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1.1 |
=head1 NAME |
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1.13 |
AnyEvent::MP::Transport - actual transport protocol handler |
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1.1 |
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=head1 SYNOPSIS |
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use AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
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=head1 DESCRIPTION |
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1.43 |
This module implements (and documents) the actual transport protocol for |
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AEMP. |
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1.1 |
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1.7 |
See the "PROTOCOL" section below if you want to write another client for |
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this protocol. |
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1.1 |
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=head1 FUNCTIONS/METHODS |
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=over 4 |
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=cut |
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package AnyEvent::MP::Transport; |
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use common::sense; |
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1.27 |
use Scalar::Util (); |
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use List::Util (); |
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1.1 |
use MIME::Base64 (); |
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use Storable (); |
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1.2 |
use JSON::XS (); |
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1.1 |
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1.19 |
use Digest::MD6 (); |
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use Digest::HMAC_MD6 (); |
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1.1 |
use AE (); |
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use AnyEvent::Socket (); |
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1.27 |
use AnyEvent::Handle 4.92 (); |
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1.2 |
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1.30 |
use AnyEvent::MP::Config (); |
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1.55 |
our $PROTOCOL_VERSION = 1; |
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1.1 |
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1.52 |
our @HOOK_CONNECT; # called at connect/accept time |
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our @HOOK_GREETING; # called at greeting1 time |
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our @HOOK_CONNECTED; # called at data phase |
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our @HOOK_DESTROY; # called at destroy time |
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1.59 |
our %HOOK_PROTOCOL = ( |
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"aemp-dataconn" => sub { |
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require AnyEvent::MP::DataConn; |
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&AnyEvent::MP::DataConn::_inject; |
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}, |
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); |
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1.52 |
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1.39 |
=item $listener = mp_listener $host, $port, <constructor-args> |
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1.1 |
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Creates a listener on the given host/port using |
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C<AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server>. |
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See C<new>, below, for constructor arguments. |
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1.10 |
Defaults for peerhost, peerport and fh are provided. |
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1.1 |
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=cut |
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1.46 |
sub mp_server($$;%) { |
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my ($host, $port, %arg) = @_; |
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1.1 |
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AnyEvent::Socket::tcp_server $host, $port, sub { |
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my ($fh, $host, $port) = @_; |
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1.39 |
my $tp = new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
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1.1 |
fh => $fh, |
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peerhost => $host, |
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peerport => $port, |
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1.46 |
%arg, |
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1.39 |
; |
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$tp->{keepalive} = $tp; |
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1.46 |
}, delete $arg{prepare} |
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1.1 |
} |
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1.2 |
=item $guard = mp_connect $host, $port, <constructor-args>, $cb->($transport) |
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=cut |
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sub mp_connect { |
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1.31 |
my $release = pop; |
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1.2 |
my ($host, $port, @args) = @_; |
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1.51 |
new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
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connect => [$host, $port], |
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1.52 |
peerhost => $host, |
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peerport => $port, |
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1.51 |
release => $release, |
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@args, |
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; |
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1.2 |
} |
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1.1 |
=item new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
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# immediately starts negotiation |
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my $transport = new AnyEvent::MP::Transport |
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1.2 |
# mandatory |
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1.1 |
fh => $filehandle, |
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1.2 |
local_id => $identifier, |
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1.1 |
on_recv => sub { receive-callback }, |
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on_error => sub { error-callback }, |
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# optional |
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on_eof => sub { clean-close-callback }, |
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on_connect => sub { successful-connect-callback }, |
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1.2 |
greeting => { key => value }, |
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1.1 |
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# tls support |
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tls_ctx => AnyEvent::TLS, |
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peername => $peername, # for verification |
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; |
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=cut |
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sub new { |
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my ($class, %arg) = @_; |
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my $self = bless \%arg, $class; |
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{ |
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Scalar::Util::weaken (my $self = $self); |
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1.50 |
my $config = $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::CONFIG; |
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my $timeout = $config->{monitor_timeout}; |
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my $lframing = $config->{data_format}; |
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my $auth_snd = $config->{auth_offer}; |
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my $auth_rcv = $config->{auth_accept}; |
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1.31 |
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1.42 |
$self->{secret} = $config->{secret} |
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unless exists $self->{secret}; |
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1.2 |
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1.42 |
my $secret = $self->{secret}; |
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1.19 |
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1.30 |
if (exists $config->{cert}) { |
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1.42 |
$self->{tls_ctx} = { |
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1.19 |
sslv2 => 0, |
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sslv3 => 0, |
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tlsv1 => 1, |
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verify => 1, |
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1.30 |
cert => $config->{cert}, |
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ca_cert => $config->{cert}, |
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1.19 |
verify_require_client_cert => 1, |
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}; |
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} |
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1.1 |
$self->{hdl} = new AnyEvent::Handle |
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1.52 |
+($self->{fh} ? (fh => $self->{fh}) : (connect => $self->{connect})), |
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1.48 |
autocork => 1, |
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no_delay => 1, |
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keepalive => 1, |
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on_error => sub { |
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1.1 |
$self->error ($_[2]); |
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}, |
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1.49 |
rtimeout => $timeout, |
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1.1 |
; |
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1.52 |
my $greeting_kv = $self->{local_greeting} ||= {}; |
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1.24 |
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1.42 |
$greeting_kv->{tls} = "1.0" if $self->{tls_ctx}; |
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1.31 |
$greeting_kv->{provider} = "AE-$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::VERSION"; |
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1.7 |
$greeting_kv->{peeraddr} = AnyEvent::Socket::format_hostport $self->{peerhost}, $self->{peerport}; |
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1.42 |
$greeting_kv->{timeout} = $self->{timeout}; |
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1.23 |
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1.58 |
my $protocol = $self->{protocol} || "aemp"; |
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1.52 |
# can modify greeting_kv |
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1.58 |
$_->($self) for $protocol eq "aemp" ? @HOOK_CONNECT : (); |
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1.52 |
|
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1.1 |
# send greeting |
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1.58 |
my $lgreeting1 = "$protocol;$PROTOCOL_VERSION" |
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1.52 |
. ";$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE" |
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1.50 |
. ";" . (join ",", @$auth_rcv) |
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. ";" . (join ",", @$lframing) |
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1.7 |
. (join "", map ";$_=$greeting_kv->{$_}", keys %$greeting_kv); |
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1.12 |
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1.31 |
my $lgreeting2 = MIME::Base64::encode_base64 AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::nonce (66), ""; |
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1.7 |
$self->{hdl}->push_write ("$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012"); |
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1.1 |
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# expect greeting |
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1.12 |
$self->{hdl}->rbuf_max (4 * 1024); |
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1.1 |
$self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
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1.7 |
my $rgreeting1 = $_[1]; |
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1.1 |
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1.26 |
my ($aemp, $version, $rnode, $auths, $framings, @kv) = split /;/, $rgreeting1; |
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1.1 |
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1.53 |
$self->{remote_node} = $rnode; |
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$self->{remote_greeting} = { |
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map /^([^=]+)(?:=(.*))?/ ? ($1 => $2) : (), |
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@kv |
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}; |
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1.58 |
$_->($self) for $protocol eq "aemp" ? @HOOK_GREETING : (); |
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1.54 |
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1.58 |
if ($aemp ne $protocol) { |
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return $self->error ("unparsable greeting, expected '$protocol', got '$aemp'"); |
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1.12 |
} elsif ($version != $PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
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return $self->error ("version mismatch (we: $PROTOCOL_VERSION, they: $version)"); |
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1.53 |
} elsif ($rnode eq $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE) { |
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1.39 |
return $self->error ("I refuse to talk to myself"); |
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} elsif ($AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE{$rnode} && $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::NODE{$rnode}{transport}) { |
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return $self->error ("$rnode already connected, not connecting again."); |
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1.1 |
} |
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1.7 |
# read nonce |
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$self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
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my $rgreeting2 = $_[1]; |
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1.19 |
"$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2" ne "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2" # echo attack? |
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or return $self->error ("authentication error, echo attack?"); |
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1.41 |
my $tls = $self->{tls_ctx} && 1 == int $self->{remote_greeting}{tls}; |
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my $s_auth; |
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for my $auth_ (split /,/, $auths) { |
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1.50 |
if (grep $auth_ eq $_, @$auth_snd and ($auth_ !~ /^tls_/ or $tls)) { |
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1.41 |
$s_auth = $auth_; |
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last; |
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} |
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} |
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defined $s_auth |
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or return $self->error ("$auths: no common auth type supported"); |
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my $s_framing; |
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for my $framing_ (split /,/, $framings) { |
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1.50 |
if (grep $framing_ eq $_, @$lframing) { |
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1.41 |
$s_framing = $framing_; |
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last; |
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} |
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} |
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defined $s_framing |
242 |
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or return $self->error ("$framings: no common framing method supported"); |
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1.30 |
my $key; |
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1.19 |
my $lauth; |
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1.41 |
if ($tls) { |
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1.8 |
$self->{tls} = $lgreeting2 lt $rgreeting2 ? "connect" : "accept"; |
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$self->{hdl}->starttls ($self->{tls}, $self->{tls_ctx}); |
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1.41 |
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$lauth = |
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$s_auth eq "tls_anon" ? "" |
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: $s_auth eq "tls_md6_64_256" ? Digest::MD6::md6_hex "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012" |
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: return $self->error ("$s_auth: fatal, selected unsupported snd auth method"); |
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1.30 |
} elsif (length $secret) { |
257 |
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1.41 |
return $self->error ("$s_auth: fatal, selected unsupported snd auth method") |
258 |
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unless $s_auth eq "hmac_md6_64_256"; # hardcoded atm. |
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1.30 |
$key = Digest::MD6::md6 $secret; |
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1.19 |
# we currently only support hmac_md6_64_256 |
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$lauth = Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012", 64, 256; |
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1.41 |
|
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1.30 |
} else { |
265 |
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return $self->error ("unable to handshake TLS and no shared secret configured"); |
266 |
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1.8 |
} |
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1.2 |
|
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1.7 |
$self->{hdl}->push_write ("$s_auth;$lauth;$s_framing\012"); |
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1.2 |
|
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1.19 |
# read the authentication response |
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1.7 |
$self->{hdl}->push_read (line => sub { |
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my ($hdl, $rline) = @_; |
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1.2 |
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1.7 |
my ($auth_method, $rauth2, $r_framing) = split /;/, $rline; |
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1.1 |
|
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1.19 |
my $rauth = |
277 |
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$auth_method eq "hmac_md6_64_256" ? Digest::HMAC_MD6::hmac_md6_hex $key, "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012", 64, 256 |
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: $auth_method eq "cleartext" ? unpack "H*", $secret |
279 |
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1.41 |
: $auth_method eq "tls_anon" ? ($tls ? "" : "\012\012") # \012\012 never matches |
280 |
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: $auth_method eq "tls_md6_64_256" ? ($tls ? Digest::MD6::md6_hex "$rgreeting1\012$rgreeting2\012$lgreeting1\012$lgreeting2\012" : "\012\012") |
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: return $self->error ("$auth_method: fatal, selected unsupported rcv auth method"); |
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1.19 |
|
283 |
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1.7 |
if ($rauth2 ne $rauth) { |
284 |
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return $self->error ("authentication failure/shared secret mismatch"); |
285 |
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} |
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1.1 |
|
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1.7 |
$self->{s_framing} = $s_framing; |
288 |
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1.2 |
|
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1.7 |
$hdl->rbuf_max (undef); |
290 |
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1.1 |
|
291 |
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1.49 |
# we rely on TCP retransmit timeouts and keepalives |
292 |
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$self->{hdl}->rtimeout (undef); |
293 |
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294 |
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$self->{remote_greeting}{untrusted} = 1 |
295 |
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if $auth_method eq "tls_anon"; |
296 |
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1.24 |
|
297 |
root |
1.7 |
$self->connected; |
298 |
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1.1 |
|
299 |
root |
1.58 |
if ($protocol eq "aemp") { |
300 |
root |
1.59 |
# listener-less node need to continuously probe |
301 |
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unless (@$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::LISTENER) { |
302 |
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$self->{hdl}->wtimeout ($timeout); |
303 |
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$self->{hdl}->on_wtimeout (sub { $self->send ([]) }); |
304 |
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} |
305 |
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1.58 |
|
306 |
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# receive handling |
307 |
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my $src_node = $self->{node}; |
308 |
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my $rmsg; $rmsg = $self->{rmsg} = sub { |
309 |
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$_[0]->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
310 |
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311 |
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local $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::SRCNODE = $src_node; |
312 |
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AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::_inject (@{ $_[1] }); |
313 |
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}; |
314 |
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$hdl->push_read ($r_framing => $rmsg); |
315 |
root |
1.45 |
|
316 |
root |
1.58 |
Scalar::Util::weaken $rmsg; |
317 |
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Scalar::Util::weaken $src_node; |
318 |
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} |
319 |
root |
1.7 |
}); |
320 |
root |
1.1 |
}); |
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}); |
322 |
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} |
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324 |
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$self |
325 |
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} |
326 |
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sub error { |
328 |
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my ($self, $msg) = @_; |
329 |
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330 |
root |
1.39 |
delete $self->{keepalive}; |
331 |
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332 |
root |
1.58 |
if ($self->{protocol}) { |
333 |
root |
1.59 |
$HOOK_PROTOCOL{$self->{protocol}}->($self, $msg); |
334 |
root |
1.58 |
} else { |
335 |
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$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::WARN->(9, "$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport} $msg");#d# |
336 |
root |
1.39 |
|
337 |
root |
1.58 |
$self->{node}->transport_error (transport_error => $self->{node}{id}, $msg) |
338 |
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if $self->{node} && $self->{node}{transport} == $self; |
339 |
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} |
340 |
root |
1.31 |
|
341 |
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(delete $self->{release})->() |
342 |
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if exists $self->{release}; |
343 |
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344 |
root |
1.37 |
# $AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::WARN->(7, "$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport}: $msg"); |
345 |
root |
1.4 |
$self->destroy; |
346 |
root |
1.1 |
} |
347 |
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|
348 |
root |
1.2 |
sub connected { |
349 |
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my ($self) = @_; |
350 |
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351 |
root |
1.39 |
delete $self->{keepalive}; |
352 |
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|
353 |
root |
1.31 |
(delete $self->{release})->() |
354 |
|
|
if exists $self->{release}; |
355 |
root |
1.23 |
|
356 |
root |
1.58 |
if ($self->{protocol}) { |
357 |
root |
1.59 |
$self->{hdl}->on_error (undef); |
358 |
|
|
$HOOK_PROTOCOL{$self->{protocol}}->($self, undef); |
359 |
root |
1.58 |
} else { |
360 |
|
|
$AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::WARN->(9, "$self->{peerhost}:$self->{peerport} connected as $self->{remote_node}"); |
361 |
|
|
|
362 |
|
|
my $node = AnyEvent::MP::Kernel::add_node ($self->{remote_node}); |
363 |
|
|
Scalar::Util::weaken ($self->{node} = $node); |
364 |
|
|
$node->transport_connect ($self); |
365 |
root |
1.39 |
|
366 |
root |
1.58 |
$_->($self) for @HOOK_CONNECTED; |
367 |
|
|
} |
368 |
root |
1.2 |
} |
369 |
|
|
|
370 |
root |
1.1 |
sub send { |
371 |
root |
1.2 |
$_[0]{hdl}->push_write ($_[0]{s_framing} => $_[1]); |
372 |
root |
1.1 |
} |
373 |
|
|
|
374 |
|
|
sub destroy { |
375 |
|
|
my ($self) = @_; |
376 |
|
|
|
377 |
root |
1.42 |
(delete $self->{release})->() |
378 |
|
|
if exists $self->{release}; |
379 |
|
|
|
380 |
root |
1.2 |
$self->{hdl}->destroy |
381 |
|
|
if $self->{hdl}; |
382 |
root |
1.52 |
|
383 |
root |
1.59 |
$_->($self) for $self->{protocol} ? () : @HOOK_DESTROY; |
384 |
root |
1.1 |
} |
385 |
|
|
|
386 |
|
|
sub DESTROY { |
387 |
|
|
my ($self) = @_; |
388 |
|
|
|
389 |
|
|
$self->destroy; |
390 |
|
|
} |
391 |
|
|
|
392 |
|
|
=back |
393 |
|
|
|
394 |
root |
1.7 |
=head1 PROTOCOL |
395 |
|
|
|
396 |
root |
1.59 |
The AEMP protocol is comparatively simple, and consists of three phases |
397 |
|
|
which are symmetrical for both sides: greeting (followed by optionally |
398 |
|
|
switching to TLS mode), authentication and packet exchange. |
399 |
root |
1.7 |
|
400 |
root |
1.43 |
The protocol is designed to allow both full-text and binary streams. |
401 |
root |
1.7 |
|
402 |
|
|
The greeting consists of two text lines that are ended by either an ASCII |
403 |
|
|
CR LF pair, or a single ASCII LF (recommended). |
404 |
|
|
|
405 |
|
|
=head2 GREETING |
406 |
|
|
|
407 |
root |
1.15 |
All the lines until after authentication must not exceed 4kb in length, |
408 |
root |
1.43 |
including line delimiter. Afterwards there is no limit on the packet size |
409 |
|
|
that can be received. |
410 |
root |
1.15 |
|
411 |
|
|
=head3 First Greeting Line |
412 |
root |
1.12 |
|
413 |
root |
1.16 |
Example: |
414 |
|
|
|
415 |
root |
1.43 |
aemp;0;rain;tls_md6_64_256,hmac_md6_64_256,tls_anon,cleartext;json,storable;timeout=12;peeraddr=10.0.0.1:48082 |
416 |
root |
1.16 |
|
417 |
|
|
The first line contains strings separated (not ended) by C<;> |
418 |
root |
1.43 |
characters. The first five strings are fixed by the protocol, the |
419 |
root |
1.16 |
remaining strings are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. None of them may contain C<;> |
420 |
root |
1.43 |
characters themselves (when escaping is needed, use C<%3b> to represent |
421 |
|
|
C<;> and C<%25> to represent C<%>)- |
422 |
root |
1.16 |
|
423 |
root |
1.12 |
The fixed strings are: |
424 |
root |
1.7 |
|
425 |
|
|
=over 4 |
426 |
|
|
|
427 |
root |
1.18 |
=item protocol identification |
428 |
root |
1.7 |
|
429 |
root |
1.43 |
The constant C<aemp> to identify this protocol. |
430 |
root |
1.7 |
|
431 |
|
|
=item protocol version |
432 |
|
|
|
433 |
root |
1.55 |
The protocol version supported by this end, currently C<1>. If the |
434 |
root |
1.12 |
versions don't match then no communication is possible. Minor extensions |
435 |
root |
1.18 |
are supposed to be handled through additional key-value pairs. |
436 |
root |
1.7 |
|
437 |
root |
1.43 |
=item the node ID |
438 |
root |
1.7 |
|
439 |
root |
1.57 |
This is the node ID of the connecting node. |
440 |
root |
1.7 |
|
441 |
|
|
=item the acceptable authentication methods |
442 |
|
|
|
443 |
|
|
A comma-separated list of authentication methods supported by the |
444 |
|
|
node. Note that AnyEvent::MP supports a C<hex_secret> authentication |
445 |
root |
1.43 |
method that accepts a clear-text password (hex-encoded), but will not use |
446 |
|
|
this authentication method itself. |
447 |
root |
1.7 |
|
448 |
root |
1.43 |
The receiving side should choose the first authentication method it |
449 |
|
|
supports. |
450 |
root |
1.7 |
|
451 |
|
|
=item the acceptable framing formats |
452 |
|
|
|
453 |
root |
1.43 |
A comma-separated list of packet encoding/framing formats understood. The |
454 |
root |
1.7 |
receiving side should choose the first framing format it supports for |
455 |
|
|
sending packets (which might be different from the format it has to accept). |
456 |
|
|
|
457 |
root |
1.10 |
=back |
458 |
root |
1.8 |
|
459 |
|
|
The remaining arguments are C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. The following key-value |
460 |
|
|
pairs are known at this time: |
461 |
|
|
|
462 |
|
|
=over 4 |
463 |
|
|
|
464 |
|
|
=item provider=<module-version> |
465 |
|
|
|
466 |
|
|
The software provider for this implementation. For AnyEvent::MP, this is |
467 |
|
|
C<AE-0.0> or whatever version it currently is at. |
468 |
|
|
|
469 |
|
|
=item peeraddr=<host>:<port> |
470 |
|
|
|
471 |
root |
1.39 |
The peer address (socket address of the other side) as seen locally. |
472 |
root |
1.8 |
|
473 |
|
|
=item tls=<major>.<minor> |
474 |
|
|
|
475 |
|
|
Indicates that the other side supports TLS (version should be 1.0) and |
476 |
|
|
wishes to do a TLS handshake. |
477 |
|
|
|
478 |
|
|
=back |
479 |
|
|
|
480 |
root |
1.15 |
=head3 Second Greeting Line |
481 |
|
|
|
482 |
root |
1.8 |
After this greeting line there will be a second line containing a |
483 |
|
|
cryptographic nonce, i.e. random data of high quality. To keep the |
484 |
|
|
protocol text-only, these are usually 32 base64-encoded octets, but |
485 |
|
|
it could be anything that doesn't contain any ASCII CR or ASCII LF |
486 |
|
|
characters. |
487 |
|
|
|
488 |
root |
1.14 |
I<< The two nonces B<must> be different, and an aemp implementation |
489 |
|
|
B<must> check and fail when they are identical >>. |
490 |
|
|
|
491 |
root |
1.43 |
Example of a nonce line (yes, it's random-looking because it is random |
492 |
|
|
data): |
493 |
root |
1.8 |
|
494 |
root |
1.43 |
2XYhdG7/O6epFa4wuP0ujAEx1rXYWRcOypjUYK7eF6yWAQr7gwIN9m/2+mVvBrTPXz5GJDgfGm9d8QRABAbmAP/s |
495 |
root |
1.8 |
|
496 |
|
|
=head2 TLS handshake |
497 |
|
|
|
498 |
root |
1.14 |
I<< If, after the handshake, both sides indicate interest in TLS, then the |
499 |
root |
1.43 |
connection B<must> use TLS, or fail to continue. >> |
500 |
root |
1.8 |
|
501 |
|
|
Both sides compare their nonces, and the side who sent the lower nonce |
502 |
|
|
value ("string" comparison on the raw octet values) becomes the client, |
503 |
|
|
and the one with the higher nonce the server. |
504 |
|
|
|
505 |
|
|
=head2 AUTHENTICATION PHASE |
506 |
|
|
|
507 |
|
|
After the greeting is received (and the optional TLS handshake), |
508 |
|
|
the authentication phase begins, which consists of sending a single |
509 |
|
|
C<;>-separated line with three fixed strings and any number of |
510 |
|
|
C<KEY=VALUE> pairs. |
511 |
|
|
|
512 |
|
|
The three fixed strings are: |
513 |
|
|
|
514 |
|
|
=over 4 |
515 |
|
|
|
516 |
|
|
=item the authentication method chosen |
517 |
|
|
|
518 |
|
|
This must be one of the methods offered by the other side in the greeting. |
519 |
|
|
|
520 |
root |
1.41 |
Note that all methods starting with C<tls_> are only valid I<iff> TLS was |
521 |
|
|
successfully handshaked (and to be secure the implementation must enforce |
522 |
|
|
this). |
523 |
|
|
|
524 |
root |
1.13 |
The currently supported authentication methods are: |
525 |
|
|
|
526 |
|
|
=over 4 |
527 |
|
|
|
528 |
|
|
=item cleartext |
529 |
|
|
|
530 |
|
|
This is simply the shared secret, lowercase-hex-encoded. This method is of |
531 |
root |
1.43 |
course very insecure if TLS is not used (and not completely secure even |
532 |
|
|
if TLS is used), which is why this module will accept, but not generate, |
533 |
|
|
cleartext auth replies. |
534 |
root |
1.13 |
|
535 |
|
|
=item hmac_md6_64_256 |
536 |
|
|
|
537 |
root |
1.43 |
This method uses an MD6 HMAC with 64 bit blocksize and 256 bit hash, and |
538 |
|
|
requires a shared secret. It is the preferred auth method when a shared |
539 |
|
|
secret is available. |
540 |
|
|
|
541 |
|
|
First, the shared secret is hashed with MD6: |
542 |
root |
1.13 |
|
543 |
|
|
key = MD6 (secret) |
544 |
|
|
|
545 |
|
|
This secret is then used to generate the "local auth reply", by taking |
546 |
|
|
the two local greeting lines and the two remote greeting lines (without |
547 |
|
|
line endings), appending \012 to all of them, concatenating them and |
548 |
root |
1.43 |
calculating the MD6 HMAC with the key: |
549 |
root |
1.13 |
|
550 |
|
|
lauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012" |
551 |
|
|
|
552 |
|
|
This authentication token is then lowercase-hex-encoded and sent to the |
553 |
|
|
other side. |
554 |
|
|
|
555 |
|
|
Then the remote auth reply is generated using the same method, but local |
556 |
|
|
and remote greeting lines swapped: |
557 |
|
|
|
558 |
|
|
rauth = HMAC_MD6 key, "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
559 |
|
|
|
560 |
|
|
This is the token that is expected from the other side. |
561 |
|
|
|
562 |
root |
1.41 |
=item tls_anon |
563 |
root |
1.19 |
|
564 |
root |
1.43 |
This type is only valid I<iff> TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake |
565 |
root |
1.19 |
was successful. It has no authentication data, as the server/client |
566 |
|
|
certificate was successfully verified. |
567 |
|
|
|
568 |
root |
1.43 |
This authentication type is somewhat insecure, as it allows a |
569 |
|
|
man-in-the-middle attacker to change some of the connection parameters |
570 |
|
|
(such as the framing format), although there is no known attack that |
571 |
|
|
exploits this in a way that is worse than just denying the service. |
572 |
root |
1.41 |
|
573 |
root |
1.43 |
By default, this implementation accepts but never generates this auth |
574 |
|
|
reply. |
575 |
root |
1.41 |
|
576 |
|
|
=item tls_md6_64_256 |
577 |
|
|
|
578 |
root |
1.43 |
This type is only valid I<iff> TLS was enabled and the TLS handshake was |
579 |
|
|
successful. |
580 |
root |
1.41 |
|
581 |
|
|
This authentication type simply calculates: |
582 |
|
|
|
583 |
|
|
lauth = MD6 "rgreeting1\012rgreeting2\012lgreeting1\012lgreeting2\012" |
584 |
|
|
|
585 |
|
|
and lowercase-hex encodes the result and sends it as authentication |
586 |
|
|
data. No shared secret is required (authentication is done by TLS). The |
587 |
root |
1.43 |
checksum exists only to make tinkering with the greeting hard. |
588 |
root |
1.19 |
|
589 |
root |
1.13 |
=back |
590 |
|
|
|
591 |
root |
1.8 |
=item the authentication data |
592 |
|
|
|
593 |
root |
1.13 |
The authentication data itself, usually base64 or hex-encoded data, see |
594 |
|
|
above. |
595 |
root |
1.8 |
|
596 |
|
|
=item the framing protocol chosen |
597 |
|
|
|
598 |
|
|
This must be one of the framing protocols offered by the other side in the |
599 |
root |
1.43 |
greeting. Each side must accept the choice of the other side, and generate |
600 |
|
|
packets in the format it chose itself. |
601 |
root |
1.8 |
|
602 |
|
|
=back |
603 |
|
|
|
604 |
root |
1.16 |
Example of an authentication reply: |
605 |
root |
1.9 |
|
606 |
root |
1.13 |
hmac_md6_64_256;363d5175df38bd9eaddd3f6ca18aa1c0c4aa22f0da245ac638d048398c26b8d3;json |
607 |
root |
1.9 |
|
608 |
root |
1.8 |
=head2 DATA PHASE |
609 |
|
|
|
610 |
|
|
After this, packets get exchanged using the chosen framing protocol. It is |
611 |
|
|
quite possible that both sides use a different framing protocol. |
612 |
|
|
|
613 |
root |
1.16 |
=head2 FULL EXAMPLE |
614 |
|
|
|
615 |
root |
1.17 |
This is an actual protocol dump of a handshake, followed by a single data |
616 |
root |
1.16 |
packet. The greater than/less than lines indicate the direction of the |
617 |
|
|
transfer only. |
618 |
|
|
|
619 |
root |
1.43 |
> aemp;0;anon/57Cs1CggVJjzYaQp13XXg4;tls_md6_64_256,hmac_md6_64_256,tls_anon,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.8;timeout=12;peeraddr=10.0.0.17:4040 |
620 |
|
|
> yLgdG1ov/02shVkVQer3wzeuywZK+oraTdEQBmIqWHaegxSGDG4g+HqogLQbvdypFOsoDWJ1Sh4ImV4DMhvUBwTK |
621 |
|
|
|
622 |
|
|
< aemp;0;ruth;tls_md6_64_256,hmac_md6_64_256,tls_anon,cleartext;json,storable;provider=AE-0.8;timeout=12;peeraddr=10.0.0.1:37108 |
623 |
|
|
< +xMQXP8ElfNmuvEhsmcp+s2wCJOuQAsPxSg3d2Ewhs6gBnJz+ypVdWJ/wAVrXqlIJfLeVS/CBy4gEGkyWHSuVb1L |
624 |
|
|
|
625 |
|
|
> hmac_md6_64_256;5ad913855742ae5a03a5aeb7eafa4c78629de136bed6acd73eea36c9e98df44a;json |
626 |
|
|
|
627 |
|
|
< hmac_md6_64_256;84cd590976f794914c2ca26dac3a207a57a6798b9171289c114de07cf0c20401;json |
628 |
|
|
< ["","AnyEvent::MP::_spawn","57Cs1CggVJjzYaQp13XXg4.c","AnyEvent::MP::Global::connect",0,"anon/57Cs1CggVJjzYaQp13XXg4"] |
629 |
|
|
... |
630 |
|
|
|
631 |
|
|
The shared secret in use was C<8ugxrtw6H5tKnfPWfaSr4HGhE8MoJXmzTT1BWq7sLutNcD0IbXprQlZjIbl7MBKoeklG3IEfY9GlJthC0pENzk>. |
632 |
root |
1.16 |
|
633 |
root |
1.49 |
=head2 MONITORING |
634 |
|
|
|
635 |
|
|
Monitoring the connection itself is transport-specific. For TCP, all |
636 |
|
|
connection monitoring is currently left to TCP retransmit time-outs |
637 |
|
|
on a busy link, and TCP keepalive (which should be enabled) for idle |
638 |
|
|
connections. |
639 |
|
|
|
640 |
|
|
This is not sufficient for listener-less nodes, however: they need |
641 |
|
|
to regularly send data (30 seconds, or the monitoring interval, is |
642 |
|
|
recommended), so TCP actively probes. |
643 |
|
|
|
644 |
|
|
Future implementations of AnyEvent::Transport might query the kernel TCP |
645 |
|
|
buffer after a write timeout occurs, and if it is non-empty, shut down the |
646 |
|
|
connections, but this is an area of future research :) |
647 |
|
|
|
648 |
|
|
=head2 NODE PROTOCOL |
649 |
|
|
|
650 |
|
|
The transport simply transfers messages, but to implement a full node, a |
651 |
|
|
special node port must exist that understands a number of requests. |
652 |
|
|
|
653 |
|
|
If you are interested in implementing this, drop us a note so we finish |
654 |
|
|
the documentation. |
655 |
|
|
|
656 |
root |
1.1 |
=head1 SEE ALSO |
657 |
|
|
|
658 |
root |
1.29 |
L<AnyEvent::MP>. |
659 |
root |
1.1 |
|
660 |
|
|
=head1 AUTHOR |
661 |
|
|
|
662 |
|
|
Marc Lehmann <schmorp@schmorp.de> |
663 |
|
|
http://home.schmorp.de/ |
664 |
|
|
|
665 |
|
|
=cut |
666 |
|
|
|
667 |
|
|
1 |
668 |
|
|
|