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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.93 by root, Tue Feb 15 13:31:23 2011 UTC vs.
Revision 1.100 by root, Wed Jul 17 05:34:17 2013 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
43#include "conf.h" 43#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 44#include "slog.h"
45#include "device.h" 45#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 46#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 47#include "connection.h"
48#include "hkdf.h"
48 49
49#include "netcompat.h" 50#include "netcompat.h"
50 51
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 52#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
57 53
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 54#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 55#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 56#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 57#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
108struct crypto_ctx 104struct crypto_ctx
109{ 105{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 107 HMAC_CTX hctx;
112 108
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 109 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 110 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 111};
116 112
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 113crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 114{
115 ecdh_key s;
116
117 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
118
119 {
120 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
121 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
122
123 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
124 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
125 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
126 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
127 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
128 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
129
130 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
131 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
132 }
133
134 {
135 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
136 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
137
138 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
139 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
140 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
141 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
142 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
143 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
144
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 145 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 146 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 147 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 148}
124 149
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 150crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 151{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 152 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 153 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
129} 154}
130 155
156static inline void
157auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
158{
159 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
160 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
161 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
162 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
163
164 memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
165}
166
167static inline bool
168auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
169{
170 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
171
172 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
173 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
174 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
175 return 0;
176
177 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
178 memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
179
180 return 1;
181}
182
131static void 183static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 184auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 185{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 186 HMAC_CTX ctx;
135 187
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 188 HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 189 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); 190 require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); 191 require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); 192 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 193}
143 194
144struct rsa_entry 195void
196connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 197{
146 tstamp expire; 198 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 199 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 200 // request data
160 { 201 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 202 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
203 auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
162 204
163 erase (i); 205 // eventual response data
164 return true; 206 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 207 }
167 208
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 209 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 210 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 211}
213 212
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 213//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 214
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 215pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
374{ 373{
375 unsigned int xlen; 374 unsigned int xlen;
376 375
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 376 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
378 377
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); 378 require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), 379 require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); 380 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen); 381 require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
383} 382}
384 383
385void 384void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 385hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 386{
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 450 d[1] = cl;
452 } 451 }
453 } 452 }
454#endif 453#endif
455 454
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 455 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
457 456
458 struct { 457 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE 458#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; 459 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif 460#endif
462 u32 seqno; 461 u32 seqno;
463 } datahdr; 462 } datahdr;
464 463
465 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); 464 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
466#if RAND_SIZE 465#if RAND_SIZE
467 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); 466 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
468#endif 467#endif
469 468
470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 469 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 470 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); 471 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
… …
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 493 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 494 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 495 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); 496 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 497
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 498 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
500 499
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 500#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 501 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 502
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 503 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
… …
546 } 545 }
547}; 546};
548 547
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 548struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 549{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 550 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 551 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 552 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 553
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 554 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 555 bool chk_config () const;
560 556
561 static u8 get_features () 557 static u8 get_features ()
… …
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 574config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 575{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 576 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 577 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE; 578 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 579 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 580 features = get_features ();
587 581
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 582 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 583 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
584 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 585
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 586 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 587 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 588}
595 589
… …
598{ 592{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 593 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 594 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 595 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); 596 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 597 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 598 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 599 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 600 slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
601 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
602 slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 603 else
614 return true; 604 return true;
615 605
616 return false; 606 return false;
617} 607}
618 608
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 609struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 610{
621 char magic[8]; 611 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 612 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 613 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 614 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 615 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 616
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 617 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 618 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 619 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 620 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 621 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 622 protocols = protocols_;
634 623
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 624 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 625 }
637}; 626};
638 627
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 628struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 629{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 630 auth_response response;
645 631
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 632 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 633 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 634 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 635
… …
683}; 669};
684 670
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 671/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 672
687void 673void
688connection::connection_established () 674connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 675{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 676 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
677 return;
678
679 si = rsi;
680 protocol = rsi.prot;
681
682 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
683 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
684 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
685 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
686
687 if (::conf.script_node_up)
688 {
689 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
690 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
691 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
692 }
693
694 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
695 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
696
697 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
698 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
691 699
692 if (ictx && octx) 700 if (ictx && octx)
693 { 701 {
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 702 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 703 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
696 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); 704 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
705
697 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); 706 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
698 707
699 // send queued packets 708 // send queued packets
700 if (ictx && octx) 709 if (ictx && octx)
701 { 710 {
… …
712 } 721 }
713 } 722 }
714 723
715 vpn->connection_established (this); 724 vpn->connection_established (this);
716 } 725 }
726#if 0
717 else 727 else
718 { 728 {
719 retry_cnt = 0; 729 retry_cnt = 0;
720 establish_connection.start (5); 730 establish_connection.start (5);
721 keepalive.stop (); 731 keepalive.stop ();
722 rekey.stop (); 732 rekey.stop ();
723 } 733 }
734#endif
724} 735}
725 736
726void 737void
727connection::reset_si () 738connection::reset_si ()
728{ 739{
… …
774 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 785 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
775 786
776 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 787 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
777 788
778 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 789 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
779
780 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 790 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
781 791
782 delete pkt; 792 delete pkt;
783} 793}
784 794
… …
799void 809void
800connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 810connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
801{ 811{
802 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 812 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
803 813
804 rsachallenge chg; 814 generate_auth_data ();
805 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
806 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 815 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
807 816
808 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 817 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
809
810 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 818 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
811 819
812 delete pkt; 820 delete pkt;
813} 821}
814 822
815void 823void
816connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 824connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
817{ 825{
818 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 826 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
819 827
820 pkt->id = id; 828 auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
821 829 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
822 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
823
824 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
825 830
826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 831 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
827
828 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 832 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
829 833
830 delete pkt; 834 delete pkt;
831} 835}
832 836
… …
924 } 928 }
925 } 929 }
926 930
927 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 931 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
928 delete octx; octx = 0; 932 delete octx; octx = 0;
929#if ENABLE_DNS
930 dnsv4_reset_connection ();
931#endif
932 933
933 si.host = 0; 934 si.host = 0;
935
936 have_snd_auth = false;
937 have_rcv_auth = false;
938 auth_expire = 0.;
934 939
935 last_activity = 0.; 940 last_activity = 0.;
936 //last_si_change = 0.; 941 //last_si_change = 0.;
937 retry_cnt = 0; 942 retry_cnt = 0;
938 943
… …
1074 1079
1075 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1080 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1076 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1081 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1077 p->protocols, p->features); 1082 p->protocols, p->features);
1078 1083
1079 if (p->chk_config () 1084 if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1080 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1081 { 1085 {
1082 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1086 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1083 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1087 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1084 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1088 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1085 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1089 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1086 1090
1087 if (p->initiate) 1091 if (p->initiate)
1088 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1092 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1089 1093
1090 rsachallenge k; 1094 auth_data auth;
1091 1095
1092 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1096 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1093 { 1097 {
1094 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1098 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1095 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1099 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1096 break;
1097 } 1100 }
1098 else 1101 else
1099 { 1102 {
1100 delete octx; 1103 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1101 1104
1102 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1105 rcv_auth = auth;
1103 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1106 have_rcv_auth = true;
1104 1107
1108 send_auth_response (rsi);
1109
1110 if (chg)
1111 {
1105 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1112 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1106 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1113 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1107 1114
1108 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1109
1110 connection_established (); 1115 connection_established (rsi);
1111
1112 break; 1116 }
1113 } 1117 }
1118
1119 break;
1114 } 1120 }
1115 else 1121 else
1116 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), 1122 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1117 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1123 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1118 1124
… …
1127 1133
1128 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1134 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1129 1135
1130 if (p->chk_config ()) 1136 if (p->chk_config ())
1131 { 1137 {
1132 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1138 if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1133 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1134 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1135 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1136
1137 rsachallenge chg;
1138
1139 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1140 { 1139 {
1141 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1140 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1142 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1141 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1143 break;
1144 } 1142 }
1145 else 1143 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1146 { 1144 {
1147 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1145 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1148 1146 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1149 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1150 {
1151 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1152 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1153 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1147 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1154 break; 1148 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1155 }
1156 else
1157 {
1158 rsaresponse h;
1159 1149
1160 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1161
1162 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1163 {
1164 prot_minor = p->prot_minor; 1150 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1151 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1165 1152
1166 delete ictx; ictx = cctx; 1153 have_snd_auth = true;
1167
1168 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1169
1170 si = rsi;
1171 protocol = rsi.prot;
1172
1173 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1174 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1175 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1176 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1177
1178 connection_established (); 1154 connection_established (rsi);
1179
1180 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1181 {
1182 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1183 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1184 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1185 }
1186
1187 break;
1188 }
1189 else
1190 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1191 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1192 }
1193
1194 delete cctx;
1195 } 1155 }
1156
1157 break;
1196 } 1158 }
1197 } 1159 }
1198 1160
1199 send_reset (rsi); 1161 send_reset (rsi);
1200 break; 1162 break;
… …
1313 1275
1314 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1276 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1315 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1277 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1316 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1278 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1317 1279
1318 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x) [%d]", 1280 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1319 conf->nodename, 1281 conf->nodename,
1320 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, 1282 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1321 (const char *)p->si, 1283 (const char *)p->si,
1322 p->protocols, 1284 p->protocols,
1285 protocol,
1286 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1323 !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1287 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1324 1288
1325 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1289 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1326 1290
1327 if (dsi.valid ()) 1291 if (dsi.valid ())
1328 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1292 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1293 else
1294 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1295 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1296 (const char *)p->si);
1329 } 1297 }
1330 else 1298 else
1331 slog (L_WARN, 1299 slog (L_WARN,
1332 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1300 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1333 p->id); 1301 p->id);
… …
1342} 1310}
1343 1311
1344inline void 1312inline void
1345connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1313connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1346{ 1314{
1347 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15) 1315 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1316
1317 if (when >= 0)
1318 w.start (when);
1319 else if (when < -15)
1348 { 1320 {
1349 reset_connection (); 1321 reset_connection ();
1350 establish_connection (); 1322 establish_connection ();
1351 } 1323 }
1352 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1353 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1354 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1324 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1355 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1325 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1356 { 1326 {
1327 w.start (3);
1357 send_ping (si); 1328 send_ping (si);
1358 w.start (3);
1359 } 1329 }
1360 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1330 else if (when >= -10)
1361 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1331 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1362 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1332 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1363 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1333 w.start (when + 10);
1364 else 1334 else
1365 reset_connection (); 1335 reset_connection ();
1366} 1336}
1367 1337
1368void 1338void

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