… | |
… | |
48 | #include "hkdf.h" |
48 | #include "hkdf.h" |
49 | |
49 | |
50 | #include "netcompat.h" |
50 | #include "netcompat.h" |
51 | |
51 | |
52 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
52 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
|
|
53 | #define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D |
53 | |
54 | |
54 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
55 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
55 | #define HLOG 15 |
56 | #define HLOG 15 |
56 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
57 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
57 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
58 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
… | |
… | |
119 | { |
120 | { |
120 | u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE]; |
121 | u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE]; |
121 | static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key"; |
122 | static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key"; |
122 | |
123 | |
123 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
124 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
124 | kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm)); |
|
|
125 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
125 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
126 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
126 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
127 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
127 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
128 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
128 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
129 | |
129 | |
… | |
… | |
134 | { |
134 | { |
135 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
135 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
136 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
136 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
137 | |
137 | |
138 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
138 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
139 | kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm)); |
|
|
140 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key)); |
139 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key)); |
141 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
140 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
142 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
141 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
143 | kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info)); |
142 | kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info)); |
144 | |
143 | |
… | |
… | |
179 | |
178 | |
180 | return 1; |
179 | return 1; |
181 | } |
180 | } |
182 | |
181 | |
183 | static void |
182 | static void |
184 | auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac) |
183 | auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac) |
185 | { |
184 | { |
186 | HMAC_CTX ctx; |
185 | hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt |
187 | |
186 | kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa)); |
188 | HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx); |
187 | kdf.extract_done (); |
189 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0)); |
188 | kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info |
190 | require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth)); |
|
|
191 | require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0)); |
|
|
192 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); |
|
|
193 | } |
189 | } |
194 | |
190 | |
195 | void |
191 | void |
196 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
192 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
197 | { |
193 | { |
198 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
194 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
199 | { |
195 | { |
200 | // request data |
196 | // request data |
201 | RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa); |
197 | rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa); |
202 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
198 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
203 | auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac); |
|
|
204 | |
199 | |
205 | // eventual response data |
200 | // eventual response data |
206 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
201 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
207 | } |
202 | } |
208 | |
203 | |
… | |
… | |
364 | } |
359 | } |
365 | } |
360 | } |
366 | |
361 | |
367 | ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
362 | ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
368 | |
363 | |
369 | unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
|
|
370 | |
|
|
371 | void |
364 | void |
372 | hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
365 | hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest) |
373 | { |
366 | { |
374 | unsigned int xlen; |
|
|
375 | |
|
|
376 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; |
367 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; |
377 | |
368 | |
378 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); |
369 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); |
379 | require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), |
370 | require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet))); |
380 | len - sizeof (hmac_packet))); |
|
|
381 | require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen)); |
371 | require (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0)); |
382 | } |
372 | } |
383 | |
373 | |
384 | void |
374 | void |
385 | hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
375 | hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
386 | { |
376 | { |
387 | hmac_gen (ctx); |
377 | unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
388 | |
378 | hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest); |
389 | memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
379 | memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
390 | } |
380 | } |
391 | |
381 | |
392 | bool |
382 | bool |
393 | hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
383 | hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
394 | { |
384 | { |
395 | hmac_gen (ctx); |
385 | unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
396 | |
386 | hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest); |
397 | return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
387 | return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
398 | } |
388 | } |
399 | |
389 | |
400 | void |
390 | void |
401 | vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) |
391 | vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) |
… | |
… | |
461 | u32 seqno; |
451 | u32 seqno; |
462 | } datahdr; |
452 | } datahdr; |
463 | |
453 | |
464 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
454 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
465 | #if RAND_SIZE |
455 | #if RAND_SIZE |
466 | RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); |
456 | // NB: a constant (per session) random prefix |
|
|
457 | // is likely enough, but we don't take any chances. |
|
|
458 | conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); |
467 | #endif |
459 | #endif |
468 | |
460 | |
469 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
461 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
470 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
462 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
471 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
463 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
… | |
… | |
502 | |
494 | |
503 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
495 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
504 | d = cdata; |
496 | d = cdata; |
505 | else |
497 | else |
506 | #endif |
498 | #endif |
507 | d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; |
499 | d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR; |
508 | |
500 | |
509 | /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ |
501 | // we play do evil games with the struct layout atm. |
|
|
502 | // pending better solutions, we at least do some verification. |
|
|
503 | // this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago. |
|
|
504 | require (DATAHDR <= 16); |
|
|
505 | require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]); |
|
|
506 | |
|
|
507 | // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields |
510 | require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, |
508 | require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, |
511 | d, &outl2, |
509 | d, &outl2, |
512 | (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); |
510 | (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); |
513 | outl += outl2; |
511 | outl += outl2; |
514 | |
512 | |
… | |
… | |
545 | } |
543 | } |
546 | }; |
544 | }; |
547 | |
545 | |
548 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
546 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
549 | { |
547 | { |
|
|
548 | u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE]; |
550 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
549 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
551 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
550 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
552 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
551 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
553 | |
552 | |
554 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
553 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
555 | bool chk_config () const; |
554 | bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const; |
556 | |
555 | |
557 | static u8 get_features () |
556 | static u8 get_features () |
558 | { |
557 | { |
559 | u8 f = 0; |
558 | u8 f = 0; |
560 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
559 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
… | |
… | |
577 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
576 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
578 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
577 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
579 | flags = 0; |
578 | flags = 0; |
580 | features = get_features (); |
579 | features = get_features (); |
581 | |
580 | |
|
|
581 | strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
582 | |
582 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
583 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
583 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
584 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
584 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
585 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
585 | |
586 | |
586 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
587 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
587 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
588 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
588 | } |
589 | } |
589 | |
590 | |
590 | bool |
591 | bool |
591 | config_packet::chk_config () const |
592 | config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const |
592 | { |
593 | { |
593 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
594 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
594 | slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
595 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
|
|
596 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
595 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
597 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
596 | slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
598 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
|
|
599 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
597 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
600 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
598 | slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
601 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
602 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
599 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
603 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
600 | slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
604 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
605 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
601 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
606 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
602 | slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
607 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
608 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
603 | else |
609 | else |
|
|
610 | { |
|
|
611 | int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
612 | |
|
|
613 | if (cmp > 0) |
|
|
614 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"), |
|
|
615 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
616 | else if (cmp == 0) |
604 | return true; |
617 | return true; |
|
|
618 | } |
605 | |
619 | |
606 | return false; |
620 | return false; |
607 | } |
621 | } |
608 | |
622 | |
609 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
623 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
… | |
… | |
623 | |
637 | |
624 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
638 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
625 | } |
639 | } |
626 | }; |
640 | }; |
627 | |
641 | |
628 | struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
642 | struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED |
629 | { |
643 | { |
630 | auth_response response; |
644 | auth_response response; |
631 | |
645 | |
632 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
646 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
633 | { |
647 | { |
634 | config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
648 | set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
635 | |
649 | |
636 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
650 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
637 | } |
651 | } |
638 | }; |
652 | }; |
639 | |
653 | |
… | |
… | |
695 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
709 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
696 | |
710 | |
697 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
711 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
698 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
712 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
699 | |
713 | |
|
|
714 | oiv.reset (); |
|
|
715 | |
|
|
716 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
|
|
717 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
|
|
718 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
|
|
719 | |
|
|
720 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
|
|
721 | |
|
|
722 | // send queued packets |
700 | if (ictx && octx) |
723 | if (ictx && octx) |
701 | { |
724 | { |
702 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
725 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
703 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
|
|
704 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
|
|
705 | |
|
|
706 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
|
|
707 | |
|
|
708 | // send queued packets |
|
|
709 | if (ictx && octx) |
|
|
710 | { |
726 | { |
711 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
|
|
712 | { |
|
|
713 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
727 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
714 | delete p; |
728 | delete p; |
715 | } |
|
|
716 | |
|
|
717 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
|
|
718 | { |
|
|
719 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
|
|
720 | delete p; |
|
|
721 | } |
|
|
722 | } |
729 | } |
723 | |
730 | |
|
|
731 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
|
|
732 | { |
|
|
733 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
|
|
734 | delete p; |
|
|
735 | } |
|
|
736 | } |
|
|
737 | |
724 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
738 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
725 | } |
|
|
726 | #if 0 |
|
|
727 | else |
|
|
728 | { |
|
|
729 | retry_cnt = 0; |
|
|
730 | establish_connection.start (5); |
|
|
731 | keepalive.stop (); |
|
|
732 | rekey.stop (); |
|
|
733 | } |
|
|
734 | #endif |
|
|
735 | } |
739 | } |
736 | |
740 | |
737 | void |
741 | void |
738 | connection::reset_si () |
742 | connection::reset_si () |
739 | { |
743 | { |
… | |
… | |
823 | void |
827 | void |
824 | connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si) |
828 | connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si) |
825 | { |
829 | { |
826 | auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); |
830 | auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); |
827 | |
831 | |
828 | auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac); |
|
|
829 | memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b)); |
832 | memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b); |
|
|
833 | auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac); |
830 | |
834 | |
831 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
835 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
832 | send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly |
836 | send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly |
833 | |
837 | |
834 | delete pkt; |
838 | delete pkt; |
… | |
… | |
1059 | { |
1063 | { |
1060 | reset_connection (); |
1064 | reset_connection (); |
1061 | |
1065 | |
1062 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1066 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1063 | |
1067 | |
1064 | if (!p->chk_config ()) |
1068 | if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
1065 | { |
|
|
1066 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."), |
|
|
1067 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1068 | connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED; |
|
|
1069 | } |
|
|
1070 | else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
|
|
1071 | establish_connection (); |
1069 | establish_connection (); |
1072 | } |
1070 | } |
1073 | break; |
1071 | break; |
1074 | |
1072 | |
1075 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
1073 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
… | |
… | |
1079 | |
1077 | |
1080 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1078 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1081 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1079 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1082 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1080 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1083 | |
1081 | |
1084 | if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
1082 | if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
|
|
1083 | { |
|
|
1084 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"), |
|
|
1085 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1086 | } |
|
|
1087 | else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi)) |
1085 | { |
1088 | { |
1086 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1089 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1087 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1090 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1088 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1091 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1089 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
1092 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
… | |
… | |
1116 | } |
1119 | } |
1117 | } |
1120 | } |
1118 | |
1121 | |
1119 | break; |
1122 | break; |
1120 | } |
1123 | } |
1121 | else |
|
|
1122 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), |
|
|
1123 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1124 | |
1124 | |
1125 | send_reset (rsi); |
1125 | send_reset (rsi); |
1126 | } |
1126 | } |
1127 | |
1127 | |
1128 | break; |
1128 | break; |
… | |
… | |
1131 | { |
1131 | { |
1132 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1132 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1133 | |
1133 | |
1134 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1134 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1135 | |
1135 | |
1136 | if (p->chk_config ()) |
1136 | auth_mac local_mac; |
|
|
1137 | auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac); |
|
|
1138 | |
|
|
1139 | if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac)) |
1137 | { |
1140 | { |
1138 | if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac))) |
|
|
1139 | { |
|
|
1140 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1141 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1141 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1142 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1142 | } |
1143 | } |
1143 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
1144 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
1144 | { |
1145 | { |
1145 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
|
|
1146 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
|
|
1147 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
|
|
1148 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
|
|
1149 | |
|
|
1150 | prot_minor = p->prot_minor; |
|
|
1151 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b)); |
1146 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b); |
1152 | |
1147 | |
1153 | have_snd_auth = true; |
1148 | have_snd_auth = true; |
1154 | connection_established (rsi); |
1149 | connection_established (rsi); |
1155 | } |
|
|
1156 | |
|
|
1157 | break; |
|
|
1158 | } |
1150 | } |
1159 | } |
1151 | } |
1160 | |
|
|
1161 | send_reset (rsi); |
|
|
1162 | break; |
1152 | break; |
1163 | |
1153 | |
1164 | case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: |
1154 | case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: |
1165 | #if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
1155 | #if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
1166 | send_reset (rsi); |
1156 | send_reset (rsi); |