… | |
… | |
26 | |
26 | |
27 | use Scalar::Util; |
27 | use Scalar::Util; |
28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
29 | use Storable (); |
29 | use Storable (); |
30 | use JSON::XS (); |
30 | use JSON::XS (); |
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31 | |
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32 | use Digest::MD6 (); |
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33 | use Digest::HMAC_MD6 (); |
31 | |
34 | |
32 | use AE (); |
35 | use AE (); |
33 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
36 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
34 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
37 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
35 | |
38 | |
… | |
… | |
126 | $self->{queue} = []; |
129 | $self->{queue} = []; |
127 | |
130 | |
128 | { |
131 | { |
129 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
132 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
130 | |
133 | |
131 | $arg{tls_ctx_disabled} ||= { |
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132 | sslv2 => 0, |
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133 | sslv3 => 0, |
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134 | tlsv1 => 1, |
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135 | verify => 1, |
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136 | cert_file => "secret.pem", |
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137 | ca_file => "secret.pem", |
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138 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
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139 | }; |
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140 | |
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141 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
134 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
142 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
135 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
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136 | |
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137 | $arg{timeout} = 30 |
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138 | unless exists $arg{timeout}; |
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139 | |
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140 | my $keepalive = (int $arg{timeout} * 0.75) || 1; |
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141 | |
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142 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
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143 | |
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144 | if ($secret =~ /-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----.*-----END CERTIFICATE-----/s) { |
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145 | # assume TLS mode |
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146 | $arg{tls_ctx} = { |
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147 | sslv2 => 0, |
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148 | sslv3 => 0, |
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149 | tlsv1 => 1, |
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150 | verify => 1, |
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151 | cert => $secret, |
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152 | ca_cert => $secret, |
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153 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
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154 | }; |
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155 | } |
143 | |
156 | |
144 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
157 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
145 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
158 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
146 | autocork => 1, |
159 | autocork => 1, |
147 | no_delay => 1, |
160 | no_delay => 1, |
148 | on_error => sub { |
161 | on_error => sub { |
149 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
162 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
150 | }, |
163 | }, |
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164 | timeout => $AnyEvent::MP::Base::CONNECT_TIMEOUT, |
151 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
165 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
152 | ; |
166 | ; |
153 | |
167 | |
154 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
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155 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
168 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
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169 | |
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170 | $self->{local_node} = $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE; |
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171 | |
156 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
172 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
157 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
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158 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
173 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
159 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
174 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
|
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175 | $greeting_kv->{maxidle} = $keepalive; |
160 | |
176 | |
161 | # send greeting |
177 | # send greeting |
162 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
178 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
163 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
179 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
164 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
180 | . ";$self->{local_node}" |
165 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
181 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
166 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
182 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
167 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
183 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
168 | |
184 | |
169 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
185 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
… | |
… | |
217 | |
233 | |
218 | # read nonce |
234 | # read nonce |
219 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
235 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
220 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
236 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
221 | |
237 | |
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238 | "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2" ne "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2" # echo attack? |
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239 | or return $self->error ("authentication error, echo attack?"); |
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240 | |
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241 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 $secret; |
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242 | my $lauth; |
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243 | |
222 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
244 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
223 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
245 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
224 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
246 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
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247 | $s_auth = "tls"; |
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248 | $lauth = ""; |
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249 | } else { |
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250 | # we currently only support hmac_md6_64_256 |
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251 | $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256; |
225 | } |
252 | } |
226 | |
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227 | # auth |
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228 | require Digest::MD6; |
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229 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
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230 | |
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231 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 ($secret); |
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232 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
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233 | |
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234 | my $rauth = |
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235 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
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236 | : $s_auth eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
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237 | : die; |
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238 | |
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239 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
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240 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
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241 | |
253 | |
242 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
254 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
243 | |
255 | |
244 | # reasd the authentication response |
256 | # read the authentication response |
245 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
257 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
246 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
258 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
247 | |
259 | |
248 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
260 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
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261 | |
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262 | my $rauth = |
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263 | $auth_method eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256 |
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264 | : $auth_method eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
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265 | : $auth_method eq "tls" ? ($self->{tls} ? "" : "\012\012") # \012\012 never matches |
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266 | : return $self->error ("$auth_method: fatal, selected unsupported auth method"); |
249 | |
267 | |
250 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
268 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
251 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
269 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
252 | } |
270 | } |
253 | |
271 | |
254 | $self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
272 | $self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
255 | |
273 | |
256 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
274 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
257 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
275 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
258 | |
276 | |
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277 | $self->{hdl}->timeout ($self->{remote_greeting}{keepalive} + 5) |
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278 | if $self->{remote_greeting}{keepalive}; |
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279 | |
259 | $self->connected; |
280 | $self->connected; |
260 | |
281 | |
261 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
282 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
262 | |
283 | |
263 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
284 | $self->send ($_) |
264 | for @$queue; |
285 | for @$queue; |
265 | |
286 | |
266 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
287 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
267 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
288 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
268 | |
289 | |
269 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
290 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
270 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
291 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
271 | }; |
292 | }; |
… | |
… | |
280 | |
301 | |
281 | sub error { |
302 | sub error { |
282 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
303 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
283 | |
304 | |
284 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
305 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
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306 | #TODO: store error, but do not instantly fail |
285 | $self->{node}->fail (transport_error => $msg); |
307 | $self->{node}->fail (transport_error => $self->{node}{noderef}, $msg); |
286 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
308 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
287 | } |
309 | } |
288 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
310 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
289 | $self->destroy; |
311 | $self->destroy; |
290 | } |
312 | } |
291 | |
313 | |
292 | sub connected { |
314 | sub connected { |
293 | my ($self) = @_; |
315 | my ($self) = @_; |
294 | |
316 | |
|
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317 | if (ref $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SLAVE) { |
|
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318 | # first connect with a master node |
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319 | my $via = $self->{remote_node}; |
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320 | $via =~ s/,/!/g; |
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321 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE .= "\@$via"; |
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322 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE{$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE} = $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE{""}; |
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323 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SLAVE->(); |
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324 | } |
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325 | |
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326 | if ($self->{local_node} ne $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE) { |
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327 | # node changed its name since first greeting |
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328 | $self->send (["", iam => $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE]); |
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329 | } |
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330 | |
295 | my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Base::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
331 | my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Base::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
296 | Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
332 | Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
297 | $node->set_transport ($self); |
333 | $node->set_transport ($self); |
298 | } |
334 | } |
299 | |
335 | |
… | |
… | |
403 | |
439 | |
404 | =item tls=<major>.<minor> |
440 | =item tls=<major>.<minor> |
405 | |
441 | |
406 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
442 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
407 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
443 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
|
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444 | |
|
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445 | =item maxidle=<seconds> |
|
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446 | |
|
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447 | The maximum amount of time the node will not sent data, i.e., idle. This |
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448 | can be used to close the conenction when no data has been received for a |
|
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449 | too-long time (say, maxidle + 5 seconds). |
408 | |
450 | |
409 | =back |
451 | =back |
410 | |
452 | |
411 | =head3 Second Greeting Line |
453 | =head3 Second Greeting Line |
412 | |
454 | |
… | |
… | |
424 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
466 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
425 | |
467 | |
426 | =head2 TLS handshake |
468 | =head2 TLS handshake |
427 | |
469 | |
428 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
470 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
429 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail.>> |
471 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail. >> |
430 | |
472 | |
431 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
473 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
432 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
474 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
433 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
475 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
434 | |
476 | |
… | |
… | |
478 | and remote greeting lines swapped: |
520 | and remote greeting lines swapped: |
479 | |
521 | |
480 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
522 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
481 | |
523 | |
482 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
524 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
|
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525 | |
|
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526 | =item tls |
|
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527 | |
|
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528 | This type is only valid iff TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake |
|
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529 | was successful. It has no authentication data, as the server/client |
|
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530 | certificate was successfully verified. |
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531 | |
|
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532 | Implementations supporting TLS I<must> accept this authentication type. |
483 | |
533 | |
484 | =back |
534 | =back |
485 | |
535 | |
486 | =item the authentication data |
536 | =item the authentication data |
487 | |
537 | |