will |
|
|
500 | accept, but not generate, cleartext auth replies. |
|
|
501 | |
|
|
502 | =item hmac_md6_64_256 |
|
|
503 | |
|
|
504 | This method uses an MD6 HMAC with 64 bit blocksize and 256 bit hash. First, the shared secret |
|
|
505 | is hashed with MD6: |
|
|
506 | |
|
|
507 | key = MD6 (secret) |
|
|
508 | |
|
|
509 | This secret is then used to generate the "local auth reply", by taking |
|
|
510 | the two local greeting lines and the two remote greeting lines (without |
|
|
511 | line endings), appending \012 to all of them, concatenating them and |
|
|
512 | calculating the MD6 HMAC with the key. |
|
|
513 | |
|
|
514 | lauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012" |
|
|
515 | |
|
|
516 | This authentication token is then lowercase-hex-encoded and sent to the |
|
|
517 | other side. |
|
|
518 | |
|
|
519 | Then the remote auth reply is generated using the same method, but local |
|
|
520 | and remote greeting lines swapped: |
|
|
521 | |
|
|
522 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
|
|
523 | |
|
|
524 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
|
|
525 | |
|
|
526 | =item tls |
|
|
527 | |
|
|
528 | This type is only valid iff TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake |
|
|
529 | was successful. It has no authentication data, as the server/client |
|
|
530 | certificate was successfully verified. |
|
|
531 | |
|
|
532 | Implementations supporting TLS I<must> accept this authentication type. |
|
|
533 | |
|
|
534 | =back |
|
|
535 | |
| 433 | =item the authentication data |
536 | =item the authentication data |
| 434 | |
537 | |
| 435 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data. |
538 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
|
|
539 | above. |
| 436 | |
540 | |
| 437 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
541 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
| 438 | |
542 | |
| 439 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
543 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
| 440 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
544 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
| 441 | |
545 | |
| 442 | =back |
546 | =back |
| 443 | |
547 | |
| 444 | Example (the actual reply matching the previous example): |
548 | Example of an authentication reply: |
| 445 | |
549 | |
| 446 | hmac_md6_64_256;wIlLedBY956UCGSISG9mBZRDTG8xUi73/sVse2DSQp0;json |
550 | hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
| 447 | |
551 | |
| 448 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
552 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
| 449 | |
553 | |
| 450 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
554 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
| 451 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
555 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
| 452 | |
556 | |
|
|
557 | =head2 FULL EXAMPLE |
|
|
558 | |
|
|
559 | This is an actual protocol dump of a handshake, followed by a single data |
|
|
560 | packet. The greater than/less than lines indicate the direction of the |
|
|
561 | transfer only. |
|
|
562 | |
|
|
563 | > aemp;0;nndKd+gn;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
|
|
564 | > sRG8bbc4TDbkpvH8FTP4HBs87OhepH6VuApoZqXXskuG |
|
|
565 | < aemp;0;nmpKd+gh;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:58760 |
|
|
566 | < dCEUcL/LJVSTJcx8byEsOzrwhzJYOq+L3YcopA5T6EAo |
|
|
567 | > hmac_md6_64_256;9513d4b258975accfcb2ab7532b83690e9c119a502c612203332a591c7237788;json |
|
|
568 | < hmac_md6_64_256;0298d6ba2240faabb2b2e881cf86b97d70a113ca74a87dc006f9f1e9d3010f90;json |
|
|
569 | > ["","lookup","pinger","10.0.0.1:4040#nndKd+gn.a","resolved"] |
|
|
570 | |
| 453 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
571 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
| 454 | |
572 | |
| 455 | L<AnyEvent>. |
573 | L<AnyEvent>. |
| 456 | |
574 | |
| 457 | =head1 AUTHOR |
575 | =head1 AUTHOR |
