… | |
… | |
26 | |
26 | |
27 | use Scalar::Util; |
27 | use Scalar::Util; |
28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
29 | use Storable (); |
29 | use Storable (); |
30 | use JSON::XS (); |
30 | use JSON::XS (); |
|
|
31 | |
|
|
32 | use Digest::MD6 (); |
|
|
33 | use Digest::HMAC_MD6 (); |
31 | |
34 | |
32 | use AE (); |
35 | use AE (); |
33 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
36 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
34 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
37 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
35 | |
38 | |
… | |
… | |
126 | $self->{queue} = []; |
129 | $self->{queue} = []; |
127 | |
130 | |
128 | { |
131 | { |
129 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
132 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
130 | |
133 | |
131 | $arg{tls_ctx_disabled} ||= { |
|
|
132 | sslv2 => 0, |
|
|
133 | sslv3 => 0, |
|
|
134 | tlsv1 => 1, |
|
|
135 | verify => 1, |
|
|
136 | cert_file => "secret.pem", |
|
|
137 | ca_file => "secret.pem", |
|
|
138 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
|
|
139 | }; |
|
|
140 | |
|
|
141 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
134 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
142 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
135 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
|
|
136 | |
|
|
137 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
|
|
138 | |
|
|
139 | if ($secret =~ /-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----.*-----END CERTIFICATE-----/s) { |
|
|
140 | # assume TLS mode |
|
|
141 | $arg{tls_ctx} = { |
|
|
142 | sslv2 => 0, |
|
|
143 | sslv3 => 0, |
|
|
144 | tlsv1 => 1, |
|
|
145 | verify => 1, |
|
|
146 | cert => $secret, |
|
|
147 | ca_cert => $secret, |
|
|
148 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
|
|
149 | }; |
|
|
150 | } |
143 | |
151 | |
144 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
152 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
145 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
153 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
146 | autocork => 1, |
154 | autocork => 1, |
147 | no_delay => 1, |
155 | no_delay => 1, |
… | |
… | |
149 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
157 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
150 | }, |
158 | }, |
151 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
159 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
152 | ; |
160 | ; |
153 | |
161 | |
154 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
|
|
155 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
162 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
156 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
163 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
157 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
164 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
158 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
165 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
159 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
166 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
… | |
… | |
217 | |
224 | |
218 | # read nonce |
225 | # read nonce |
219 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
226 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
220 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
227 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
221 | |
228 | |
|
|
229 | "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2" ne "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2" # echo attack? |
|
|
230 | or return $self->error ("authentication error, echo attack?"); |
|
|
231 | |
|
|
232 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 $secret; |
|
|
233 | my $lauth; |
|
|
234 | |
222 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
235 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
223 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
236 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
224 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
237 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
|
|
238 | $s_auth = "tls"; |
|
|
239 | $lauth = ""; |
|
|
240 | } else { |
|
|
241 | # we currently only support hmac_md6_64_256 |
|
|
242 | $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256; |
225 | } |
243 | } |
226 | |
|
|
227 | # auth |
|
|
228 | require Digest::MD6; |
|
|
229 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
|
|
230 | |
|
|
231 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 ($secret); |
|
|
232 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
|
|
233 | |
|
|
234 | my $rauth = |
|
|
235 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
|
|
236 | : $s_auth eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
237 | : die; |
|
|
238 | |
|
|
239 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
|
|
240 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
|
|
241 | |
244 | |
242 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
245 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
243 | |
246 | |
244 | # reasd the authentication response |
247 | # read the authentication response |
245 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
248 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
246 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
249 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
247 | |
250 | |
248 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
251 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
|
|
252 | |
|
|
253 | my $rauth = |
|
|
254 | $auth_method eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256 |
|
|
255 | : $auth_method eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
256 | : $auth_method eq "tls" ? ($self->{tls} ? "" : "\012\012") # \012\012 never matches |
|
|
257 | : return $self->error ("$auth_method: fatal, selected unsupported auth method"); |
249 | |
258 | |
250 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
259 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
251 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
260 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
252 | } |
261 | } |
253 | |
262 | |
… | |
… | |
261 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
270 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
262 | |
271 | |
263 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
272 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
264 | for @$queue; |
273 | for @$queue; |
265 | |
274 | |
266 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
275 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
267 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
276 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
268 | |
277 | |
269 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
278 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
270 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
279 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
271 | }; |
280 | }; |
… | |
… | |
280 | |
289 | |
281 | sub error { |
290 | sub error { |
282 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
291 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
283 | |
292 | |
284 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
293 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
|
|
294 | #TODO: store error, but do not instantly fail |
|
|
295 | $self->{node}->fail (transport_error => $self->{node}{noderef}, $msg); |
285 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
296 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
286 | } |
297 | } |
287 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
298 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
288 | $self->destroy; |
299 | $self->destroy; |
289 | } |
300 | } |
… | |
… | |
326 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
337 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
327 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
338 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
328 | |
339 | |
329 | =head2 GREETING |
340 | =head2 GREETING |
330 | |
341 | |
|
|
342 | All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, |
|
|
343 | including delimiter. Afterwards there is no limit on the packet size that |
|
|
344 | can be received. |
|
|
345 | |
|
|
346 | =head3 First Greeting Line |
|
|
347 | |
|
|
348 | Example: |
|
|
349 | |
|
|
350 | aemp;0;fec.4a7720fc;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0 |
|
|
351 | |
331 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
352 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
332 | characters. The first even ixtrings are fixed by the protocol, the |
353 | characters. The first even ixtrings are fixed by the protocol, the |
333 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
354 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
334 | characters themselves. |
355 | characters themselves. |
335 | |
356 | |
336 | All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, including delimiter. |
|
|
337 | |
|
|
338 | The fixed strings are: |
357 | The fixed strings are: |
339 | |
358 | |
340 | =over 4 |
359 | =over 4 |
341 | |
360 | |
342 | =item C<aemp> |
361 | =item protocol identification |
343 | |
362 | |
344 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
363 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
345 | |
364 | |
346 | =item protocol version |
365 | =item protocol version |
347 | |
366 | |
348 | The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
367 | The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
349 | versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
368 | versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
350 | are supposed to be handled by addign additional key-value pairs. |
369 | are supposed to be handled through additional key-value pairs. |
351 | |
370 | |
352 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
371 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
353 | |
372 | |
354 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
373 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
355 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
374 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
… | |
… | |
396 | |
415 | |
397 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
416 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
398 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
417 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
399 | |
418 | |
400 | =back |
419 | =back |
|
|
420 | |
|
|
421 | =head3 Second Greeting Line |
401 | |
422 | |
402 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
423 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
403 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
424 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
404 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
425 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
405 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
426 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
406 | characters. |
427 | characters. |
407 | |
428 | |
408 | Example of the two lines of greeting: |
429 | I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
|
|
430 | B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
409 | |
431 | |
410 | aemp;0;fec.4a7720fc;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0 |
432 | Example of a nonce line: |
|
|
433 | |
411 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
434 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
412 | |
435 | |
413 | =head2 TLS handshake |
436 | =head2 TLS handshake |
414 | |
437 | |
415 | If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
438 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
416 | connection I<must> use TLS, or fail. |
439 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail. >> |
417 | |
440 | |
418 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
441 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
419 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
442 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
420 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
443 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
421 | |
444 | |
… | |
… | |
466 | |
489 | |
467 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
490 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
468 | |
491 | |
469 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
492 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
470 | |
493 | |
|
|
494 | =item tls |
|
|
495 | |
|
|
496 | This type is only valid iff TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake |
|
|
497 | was successful. It has no authentication data, as the server/client |
|
|
498 | certificate was successfully verified. |
|
|
499 | |
|
|
500 | Implementations supporting TLS I<must> accept this authentication type. |
|
|
501 | |
471 | =back |
502 | =back |
472 | |
503 | |
473 | =item the authentication data |
504 | =item the authentication data |
474 | |
505 | |
475 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
506 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
… | |
… | |
480 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
511 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
481 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
512 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
482 | |
513 | |
483 | =back |
514 | =back |
484 | |
515 | |
485 | Example: |
516 | Example of an authentication reply: |
486 | |
517 | |
487 | hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
518 | hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
488 | |
519 | |
489 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
520 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
490 | |
521 | |
491 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
522 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
492 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
523 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
493 | |
524 | |
|
|
525 | =head2 FULL EXAMPLE |
|
|
526 | |
|
|
527 | This is an actual protocol dump of a handshake, followed by a single data |
|
|
528 | packet. The greater than/less than lines indicate the direction of the |
|
|
529 | transfer only. |
|
|
530 | |
|
|
531 | > aemp;0;nndKd+gn;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
|
|
532 | > sRG8bbc4TDbkpvH8FTP4HBs87OhepH6VuApoZqXXskuG |
|
|
533 | < aemp;0;nmpKd+gh;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:58760 |
|
|
534 | < dCEUcL/LJVSTJcx8byEsOzrwhzJYOq+L3YcopA5T6EAo |
|
|
535 | > hmac_md6_64_256;9513d4b258975accfcb2ab7532b83690e9c119a502c612203332a591c7237788;json |
|
|
536 | < hmac_md6_64_256;0298d6ba2240faabb2b2e881cf86b97d70a113ca74a87dc006f9f1e9d3010f90;json |
|
|
537 | > ["","lookup","pinger","10.0.0.1:4040#nndKd+gn.a","resolved"] |
|
|
538 | |
494 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
539 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
495 | |
540 | |
496 | L<AnyEvent>. |
541 | L<AnyEvent>. |
497 | |
542 | |
498 | =head1 AUTHOR |
543 | =head1 AUTHOR |