| 1 | =head1 NAME |
1 | =head1 NAME |
| 2 | |
2 | |
| 3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol |
3 | AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol handler |
| 4 | |
4 | |
| 5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
5 | =head1 SYNOPSIS |
| 6 | |
6 | |
| 7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
7 | use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
| 8 | |
8 | |
| 9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
9 | =head1 DESCRIPTION |
| 10 | |
10 | |
| 11 | This is the superclass for MP transports, most of which is considered an |
11 | This implements the actual transport protocol for MP (it represents a |
| 12 | implementation detail. |
12 | single link), most of which is considered an implementation detail. |
| 13 | |
13 | |
| 14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
14 | See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
| 15 | this protocol. |
15 | this protocol. |
| 16 | |
16 | |
| 17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
17 | =head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
| … | |
… | |
| 27 | use Scalar::Util; |
27 | use Scalar::Util; |
| 28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
28 | use MIME::Base64 (); |
| 29 | use Storable (); |
29 | use Storable (); |
| 30 | use JSON::XS (); |
30 | use JSON::XS (); |
| 31 | |
31 | |
|
|
32 | use Digest::MD6 (); |
|
|
33 | use Digest::HMAC_MD6 (); |
|
|
34 | |
| 32 | use AE (); |
35 | use AE (); |
| 33 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
36 | use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
| 34 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
37 | use AnyEvent::Handle (); |
| 35 | |
38 | |
| 36 | use base Exporter::; |
39 | use base Exporter::; |
| … | |
… | |
| 43 | Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
46 | Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
| 44 | C<AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server>. |
47 | C<AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server>. |
| 45 | |
48 | |
| 46 | See C<new>, below, for constructor arguments. |
49 | See C<new>, below, for constructor arguments. |
| 47 | |
50 | |
| 48 | Defaults for peerhost, peerport, fh and tls are provided. |
51 | Defaults for peerhost, peerport and fh are provided. |
| 49 | |
52 | |
| 50 | =cut |
53 | =cut |
| 51 | |
54 | |
| 52 | sub mp_server($$@) { |
55 | sub mp_server($$@) { |
| 53 | my $cb = pop; |
56 | my $cb = pop; |
| … | |
… | |
| 58 | |
61 | |
| 59 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
62 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
| 60 | fh => $fh, |
63 | fh => $fh, |
| 61 | peerhost => $host, |
64 | peerhost => $host, |
| 62 | peerport => $port, |
65 | peerport => $port, |
| 63 | tls => "accept", |
|
|
| 64 | @args, |
66 | @args, |
| 65 | ); |
67 | ); |
| 66 | } |
68 | } |
| 67 | } |
69 | } |
| 68 | |
70 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 82 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
84 | $cb->(new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
| 83 | fh => $fh, |
85 | fh => $fh, |
| 84 | peername => $host, |
86 | peername => $host, |
| 85 | peerhost => $nhost, |
87 | peerhost => $nhost, |
| 86 | peerport => $nport, |
88 | peerport => $nport, |
| 87 | tls => "accept", |
|
|
| 88 | @args, |
89 | @args, |
| 89 | ); |
90 | ); |
| 90 | } |
91 | } |
| 91 | } |
92 | } |
| 92 | |
93 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 105 | on_eof => sub { clean-close-callback }, |
106 | on_eof => sub { clean-close-callback }, |
| 106 | on_connect => sub { successful-connect-callback }, |
107 | on_connect => sub { successful-connect-callback }, |
| 107 | greeting => { key => value }, |
108 | greeting => { key => value }, |
| 108 | |
109 | |
| 109 | # tls support |
110 | # tls support |
| 110 | tls => "accept|connect", |
|
|
| 111 | tls_ctx => AnyEvent::TLS, |
111 | tls_ctx => AnyEvent::TLS, |
| 112 | peername => $peername, # for verification |
112 | peername => $peername, # for verification |
| 113 | ; |
113 | ; |
| 114 | |
114 | |
| 115 | =cut |
115 | =cut |
| 116 | |
116 | |
| 117 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
117 | our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
| 118 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
118 | our @AUTH_SND = qw(hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
| 119 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(hex_secret)); # auth types we accept |
119 | our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(cleartext)); # auth types we accept |
| 120 | |
120 | |
| 121 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
121 | #AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
| 122 | #}; |
122 | #}; |
| 123 | |
123 | |
| 124 | sub new { |
124 | sub new { |
| … | |
… | |
| 129 | $self->{queue} = []; |
129 | $self->{queue} = []; |
| 130 | |
130 | |
| 131 | { |
131 | { |
| 132 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
132 | Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
| 133 | |
133 | |
| 134 | if (exists $arg{connect}) { |
|
|
| 135 | $arg{tls_ctx} ||= { sslv2 => 0, sslv3 => 0, tlsv1 => 1, verify => 1 }; |
|
|
| 136 | } |
|
|
| 137 | |
|
|
| 138 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
134 | $arg{secret} = AnyEvent::MP::Base::default_secret () |
| 139 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
135 | unless exists $arg{secret}; |
| 140 | |
136 | |
|
|
137 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
|
|
138 | |
|
|
139 | if ($secret =~ /-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----.*-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----.*-----END CERTIFICATE-----/s) { |
|
|
140 | # assume TLS mode |
|
|
141 | $arg{tls_ctx} = { |
|
|
142 | sslv2 => 0, |
|
|
143 | sslv3 => 0, |
|
|
144 | tlsv1 => 1, |
|
|
145 | verify => 1, |
|
|
146 | cert => $secret, |
|
|
147 | ca_cert => $secret, |
|
|
148 | verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
|
|
149 | }; |
|
|
150 | } |
|
|
151 | |
| 141 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
152 | $self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
| 142 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
153 | fh => delete $arg{fh}, |
| 143 | rbuf_max => 64 * 1024, |
|
|
| 144 | autocork => 1, |
154 | autocork => 1, |
| 145 | no_delay => 1, |
155 | no_delay => 1, |
| 146 | on_error => sub { |
156 | on_error => sub { |
| 147 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
157 | $self->error ($_[2]); |
| 148 | }, |
158 | }, |
| 149 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
159 | peername => delete $arg{peername}, |
| 150 | ; |
160 | ; |
| 151 | |
161 | |
| 152 | my $secret = $arg{secret}; |
|
|
| 153 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
162 | my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
| 154 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
163 | $greeting_kv->{"tls"} = "1.0" |
| 155 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
164 | if $arg{tls_ctx}; |
| 156 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
165 | $greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$VERSION"; |
| 157 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
166 | $greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
| 158 | |
167 | |
|
|
168 | $self->{local_node} = $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE; |
|
|
169 | |
| 159 | # send greeting |
170 | # send greeting |
| 160 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" # version, min |
171 | my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
| 161 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
172 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::UNIQ" |
| 162 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
173 | . ";$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE" |
| 163 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
174 | . ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
| 164 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
175 | . ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
| 165 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
176 | . (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
|
|
177 | |
| 166 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
178 | my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Base::nonce (33), ""; |
| 167 | |
179 | |
| 168 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
180 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
| 169 | |
181 | |
| 170 | # expect greeting |
182 | # expect greeting |
|
|
183 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (4 * 1024); |
| 171 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
184 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 172 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
185 | my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
| 173 | |
186 | |
| 174 | my ($aemp, $version, $version_min, $uniq, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
187 | my ($aemp, $version, $uniq, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
| 175 | |
188 | |
| 176 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
189 | if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
| 177 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
190 | return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
| 178 | } elsif ($version_min > $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
191 | } elsif ($version != $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
| 179 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version_min .. $version)"); |
192 | return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version)"); |
| 180 | } |
193 | } |
| 181 | |
194 | |
| 182 | my $s_auth; |
195 | my $s_auth; |
| 183 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
196 | for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
| 184 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
197 | if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND) { |
| … | |
… | |
| 213 | |
226 | |
| 214 | # read nonce |
227 | # read nonce |
| 215 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
228 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 216 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
229 | my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
| 217 | |
230 | |
|
|
231 | "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2" ne "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2" # echo attack? |
|
|
232 | or return $self->error ("authentication error, echo attack?"); |
|
|
233 | |
|
|
234 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6 $secret; |
|
|
235 | my $lauth; |
|
|
236 | |
| 218 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{"tls"}) { |
237 | if ($self->{tls_ctx} and 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}) { |
| 219 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
238 | $self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
| 220 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
239 | $self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
|
|
240 | $s_auth = "tls"; |
|
|
241 | $lauth = ""; |
|
|
242 | } else { |
|
|
243 | # we currently only support hmac_md6_64_256 |
|
|
244 | $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256; |
| 221 | } |
245 | } |
| 222 | |
|
|
| 223 | # auth |
|
|
| 224 | require Digest::MD6; |
|
|
| 225 | require Digest::HMAC_MD6; |
|
|
| 226 | |
|
|
| 227 | my $key = Digest::MD6::md6_hex ($secret); |
|
|
| 228 | my $lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256); |
|
|
| 229 | |
|
|
| 230 | my $rauth = |
|
|
| 231 | $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_base64 ($key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256) |
|
|
| 232 | : $s_auth eq "hex_secret" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
| 233 | : die; |
|
|
| 234 | |
|
|
| 235 | $lauth ne $rauth # echo attack? |
|
|
| 236 | or return $self->error ("authentication error"); |
|
|
| 237 | |
246 | |
| 238 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
247 | $self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
| 239 | |
248 | |
| 240 | $self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (64); # enough for 44 reply bytes or so |
249 | # read the authentication response |
| 241 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
250 | $self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
| 242 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
251 | my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
| 243 | |
252 | |
| 244 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
253 | my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
|
|
254 | |
|
|
255 | my $rauth = |
|
|
256 | $auth_method eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256 |
|
|
257 | : $auth_method eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
|
|
258 | : $auth_method eq "tls" ? ($self->{tls} ? "" : "\012\012") # \012\012 never matches |
|
|
259 | : return $self->error ("$auth_method: fatal, selected unsupported auth method"); |
| 245 | |
260 | |
| 246 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
261 | if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
| 247 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
262 | return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
| 248 | } |
263 | } |
| 249 | |
264 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 252 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
267 | $hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
| 253 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
268 | my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
| 254 | |
269 | |
| 255 | $self->connected; |
270 | $self->connected; |
| 256 | |
271 | |
| 257 | $hdl->push_write ($self->{s_framing} => $_) |
272 | my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
|
|
273 | |
|
|
274 | $self->send ($_) |
| 258 | for @$queue; |
275 | for @$queue; |
| 259 | |
276 | |
| 260 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
277 | my $rmsg; $rmsg = sub { |
| 261 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
278 | $_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
| 262 | |
279 | |
|
|
280 | local $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
| 263 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject ($_[1]); |
281 | AnyEvent::MP::Base::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
| 264 | }; |
282 | }; |
| 265 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
283 | $hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
| 266 | }); |
284 | }); |
| 267 | }); |
285 | }); |
| 268 | }); |
286 | }); |
| … | |
… | |
| 273 | |
291 | |
| 274 | sub error { |
292 | sub error { |
| 275 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
293 | my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
| 276 | |
294 | |
| 277 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
295 | if ($self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self) { |
|
|
296 | #TODO: store error, but do not instantly fail |
|
|
297 | $self->{node}->fail (transport_error => $self->{node}{noderef}, $msg); |
| 278 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
298 | $self->{node}->clr_transport; |
| 279 | } |
299 | } |
| 280 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
300 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::WARN->("$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
| 281 | $self->destroy; |
301 | $self->destroy; |
| 282 | } |
302 | } |
| 283 | |
303 | |
| 284 | sub connected { |
304 | sub connected { |
| 285 | my ($self) = @_; |
305 | my ($self) = @_; |
| 286 | |
306 | |
|
|
307 | if (ref $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SLAVE) { |
|
|
308 | # first connect with a master node |
|
|
309 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE .= "\@$self->{remote_node}"; |
|
|
310 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE{$AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE} = $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE{""}; |
|
|
311 | $AnyEvent::MP::Base::SLAVE->(); |
|
|
312 | } |
|
|
313 | |
|
|
314 | if ($self->{local_node} ne $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE) { |
|
|
315 | # node changed its name since first greeting |
|
|
316 | $self->send (["", iam => $AnyEvent::MP::Base::NODE]); |
|
|
317 | } |
|
|
318 | |
| 287 | my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Base::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
319 | my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Base::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
| 288 | Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
320 | Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
| 289 | $node->set_transport ($self); |
321 | $node->set_transport ($self); |
| 290 | } |
322 | } |
| 291 | |
323 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 319 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
351 | The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
| 320 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
352 | CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
| 321 | |
353 | |
| 322 | =head2 GREETING |
354 | =head2 GREETING |
| 323 | |
355 | |
|
|
356 | All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, |
|
|
357 | including delimiter. Afterwards there is no limit on the packet size that |
|
|
358 | can be received. |
|
|
359 | |
|
|
360 | =head3 First Greeting Line |
|
|
361 | |
|
|
362 | Example: |
|
|
363 | |
|
|
364 | aemp;0;fec.4a7720fc;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0 |
|
|
365 | |
| 324 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
366 | The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
| 325 | characters. The first seven strings are fixed by the protocol, the |
367 | characters. The first even ixtrings are fixed by the protocol, the |
| 326 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
368 | remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
| 327 | characters themselves. |
369 | characters themselves. |
| 328 | |
370 | |
| 329 | The seven fixed strings are: |
371 | The fixed strings are: |
| 330 | |
372 | |
| 331 | =over 4 |
373 | =over 4 |
| 332 | |
374 | |
| 333 | =item C<aemp> |
375 | =item protocol identification |
| 334 | |
376 | |
| 335 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
377 | The constant C<aemp> to identify the protocol. |
| 336 | |
378 | |
| 337 | =item protocol version |
379 | =item protocol version |
| 338 | |
380 | |
| 339 | The (maximum) protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. |
|
|
| 340 | |
|
|
| 341 | =item minimum protocol version |
|
|
| 342 | |
|
|
| 343 | The minimum protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. |
381 | The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
|
|
382 | versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
|
|
383 | are supposed to be handled through additional key-value pairs. |
| 344 | |
384 | |
| 345 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
385 | =item a token uniquely identifying the current node instance |
| 346 | |
386 | |
| 347 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
387 | This is a string that must change between restarts. It usually contains |
| 348 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
388 | things like the current time, the (OS) process id or similar values, but |
| … | |
… | |
| 366 | |
406 | |
| 367 | A comma-separated list of packet encoding/framign formats understood. The |
407 | A comma-separated list of packet encoding/framign formats understood. The |
| 368 | receiving side should choose the first framing format it supports for |
408 | receiving side should choose the first framing format it supports for |
| 369 | sending packets (which might be different from the format it has to accept). |
409 | sending packets (which might be different from the format it has to accept). |
| 370 | |
410 | |
| 371 | =cut |
411 | =back |
| 372 | |
412 | |
| 373 | The remaining arguments are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. The following key-value |
413 | The remaining arguments are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. The following key-value |
| 374 | pairs are known at this time: |
414 | pairs are known at this time: |
| 375 | |
415 | |
| 376 | =over 4 |
416 | =over 4 |
| … | |
… | |
| 389 | |
429 | |
| 390 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
430 | Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
| 391 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
431 | wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
| 392 | |
432 | |
| 393 | =back |
433 | =back |
|
|
434 | |
|
|
435 | =head3 Second Greeting Line |
| 394 | |
436 | |
| 395 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
437 | After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
| 396 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
438 | cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
| 397 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
439 | protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
| 398 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
440 | it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
| 399 | characters. |
441 | characters. |
| 400 | |
442 | |
| 401 | Example of the two lines of greeting: |
443 | I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
|
|
444 | B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
| 402 | |
445 | |
| 403 | aemp;0;0;e7d.4a76f48f;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,hex_secret;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
446 | Example of a nonce line: |
| 404 | XntegV2Guvss0qNn7phCPnoU87xqxV+4Mqm/5y4iQm6a |
447 | |
|
|
448 | p/I122ql7kJR8lumW3lXlXCeBnyDAvz8NQo3x5IFowE4 |
| 405 | |
449 | |
| 406 | =head2 TLS handshake |
450 | =head2 TLS handshake |
| 407 | |
451 | |
| 408 | If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
452 | I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
| 409 | connection I<must> use TLS, or fail. |
453 | connection B<must> use TLS, or fail. >> |
| 410 | |
454 | |
| 411 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
455 | Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
| 412 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
456 | value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
| 413 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
457 | and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
| 414 | |
458 | |
| … | |
… | |
| 425 | |
469 | |
| 426 | =item the authentication method chosen |
470 | =item the authentication method chosen |
| 427 | |
471 | |
| 428 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
472 | This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
| 429 | |
473 | |
|
|
474 | The currently supported authentication methods are: |
|
|
475 | |
|
|
476 | =over 4 |
|
|
477 | |
|
|
478 | =item cleartext |
|
|
479 | |
|
|
480 | This is simply the shared secret, lowercase-hex-encoded. This method is of |
|
|
481 | course very insecure, unless TLS is used, which is why this module will |
|
|
482 | accept, but not generate, cleartext auth replies. |
|
|
483 | |
|
|
484 | =item hmac_md6_64_256 |
|
|
485 | |
|
|
486 | This method uses an MD6 HMAC with 64 bit blocksize and 256 bit hash. First, the shared secret |
|
|
487 | is hashed with MD6: |
|
|
488 | |
|
|
489 | key = MD6 (secret) |
|
|
490 | |
|
|
491 | This secret is then used to generate the "local auth reply", by taking |
|
|
492 | the two local greeting lines and the two remote greeting lines (without |
|
|
493 | line endings), appending \012 to all of them, concatenating them and |
|
|
494 | calculating the MD6 HMAC with the key. |
|
|
495 | |
|
|
496 | lauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012" |
|
|
497 | |
|
|
498 | This authentication token is then lowercase-hex-encoded and sent to the |
|
|
499 | other side. |
|
|
500 | |
|
|
501 | Then the remote auth reply is generated using the same method, but local |
|
|
502 | and remote greeting lines swapped: |
|
|
503 | |
|
|
504 | rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
|
|
505 | |
|
|
506 | This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
|
|
507 | |
|
|
508 | =item tls |
|
|
509 | |
|
|
510 | This type is only valid iff TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake |
|
|
511 | was successful. It has no authentication data, as the server/client |
|
|
512 | certificate was successfully verified. |
|
|
513 | |
|
|
514 | Implementations supporting TLS I<must> accept this authentication type. |
|
|
515 | |
|
|
516 | =back |
|
|
517 | |
| 430 | =item the authentication data |
518 | =item the authentication data |
| 431 | |
519 | |
| 432 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data. |
520 | The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
|
|
521 | above. |
| 433 | |
522 | |
| 434 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
523 | =item the framing protocol chosen |
| 435 | |
524 | |
| 436 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
525 | This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
| 437 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
526 | greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side. |
| 438 | |
527 | |
| 439 | =back |
528 | =back |
| 440 | |
529 | |
|
|
530 | Example of an authentication reply: |
|
|
531 | |
|
|
532 | hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
|
|
533 | |
| 441 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
534 | =head2 DATA PHASE |
| 442 | |
535 | |
| 443 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
536 | After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
| 444 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
537 | quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
| 445 | |
538 | |
|
|
539 | =head2 FULL EXAMPLE |
|
|
540 | |
|
|
541 | This is an actual protocol dump of a handshake, followed by a single data |
|
|
542 | packet. The greater than/less than lines indicate the direction of the |
|
|
543 | transfer only. |
|
|
544 | |
|
|
545 | > aemp;0;nndKd+gn;10.0.0.1:4040;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:1235 |
|
|
546 | > sRG8bbc4TDbkpvH8FTP4HBs87OhepH6VuApoZqXXskuG |
|
|
547 | < aemp;0;nmpKd+gh;127.0.0.1:1235,[::1]:1235;hmac_md6_64_256,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.0;peeraddr=127.0.0.1:58760 |
|
|
548 | < dCEUcL/LJVSTJcx8byEsOzrwhzJYOq+L3YcopA5T6EAo |
|
|
549 | > hmac_md6_64_256;9513d4b258975accfcb2ab7532b83690e9c119a502c612203332a591c7237788;json |
|
|
550 | < hmac_md6_64_256;0298d6ba2240faabb2b2e881cf86b97d70a113ca74a87dc006f9f1e9d3010f90;json |
|
|
551 | > ["","lookup","pinger","10.0.0.1:4040#nndKd+gn.a","resolved"] |
|
|
552 | |
| 446 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
553 | =head1 SEE ALSO |
| 447 | |
554 | |
| 448 | L<AnyEvent>. |
555 | L<AnyEvent>. |
| 449 | |
556 | |
| 450 | =head1 AUTHOR |
557 | =head1 AUTHOR |
