[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.100 by root, Wed Jul 17 05:34:17 2013 UTC vs.
Revision 1.113 by root, Thu Jan 29 00:21:39 2015 UTC

…		…
33		33
34	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
35	#include <queue>	35	#include <queue>
36	#include <utility>	36	#include <utility>
37		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
39	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
40	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
		43
		44	// openssl 0.9.8 compatibility
		45	#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
		46	#define require101(exp) exp
		47	#else
		48	#define require101(exp) require (exp)
		49	#endif
42		50
43	#include "conf.h"	51	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	52	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	53	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	54	#include "vpn.h"
…		…
119	{	127	{
120	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];	128	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
121	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";	129	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
122		130
123	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());	131	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
124	kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
125	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));	132	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
126	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));	133	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
127	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());	134	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
128	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));	135	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
129		136
130	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	137	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
131	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));	138	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
132	}	139	}
133		140
134	{	141	{
135	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];	142	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
136	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";	143	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
137		144
138	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());	145	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
139	kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
140	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));	146	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
141	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));	147	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
142	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());	148	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
143	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));	149	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
144		150
…		…
179		185
180	return 1;	186	return 1;
181	}	187	}
182		188
183	static void	189	static void
184	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)	190	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
185	{	191	{
186	HMAC_CTX ctx;	192	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
187		193	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
188	HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);	194	kdf.extract_done ();
189	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));	195	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
190	require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
191	require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
192	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
193	}	196	}
194		197
195	void	198	void
196	connection::generate_auth_data ()	199	connection::generate_auth_data ()
197	{	200	{
198	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())	201	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
199	{	202	{
200	// request data	203	// request data
201	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa);	204	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
202	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);	205	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
203	auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
204		206
205	// eventual response data	207	// eventual response data
206	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);	208	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
207	}	209	}
208		210
…		…
364	}	366	}
365	}	367	}
366		368
367	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	369	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
368		370
369	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
370
371	void	371	void
372	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	372	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx ctx, u8 hmac_digest)
373	{	373	{
374	unsigned int xlen;
375
376	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	374	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
377		375
378	require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	376	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
379	require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	377	require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
380	len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
381	require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));	378	require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
382	}	379	}
383		380
384	void	381	void
385	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	382	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
386	{	383	{
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	384	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
388		385	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
389	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	386	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	387	}
391		388
392	bool	389	bool
393	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	390	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
394	{	391	{
395	hmac_gen (ctx);	392	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
396		393	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
397	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	394	return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
398	}	395	}
399		396
400	void	397	void
401	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	398	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
402	{	399	{
…		…
408	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);	405	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);
409	dst1 = dst;	406	dst1 = dst;
410	}	407	}
411		408
412	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	409	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
413	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
414		410
415	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	411	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
416	{	412	{
417	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno	413	u32 ctr; // seqno
		414	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA];
418		415
419	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);	416	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
420	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);	417	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
421		418
422	private:	419	private:
423	const u32 data_hdr_size () const	420	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
424	{	421	{
425	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	422	// the distance from beginning of packet to data member
		423	return data - at (0);
426	}	424	}
427	};	425	};
		426
		427	// expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV
		428	static unsigned char *
		429	expand_iv (u32 ctr)
		430	{
		431	static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4];
		432
		433	require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4);
		434	require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0);
		435
		436	iv[0] =
		437	iv[1] =
		438	iv[2] = ctr;
		439
		440	// I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues,
		441	// but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok,
		442	// and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise
		443	// to 0.
		444	iv[3] = 0;
		445
		446	return (unsigned char *)iv;
		447	}
428		448
429	void	449	void
430	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	450	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
431	{	451	{
432	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	452	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
450	d[1] = cl;	470	d[1] = cl;
451	}	471	}
452	}	472	}
453	#endif	473	#endif
454		474
455	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));	475	ctr = htonl (seqno);
456		476
457	struct {	477	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
458	#if RAND_SIZE
459	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
460	#endif
461	u32 seqno;
462	} datahdr;
463
464	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
465	#if RAND_SIZE
466	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
467	#endif
468		478
469	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	479	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
470	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	480	(unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2,
471	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	481	(unsigned char *)d, l));
472	outl += outl2;	482	outl += outl2;
473		483
474	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	484	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
475	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	485	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2));
476	(unsigned char *) d, l));
477	outl += outl2;	486	outl += outl2;
478		487
479	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
480	outl += outl2;
481
482	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();	488	len = data_hdr_size () + outl;
483		489
484	set_hdr (type, dst);	490	set_hdr (type, dst);
485		491
486	hmac_set (conn->octx);	492	hmac_set (conn->octx);
487	}	493	}
…		…
491	{	497	{
492	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx;	498	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx;
493	int outl = 0, outl2;	499	int outl = 0, outl2;
494	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	500	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
495	u8 *d;	501	u8 *d;
496	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
497		502
498	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));	503	seqno = ntohl (ctr);
		504
		505	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
499		506
500	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	507	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
501	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	508	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
502		509
503	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	510	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
504	d = cdata;	511	d = cdata;
505	else	512	else
506	#endif	513	#endif
507	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	514	d = &(*p)[6 + 6];
508		515
509	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	516	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
510	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	517	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
511	d, &outl2,	518	d, &outl2,
512	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	519	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
513	outl += outl2;	520	outl += outl2;
514		521
		522	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
515	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));	523	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
516	outl += outl2;	524	outl += outl2;
517		525
518	seqno = ntohl ((u32 )(d + RAND_SIZE));
519
520	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);	526	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
521	id2mac (src (), p->src);	527	id2mac (src (), p->src);
522		528
523	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	529	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
524	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	530	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
525	{	531	{
526	u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) \| d[DATAHDR + 1];	532	u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) \| d[1];
527		533
528	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0,	534	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0,
529	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)	535	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)
530	+ 6 + 6;	536	+ 6 + 6;
531	}	537	}
532	else	538	else
533	p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR);	539	p->len = outl + (6 + 6);
534	#endif	540	#endif
535		541
536	return p;	542	return p;
537	}	543	}
538		544
…		…
545	}	551	}
546	};	552	};
547		553
548	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	554	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
549	{	555	{
		556	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
550	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
551	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
552	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
553		560
554	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
555	bool chk_config () const;	562	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
556		563
557	static u8 get_features ()	564	static u8 get_features ()
558	{	565	{
559	u8 f = 0;	566	u8 f = 0;
560	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	567	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
573	void	580	void
574	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
575	{	582	{
576	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
577	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
578	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
579	flags = 0;	585	flags = 0;
580	features = get_features ();	586	features = get_features ();
		587
		588	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
581		589
582	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));	590	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
583	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));	591	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
584	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));	592	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
585		593
586	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	594	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
587	set_hdr (type, dst);	595	set_hdr (type, dst);
588	}	596	}
589		597
590	bool	598	bool
591	config_packet::chk_config () const	599	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
592	{	600	{
593	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	601	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
594	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	602	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
595	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	603	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
596	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
597	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))	604	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
598	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));	605	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		606	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
599	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))	607	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));	608	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		609	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
601	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))	610	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
602	slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));	611	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		612	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
603	else	613	else
		614	{
		615	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		616
		617	if (cmp > 0)
		618	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		619	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		620	else if (cmp == 0)
604	return true;	621	return true;
		622	}
605		623
606	return false;	624	return false;
607	}	625	}
608		626
609	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED	627	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
…		…
623		641
624	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	642	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
625	}	643	}
626	};	644	};
627		645
628	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED	646	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
629	{	647	{
630	auth_response response;	648	auth_response response;
631		649
632	auth_res_packet (int dst)	650	auth_res_packet (int dst)
633	{	651	{
634	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	652	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
635		653
636	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	654	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
637	}	655	}
638	};	656	};
639		657
…		…
679	si = rsi;	697	si = rsi;
680	protocol = rsi.prot;	698	protocol = rsi.prot;
681		699
682	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),	700	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
683	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	701	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
684	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",	702	vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
685	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);	703	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
686		704
687	if (::conf.script_node_up)	705	if (::conf.script_node_up)
688	{	706	{
689	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;	707	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
…		…
695	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);	713	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
696		714
697	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);	715	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
698	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;	716	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
699		717
700	if (ictx && octx)
701	{
702	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	718	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
703	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);	719	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
704	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);	720	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
705		721
		722	hmac_error = 0.;
		723
706	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);	724	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
707		725
708	// send queued packets	726	// send queued packets
709	if (ictx && octx)
710	{
711	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())	727	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
712	{	728	{
713	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	729	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
714	delete p;	730	delete p;
715	}	731	}
716		732
717	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())	733	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
718	{	734	{
719	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);	735	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
720	delete p;	736	delete p;
721	}	737	}
722	}
723		738
724	vpn->connection_established (this);	739	vpn->connection_established (this);
725	}
726	#if 0
727	else
728	{
729	retry_cnt = 0;
730	establish_connection.start (5);
731	keepalive.stop ();
732	rekey.stop ();
733	}
734	#endif
735	}	740	}
736		741
737	void	742	void
738	connection::reset_si ()	743	connection::reset_si ()
739	{	744	{
…		…
744	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);	749	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
745	protocol = 0;	750	protocol = 0;
746	}	751	}
747		752
748	si.set (conf, protocol);	753	si.set (conf, protocol);
749
750	is_direct = si.valid ();
751	}	754	}
752		755
753	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary	756	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
754	const sockinfo &	757	const sockinfo &
755	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const	758	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
…		…
774		777
775	void	778	void
776	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)	779	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
777	{	780	{
778	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))	781	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
779	reset_connection ();	782	reset_connection ("packet send error");
780	}	783	}
781		784
782	void	785	void
783	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)	786	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
784	{	787	{
…		…
823	void	826	void
824	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)	827	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
825	{	828	{
826	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	829	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
827		830
828	auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
829	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));	831	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
		832	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
830		833
831	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	834	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
832	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	835	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
833		836
834	delete pkt;	837	delete pkt;
…		…
860	{	863	{
861	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection	864	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
862	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.	865	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
863	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())	866	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
864	{	867	{
865	reset_connection ();	868	reset_connection ("no demand");
866	return;	869	return;
867	}	870	}
868		871
869	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();	872	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
870		873
…		…
872	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1	875	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
873	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));	876	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
874		877
875	reset_si ();	878	reset_si ();
876		879
877	bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW;	880	bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) \|\| (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power);
878		881
879	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))	882	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
880	{	883	{
881	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */	884	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
882	w.start (1);	885	w.start (1);
…		…
892		895
893	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);	896	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
894		897
895	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))	898	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
896	{	899	{
897	if (retry_cnt < 4)	900	// use ping after the first few retries
		901	// TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
		902	// TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
		903	if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power))
898	send_auth_request (dsi, true);	904	send_auth_request (dsi, true);
899	else	905	else
900	send_ping (dsi, 0);	906	send_ping (dsi, 0);
901	}	907	}
902	}	908	}
903		909
904	retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9;	910	retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
905		911
906	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)	912	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
907	retry_cnt++;	913	retry_cnt++;
908	else	914	else
909	retry_int = conf->max_retry;	915	retry_int = conf->max_retry;
…		…
911	w.start (retry_int);	917	w.start (retry_int);
912	}	918	}
913	}	919	}
914		920
915	void	921	void
916	connection::reset_connection ()	922	connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
917	{	923	{
918	if (ictx && octx)	924	if (ictx && octx)
919	{	925	{
920	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"),	926	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
921	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	927	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
922		928
923	if (::conf.script_node_down)	929	if (::conf.script_node_down)
924	{	930	{
925	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;	931	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
926	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);	932	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
…		…
950	connection::shutdown ()	956	connection::shutdown ()
951	{	957	{
952	if (ictx && octx)	958	if (ictx && octx)
953	send_reset (si);	959	send_reset (si);
954		960
955	reset_connection ();	961	reset_connection ("shutdown");
956	}	962	}
957		963
958	// poor-man's rekeying	964	// poor-man's rekeying
959	inline void	965	inline void
960	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	966	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
961	{	967	{
962	reset_connection ();	968	reset_connection ("rekeying");
963	establish_connection ();	969	establish_connection ();
964	}	970	}
965		971
966	void	972	void
967	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)	973	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
…		…
984		990
985	void	991	void
986	connection::post_inject_queue ()	992	connection::post_inject_queue ()
987	{	993	{
988	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)	994	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
989	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary	995	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
990	establish_connection.stop ();	996	establish_connection.stop ();
991		997
992	establish_connection ();	998	establish_connection ();
993	}	999	}
994		1000
…		…
1054	// about our desire for communication.	1060	// about our desire for communication.
1055	establish_connection ();	1061	establish_connection ();
1056	break;	1062	break;
1057		1063
1058	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1064	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
		1065	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
		1066
		1067	if (ictx && octx)
1059	{	1068	{
1060	reset_connection ();	1069	reset_connection ("remote reset");
1061		1070
1062	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1071	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1063		1072
1064	if (!p->chk_config ())	1073	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1065	{
1066	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1067	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1068	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1069	}
1070	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1071	establish_connection ();	1074	establish_connection ();
1072	}	1075	}
		1076
1073	break;	1077	break;
1074		1078
1075	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1079	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1076	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1080	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1077	{	1081	{
…		…
1079		1083
1080	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",	1084	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1081	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",	1085	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1082	p->protocols, p->features);	1086	p->protocols, p->features);
1083		1087
1084	if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))	1088	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1089	{
		1090	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1091	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1092	}
		1093	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1085	{	1094	{
1086	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1095	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1087	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1096	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1088	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1097	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1089	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1098	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1090		1099
1091	if (p->initiate)	1100	if (p->initiate)
		1101	{
1092	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1102	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
		1103
		1104	if (ictx && octx)
		1105	reset_connection ("reconnect");
		1106	}
1093		1107
1094	auth_data auth;	1108	auth_data auth;
1095		1109
1096	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))	1110	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1097	{	1111	{
1098	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1112	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1099	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1113	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1100	}	1114	}
1101	else	1115	else
1102	{	1116	{
1103	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);	1117	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1104		1118
1105	rcv_auth = auth;	1119	rcv_auth = auth;
1106	have_rcv_auth = true;	1120	have_rcv_auth = true;
1107		1121
1108	send_auth_response (rsi);	1122	send_auth_response (rsi);
…		…
1116	}	1130	}
1117	}	1131	}
1118		1132
1119	break;	1133	break;
1120	}	1134	}
1121	else
1122	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1123	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1124		1135
1125	send_reset (rsi);	1136	send_reset (rsi);
1126	}	1137	}
1127		1138
1128	break;	1139	break;
…		…
1131	{	1142	{
1132	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;	1143	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1133		1144
1134	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1145	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1135		1146
1136	if (p->chk_config ())	1147	auth_mac local_mac;
		1148	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1149
		1150	if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1137	{	1151	{
1138	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1139	{
1140	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),	1152	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1141	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1153	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1142	}	1154	}
1143	else if (!have_snd_auth)	1155	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1144	{	1156	{
1145	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1146	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1147	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1148	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1149
1150	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1151	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));	1157	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1152		1158
1153	have_snd_auth = true;	1159	have_snd_auth = true;
1154	connection_established (rsi);	1160	connection_established (rsi);
1155	}
1156
1157	break;
1158	}	1161	}
1159	}	1162	}
1160
1161	send_reset (rsi);
1162	break;	1163	break;
1163		1164
1164	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1165	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1165	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1166	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1166	send_reset (rsi);	1167	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1172	if (ictx && octx)	1173	if (ictx && octx)
1173	{	1174	{
1174	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;	1175	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;
1175		1176
1176	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))	1177	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
		1178	{
		1179	// rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
		1180	// we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
		1181	// and suppress messages and resets during that time.
		1182	//TODO: should be done per source address
		1183	if (!hmac_error)
		1184	{
		1185	hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
		1186	break;
		1187	}
		1188	else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
		1189	break; // silently suppress
		1190	else
		1191	{
1177	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"	1192	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1178	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),	1193	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1179	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1194	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1195	// reset
		1196	}
		1197	}
1180	else	1198	else
1181	{	1199	{
1182	u32 seqno;	1200	u32 seqno;
1183	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);	1201	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
1184	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);	1202	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
		1203
		1204	hmac_error = 0;
1185		1205
1186	if (seqclass == 0) // ok	1206	if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1187	{	1207	{
1188	vpn->tap->send (d);	1208	vpn->tap->send (d);
1189		1209
…		…
1316		1336
1317	if (when >= 0)	1337	if (when >= 0)
1318	w.start (when);	1338	w.start (when);
1319	else if (when < -15)	1339	else if (when < -15)
1320	{	1340	{
1321	reset_connection ();	1341	reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1322	establish_connection ();	1342	establish_connection ();
1323	}	1343	}
1324	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1344	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1325	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1345	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1326	{	1346	{
…		…
1330	else if (when >= -10)	1350	else if (when >= -10)
1331	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1351	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1332	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1352	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1333	w.start (when + 10);	1353	w.start (when + 10);
1334	else	1354	else
1335	reset_connection ();	1355	reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1336	}	1356	}
1337		1357
1338	void	1358	void
1339	connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1359	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1340	{	1360	{
…		…
1440		1460
1441	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1461	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1442	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1462	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1443	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1463	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1444		1464
1445	reset_connection ();	1465	reset_connection ("startup");
1446	}	1466	}
1447		1467
1448	connection::~connection ()	1468	connection::~connection ()
1449	{	1469	{
1450	shutdown ();	1470	shutdown ();

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.100 by root, Wed Jul 17 05:34:17 2013 UTC vs. Revision 1.113 by root, Thu Jan 29 00:21:39 2015 UTC

Diff Legend

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.100 by root, Wed Jul 17 05:34:17 2013 UTC vs.
Revision 1.113 by root, Thu Jan 29 00:21:39 2015 UTC