--- gvpe/NEWS 2014/01/16 07:53:44 1.121 +++ gvpe/NEWS 2016/06/30 11:43:38 1.130 @@ -5,32 +5,22 @@ TODO: replace ripemd160 as the only authentication hash. TODO: increase rsa size. TODO: replace transport bits by transport endpoint structs? -TODO: ecdh to avoid session replay attacks TODO: http://incog-izick.blogspot.de/2011/08/using-openssl-aes-gcm.html TODO: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12153009/openssl-c-example-of-aes-gcm-using-evp-interfaces -proposed: 3 types, req, resreq, res - -req (hmac1) rsa(seqno1 hmac1 aes1 seqno2 hmac2 aes2 auth) ecdh1 -res (hmac1) hash(rsa-contents) ecdh2 - -req hmac0(*) rsa(seqno hmac0 hmac aes auth) hkdf-salt ecdh1 -res hmac0(rsa-contents ecdh2) - hmac_key = hkdf(hkdf-salt, hmac | ecdh) - aes_key = hkdf(hkdf-salt, aes | ecdh) - -TODO: protocol magic fixen(!!!) -TODO: "global" TODO: verify TODO: make sense of overhead calculation TODO: if-up &c should not be scripts? -TODO: low-power TODO: ipv6 +TODO: gvpectrl should not use default privatekey,. or maybe document it better +TODO: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=828336 - INCOMPATIBLE CHANGE: core protocol version 1.0. - - INCOMPATIBLE CHANGE: node sextions are now introduced + - INCOMPATIBLE CHANGE: node sections are now introduced with "node nodename", not "node = nodename". + - add workaround for temporary/rare ENOBUFS condition. - while individual packets couldn't be replayed, a whole session could be replayed - this has been fixed by an extra key exchange. + - fix a delete vs. delete [] mismatch in the central logging function. - in addition to rsa key exchange and authentication, the handshake now adds a diffie-hellman key exchange (using curve25119) for perfect forward secrecy. mac and cipher keys are derived using HKDF. @@ -43,6 +33,11 @@ only missing private keys. private keys are also put into the configured location. - the pid-file now accepts %s as nodename as elsewhere. + - switch to counter mode (only aes supported at the moment in + openssl). this gets rid of the need to generate a random iv, + is likely more secure (and, as a side effect, gets rid of + slow randomness generation. counter mode is often faster + then cbc mode as well, and packets are smaller). - no longer use RAND_bytes to generate session keys - you NEED a real source of entropy now (e.g. egd or /dev/random - see the openssl documentation). @@ -50,13 +45,6 @@ and will be merged. - a new directive "global" switches back to the global section of the config file. - - 12 random prefix bytes are now properly supported, leading to - a fully random IV. - - use aes with a random key in counter-mode to generate IVs, - for speed reasons (generating 12 random bytes with openssl can - take longer than encrypting and mac'ing a 1.5kb packet, and IVs - do not need to be cryptographically strong random numbers - (and in fact, shouldn't be)). - if-up scripts can now be specified with absolute paths. - new global option: serial, to detect configuration mismatches. - use HKDF as authentication proof, not HMAC or a plain hash @@ -66,6 +54,12 @@ authentication errors are now being ignored for 3 seconds. - log the reason for a conneciton loss. - use a (hopefully) constant time memcmp to compare internal secrets. + - fix a (harmless) errornous out of bounds stack read that would trigger + gcc's -fsanitize=address. + - bump old packet window size from 512 to 65536. + - update for big changes in openssl 1.1 API, wrap primitives + to make further changes easier. + - correctly check return values for openssl 1.0.0 and later. 2.25 Sat Jul 13 06:42:33 CEST 2013 - INCOMPATIBLE CHANGE: no longer enable udp protocol if no other