| 1 | =head1 NAME |
1 | =head1 NAME |
| 2 | |
2 | |
| 3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol |
3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol handler |
| 4 | |
4 | |
| 5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
| 6 | |
6 | |
| 7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
| 8 | |
8 | |
| 9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
| 10 | |
10 | |
| 11 | This is the superclass for MP transports, most of which is considered an |
11 | This implements the actual transport protocol for MP (it represents a |
| 12 | implementation detail. |
12 | single link), most of which is considered an implementation detail. |
| 13 | |
13 | |
| 14 | Future versions might document the actual protocol. |
14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
|
|
15 | this protocol. |
| 15 | |
16 | |
| 16 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
| 17 | |
18 | |
| 18 | =over 4 |
19 | =over 4 |
| 19 | |
20 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 30 | |
31 | |
| 31 | use AE (); |
32 | use AE (); |
| 32 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
33 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
| 33 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
34 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
| 34 | |
35 | |
| 35 | use AnyEvent::MP::Util (); |
|
|
| 36 | |
|
|
| 37 | use base Exporter::; |
36 | use base Exporter::; |
| 38 | |
37 | |
| 39 | our $VERSION = '0.0'; |
38 | our $VERSION = '0.0'; |
| 40 | our $PROTOCOL_VERSION = 0; |
39 | our $PROTOCOL_VERSION = 0; |
| 41 | |
40 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 44 | Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
43 | Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
| 45 | C<AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server>. |
44 | C<AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server>. |
| 46 | |
45 | |
| 47 | See C<new>, below, for constructor arguments. |
46 | See C<new>, below, for constructor arguments. |
| 48 | |
47 | |
| 49 | Defaults for peerhost, peerport, fh and tls are provided. |
48 | Defaults for peerhost, peerport and fh are provided. |
| 50 | |
49 | |
| 51 | =cut |
50 | =cut |
| 52 | |
51 | |
| 53 | sub mp_server($$@) { |
52 | sub mp_server($$@) { |
| 54 | my $cb = pop; |
53 | my $cb = pop; |
| … | |
… | |
| 59 | |
58 | |
| 60 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
59 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
| 61 | fh => $fh, |
60 | fh => $fh, |
| 62 | peerhost => $host, |
61 | peerhost => $host, |
| 63 | peerport => $port, |
62 | peerport => $port, |
| 64 | tls => "accept", |
|
|
| 65 | @args, |
63 | @args, |
| 66 | ); |
64 | ); |
| 67 | } |
65 | } |
| 68 | } |
66 | } |
| 69 | |
67 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 83 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
81 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
| 84 | fh => $fh, |
82 | fh => $fh, |
| 85 | peername => $host, |
83 | peername => $host, |
| 86 | peerhost => $nhost, |
84 | peerhost => $nhost, |
| 87 | peerport => $nport, |
85 | peerport => $nport, |
| 88 | tls => "accept", |
|
|
| 89 | @args, |
86 | @args, |
| 90 | ); |
87 | ); |
| 91 | } |
88 | } |
| 92 | } |
89 | } |
| 93 | |
90 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 106 | on_eof => sub { clean-close-callback }, |
103 | on_eof => sub { clean-close-callback }, |
| 107 | on_connect => sub { successful-connect-callback }, |
104 | on_connect => sub { successful-connect-callback }, |
| 108 | greeting => { key => value }, |
105 | greeting => { key => value }, |
| 109 | |
106 | |
| 110 | # tls support |
107 | # tls support |
| 111 | tls => "accept|connect", |
|
|
| 112 | tls_ctx => AnyEvent::TLS, |
108 | tls_ctx => AnyEvent::TLS, |
| 113 | peername => $peername, # for verification |
109 | peername => $peername, # for verification |
| 114 | ; |
110 | ; |
| 115 | |
111 | |
| 116 | =cut |
112 | =cut |
| 117 | |
113 | |
| 118 | our @FRAMING_WANT = qw(json storable);#d##TODO# |
114 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
|
|
115 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
|
|
116 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(cleartext)); # auth types we accept |
|
|
117 | |
|
|
118 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
|
|
119 | #}; |
| 119 | |
120 | |
| 120 | sub new { |
121 | sub new { |
| 121 | my ($class, %arg) = @_; |
122 | my ($class, %arg) = @_; |
| 122 | |
123 | |
| 123 | my $self = bless \%arg, $class; |
124 | my $self = bless \%arg, $class; |
| … | |
… | |
| 125 | $self->{queue} = []; |
126 | $self->{queue} = []; |
| 126 | |
127 | |
| 127 | { |
128 | { |
| 128 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
129 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
| 129 | |
130 | |
| 130 | if (exists $arg{connect}) { |
131 | $arg{tls_ctx_disabled} ||= { |
| 131 | $arg{tls} ||= "connect"; |
132 | sslv2 => 0, |
| 132 | $arg{tls_ctx} ||= { sslv2 => 0, sslv3 => 0, tlsv1 => 1, verify => 1 }; |
133 | sslv3 => 0, |
|
|
134 | tlsv1 => 1, |
|
|
135 | verify => 1, |
|
|
136 | cert_file => "secret.pem", |
|
|
137 | ca_file => "secret.pem", |
|
|
138 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
| 133 | } |
139 | }; |
| 134 | |
140 | |
| 135 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
141 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
| 136 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
142 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
| 137 | |
143 | |
| 138 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
144 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
| 139 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
145 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
| 140 | rbuf_max => 64 * 1024, |
|
|
| 141 | autocork => 1, |
146 | autocork => 1, |
| 142 | no_delay => 1, |
147 | no_delay => 1, |
| 143 | on_error => sub { |
148 | on_error => sub { |
| 144 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
149 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
| 145 | }, |
150 | }, |
| 146 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
151 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
| 147 | ; |
152 | ; |
| 148 | |
153 | |
| 149 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
154 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
| 150 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
155 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
| 151 | $greeting_kv->{"tls1.0"} ||= $arg{tls} |
156 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
| 152 | if exists $arg{tls} && $arg{tls_ctx}; |
157 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
| 153 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
158 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
|
|
159 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
| 154 | |
160 | |
| 155 | # send greeting |
161 | # send greeting |
| 156 | my $lgreeting = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" # version, min |
162 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
| 157 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
163 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
| 158 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
164 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
| 159 | . ";" . (MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), "") |
165 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
| 160 | . ";hmac_md6_64_256" # hardcoded atm. |
166 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
| 161 | . ";json" # hardcoded atm. |
|
|
| 162 | . ";$self->{peerhost};$self->{peerport}" |
|
|
| 163 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
167 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
| 164 | |
168 | |
|
|
169 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
|
|
170 | |
| 165 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting\012"); |
171 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
| 166 | |
172 | |
| 167 | # expect greeting |
173 | # expect greeting |
|
|
174 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (4 * 1024); |
| 168 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
175 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 169 | my $rgreeting = $_[1]; |
176 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
| 170 | |
177 | |
| 171 | my ($aemp, $version, $version_min, $uniq, $rnode, undef, $auth, $framing, $peerport, $peerhost, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting; |
178 | my ($aemp, $version, $uniq, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
| 172 | |
179 | |
| 173 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
180 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
| 174 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
181 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
| 175 | } elsif ($version_min > $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
182 | } elsif ($version != $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
| 176 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version_min .. $version)"); |
183 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version)"); |
| 177 | } elsif ($auth ne "hmac_md6_64_256") { |
|
|
| 178 | return $self->error ("unsupported auth method ($auth)"); |
|
|
| 179 | } elsif ($framing ne "json") { |
|
|
| 180 | return $self->error ("unsupported framing method ($auth)"); |
|
|
| 181 | } |
184 | } |
|
|
185 | |
|
|
186 | my $s_auth; |
|
|
187 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
|
|
188 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
|
|
189 | $s_auth = $auth_; |
|
|
190 | last; |
|
|
191 | } |
|
|
192 | } |
|
|
193 | |
|
|
194 | defined $s_auth |
|
|
195 | or return $self->error ("$auths: no common auth type supported"); |
|
|
196 | |
|
|
197 | die unless $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256"; # hardcoded atm. |
|
|
198 | |
|
|
199 | my $s_framing; |
|
|
200 | for my $framing_ (split /,/, $framings) { |
|
|
201 | if (grep $framing_ eq $_, @FRAMINGS) { |
|
|
202 | $s_framing = $framing_; |
|
|
203 | last; |
|
|
204 | } |
|
|
205 | } |
|
|
206 | |
|
|
207 | defined $s_framing |
|
|
208 | or return $self->error ("$framings: no common framing method supported"); |
| 182 | |
209 | |
| 183 | $self->{remote_uniq} = $uniq; |
210 | $self->{remote_uniq} = $uniq; |
| 184 | $self->{remote_node} = $rnode; |
211 | $self->{remote_node} = $rnode; |
| 185 | |
212 | |
| 186 | $self->{remote_greeting} = { |
213 | $self->{remote_greeting} = { |
| 187 | map /^([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?/ ? ($1 => $2) : (), |
214 | map /^([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?/ ? ($1 => $2) : (), |
| 188 | @kv |
215 | @kv |
| 189 | }; |
216 | }; |
| 190 | |
217 | |
| 191 | if (exists $self->{tls} and $self->{tls_ctx} and exists $self->{remote_greeting}{"tls1.0"}) { |
218 | # read nonce |
|
|
219 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
|
|
220 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
|
|
221 | |
| 192 | if ($self->{tls} ne $self->{remote_greeting}{"tls1.0"}) { |
222 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
| 193 | return $self->error ("TLS server/client mismatch"); |
223 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
|
|
224 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
| 194 | } |
225 | } |
| 195 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
|
|
| 196 | } |
226 | |
| 197 | |
|
|
| 198 | # auth |
227 | # auth |
| 199 | require Digest::MD6; |
228 | require Digest::MD6; |
| 200 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
229 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
| 201 | |
230 | |
| 202 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6_hex ($secret); |
231 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 ($secret); |
| 203 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$lgreeting\012$rgreeting", 64, 256); |
232 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
| 204 | my $rauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$rgreeting\012$lgreeting", 64, 256); |
|
|
| 205 | |
233 | |
|
|
234 | my $rauth = |
|
|
235 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
|
|
236 | : $s_auth eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
237 | : die; |
|
|
238 | |
| 206 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
239 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
| 207 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
240 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
| 208 | |
241 | |
| 209 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$auth;$lauth;$framing\012"); |
242 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
| 210 | |
243 | |
| 211 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (64); # enough for 44 reply bytes or so |
244 | # reasd the authentication response |
| 212 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
245 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 213 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
246 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
| 214 | |
247 | |
| 215 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
248 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
| 216 | |
249 | |
| 217 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
250 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
| 218 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
251 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
| 219 | } |
252 | } |
| 220 | |
253 | |
| 221 | $self->{s_framing} = "json";#d# |
254 | $self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
| 222 | |
255 | |
| 223 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
256 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
| 224 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
257 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
| 225 | |
258 | |
| 226 | $self->connected; |
259 | $self->connected; |
| 227 | |
260 | |
|
|
261 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
|
|
262 | |
| 228 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
263 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
| 229 | for @$queue; |
264 | for @$queue; |
| 230 | |
265 | |
| 231 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
266 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
| 232 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
267 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
| 233 | |
268 | |
|
|
269 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
| 234 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject ($_[1]); |
270 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
| 235 | }; |
271 | }; |
| 236 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
272 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
|
|
273 | }); |
| 237 | }); |
274 | }); |
| 238 | }); |
275 | }); |
| 239 | } |
276 | } |
| 240 | |
277 | |
| 241 | $self |
278 | $self |
| … | |
… | |
| 245 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
282 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
| 246 | |
283 | |
| 247 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
284 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
| 248 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
285 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
| 249 | } |
286 | } |
| 250 | # $self->{on_error}($self, $msg); |
287 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
| 251 | $self->destroy; |
288 | $self->destroy; |
| 252 | } |
289 | } |
| 253 | |
290 | |
| 254 | sub connected { |
291 | sub connected { |
| 255 | my ($self) = @_; |
292 | my ($self) = @_; |
| … | |
… | |
| 276 | $self->destroy; |
313 | $self->destroy; |
| 277 | } |
314 | } |
| 278 | |
315 | |
| 279 | =back |
316 | =back |
| 280 | |
317 | |
|
|
318 | =head1 PROTOCOL |
|
|
319 | |
|
|
320 | The protocol is relatively simple, and consists of three phases which are |
|
|
321 | symmetrical for both sides: greeting (followed by optionally switching to |
|
|
322 | TLS mode), authentication and packet exchange. |
|
|
323 | |
|
|
324 | the protocol is designed to allow both full-text and binary streams. |
|
|
325 | |
|
|
326 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
|
|
327 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
|
|
328 | |
|
|
329 | =head2 GREETING |
|
|
330 | |
|
|
331 | All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, |
|
|
332 | including delimiter. Afterwards there is no limit on the packet size that |
|
|
333 | can be received. |
|
|
334 | |
|
|
335 | =head3 First Greeting Line |
|
|
336 | |
|
|
337 | Example: |
|
|
338 | |
|
|
339 | aemp;0;fec.4a7720fc;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0 |
|
|
340 | |
|
|
341 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
|
|
342 | characters. The first even ixtrings are fixed by the protocol, the |
|
|
343 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
|
|
344 | characters themselves. |
|
|
345 | |
|
|
346 | The fixed strings are: |
|
|
347 | |
|
|
348 | =over 4 |
|
|
349 | |
|
|
350 | =item C<aemp> |
|
|
351 | |
|
|
352 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
|
|
353 | |
|
|
354 | =item protocol version |
|
|
355 | |
|
|
356 | The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
|
|
357 | versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
|
|
358 | are supposed to be handled by addign additional key-value pairs. |
|
|
359 | |
|
|
360 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
|
|
361 | |
|
|
362 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
|
|
363 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
|
|
364 | no meaning of the contents are assumed. |
|
|
365 | |
|
|
366 | =item the node endpoint descriptors |
|
|
367 | |
|
|
368 | for public nodes, this is a comma-separated list of protocol endpoints, |
|
|
369 | i.e., the noderef. For slave nodes, this is a unique identifier. |
|
|
370 | |
|
|
371 | =item the acceptable authentication methods |
|
|
372 | |
|
|
373 | A comma-separated list of authentication methods supported by the |
|
|
374 | node. Note that AnyEvent::MP supports a C<hex_secret> authentication |
|
|
375 | method that accepts a cleartext password (hex-encoded), but will not use |
|
|
376 | this auth method itself. |
|
|
377 | |
|
|
378 | The receiving side should choose the first auth method it supports. |
|
|
379 | |
|
|
380 | =item the acceptable framing formats |
|
|
381 | |
|
|
382 | A comma-separated list of packet encoding/framign formats understood. The |
|
|
383 | receiving side should choose the first framing format it supports for |
|
|
384 | sending packets (which might be different from the format it has to accept). |
|
|
385 | |
|
|
386 | =back |
|
|
387 | |
|
|
388 | The remaining arguments are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. The following key-value |
|
|
389 | pairs are known at this time: |
|
|
390 | |
|
|
391 | =over 4 |
|
|
392 | |
|
|
393 | =item provider=<module-version> |
|
|
394 | |
|
|
395 | The software provider for this implementation. For AnyEvent::MP, this is |
|
|
396 | C<AE-0.0> or whatever version it currently is at. |
|
|
397 | |
|
|
398 | =item peeraddr=<host>:<port> |
|
|
399 | |
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400 | The peer address (socket address of the other side) as seen locally, in the same format |
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401 | as noderef endpoints. |
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402 | |
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403 | =item tls=<major>.<minor> |
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404 | |
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405 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
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406 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
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407 | |
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408 | =back |
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409 | |
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410 | =head3 Second Greeting Line |
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411 | |
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412 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
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413 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
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414 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
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415 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
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416 | characters. |
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417 | |
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418 | I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
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419 | B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
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420 | |
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421 | Example of a nonce line: |
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422 | |
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423 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
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424 | |
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425 | =head2 TLS handshake |
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426 | |
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427 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
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428 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail.>> |
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429 | |
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430 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
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431 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
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432 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
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433 | |
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434 | =head2 AUTHENTICATION PHASE |
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435 | |
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436 | After the greeting is received (and the optional TLS handshake), |
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437 | the authentication phase begins, which consists of sending a single |
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438 | C<;>-separated line with three fixed strings and any number of |
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439 | C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. |
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440 | |
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441 | The three fixed strings are: |
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442 | |
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443 | =over 4 |
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444 | |
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445 | =item the authentication method chosen |
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446 | |
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447 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
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448 | |
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449 | The currently supported authentication methods are: |
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450 | |
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451 | =over 4 |
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452 | |
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453 | =item cleartext |
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454 | |
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455 | This is simply the shared secret, lowercase-hex-encoded. This method is of |
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456 | course very insecure, unless TLS is used, which is why this module will |
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457 | accept, but not generate, cleartext auth replies. |
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458 | |
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459 | =item hmac_md6_64_256 |
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460 | |
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461 | This method uses an MD6 HMAC with 64 bit blocksize and 256 bit hash. First, the shared secret |
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462 | is hashed with MD6: |
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463 | |
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464 | key = MD6 (secret) |
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465 | |
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466 | This secret is then used to generate the "local auth reply", by taking |
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467 | the two local greeting lines and the two remote greeting lines (without |
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468 | line endings), appending \012 to all of them, concatenating them and |
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469 | calculating the MD6 HMAC with the key. |
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470 | |
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471 | lauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012" |
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472 | |
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473 | This authentication token is then lowercase-hex-encoded and sent to the |
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474 | other side. |
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475 | |
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476 | Then the remote auth reply is generated using the same method, but local |
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477 | and remote greeting lines swapped: |
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478 | |
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479 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
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480 | |
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481 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
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482 | |
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483 | =back |
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484 | |
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485 | =item the authentication data |
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486 | |
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487 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
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488 | above. |
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489 | |
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490 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
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491 | |
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492 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
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493 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
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494 | |
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495 | =back |
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496 | |
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497 | Example of an authentication reply: |
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498 | |
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499 | hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
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500 | |
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501 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
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502 | |
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503 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
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504 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
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505 | |
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506 | =head2 FULL EXAMPLE |
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507 | |
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508 | This is an actual protocol dump of a handshake, followed by a single data |
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509 | packet. The greater than/less than lines indicate the direction of the |
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510 | transfer only. |
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511 | |
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512 | > aemp;0;nndKd+gn;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
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513 | > sRG8bbc4TDbkpvH8FTP4HBs87OhepH6VuApoZqXXskuG |
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514 | < aemp;0;nmpKd+gh;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:58760 |
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515 | < dCEUcL/LJVSTJcx8byEsOzrwhzJYOq+L3YcopA5T6EAo |
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516 | > hmac_md6_64_256;9513d4b258975accfcb2ab7532b83690e9c119a502c612203332a591c7237788;json |
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517 | < hmac_md6_64_256;0298d6ba2240faabb2b2e881cf86b97d70a113ca74a87dc006f9f1e9d3010f90;json |
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518 | > ["","wkp","pinger","10.0.0.1:4040#nndKd+gn.a","resolved"] |
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519 | |
| 281 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
520 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
| 282 | |
521 | |
| 283 | L<AnyEvent>. |
522 | L<AnyEvent>. |
| 284 | |
523 | |
| 285 | =head1 AUTHOR |
524 | =head1 AUTHOR |
