[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.85 by pcg, Tue Jul 28 00:42:14 2009 UTC vs.
Revision 1.98 by root, Tue Jul 16 16:44:36 2013 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
43	#include "conf.h"	43	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	44	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	45	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	46	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	47	#include "connection.h"
		48	#include "hkdf.h"
48		49
49	#include "netcompat.h"	50	#include "netcompat.h"
50		51
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated)	52	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
57		53
58	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	54	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59	#define HLOG 15	55	#define HLOG 15
60	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	56	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	57	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
64	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	60	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65		61
66	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	62	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
67	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	63	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
68		64
		65	namespace
		66	{
69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	67	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	68	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
71	{	69	{
72	w.stop ();	70	w.stop ();
73		71
74	if (rs_queue.empty ())	72	if (rs_queue.empty ())
75	return;	73	return;
76		74
77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	75	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
78	if (pid)	76	if (pid)
79	{	77	{
80	w.set (pid);	78	w.set (pid);
81	w.start ();	79	w.start ();
82	}	80	}
83	else	81	else
84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	82	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
85		83
86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	84	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
87	rs_queue.pop ();	85	rs_queue.pop ();
88	}	86	}
		87	};
89		88
90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	89	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
91	static void	90	static void
92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	91	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
93	{	92	{
…		…
105	struct crypto_ctx	104	struct crypto_ctx
106	{	105	{
107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	106	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
108	HMAC_CTX hctx;	107	HMAC_CTX hctx;
109		108
110	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	109	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
111	~crypto_ctx ();	110	~crypto_ctx ();
112	};	111	};
113		112
114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	113	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
115	{	114	{
		115	ecdh_key s;
		116
		117	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		118
		119	{
		120	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		121	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		122
		123	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt));
		124	kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
		125	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		126	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		127	kdf.extract_done ();
		128	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		129
		130	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		131	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		132	}
		133
		134	{
		135	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		136	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		137
		138	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt));
		139	kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
		140	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		141	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		142	kdf.extract_done ();
		143	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		144
116	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	145	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
117	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	146	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
118	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	147	}
119	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
120	}	148	}
121		149
122	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	150	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
123	{	151	{
124	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	152	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
125	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	153	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
126	}	154	}
127		155
		156	static inline void
		157	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		158	{
		159	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		160	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		161	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		162	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		163	}
		164
		165	static inline bool
		166	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		167	{
		168	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		169
		170	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		171	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		172	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		173	return 0;
		174
		175	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		176
		177	return 1;
		178	}
		179
128	static void	180	static void
129	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	181	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
130	{	182	{
131	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	183	HMAC_CTX ctx;
132		184
133	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	185	HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
134	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	186	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));	187	require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
136	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
137	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));	188	require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
138	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);	189	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
139	}	190	}
140		191
141	struct rsa_entry	192	void
		193	connection::generate_auth_data ()
142	{	194	{
143	tstamp expire;	195	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
144	rsaid id;
145	rsachallenge chg;
146	};
147
148	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
149	{
150	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
151
152	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
153	{
154	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
155	{	196	{
156	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	197	// request data
157	{	198	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa);
158	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	199	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
		200	auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
159		201
160	erase (i);	202	// eventual response data
161	return true;	203	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
162	}
163	}	204	}
164		205
165	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	206	// every use prolongs the expiry
166	cleaner.again ();
167
168	return false;
169	}
170
171	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
172	{
173	rsa_entry e;
174
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
176	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
177
178	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	207	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
179	e.id = id;
180	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
181
182	push_back (e);
183
184	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
185	cleaner.again ();
186	}
187
188	rsa_cache ()
189	{
190	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
191	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
192	}
193
194	} rsa_cache;
195
196	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
197	{
198	if (empty ())
199	w.stop ();
200	else
201	{
202	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
203	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
204	i = erase (i);
205	else
206	++i;
207	}
208	}	208	}
209		209
210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
211		211
212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
226	delete p;	226	delete p;
227		227
228	delete [] queue;	228	delete [] queue;
229	}	229	}
230		230
		231	void
231	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	232	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
232	{	233	{
233	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	234	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
234		235
235	for (;;)	236	for (;;)
236	{	237	{
…		…
247		248
248	delete get ();	249	delete get ();
249	}	250	}
250	}	251	}
251		252
		253	void
252	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	254	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
253	{	255	{
254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	256	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
255		257
256	// start expiry timer	258	// start expiry timer
257	if (empty ())	259	if (empty ())
…		…
266	queue[i].tstamp = now;	268	queue[i].tstamp = now;
267		269
268	i = ni;	270	i = ni;
269	}	271	}
270		272
271	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	273	net_packet *
		274	pkt_queue::get ()
272	{	275	{
273	if (empty ())	276	if (empty ())
274	return 0;	277	return 0;
275		278
276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	279	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
300		303
301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	304	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
302	bool can (u32 host);	305	bool can (u32 host);
303	};	306	};
304		307
305	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	308	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
306		309
		310	bool
307	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	311	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
308	{	312	{
309	iterator i;	313	iterator i;
310		314
311	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	315	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
312	if (i->host == host)	316	if (i->host == host)
…		…
359		363
360	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	364	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
361		365
362	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	366	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
363		367
		368	void
364	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	369	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)
365	{	370	{
366	unsigned int xlen;	371	unsigned int xlen;
367		372
368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	373	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
369		374
370	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	375	require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
371	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	376	require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
372	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	377	len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
373	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);	378	require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
374	}	379	}
375		380
376	void	381	void
377	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	382	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
378	{	383	{
…		…
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	392	hmac_gen (ctx);
388		393
389	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	394	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	395	}
391		396
		397	void
392	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	398	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
393	{	399	{
394	type = type_;	400	type = type_;
395		401
396	int src = THISNODE->id;	402	int src = THISNODE->id;
397		403
…		…
402		408
403	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	409	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
404	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	410	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
405		411
406	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	412	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		413	{
		414	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		415
		416	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		417	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		418
		419	private:
		420	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
407	{	421	{
408	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
409
410	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
411	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
412	private:
413
414	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
415	{
416	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	422	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
417	}
418	};	423	}
		424	};
419		425
420	void	426	void
421	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	427	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
422	{	428	{
423	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	429	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
425	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;	431	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
426		432
427	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	433	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
428	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	434	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
429		435
430	if (conn->features & ENABLE_COMPRESSION)	436	if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
431	{	437	{
432	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);	438	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);
433		439
434	if (cl)	440	if (cl)
435	{	441	{
…		…
441	d[1] = cl;	447	d[1] = cl;
442	}	448	}
443	}	449	}
444	#endif	450	#endif
445		451
446	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	452	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
447		453
448	struct {	454	struct {
449	#if RAND_SIZE	455	#if RAND_SIZE
450	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	456	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
451	#endif	457	#endif
…		…
484	int outl = 0, outl2;	490	int outl = 0, outl2;
485	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	491	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
486	u8 *d;	492	u8 *d;
487	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	493	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
488		494
489	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	495	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
490		496
491	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	497	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
492	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	498	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
493		499
494	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	500	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
…		…
536	}	542	}
537	};	543	};
538		544
539	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	545	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
540	{	546	{
541	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
542	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
543	// hmacs simply will not work.
544	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	547	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
545	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	548	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
546	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	549	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
547		550
548	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	551	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
549	bool chk_config () const;	552	bool chk_config () const;
550		553
551	static u8 get_features ()	554	static u8 get_features ()
…		…
562	#endif	565	#endif
563	return f;	566	return f;
564	}	567	}
565	};	568	};
566		569
		570	void
567	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	571	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
568	{	572	{
569	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	573	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
570	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	574	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
571	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	575	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
572	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
573	flags = 0;	576	flags = 0;
574	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
575	features = get_features ();	577	features = get_features ();
576		578
577	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	579	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
578	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
579	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	580	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		581	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
580		582
581	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	583	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
582	set_hdr (type, dst);	584	set_hdr (type, dst);
583	}	585	}
584		586
		587	bool
585	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	588	config_packet::chk_config () const
586	{	589	{
587	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	590	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
588	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	591	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	592	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
590	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	593	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
591	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
592	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
593	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
594	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
595	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	594	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
596	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	595	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
597	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
598	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
599	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	596	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	597	slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		598	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		599	slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
601	else	600	else
602	return true;	601	return true;
603		602
604	return false;	603	return false;
605	}	604	}
606		605
607	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	606	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
608	{	607	{
609	char magic[8];	608	char magic[8];
610	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	609	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
611	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	610	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
612	u8 pad2, pad3;	611	u8 pad2, pad3;
613	rsaid id;	612	auth_encr encr;
614	rsaencrdata encr;
615		613
616	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	614	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
617	{	615	{
618	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	616	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
619	strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8);	617	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
620	initiate = !!initiate_;	618	initiate = !!initiate_;
621	protocols = protocols_;	619	protocols = protocols_;
622		620
623	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	621	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
624	}	622	}
625	};	623	};
626		624
627	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	625	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
628	{	626	{
629	rsaid id;
630	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
631	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
632	rsaresponse response;	627	auth_response response;
633		628
634	auth_res_packet (int dst)	629	auth_res_packet (int dst)
635	{	630	{
636	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	631	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
637		632
…		…
671	};	666	};
672		667
673	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	668	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
674		669
675	void	670	void
676	connection::connection_established ()	671	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
677	{	672	{
678	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	673	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		674	return;
		675
		676	si = rsi;
		677	protocol = rsi.prot;
		678
		679	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		680	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		681	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		682	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		683
		684	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		685	{
		686	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		687	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		688	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
		689	}
		690
		691	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		692	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		693
		694	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		695	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
679		696
680	if (ictx && octx)	697	if (ictx && octx)
681	{	698	{
682	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	699	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
683	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);	700	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
684	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);	701	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		702
685	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);	703	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
686		704
687	// send queued packets	705	// send queued packets
688	if (ictx && octx)	706	if (ictx && octx)
689	{	707	{
…		…
700	}	718	}
701	}	719	}
702		720
703	vpn->connection_established (this);	721	vpn->connection_established (this);
704	}	722	}
		723	#if 0
705	else	724	else
706	{	725	{
707	retry_cnt = 0;	726	retry_cnt = 0;
708	establish_connection.start (5);	727	establish_connection.start (5);
709	keepalive.stop ();	728	keepalive.stop ();
710	rekey.stop ();	729	rekey.stop ();
711	}	730	}
		731	#endif
712	}	732	}
713		733
714	void	734	void
715	connection::reset_si ()	735	connection::reset_si ()
716	{	736	{
…		…
762	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	782	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
763		783
764	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	784	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
765		785
766	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	786	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767
768	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	787	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
769		788
770	delete pkt;	789	delete pkt;
771	}	790	}
772		791
…		…
787	void	806	void
788	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	807	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
789	{	808	{
790	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	809	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
791		810
792	rsachallenge chg;	811	generate_auth_data ();
793	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
794	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	812	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
795		813
796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
797
798	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	815	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
799		816
800	delete pkt;	817	delete pkt;
801	}	818	}
802		819
803	void	820	void
804	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	821	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
805	{	822	{
806	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	823	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
807		824
808	pkt->id = id;	825	auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
809		826	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
810	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
811
812	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
813		827
814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	828	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
815
816	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	829	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
817		830
818	delete pkt;	831	delete pkt;
819	}	832	}
820		833
821	void	834	void
822	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	835	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
823	{	836	{
824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	837	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
825	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	838	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		839	conf->protocols);
826		840
827	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	841	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
828		842
829	r->hmac_set (octx);	843	r->hmac_set (octx);
830	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	844	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
833	}	847	}
834		848
835	inline void	849	inline void
836	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	850	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
837	{	851	{
838	if (!ictx	852	if (!(ictx && octx)
839	&& conf != THISNODE	853	&& conf != THISNODE
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	854	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
841	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	855	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
842	&& !w.is_active ())	856	&& !w.is_active ())
843	{	857	{
…		…
911	}	925	}
912	}	926	}
913		927
914	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	928	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
915	delete octx; octx = 0;	929	delete octx; octx = 0;
916	#if ENABLE_DNS
917	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
918	#endif
919		930
920	si.host = 0;	931	si.host = 0;
		932
		933	have_snd_auth = false;
		934	have_rcv_auth = false;
		935	auth_expire = 0.;
921		936
922	last_activity = 0.;	937	last_activity = 0.;
923	//last_si_change = 0.;	938	//last_si_change = 0.;
924	retry_cnt = 0;	939	retry_cnt = 0;
925		940
…		…
984	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	999	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
985	post_inject_queue ();	1000	post_inject_queue ();
986	}	1001	}
987	}	1002	}
988		1003
		1004	void
989	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1005	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
990	{	1006	{
991	if (ictx && octx)	1007	if (ictx && octx)
992	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1008	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
993	else	1009	else
994	{	1010	{
…		…
1000	void	1016	void
1001	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1017	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1002	{	1018	{
1003	last_activity = ev_now ();	1019	last_activity = ev_now ();
1004		1020
1005	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1021	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1006	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1022	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1007		1023
1008	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1024	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1009	return;	1025	return;
1010		1026
…		…
1020	{	1036	{
1021	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1037	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1022	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1038	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1023	}	1039	}
1024	else	1040	else
1025	// we would love to change thre socket address here, but ping's aren't	1041	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
1026	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.	1042	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1027	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1043	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1028		1044
1029	break;	1045	break;
1030		1046
1031	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1047	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
1032	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);	1048	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1049
		1050	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1051	// about our desire for communication.
		1052	establish_connection ();
1033	break;	1053	break;
1034		1054
1035	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1055	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1036	{	1056	{
1037	reset_connection ();	1057	reset_connection ();
…		…
1050	break;	1070	break;
1051		1071
1052	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1072	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1053	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1073	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1054	{	1074	{
1055	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1075	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1056		1076
1057	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1077	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1078	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1079	p->protocols, p->features);
1058		1080
1059	if (p->chk_config ()	1081	if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1060	&& (!strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) \|\| !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1061	{	1082	{
1062	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1083	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1063	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1084	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1064	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1085	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1065	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1086	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1066		1087
1067	if (p->initiate)	1088	if (p->initiate)
1068	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1089	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1069		1090
1070	rsachallenge k;	1091	auth_data auth;
1071		1092
1072	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1093	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1073	{	1094	{
1074	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1095	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1075	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1096	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1076	break;
1077	}	1097	}
1078	else	1098	else
1079	{	1099	{
1080	delete octx;	1100	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1081		1101
1082	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1102	rcv_auth = auth;
1083	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1103	have_rcv_auth = true;
1084		1104
		1105	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1106
		1107	if (chg)
		1108	{
1085	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1109	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1086	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1110	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1087		1111
1088	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1089
1090	connection_established ();	1112	connection_established (rsi);
1091
1092	break;	1113	}
1093	}	1114	}
		1115
		1116	break;
1094	}	1117	}
1095	else	1118	else
1096	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),	1119	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1097	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1120	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1098		1121
…		…
1107		1130
1108	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1131	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1109		1132
1110	if (p->chk_config ())	1133	if (p->chk_config ())
1111	{	1134	{
1112	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1135	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1113	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1114	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1115	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1116
1117	rsachallenge chg;
1118
1119	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1120	{	1136	{
1121	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1137	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1122	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1138	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1123	break;
1124	}	1139	}
1125	else	1140	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1126	{	1141	{
1127	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1142	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1128		1143	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1129	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1130	{
1131	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1132	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1133	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1144	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1134	break;	1145	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1135	}
1136	else
1137	{
1138	rsaresponse h;
1139		1146
1140	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1141
1142	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1143	{
1144	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;	1147	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
		1148	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1145		1149
1146	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;	1150	have_snd_auth = true;
1147
1148	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1149
1150	si = rsi;
1151	protocol = rsi.prot;
1152
1153	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1154	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1155	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1156	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1157
1158	connection_established ();	1151	connection_established (rsi);
1159
1160	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1161	{
1162	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1163	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1164	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1165	}
1166
1167	break;
1168	}
1169	else
1170	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1171	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1172	}
1173
1174	delete cctx;
1175	}	1152	}
		1153
		1154	break;
1176	}	1155	}
1177	}	1156	}
1178		1157
1179	send_reset (rsi);	1158	send_reset (rsi);
1180	break;	1159	break;
…		…
1257	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1236	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1258	{	1237	{
1259	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1238	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1260	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1239	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1261		1240
1262	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1241	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1263	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1242	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1243	p->protocols,
		1244	c->ictx && c->octx);
1264		1245
1265	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1246	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1266	{	1247	{
1267	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1248	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1268	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1249	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1291		1272
1292	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1273	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1293	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1274	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1294	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1275	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1295		1276
1296	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1277	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1278	conf->nodename,
1297	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1279	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1280	(const char *)p->si,
		1281	p->protocols,
		1282	protocol,
		1283	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1298	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1284	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1299		1285
1300	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1286	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1301		1287
1302	if (dsi.valid ())	1288	if (dsi.valid ())
1303	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1289	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1290	else
		1291	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1292	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1293	(const char *)p->si);
1304	}	1294	}
1305	else	1295	else
1306	slog (L_WARN,	1296	slog (L_WARN,
1307	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1297	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1308	p->id);	1298	p->id);
…		…
1317	}	1307	}
1318		1308
1319	inline void	1309	inline void
1320	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1310	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1321	{	1311	{
1322	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15)	1312	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1313
		1314	if (when >= 0)
		1315	w.start (when);
		1316	else if (when < -15)
1323	{	1317	{
1324	reset_connection ();	1318	reset_connection ();
1325	establish_connection ();	1319	establish_connection ();
1326	}	1320	}
1327	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1328	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1329	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1321	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1330	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1322	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1331	{	1323	{
		1324	w.start (3);
1332	send_ping (si);	1325	send_ping (si);
1333	w.start (3);
1334	}	1326	}
1335	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1327	else if (when >= -10)
1336	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1328	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1337	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1329	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1338	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1330	w.start (when + 10);
1339	else	1331	else
1340	reset_connection ();	1332	reset_connection ();
1341	}	1333	}
1342		1334
		1335	void
1343	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1336	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1344	{	1337	{
1345	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1338	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1346		1339
1347	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1340	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1348	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1341	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1342	THISNODE->protocols);
1349	p->hmac_set (octx);	1343	p->hmac_set (octx);
1350	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1344	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1351		1345
1352	delete p;	1346	delete p;
1353	}	1347	}
1354		1348
		1349	void
1355	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1350	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1356	{	1351	{
1357	char *env;	1352	char *env;
1358	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1353	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1359	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1354	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1360	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1355	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1361	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1356	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1362	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1357	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1363	}	1358	}
1364		1359
		1360	void
1365	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1361	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1366	{	1362	{
1367	vpn->script_init_env ();	1363	vpn->script_init_env ();
1368		1364
1369	char *env;	1365	char *env;
1370	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1366	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
…		…
1435	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1431	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1436		1432
1437	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1433	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1438	octx = ictx = 0;	1434	octx = ictx = 0;
1439		1435
1440	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1441	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1442
1443	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1436	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1444		1437
1445	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1438	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1446	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1439	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1447	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1440	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
…		…
1452	connection::~connection ()	1445	connection::~connection ()
1453	{	1446	{
1454	shutdown ();	1447	shutdown ();
1455	}	1448	}
1456		1449
		1450	void
1457	void connection_init ()	1451	connection_init ()
1458	{	1452	{
1459	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1453	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1460	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1454	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1461	}	1455	}
1462		1456

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.85 by pcg, Tue Jul 28 00:42:14 2009 UTC vs. Revision 1.98 by root, Tue Jul 16 16:44:36 2013 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.85 by pcg, Tue Jul 28 00:42:14 2009 UTC vs.
Revision 1.98 by root, Tue Jul 16 16:44:36 2013 UTC