1 |
=head1 NAME |
2 |
|
3 |
AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol handler |
4 |
|
5 |
=head1 SYNOPSIS |
6 |
|
7 |
use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
8 |
|
9 |
=head1 DESCRIPTION |
10 |
|
11 |
This module implements (and documents) the actual transport protocol for |
12 |
AEMP. |
13 |
|
14 |
See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
15 |
this protocol. |
16 |
|
17 |
=head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
18 |
|
19 |
=over 4 |
20 |
|
21 |
=cut |
22 |
|
23 |
package AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
24 |
|
25 |
use common::sense; |
26 |
|
27 |
use Scalar::Util (); |
28 |
use List::Util (); |
29 |
use MIME::Base64 (); |
30 |
use Storable (); |
31 |
use JSON::XS (); |
32 |
|
33 |
use Digest::MD6 (); |
34 |
use Digest::HMAC_MD6 (); |
35 |
|
36 |
use AE (); |
37 |
use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
38 |
use AnyEvent::Handle 4.92 (); |
39 |
|
40 |
use AnyEvent::MP::Config (); |
41 |
|
42 |
our $PROTOCOL_VERSION = 0; |
43 |
|
44 |
=item $listener = mp_listener $host, $port, <constructor-args> |
45 |
|
46 |
Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
47 |
C<AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server>. |
48 |
|
49 |
See C<new>, below, for constructor arguments. |
50 |
|
51 |
Defaults for peerhost, peerport and fh are provided. |
52 |
|
53 |
=cut |
54 |
|
55 |
sub mp_server($$;%) { |
56 |
my ($host, $port, %arg) = @_; |
57 |
|
58 |
AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server $host, $port, sub { |
59 |
my ($fh, $host, $port) = @_; |
60 |
|
61 |
my $tp = new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
62 |
fh => $fh, |
63 |
peerhost => $host, |
64 |
peerport => $port, |
65 |
%arg, |
66 |
; |
67 |
$tp->{keepalive} = $tp; |
68 |
}, delete $arg{prepare} |
69 |
} |
70 |
|
71 |
=item $guard = mp_connect $host, $port, <constructor-args>, $cb->($transport) |
72 |
|
73 |
=cut |
74 |
|
75 |
sub mp_connect { |
76 |
my $release = pop; |
77 |
my ($host, $port, @args) = @_; |
78 |
|
79 |
my $state; |
80 |
|
81 |
$state = AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_connect $host, $port, my$x=sub { |
82 |
my ($fh, $nhost, $nport) = @_; |
83 |
|
84 |
return $release->() unless $fh; |
85 |
|
86 |
$state = new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
87 |
fh => $fh, |
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peername => $host, |
89 |
peerhost => $nhost, |
90 |
peerport => $nport, |
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release => $release, |
92 |
@args, |
93 |
; |
94 |
}; |
95 |
|
96 |
\$state |
97 |
} |
98 |
|
99 |
=item new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
100 |
|
101 |
# immediately starts negotiation |
102 |
my $transport = new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
103 |
# mandatory |
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fh => $filehandle, |
105 |
local_id => $identifier, |
106 |
on_recv => sub { receive-callback }, |
107 |
on_error => sub { error-callback }, |
108 |
|
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# optional |
110 |
on_eof => sub { clean-close-callback }, |
111 |
on_connect => sub { successful-connect-callback }, |
112 |
greeting => { key => value }, |
113 |
|
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# tls support |
115 |
tls_ctx => AnyEvent::TLS, |
116 |
peername => $peername, # for verification |
117 |
; |
118 |
|
119 |
=cut |
120 |
|
121 |
sub LATENCY() { 5 } # assumed max. network latency |
122 |
|
123 |
our @FRAMINGS = qw(json storable); # the framing types we accept and send, in order of preference |
124 |
our @AUTH_SND = qw(tls_md6_64_256 hmac_md6_64_256); # auth types we send |
125 |
our @AUTH_RCV = (@AUTH_SND, qw(tls_anon cleartext)); # auth types we accept |
126 |
|
127 |
#AnyEvent::Handle::register_write_type mp_record => sub { |
128 |
#}; |
129 |
|
130 |
sub new { |
131 |
my ($class, %arg) = @_; |
132 |
|
133 |
my $self = bless \%arg, $class; |
134 |
|
135 |
$self->{queue} = []; |
136 |
|
137 |
{ |
138 |
Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
139 |
|
140 |
my $config = AnyEvent::MP::Config::config; |
141 |
|
142 |
my $latency = $config->{network_latency} || LATENCY; |
143 |
|
144 |
$self->{secret} = $config->{secret} |
145 |
unless exists $self->{secret}; |
146 |
|
147 |
$self->{timeout} = $config->{monitor_timeout} || $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::MONITOR_TIMEOUT |
148 |
unless exists $self->{timeout}; |
149 |
|
150 |
$self->{timeout} -= $latency; |
151 |
|
152 |
$self->{timeout} = 1 + $latency |
153 |
if $self->{timeout} < 1 + $latency; |
154 |
|
155 |
my $secret = $self->{secret}; |
156 |
|
157 |
if (exists $config->{cert}) { |
158 |
$self->{tls_ctx} = { |
159 |
sslv2 => 0, |
160 |
sslv3 => 0, |
161 |
tlsv1 => 1, |
162 |
verify => 1, |
163 |
cert => $config->{cert}, |
164 |
ca_cert => $config->{cert}, |
165 |
verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
166 |
}; |
167 |
} |
168 |
|
169 |
$self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
170 |
fh => delete $self->{fh}, |
171 |
autocork => 1, |
172 |
no_delay => 1, |
173 |
keepalive => 1, |
174 |
on_error => sub { |
175 |
$self->error ($_[2]); |
176 |
}, |
177 |
rtimeout => $latency, |
178 |
peername => delete $self->{peername}, |
179 |
; |
180 |
|
181 |
my $greeting_kv = $self->{greeting} ||= {}; |
182 |
|
183 |
$self->{local_node} ||= $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE; |
184 |
|
185 |
$greeting_kv->{tls} = "1.0" if $self->{tls_ctx}; |
186 |
$greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::VERSION"; |
187 |
$greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
188 |
$greeting_kv->{timeout} = $self->{timeout}; |
189 |
|
190 |
# send greeting |
191 |
my $lgreeting1 = "aemp;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
192 |
. ";$self->{local_node}" |
193 |
. ";" . (join ",", @AUTH_RCV) |
194 |
. ";" . (join ",", @FRAMINGS) |
195 |
. (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
196 |
|
197 |
my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::nonce (66), ""; |
198 |
|
199 |
$self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
200 |
|
201 |
# expect greeting |
202 |
$self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (4 * 1024); |
203 |
$self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
204 |
my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
205 |
|
206 |
my ($aemp, $version, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
207 |
|
208 |
if ($aemp ne "aemp") { |
209 |
return $self->error ("unparsable greeting"); |
210 |
} elsif ($version != $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
211 |
return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version)"); |
212 |
} elsif ($rnode eq $self->{local_node}) { |
213 |
AnyEvent::MP::Global::avoid_seed ($self->{seed}) |
214 |
if exists $self->{seed}; |
215 |
|
216 |
return $self->error ("I refuse to talk to myself"); |
217 |
} elsif ($AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE{$rnode} && $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE{$rnode}{transport}) { |
218 |
return $self->error ("$rnode already connected, not connecting again."); |
219 |
} |
220 |
|
221 |
$self->{remote_node} = $rnode; |
222 |
|
223 |
$self->{remote_greeting} = { |
224 |
map /^([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?/ ? ($1 => $2) : (), |
225 |
@kv |
226 |
}; |
227 |
|
228 |
# read nonce |
229 |
$self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
230 |
my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
231 |
|
232 |
"$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2" ne "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2" # echo attack? |
233 |
or return $self->error ("authentication error, echo attack?"); |
234 |
|
235 |
my $tls = $self->{tls_ctx} && 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}; |
236 |
|
237 |
my $s_auth; |
238 |
for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
239 |
if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @AUTH_SND and ($auth_ !~ /^tls_/ or $tls)) { |
240 |
$s_auth = $auth_; |
241 |
last; |
242 |
} |
243 |
} |
244 |
|
245 |
defined $s_auth |
246 |
or return $self->error ("$auths: no common auth type supported"); |
247 |
|
248 |
my $s_framing; |
249 |
for my $framing_ (split /,/, $framings) { |
250 |
if (grep $framing_ eq $_, @FRAMINGS) { |
251 |
$s_framing = $framing_; |
252 |
last; |
253 |
} |
254 |
} |
255 |
|
256 |
defined $s_framing |
257 |
or return $self->error ("$framings: no common framing method supported"); |
258 |
|
259 |
my $key; |
260 |
my $lauth; |
261 |
|
262 |
if ($tls) { |
263 |
$self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
264 |
$self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
265 |
|
266 |
$lauth = |
267 |
$s_auth eq "tls_anon" ? "" |
268 |
: $s_auth eq "tls_md6_64_256" ? Digest::MD6::md6_hex "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012" |
269 |
: return $self->error ("$s_auth: fatal, selected unsupported snd auth method"); |
270 |
|
271 |
} elsif (length $secret) { |
272 |
return $self->error ("$s_auth: fatal, selected unsupported snd auth method") |
273 |
unless $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256"; # hardcoded atm. |
274 |
|
275 |
$key = Digest::MD6::md6 $secret; |
276 |
# we currently only support hmac_md6_64_256 |
277 |
$lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256; |
278 |
|
279 |
} else { |
280 |
return $self->error ("unable to handshake TLS and no shared secret configured"); |
281 |
} |
282 |
|
283 |
$self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
284 |
|
285 |
# read the authentication response |
286 |
$self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
287 |
my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
288 |
|
289 |
my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
290 |
|
291 |
my $rauth = |
292 |
$auth_method eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256 |
293 |
: $auth_method eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
294 |
: $auth_method eq "tls_anon" ? ($tls ? "" : "\012\012") # \012\012 never matches |
295 |
: $auth_method eq "tls_md6_64_256" ? ($tls ? Digest::MD6::md6_hex "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012" : "\012\012") |
296 |
: return $self->error ("$auth_method: fatal, selected unsupported rcv auth method"); |
297 |
|
298 |
if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
299 |
return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
300 |
} |
301 |
|
302 |
$self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
303 |
|
304 |
$hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
305 |
|
306 |
$self->{hdl}->rtimeout ($self->{remote_greeting}{timeout}); |
307 |
$self->{hdl}->wtimeout ($self->{timeout} - LATENCY); |
308 |
$self->{hdl}->on_wtimeout (sub { $self->send ([]) }); |
309 |
|
310 |
my $queue = delete $self->{queue}; # we are connected |
311 |
|
312 |
$self->connected; |
313 |
|
314 |
# send queued messages |
315 |
$self->send ($_) |
316 |
for @$queue; |
317 |
|
318 |
# receive handling |
319 |
my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
320 |
my $rmsg; $rmsg = $self->{rmsg} = sub { |
321 |
$_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
322 |
|
323 |
local $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
324 |
AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
325 |
}; |
326 |
$hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
327 |
|
328 |
Scalar::Util::weaken $rmsg; |
329 |
Scalar::Util::weaken $src_node; |
330 |
}); |
331 |
}); |
332 |
}); |
333 |
} |
334 |
|
335 |
$self |
336 |
} |
337 |
|
338 |
sub error { |
339 |
my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
340 |
|
341 |
delete $self->{keepalive}; |
342 |
|
343 |
# $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::WARN->(9, "$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport} $msg");#d# |
344 |
|
345 |
$self->{node}->transport_error (transport_error => $self->{node}{id}, $msg) |
346 |
if $self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self; |
347 |
|
348 |
(delete $self->{release})->() |
349 |
if exists $self->{release}; |
350 |
|
351 |
# $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::WARN->(7, "$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
352 |
$self->destroy; |
353 |
} |
354 |
|
355 |
sub connected { |
356 |
my ($self) = @_; |
357 |
|
358 |
delete $self->{keepalive}; |
359 |
|
360 |
(delete $self->{release})->() |
361 |
if exists $self->{release}; |
362 |
|
363 |
$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::WARN->(9, "$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport} connected as $self->{remote_node}"); |
364 |
|
365 |
my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
366 |
Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
367 |
$node->transport_connect ($self); |
368 |
} |
369 |
|
370 |
sub send { |
371 |
$_[0]{hdl}->push_write ($_[0]{s_framing} => $_[1]); |
372 |
} |
373 |
|
374 |
sub destroy { |
375 |
my ($self) = @_; |
376 |
|
377 |
(delete $self->{release})->() |
378 |
if exists $self->{release}; |
379 |
|
380 |
$self->{hdl}->destroy |
381 |
if $self->{hdl}; |
382 |
} |
383 |
|
384 |
sub DESTROY { |
385 |
my ($self) = @_; |
386 |
|
387 |
$self->destroy; |
388 |
} |
389 |
|
390 |
=back |
391 |
|
392 |
=head1 PROTOCOL |
393 |
|
394 |
The AEMP protocol is relatively simple, and consists of three phases which |
395 |
are symmetrical for both sides: greeting (followed by optionally switching |
396 |
to TLS mode), authentication and packet exchange. |
397 |
|
398 |
The protocol is designed to allow both full-text and binary streams. |
399 |
|
400 |
The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
401 |
CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
402 |
|
403 |
=head2 GREETING |
404 |
|
405 |
All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, |
406 |
including line delimiter. Afterwards there is no limit on the packet size |
407 |
that can be received. |
408 |
|
409 |
=head3 First Greeting Line |
410 |
|
411 |
Example: |
412 |
|
413 |
aemp;0;rain;tls_md6_64_256,hmac_md6_64_256,tls_anon,cleartext;json,storable;timeout=12;peeraddr=10.0.0.1:48082 |
414 |
|
415 |
The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
416 |
characters. The first five strings are fixed by the protocol, the |
417 |
remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
418 |
characters themselves (when escaping is needed, use C<%3b> to represent |
419 |
C<;> and C<%25> to represent C<%>)- |
420 |
|
421 |
The fixed strings are: |
422 |
|
423 |
=over 4 |
424 |
|
425 |
=item protocol identification |
426 |
|
427 |
The constant C<aemp> to identify this protocol. |
428 |
|
429 |
=item protocol version |
430 |
|
431 |
The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<0>. If the |
432 |
versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
433 |
are supposed to be handled through additional key-value pairs. |
434 |
|
435 |
=item the node ID |
436 |
|
437 |
This is the node ID of the connecting node. |
438 |
|
439 |
=item the acceptable authentication methods |
440 |
|
441 |
A comma-separated list of authentication methods supported by the |
442 |
node. Note that AnyEvent::MP supports a C<hex_secret> authentication |
443 |
method that accepts a clear-text password (hex-encoded), but will not use |
444 |
this authentication method itself. |
445 |
|
446 |
The receiving side should choose the first authentication method it |
447 |
supports. |
448 |
|
449 |
=item the acceptable framing formats |
450 |
|
451 |
A comma-separated list of packet encoding/framing formats understood. The |
452 |
receiving side should choose the first framing format it supports for |
453 |
sending packets (which might be different from the format it has to accept). |
454 |
|
455 |
=back |
456 |
|
457 |
The remaining arguments are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. The following key-value |
458 |
pairs are known at this time: |
459 |
|
460 |
=over 4 |
461 |
|
462 |
=item timeout=<seconds> |
463 |
|
464 |
The amount of time after which this node should be detected as dead unless |
465 |
some data has been received. The node is responsible to send traffic |
466 |
reasonably more often than this interval (such as every timeout minus |
467 |
five seconds). |
468 |
|
469 |
=item provider=<module-version> |
470 |
|
471 |
The software provider for this implementation. For AnyEvent::MP, this is |
472 |
C<AE-0.0> or whatever version it currently is at. |
473 |
|
474 |
=item peeraddr=<host>:<port> |
475 |
|
476 |
The peer address (socket address of the other side) as seen locally. |
477 |
|
478 |
=item tls=<major>.<minor> |
479 |
|
480 |
Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
481 |
wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
482 |
|
483 |
=back |
484 |
|
485 |
=head3 Second Greeting Line |
486 |
|
487 |
After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
488 |
cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
489 |
protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
490 |
it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
491 |
characters. |
492 |
|
493 |
I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
494 |
B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
495 |
|
496 |
Example of a nonce line (yes, it's random-looking because it is random |
497 |
data): |
498 |
|
499 |
2XYhdG7/O6epFa4wuP0ujAEx1rXYWRcOypjUYK7eF6yWAQr7gwIN9m/2+mVvBrTPXz5GJDgfGm9d8QRABAbmAP/s |
500 |
|
501 |
=head2 TLS handshake |
502 |
|
503 |
I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
504 |
connection B<must> use TLS, or fail to continue. >> |
505 |
|
506 |
Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
507 |
value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
508 |
and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
509 |
|
510 |
=head2 AUTHENTICATION PHASE |
511 |
|
512 |
After the greeting is received (and the optional TLS handshake), |
513 |
the authentication phase begins, which consists of sending a single |
514 |
C<;>-separated line with three fixed strings and any number of |
515 |
C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. |
516 |
|
517 |
The three fixed strings are: |
518 |
|
519 |
=over 4 |
520 |
|
521 |
=item the authentication method chosen |
522 |
|
523 |
This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
524 |
|
525 |
Note that all methods starting with C<tls_> are only valid I<iff> TLS was |
526 |
successfully handshaked (and to be secure the implementation must enforce |
527 |
this). |
528 |
|
529 |
The currently supported authentication methods are: |
530 |
|
531 |
=over 4 |
532 |
|
533 |
=item cleartext |
534 |
|
535 |
This is simply the shared secret, lowercase-hex-encoded. This method is of |
536 |
course very insecure if TLS is not used (and not completely secure even |
537 |
if TLS is used), which is why this module will accept, but not generate, |
538 |
cleartext auth replies. |
539 |
|
540 |
=item hmac_md6_64_256 |
541 |
|
542 |
This method uses an MD6 HMAC with 64 bit blocksize and 256 bit hash, and |
543 |
requires a shared secret. It is the preferred auth method when a shared |
544 |
secret is available. |
545 |
|
546 |
First, the shared secret is hashed with MD6: |
547 |
|
548 |
key = MD6 (secret) |
549 |
|
550 |
This secret is then used to generate the "local auth reply", by taking |
551 |
the two local greeting lines and the two remote greeting lines (without |
552 |
line endings), appending \012 to all of them, concatenating them and |
553 |
calculating the MD6 HMAC with the key: |
554 |
|
555 |
lauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012" |
556 |
|
557 |
This authentication token is then lowercase-hex-encoded and sent to the |
558 |
other side. |
559 |
|
560 |
Then the remote auth reply is generated using the same method, but local |
561 |
and remote greeting lines swapped: |
562 |
|
563 |
rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
564 |
|
565 |
This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
566 |
|
567 |
=item tls_anon |
568 |
|
569 |
This type is only valid I<iff> TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake |
570 |
was successful. It has no authentication data, as the server/client |
571 |
certificate was successfully verified. |
572 |
|
573 |
This authentication type is somewhat insecure, as it allows a |
574 |
man-in-the-middle attacker to change some of the connection parameters |
575 |
(such as the framing format), although there is no known attack that |
576 |
exploits this in a way that is worse than just denying the service. |
577 |
|
578 |
By default, this implementation accepts but never generates this auth |
579 |
reply. |
580 |
|
581 |
=item tls_md6_64_256 |
582 |
|
583 |
This type is only valid I<iff> TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake was |
584 |
successful. |
585 |
|
586 |
This authentication type simply calculates: |
587 |
|
588 |
lauth = MD6 "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
589 |
|
590 |
and lowercase-hex encodes the result and sends it as authentication |
591 |
data. No shared secret is required (authentication is done by TLS). The |
592 |
checksum exists only to make tinkering with the greeting hard. |
593 |
|
594 |
=back |
595 |
|
596 |
=item the authentication data |
597 |
|
598 |
The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
599 |
above. |
600 |
|
601 |
=item the framing protocol chosen |
602 |
|
603 |
This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
604 |
greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side, and generate |
605 |
packets in the format it chose itself. |
606 |
|
607 |
=back |
608 |
|
609 |
Example of an authentication reply: |
610 |
|
611 |
hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
612 |
|
613 |
=head2 DATA PHASE |
614 |
|
615 |
After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
616 |
quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
617 |
|
618 |
=head2 FULL EXAMPLE |
619 |
|
620 |
This is an actual protocol dump of a handshake, followed by a single data |
621 |
packet. The greater than/less than lines indicate the direction of the |
622 |
transfer only. |
623 |
|
624 |
> aemp;0;anon/57Cs1CggVJjzYaQp13XXg4;tls_md6_64_256,hmac_md6_64_256,tls_anon,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.8;timeout=12;peeraddr=10.0.0.17:4040 |
625 |
> yLgdG1ov/02shVkVQer3wzeuywZK+oraTdEQBmIqWHaegxSGDG4g+HqogLQbvdypFOsoDWJ1Sh4ImV4DMhvUBwTK |
626 |
|
627 |
< aemp;0;ruth;tls_md6_64_256,hmac_md6_64_256,tls_anon,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.8;timeout=12;peeraddr=10.0.0.1:37108 |
628 |
< +xMQXP8ElfNmuvEhsmcp+s2wCJOuQAsPxSg3d2Ewhs6gBnJz+ypVdWJ/wAVrXqlIJfLeVS/CBy4gEGkyWHSuVb1L |
629 |
|
630 |
> hmac_md6_64_256;5ad913855742ae5a03a5aeb7eafa4c78629de136bed6acd73eea36c9e98df44a;json |
631 |
|
632 |
< hmac_md6_64_256;84cd590976f794914c2ca26dac3a207a57a6798b9171289c114de07cf0c20401;json |
633 |
< ["","AnyEvent::MP::_spawn","57Cs1CggVJjzYaQp13XXg4.c","AnyEvent::MP::Global::connect",0,"anon/57Cs1CggVJjzYaQp13XXg4"] |
634 |
... |
635 |
|
636 |
The shared secret in use was C<8ugxrtw6H5tKnfPWfaSr4HGhE8MoJXmzTT1BWq7sLutNcD0IbXprQlZjIbl7MBKoeklG3IEfY9GlJthC0pENzk>. |
637 |
|
638 |
=head1 SEE ALSO |
639 |
|
640 |
L<AnyEvent::MP>. |
641 |
|
642 |
=head1 AUTHOR |
643 |
|
644 |
Marc Lehmann <schmorp@schmorp.de> |
645 |
http://home.schmorp.de/ |
646 |
|
647 |
=cut |
648 |
|
649 |
1 |
650 |
|