[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.87 by pcg, Fri Nov 12 18:39:33 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.101 by root, Wed Jul 17 16:40:57 2013 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
43	#include "conf.h"	43	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	44	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	45	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	46	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	47	#include "connection.h"
		48	#include "hkdf.h"
48		49
49	#include "netcompat.h"	50	#include "netcompat.h"
50		51
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated)	52	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		53	#define MAGIC "PORN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57		54
58	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	55	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59	#define HLOG 15	56	#define HLOG 15
60	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	57	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	58	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
64	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	61	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65		62
66	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	63	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
67	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	64	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
68		65
		66	namespace
		67	{
69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
71	{	70	{
72	w.stop ();	71	w.stop ();
73		72
74	if (rs_queue.empty ())	73	if (rs_queue.empty ())
75	return;	74	return;
76		75
77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
78	if (pid)	77	if (pid)
79	{	78	{
80	w.set (pid);	79	w.set (pid);
81	w.start ();	80	w.start ();
82	}	81	}
83	else	82	else
84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
85		84
86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
87	rs_queue.pop ();	86	rs_queue.pop ();
88	}	87	}
		88	};
89		89
90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
91	static void	91	static void
92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
93	{	93	{
…		…
105	struct crypto_ctx	105	struct crypto_ctx
106	{	106	{
107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
108	HMAC_CTX hctx;	108	HMAC_CTX hctx;
109		109
110	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	110	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
111	~crypto_ctx ();	111	~crypto_ctx ();
112	};	112	};
113		113
114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
115	{	115	{
		116	ecdh_key s;
		117
		118	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		119
		120	{
		121	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		122	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		123
		124	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		125	kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
		126	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		127	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		128	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		129	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		130
		131	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		132	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		133	}
		134
		135	{
		136	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		137	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		138
		139	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		140	kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
		141	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		142	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		143	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		144	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		145
116	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	146	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
117	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	147	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
118	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	148	}
119	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
120	}	149	}
121		150
122	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	151	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
123	{	152	{
124	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	153	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
125	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	154	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
126	}	155	}
127		156
		157	static inline void
		158	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		159	{
		160	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		161	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		162	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		163	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		164
		165	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		166	}
		167
		168	static inline bool
		169	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		170	{
		171	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		172
		173	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		174	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		175	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		176	return 0;
		177
		178	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		179	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		180
		181	return 1;
		182	}
		183
128	static void	184	static void
129	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	185	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
130	{	186	{
131	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	187	HMAC_CTX ctx;
132		188
133	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	189	HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
134	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	190	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));	191	require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
136	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
137	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));	192	require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
138	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);	193	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
139	}	194	}
140		195
141	struct rsa_entry	196	void
		197	connection::generate_auth_data ()
142	{	198	{
143	tstamp expire;	199	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
144	rsaid id;
145	rsachallenge chg;
146	};
147
148	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
149	{
150	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
151
152	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
153	{
154	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
155	{	200	{
156	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	201	// request data
157	{	202	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
158	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	203	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
		204	auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
159		205
160	erase (i);	206	// eventual response data
161	return true;	207	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
162	}
163	}	208	}
164		209
165	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	210	// every use prolongs the expiry
166	cleaner.again ();
167
168	return false;
169	}
170
171	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
172	{
173	rsa_entry e;
174
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
176	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
177
178	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	211	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
179	e.id = id;
180	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
181
182	push_back (e);
183
184	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
185	cleaner.again ();
186	}
187
188	rsa_cache ()
189	{
190	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
191	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
192	}
193
194	} rsa_cache;
195
196	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
197	{
198	if (empty ())
199	w.stop ();
200	else
201	{
202	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
203	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
204	i = erase (i);
205	else
206	++i;
207	}
208	}	212	}
209		213
210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	214	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
211		215
212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	216	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
226	delete p;	230	delete p;
227		231
228	delete [] queue;	232	delete [] queue;
229	}	233	}
230		234
		235	void
231	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	236	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
232	{	237	{
233	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	238	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
234		239
235	for (;;)	240	for (;;)
236	{	241	{
…		…
247		252
248	delete get ();	253	delete get ();
249	}	254	}
250	}	255	}
251		256
		257	void
252	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	258	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
253	{	259	{
254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	260	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
255		261
256	// start expiry timer	262	// start expiry timer
257	if (empty ())	263	if (empty ())
…		…
266	queue[i].tstamp = now;	272	queue[i].tstamp = now;
267		273
268	i = ni;	274	i = ni;
269	}	275	}
270		276
271	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	277	net_packet *
		278	pkt_queue::get ()
272	{	279	{
273	if (empty ())	280	if (empty ())
274	return 0;	281	return 0;
275		282
276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	283	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
300		307
301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	308	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
302	bool can (u32 host);	309	bool can (u32 host);
303	};	310	};
304		311
305	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	312	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
306		313
		314	bool
307	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	315	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
308	{	316	{
309	iterator i;	317	iterator i;
310		318
311	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	319	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
312	if (i->host == host)	320	if (i->host == host)
…		…
359		367
360	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	368	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
361		369
362	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	370	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
363		371
		372	void
364	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	373	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)
365	{	374	{
366	unsigned int xlen;	375	unsigned int xlen;
367		376
368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	377	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
369		378
370	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	379	require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
371	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	380	require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
372	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	381	len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
373	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);	382	require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
374	}	383	}
375		384
376	void	385	void
377	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	386	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
378	{	387	{
…		…
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	396	hmac_gen (ctx);
388		397
389	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	398	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	399	}
391		400
		401	void
392	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	402	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
393	{	403	{
394	type = type_;	404	type = type_;
395		405
396	int src = THISNODE->id;	406	int src = THISNODE->id;
397		407
…		…
402		412
403	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	413	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
404	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	414	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
405		415
406	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	416	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		417	{
		418	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		419
		420	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		421	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		422
		423	private:
		424	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
407	{	425	{
408	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
409
410	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
411	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
412	private:
413
414	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
415	{
416	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	426	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
417	}
418	};	427	}
		428	};
419		429
420	void	430	void
421	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	431	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
422	{	432	{
423	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	433	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
441	d[1] = cl;	451	d[1] = cl;
442	}	452	}
443	}	453	}
444	#endif	454	#endif
445		455
446	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	456	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
447		457
448	struct {	458	struct {
449	#if RAND_SIZE	459	#if RAND_SIZE
450	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	460	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
451	#endif	461	#endif
452	u32 seqno;	462	u32 seqno;
453	} datahdr;	463	} datahdr;
454		464
455	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	465	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
456	#if RAND_SIZE	466	#if RAND_SIZE
457	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	467	require (RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE) >= 0);
458	#endif	468	#endif
459		469
460	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	470	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
461	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	471	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
462	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	472	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
…		…
484	int outl = 0, outl2;	494	int outl = 0, outl2;
485	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	495	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
486	u8 *d;	496	u8 *d;
487	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	497	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
488		498
489	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	499	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
490		500
491	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	501	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
492	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	502	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
493		503
494	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	504	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
495	d = cdata;	505	d = cdata;
496	else	506	else
497	#endif	507	#endif
498	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	508	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
499		509
500	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	510	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		511	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		512	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		513	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		514	require ((u8 )(&p->len + 1) == &(p)[0]);
		515
		516	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
501	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	517	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
502	d, &outl2,	518	d, &outl2,
503	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	519	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
504	outl += outl2;	520	outl += outl2;
505		521
…		…
536	}	552	}
537	};	553	};
538		554
539	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	555	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
540	{	556	{
541	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
542	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
543	// hmacs simply will not work.
544	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
545	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
546	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
547		560
548	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
549	bool chk_config () const;	562	bool chk_config () const;
550		563
551	static u8 get_features ()	564	static u8 get_features ()
…		…
562	#endif	575	#endif
563	return f;	576	return f;
564	}	577	}
565	};	578	};
566		579
		580	void
567	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
568	{	582	{
569	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
570	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
571	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	585	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
572	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
573	flags = 0;	586	flags = 0;
574	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
575	features = get_features ();	587	features = get_features ();
576		588
577	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	589	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
578	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
579	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	590	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		591	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
580		592
581	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	593	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
582	set_hdr (type, dst);	594	set_hdr (type, dst);
583	}	595	}
584		596
		597	bool
585	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	598	config_packet::chk_config () const
586	{	599	{
587	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	600	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
588	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	601	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	602	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
590	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	603	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
591	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
592	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
593	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
594	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
595	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	604	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
596	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	605	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
597	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
598	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
599	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	606	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	607	slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		608	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		609	slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
601	else	610	else
602	return true;	611	return true;
603		612
604	return false;	613	return false;
605	}	614	}
606		615
607	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	616	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
608	{	617	{
609	char magic[8];	618	char magic[8];
610	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	619	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
611	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	620	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
612	u8 pad2, pad3;	621	u8 pad2, pad3;
613	rsaid id;	622	auth_encr encr;
614	rsaencrdata encr;
615		623
616	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	624	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
617	{	625	{
618	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	626	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
619	strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8);	627	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
620	initiate = !!initiate_;	628	initiate = !!initiate_;
621	protocols = protocols_;	629	protocols = protocols_;
622		630
623	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	631	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
624	}	632	}
625	};	633	};
626		634
627	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	635	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
628	{	636	{
629	rsaid id;
630	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
631	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
632	rsaresponse response;	637	auth_response response;
633		638
634	auth_res_packet (int dst)	639	auth_res_packet (int dst)
635	{	640	{
636	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	641	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
637		642
…		…
671	};	676	};
672		677
673	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	678	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
674		679
675	void	680	void
676	connection::connection_established ()	681	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
677	{	682	{
678	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	683	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		684	return;
		685
		686	si = rsi;
		687	protocol = rsi.prot;
		688
		689	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		690	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		691	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		692	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		693
		694	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		695	{
		696	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		697	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		698	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
		699	}
		700
		701	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		702	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		703
		704	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		705	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
679		706
680	if (ictx && octx)	707	if (ictx && octx)
681	{	708	{
682	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	709	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
683	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);	710	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
684	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);	711	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		712
685	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);	713	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
686		714
687	// send queued packets	715	// send queued packets
688	if (ictx && octx)	716	if (ictx && octx)
689	{	717	{
…		…
700	}	728	}
701	}	729	}
702		730
703	vpn->connection_established (this);	731	vpn->connection_established (this);
704	}	732	}
		733	#if 0
705	else	734	else
706	{	735	{
707	retry_cnt = 0;	736	retry_cnt = 0;
708	establish_connection.start (5);	737	establish_connection.start (5);
709	keepalive.stop ();	738	keepalive.stop ();
710	rekey.stop ();	739	rekey.stop ();
711	}	740	}
		741	#endif
712	}	742	}
713		743
714	void	744	void
715	connection::reset_si ()	745	connection::reset_si ()
716	{	746	{
…		…
762	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	792	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
763		793
764	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	794	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
765		795
766	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767
768	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	797	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
769		798
770	delete pkt;	799	delete pkt;
771	}	800	}
772		801
…		…
787	void	816	void
788	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	817	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
789	{	818	{
790	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	819	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
791		820
792	rsachallenge chg;	821	generate_auth_data ();
793	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
794	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	822	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
795		823
796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
797
798	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	825	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
799		826
800	delete pkt;	827	delete pkt;
801	}	828	}
802		829
803	void	830	void
804	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	831	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
805	{	832	{
806	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	833	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
807		834
808	pkt->id = id;	835	auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
809		836	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
810	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
811
812	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
813		837
814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	838	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
815
816	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	839	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
817		840
818	delete pkt;	841	delete pkt;
819	}	842	}
820		843
821	void	844	void
822	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	845	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
823	{	846	{
824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	847	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
825	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	848	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		849	conf->protocols);
826		850
827	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	851	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
828		852
829	r->hmac_set (octx);	853	r->hmac_set (octx);
830	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	854	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
833	}	857	}
834		858
835	inline void	859	inline void
836	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	860	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
837	{	861	{
838	if (!ictx	862	if (!(ictx && octx)
839	&& conf != THISNODE	863	&& conf != THISNODE
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	864	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
841	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	865	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
842	&& !w.is_active ())	866	&& !w.is_active ())
843	{	867	{
…		…
911	}	935	}
912	}	936	}
913		937
914	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	938	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
915	delete octx; octx = 0;	939	delete octx; octx = 0;
916	#if ENABLE_DNS
917	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
918	#endif
919		940
920	si.host = 0;	941	si.host = 0;
		942
		943	have_snd_auth = false;
		944	have_rcv_auth = false;
		945	auth_expire = 0.;
921		946
922	last_activity = 0.;	947	last_activity = 0.;
923	//last_si_change = 0.;	948	//last_si_change = 0.;
924	retry_cnt = 0;	949	retry_cnt = 0;
925		950
…		…
984	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1009	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
985	post_inject_queue ();	1010	post_inject_queue ();
986	}	1011	}
987	}	1012	}
988		1013
		1014	void
989	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1015	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
990	{	1016	{
991	if (ictx && octx)	1017	if (ictx && octx)
992	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1018	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
993	else	1019	else
994	{	1020	{
…		…
1000	void	1026	void
1001	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1027	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1002	{	1028	{
1003	last_activity = ev_now ();	1029	last_activity = ev_now ();
1004		1030
1005	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1031	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1006	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1032	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1007		1033
1008	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1034	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1009	return;	1035	return;
1010		1036
…		…
1014	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);	1040	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
1015		1041
1016	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,	1042	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
1017	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection	1043	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
1018	// when we receive a ping.	1044	// when we receive a ping.
1019	if (!(ictx && octx))	1045	if (!ictx)
1020	{	1046	{
1021	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1047	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1022	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1048	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1023	}	1049	}
1024	else	1050	else
1025	// we would love to change thre socket address here, but ping's aren't	1051	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
1026	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.	1052	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1027	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1053	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1028		1054
1029	break;	1055	break;
1030		1056
1031	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1057	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
1032	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);	1058	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1059
		1060	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1061	// about our desire for communication.
		1062	establish_connection ();
1033	break;	1063	break;
1034		1064
1035	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1065	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1036	{	1066	{
1037	reset_connection ();	1067	reset_connection ();
…		…
1050	break;	1080	break;
1051		1081
1052	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1082	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1053	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1083	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1054	{	1084	{
1055	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1085	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1056		1086
1057	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1087	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1088	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1089	p->protocols, p->features);
1058		1090
1059	if (p->chk_config ()	1091	if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1060	&& (!strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) \|\| !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1061	{	1092	{
1062	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1093	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1063	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1094	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1064	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1095	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1065	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1096	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1066		1097
1067	if (p->initiate)	1098	if (p->initiate)
1068	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1099	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1069		1100
1070	rsachallenge k;	1101	auth_data auth;
1071		1102
1072	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1103	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1073	{	1104	{
1074	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1105	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1075	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1106	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1076	break;
1077	}	1107	}
1078	else	1108	else
1079	{	1109	{
1080	delete octx;	1110	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1081		1111
1082	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1112	rcv_auth = auth;
1083	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1113	have_rcv_auth = true;
1084		1114
		1115	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1116
		1117	if (chg)
		1118	{
1085	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1119	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1086	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1120	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1087		1121
1088	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1089
1090	connection_established ();	1122	connection_established (rsi);
1091
1092	break;	1123	}
1093	}	1124	}
		1125
		1126	break;
1094	}	1127	}
1095	else	1128	else
1096	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),	1129	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1097	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1130	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1098		1131
…		…
1107		1140
1108	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1141	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1109		1142
1110	if (p->chk_config ())	1143	if (p->chk_config ())
1111	{	1144	{
1112	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1145	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1113	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1114	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1115	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1116
1117	rsachallenge chg;
1118
1119	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1120	{	1146	{
1121	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1147	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1122	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1148	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1123	break;
1124	}	1149	}
1125	else	1150	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1126	{	1151	{
1127	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1152	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1128		1153	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1129	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1130	{
1131	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1132	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1133	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1154	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1134	break;	1155	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1135	}
1136	else
1137	{
1138	rsaresponse h;
1139		1156
1140	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1141
1142	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1143	{
1144	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;	1157	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
		1158	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1145		1159
1146	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;	1160	have_snd_auth = true;
1147
1148	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1149
1150	si = rsi;
1151	protocol = rsi.prot;
1152
1153	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1154	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1155	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1156	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1157
1158	connection_established ();	1161	connection_established (rsi);
1159
1160	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1161	{
1162	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1163	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1164	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1165	}
1166
1167	break;
1168	}
1169	else
1170	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1171	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1172	}
1173
1174	delete cctx;
1175	}	1162	}
		1163
		1164	break;
1176	}	1165	}
1177	}	1166	}
1178		1167
1179	send_reset (rsi);	1168	send_reset (rsi);
1180	break;	1169	break;
…		…
1257	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1246	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1258	{	1247	{
1259	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1248	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1260	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1249	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1261		1250
1262	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1251	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1263	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1252	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1253	p->protocols,
		1254	c->ictx && c->octx);
1264		1255
1265	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1256	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1266	{	1257	{
1267	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1258	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1268	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1259	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1291		1282
1292	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1283	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1293	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1284	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1294	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1285	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1295		1286
1296	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1287	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1288	conf->nodename,
1297	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1289	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1290	(const char *)p->si,
		1291	p->protocols,
		1292	protocol,
		1293	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1298	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1294	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1299		1295
1300	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1296	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1301		1297
1302	if (dsi.valid ())	1298	if (dsi.valid ())
1303	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1299	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1300	else
		1301	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1302	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1303	(const char *)p->si);
1304	}	1304	}
1305	else	1305	else
1306	slog (L_WARN,	1306	slog (L_WARN,
1307	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1307	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1308	p->id);	1308	p->id);
…		…
1317	}	1317	}
1318		1318
1319	inline void	1319	inline void
1320	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1320	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1321	{	1321	{
1322	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15)	1322	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1323
		1324	if (when >= 0)
		1325	w.start (when);
		1326	else if (when < -15)
1323	{	1327	{
1324	reset_connection ();	1328	reset_connection ();
1325	establish_connection ();	1329	establish_connection ();
1326	}	1330	}
1327	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1328	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1329	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1331	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1330	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1332	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1331	{	1333	{
		1334	w.start (3);
1332	send_ping (si);	1335	send_ping (si);
1333	w.start (3);
1334	}	1336	}
1335	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1337	else if (when >= -10)
1336	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1338	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1337	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1339	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1338	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1340	w.start (when + 10);
1339	else	1341	else
1340	reset_connection ();	1342	reset_connection ();
1341	}	1343	}
1342		1344
		1345	void
1343	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1346	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1344	{	1347	{
1345	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1348	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1346		1349
1347	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1350	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1348	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1351	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1352	THISNODE->protocols);
1349	p->hmac_set (octx);	1353	p->hmac_set (octx);
1350	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1354	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1351		1355
1352	delete p;	1356	delete p;
1353	}	1357	}
1354		1358
		1359	void
1355	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1360	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1356	{	1361	{
1357	char *env;	1362	char *env;
1358	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1363	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1359	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1364	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1360	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1365	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1361	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1366	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1362	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1367	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1363	}	1368	}
1364		1369
		1370	void
1365	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1371	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1366	{	1372	{
1367	vpn->script_init_env ();	1373	vpn->script_init_env ();
1368		1374
1369	char *env;	1375	char *env;
1370	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1376	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
…		…
1435	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1441	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1436		1442
1437	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1443	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1438	octx = ictx = 0;	1444	octx = ictx = 0;
1439		1445
1440	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1441	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1442
1443	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1446	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1444		1447
1445	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1448	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1446	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1449	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1447	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1450	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
…		…
1452	connection::~connection ()	1455	connection::~connection ()
1453	{	1456	{
1454	shutdown ();	1457	shutdown ();
1455	}	1458	}
1456		1459
		1460	void
1457	void connection_init ()	1461	connection_init ()
1458	{	1462	{
1459	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1463	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1460	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1464	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1461	}	1465	}
1462		1466

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.87 by pcg, Fri Nov 12 18:39:33 2010 UTC vs. Revision 1.101 by root, Wed Jul 17 16:40:57 2013 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.87 by pcg, Fri Nov 12 18:39:33 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.101 by root, Wed Jul 17 16:40:57 2013 UTC