1 | /* |
1 | /* |
2 | connection.C -- manage a single connection |
2 | connection.C -- manage a single connection |
3 | Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> |
3 | Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013,2016 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> |
4 | |
4 | |
5 | This file is part of GVPE. |
5 | This file is part of GVPE. |
6 | |
6 | |
7 | GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
7 | GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
8 | under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the |
8 | under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the |
… | |
… | |
33 | |
33 | |
34 | #include <list> |
34 | #include <list> |
35 | #include <queue> |
35 | #include <queue> |
36 | #include <utility> |
36 | #include <utility> |
37 | |
37 | |
|
|
38 | #include <openssl/opensslv.h> |
38 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
39 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
39 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
40 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
40 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
41 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
41 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
42 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
42 | |
43 | |
43 | #include "conf.h" |
44 | #include "conf.h" |
44 | #include "slog.h" |
45 | #include "slog.h" |
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46 | #include "crypto.h" |
45 | #include "device.h" |
47 | #include "device.h" |
46 | #include "vpn.h" |
48 | #include "vpn.h" |
47 | #include "connection.h" |
49 | #include "connection.h" |
48 | #include "hkdf.h" |
50 | #include "hkdf.h" |
49 | |
51 | |
50 | #include "netcompat.h" |
52 | #include "netcompat.h" |
51 | |
53 | |
52 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
54 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
53 | #define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D |
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54 | |
55 | |
55 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
56 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
56 | #define HLOG 15 |
57 | #define HLOG 15 |
57 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
58 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
58 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
59 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
… | |
… | |
103 | ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
104 | ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
104 | |
105 | |
105 | struct crypto_ctx |
106 | struct crypto_ctx |
106 | { |
107 | { |
107 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; |
108 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; |
108 | HMAC_CTX hctx; |
109 | hmac hctx; |
109 | |
110 | |
110 | crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc); |
111 | crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc); |
111 | ~crypto_ctx (); |
112 | ~crypto_ctx (); |
112 | }; |
113 | }; |
113 | |
114 | |
… | |
… | |
125 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
126 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
126 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
127 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
127 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
128 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
128 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
129 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
129 | |
130 | |
130 | HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); |
131 | hctx.init (mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST ()); |
131 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0)); |
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132 | } |
132 | } |
133 | |
133 | |
134 | { |
134 | { |
135 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
135 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
136 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
136 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
… | |
… | |
147 | } |
147 | } |
148 | |
148 | |
149 | crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () |
149 | crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () |
150 | { |
150 | { |
151 | require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); |
151 | require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); |
152 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); |
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153 | } |
152 | } |
154 | |
153 | |
155 | static inline void |
154 | static inline void |
156 | auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr) |
155 | auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr) |
157 | { |
156 | { |
… | |
… | |
178 | |
177 | |
179 | return 1; |
178 | return 1; |
180 | } |
179 | } |
181 | |
180 | |
182 | static void |
181 | static void |
183 | auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac) |
182 | auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac) |
184 | { |
183 | { |
185 | HMAC_CTX ctx; |
184 | hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt |
186 | |
185 | kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa)); |
187 | HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx); |
186 | kdf.extract_done (); |
188 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0)); |
187 | kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info |
189 | require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth)); |
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190 | require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0)); |
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191 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); |
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192 | } |
188 | } |
193 | |
189 | |
194 | void |
190 | void |
195 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
191 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
196 | { |
192 | { |
197 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
193 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
198 | { |
194 | { |
199 | // request data |
195 | // request data |
200 | rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa); |
196 | rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa); |
201 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
197 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
202 | auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac); |
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203 | |
198 | |
204 | // eventual response data |
199 | // eventual response data |
205 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
200 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
206 | } |
201 | } |
207 | |
202 | |
… | |
… | |
363 | } |
358 | } |
364 | } |
359 | } |
365 | |
360 | |
366 | ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
361 | ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
367 | |
362 | |
368 | unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
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369 | |
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370 | void |
363 | void |
371 | hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
364 | hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest) |
372 | { |
365 | { |
373 | unsigned int xlen; |
366 | ctx->hctx.init (); |
374 | |
367 | ctx->hctx.add (((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); |
375 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; |
368 | ctx->hctx.digest (hmac_digest); |
376 | |
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377 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); |
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378 | require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), |
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379 | len - sizeof (hmac_packet))); |
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380 | require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen)); |
|
|
381 | } |
369 | } |
382 | |
370 | |
383 | void |
371 | void |
384 | hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
372 | hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
385 | { |
373 | { |
386 | hmac_gen (ctx); |
374 | unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
387 | |
375 | hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest); |
388 | memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
376 | memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
389 | } |
377 | } |
390 | |
378 | |
391 | bool |
379 | bool |
392 | hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
380 | hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
393 | { |
381 | { |
394 | hmac_gen (ctx); |
382 | unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
395 | |
383 | hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest); |
396 | return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
384 | return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
397 | } |
385 | } |
398 | |
386 | |
399 | void |
387 | void |
400 | vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) |
388 | vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) |
401 | { |
389 | { |
… | |
… | |
407 | srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) | (dst >> 8); |
395 | srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) | (dst >> 8); |
408 | dst1 = dst; |
396 | dst1 = dst; |
409 | } |
397 | } |
410 | |
398 | |
411 | #define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) |
399 | #define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) |
412 | #define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE) |
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413 | |
400 | |
414 | struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet |
401 | struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet |
415 | { |
402 | { |
416 | u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno |
403 | u32 ctr; // seqno |
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|
404 | u8 data[MAXVPNDATA]; |
417 | |
405 | |
418 | void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno); |
406 | void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno); |
419 | tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno); |
407 | tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno); |
420 | |
408 | |
421 | private: |
409 | private: |
422 | const u32 data_hdr_size () const |
410 | const u32 data_hdr_size () const |
423 | { |
411 | { |
424 | return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR; |
412 | // the distance from beginning of packet to data member |
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413 | return data - at (0); |
425 | } |
414 | } |
426 | }; |
415 | }; |
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416 | |
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417 | // expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV |
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418 | static unsigned char * |
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419 | expand_iv (u32 ctr) |
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420 | { |
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421 | static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4]; |
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422 | |
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423 | require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4); |
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424 | require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0); |
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425 | |
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426 | iv[0] = |
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427 | iv[1] = |
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428 | iv[2] = ctr; |
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429 | |
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430 | // I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues, |
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431 | // but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok, |
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432 | // and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise |
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433 | // to 0. |
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434 | iv[3] = 0; |
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435 | |
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436 | return (unsigned char *)iv; |
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437 | } |
427 | |
438 | |
428 | void |
439 | void |
429 | vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno) |
440 | vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno) |
430 | { |
441 | { |
431 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx; |
442 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx; |
… | |
… | |
449 | d[1] = cl; |
460 | d[1] = cl; |
450 | } |
461 | } |
451 | } |
462 | } |
452 | #endif |
463 | #endif |
453 | |
464 | |
454 | require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)); |
465 | ctr = htonl (seqno); |
455 | |
466 | |
456 | struct { |
467 | require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr))); |
457 | #if RAND_SIZE |
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458 | u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; |
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459 | #endif |
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460 | u32 seqno; |
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461 | } datahdr; |
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462 | |
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463 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
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464 | #if RAND_SIZE |
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465 | // NB: a constant (per session) random prefix |
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466 | // is likely enough, but we don't take any chances. |
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467 | conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); |
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468 | #endif |
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469 | |
468 | |
470 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
469 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
471 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
470 | (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2, |
472 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
471 | (unsigned char *)d, l)); |
473 | outl += outl2; |
472 | outl += outl2; |
474 | |
473 | |
475 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
474 | // it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways |
476 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
475 | require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2)); |
477 | (unsigned char *) d, l)); |
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|
478 | outl += outl2; |
476 | outl += outl2; |
479 | |
477 | |
480 | require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2)); |
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481 | outl += outl2; |
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482 | |
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483 | len = outl + data_hdr_size (); |
478 | len = data_hdr_size () + outl; |
484 | |
479 | |
485 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
480 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
486 | |
481 | |
487 | hmac_set (conn->octx); |
482 | hmac_set (conn->octx); |
488 | } |
483 | } |
… | |
… | |
492 | { |
487 | { |
493 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx; |
488 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx; |
494 | int outl = 0, outl2; |
489 | int outl = 0, outl2; |
495 | tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; |
490 | tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; |
496 | u8 *d; |
491 | u8 *d; |
497 | u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); |
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498 | |
492 | |
499 | require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)); |
493 | seqno = ntohl (ctr); |
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494 | |
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495 | require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr))); |
500 | |
496 | |
501 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
497 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
502 | u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; |
498 | u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; |
503 | |
499 | |
504 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
500 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
505 | d = cdata; |
501 | d = cdata; |
506 | else |
502 | else |
507 | #endif |
503 | #endif |
508 | d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR; |
504 | d = &(*p)[6 + 6]; |
509 | |
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510 | // we play do evil games with the struct layout atm. |
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511 | // pending better solutions, we at least do some verification. |
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512 | // this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago. |
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513 | require (DATAHDR <= 16); |
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514 | require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]); |
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515 | |
505 | |
516 | // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields |
506 | // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields |
517 | require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, |
507 | require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, |
518 | d, &outl2, |
508 | d, &outl2, |
519 | (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); |
509 | (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); |
520 | outl += outl2; |
510 | outl += outl2; |
521 | |
511 | |
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512 | // it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways |
522 | require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2)); |
513 | require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2)); |
523 | outl += outl2; |
514 | outl += outl2; |
524 | |
515 | |
525 | seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE)); |
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526 | |
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527 | id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst); |
516 | id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst); |
528 | id2mac (src (), p->src); |
517 | id2mac (src (), p->src); |
529 | |
518 | |
530 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
519 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
531 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
520 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
532 | { |
521 | { |
533 | u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) | d[DATAHDR + 1]; |
522 | u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) | d[1]; |
534 | |
523 | |
535 | p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0, |
524 | p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0, |
536 | &(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU) |
525 | &(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU) |
537 | + 6 + 6; |
526 | + 6 + 6; |
538 | } |
527 | } |
539 | else |
528 | else |
540 | p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR); |
529 | p->len = outl + (6 + 6); |
541 | #endif |
530 | #endif |
542 | |
531 | |
543 | return p; |
532 | return p; |
544 | } |
533 | } |
545 | |
534 | |
… | |
… | |
552 | } |
541 | } |
553 | }; |
542 | }; |
554 | |
543 | |
555 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
544 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
556 | { |
545 | { |
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546 | u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE]; |
557 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
547 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
558 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
548 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
559 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
549 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
560 | |
550 | |
561 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
551 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
562 | bool chk_config () const; |
552 | bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const; |
563 | |
553 | |
564 | static u8 get_features () |
554 | static u8 get_features () |
565 | { |
555 | { |
566 | u8 f = 0; |
556 | u8 f = 0; |
567 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
557 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
… | |
… | |
580 | void |
570 | void |
581 | config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) |
571 | config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) |
582 | { |
572 | { |
583 | prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; |
573 | prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; |
584 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
574 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
585 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
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586 | flags = 0; |
575 | flags = 0; |
587 | features = get_features (); |
576 | features = get_features (); |
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577 | |
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578 | strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
588 | |
579 | |
589 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
580 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
590 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
581 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
591 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
582 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
592 | |
583 | |
593 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
584 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
594 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
585 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
595 | } |
586 | } |
596 | |
587 | |
597 | bool |
588 | bool |
598 | config_packet::chk_config () const |
589 | config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const |
599 | { |
590 | { |
600 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
591 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
601 | slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
592 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
602 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
593 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
603 | slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
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604 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
594 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
605 | slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
595 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
596 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
606 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
597 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
607 | slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
598 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
599 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
608 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
600 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
609 | slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
601 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
602 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
610 | else |
603 | else |
|
|
604 | { |
|
|
605 | int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
606 | |
|
|
607 | if (cmp > 0) |
|
|
608 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"), |
|
|
609 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
610 | else if (cmp == 0) |
611 | return true; |
611 | return true; |
|
|
612 | } |
612 | |
613 | |
613 | return false; |
614 | return false; |
614 | } |
615 | } |
615 | |
616 | |
616 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
617 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
… | |
… | |
630 | |
631 | |
631 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
632 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
632 | } |
633 | } |
633 | }; |
634 | }; |
634 | |
635 | |
635 | struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
636 | struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED |
636 | { |
637 | { |
637 | auth_response response; |
638 | auth_response response; |
638 | |
639 | |
639 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
640 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
640 | { |
641 | { |
641 | config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
642 | set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
642 | |
643 | |
643 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
644 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
644 | } |
645 | } |
645 | }; |
646 | }; |
646 | |
647 | |
… | |
… | |
686 | si = rsi; |
687 | si = rsi; |
687 | protocol = rsi.prot; |
688 | protocol = rsi.prot; |
688 | |
689 | |
689 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."), |
690 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."), |
690 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
691 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
691 | is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded", |
692 | vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded", |
692 | PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor); |
693 | PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor); |
693 | |
694 | |
694 | if (::conf.script_node_up) |
695 | if (::conf.script_node_up) |
695 | { |
696 | { |
696 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
697 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
… | |
… | |
702 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
703 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
703 | |
704 | |
704 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
705 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
705 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
706 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
706 | |
707 | |
707 | oiv.reset (); |
|
|
708 | |
|
|
709 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
708 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
710 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
709 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
711 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
710 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
712 | |
711 | |
|
|
712 | hmac_error = 0.; |
|
|
713 | |
713 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
714 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
714 | |
715 | |
715 | // send queued packets |
716 | // send queued packets |
716 | if (ictx && octx) |
|
|
717 | { |
|
|
718 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
717 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
719 | { |
718 | { |
720 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
719 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
721 | delete p; |
720 | delete p; |
722 | } |
721 | } |
723 | |
722 | |
724 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
723 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
725 | { |
724 | { |
726 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
725 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
727 | delete p; |
726 | delete p; |
728 | } |
|
|
729 | } |
727 | } |
730 | |
728 | |
731 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
729 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
732 | } |
730 | } |
733 | |
731 | |
… | |
… | |
741 | slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); |
739 | slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); |
742 | protocol = 0; |
740 | protocol = 0; |
743 | } |
741 | } |
744 | |
742 | |
745 | si.set (conf, protocol); |
743 | si.set (conf, protocol); |
746 | |
|
|
747 | is_direct = si.valid (); |
|
|
748 | } |
744 | } |
749 | |
745 | |
750 | // ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary |
746 | // ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary |
751 | const sockinfo & |
747 | const sockinfo & |
752 | connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const |
748 | connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const |
… | |
… | |
771 | |
767 | |
772 | void |
768 | void |
773 | connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) |
769 | connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) |
774 | { |
770 | { |
775 | if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) |
771 | if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) |
776 | reset_connection (); |
772 | reset_connection ("packet send error"); |
777 | } |
773 | } |
778 | |
774 | |
779 | void |
775 | void |
780 | connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) |
776 | connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) |
781 | { |
777 | { |
… | |
… | |
820 | void |
816 | void |
821 | connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si) |
817 | connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si) |
822 | { |
818 | { |
823 | auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); |
819 | auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); |
824 | |
820 | |
825 | auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac); |
|
|
826 | memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b)); |
821 | memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b); |
|
|
822 | auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac); |
827 | |
823 | |
828 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
824 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
829 | send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly |
825 | send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly |
830 | |
826 | |
831 | delete pkt; |
827 | delete pkt; |
… | |
… | |
857 | { |
853 | { |
858 | // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection |
854 | // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection |
859 | // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. |
855 | // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. |
860 | if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) |
856 | if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) |
861 | { |
857 | { |
862 | reset_connection (); |
858 | reset_connection ("no demand"); |
863 | return; |
859 | return; |
864 | } |
860 | } |
865 | |
861 | |
866 | last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); |
862 | last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); |
867 | |
863 | |
… | |
… | |
869 | ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 |
865 | ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 |
870 | : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); |
866 | : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); |
871 | |
867 | |
872 | reset_si (); |
868 | reset_si (); |
873 | |
869 | |
874 | bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW; |
870 | bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) || (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power); |
875 | |
871 | |
876 | if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) |
872 | if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) |
877 | { |
873 | { |
878 | /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ |
874 | /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ |
879 | w.start (1); |
875 | w.start (1); |
… | |
… | |
889 | |
885 | |
890 | slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); |
886 | slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); |
891 | |
887 | |
892 | if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) |
888 | if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) |
893 | { |
889 | { |
894 | if (retry_cnt < 4) |
890 | // use ping after the first few retries |
|
|
891 | // TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly, |
|
|
892 | // TODO: as it will still have a valid connection |
|
|
893 | if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power)) |
895 | send_auth_request (dsi, true); |
894 | send_auth_request (dsi, true); |
896 | else |
895 | else |
897 | send_ping (dsi, 0); |
896 | send_ping (dsi, 0); |
898 | } |
897 | } |
899 | } |
898 | } |
900 | |
899 | |
901 | retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9; |
900 | retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9; |
902 | |
901 | |
903 | if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) |
902 | if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) |
904 | retry_cnt++; |
903 | retry_cnt++; |
905 | else |
904 | else |
906 | retry_int = conf->max_retry; |
905 | retry_int = conf->max_retry; |
… | |
… | |
908 | w.start (retry_int); |
907 | w.start (retry_int); |
909 | } |
908 | } |
910 | } |
909 | } |
911 | |
910 | |
912 | void |
911 | void |
913 | connection::reset_connection () |
912 | connection::reset_connection (const char *reason) |
914 | { |
913 | { |
915 | if (ictx && octx) |
914 | if (ictx && octx) |
916 | { |
915 | { |
917 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"), |
916 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"), |
918 | conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
917 | conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason); |
919 | |
918 | |
920 | if (::conf.script_node_down) |
919 | if (::conf.script_node_down) |
921 | { |
920 | { |
922 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
921 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
923 | cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); |
922 | cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); |
… | |
… | |
947 | connection::shutdown () |
946 | connection::shutdown () |
948 | { |
947 | { |
949 | if (ictx && octx) |
948 | if (ictx && octx) |
950 | send_reset (si); |
949 | send_reset (si); |
951 | |
950 | |
952 | reset_connection (); |
951 | reset_connection ("shutdown"); |
953 | } |
952 | } |
954 | |
953 | |
955 | // poor-man's rekeying |
954 | // poor-man's rekeying |
956 | inline void |
955 | inline void |
957 | connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) |
956 | connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) |
958 | { |
957 | { |
959 | reset_connection (); |
958 | reset_connection ("rekeying"); |
960 | establish_connection (); |
959 | establish_connection (); |
961 | } |
960 | } |
962 | |
961 | |
963 | void |
962 | void |
964 | connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) |
963 | connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) |
… | |
… | |
981 | |
980 | |
982 | void |
981 | void |
983 | connection::post_inject_queue () |
982 | connection::post_inject_queue () |
984 | { |
983 | { |
985 | // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) |
984 | // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) |
986 | if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary |
985 | if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary |
987 | establish_connection.stop (); |
986 | establish_connection.stop (); |
988 | |
987 | |
989 | establish_connection (); |
988 | establish_connection (); |
990 | } |
989 | } |
991 | |
990 | |
… | |
… | |
1051 | // about our desire for communication. |
1050 | // about our desire for communication. |
1052 | establish_connection (); |
1051 | establish_connection (); |
1053 | break; |
1052 | break; |
1054 | |
1053 | |
1055 | case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: |
1054 | case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: |
|
|
1055 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename); |
|
|
1056 | |
|
|
1057 | if (ictx && octx) |
1056 | { |
1058 | { |
1057 | reset_connection (); |
1059 | reset_connection ("remote reset"); |
1058 | |
1060 | |
1059 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1061 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1060 | |
1062 | |
1061 | if (!p->chk_config ()) |
1063 | if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
1062 | { |
|
|
1063 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."), |
|
|
1064 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1065 | connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED; |
|
|
1066 | } |
|
|
1067 | else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
|
|
1068 | establish_connection (); |
1064 | establish_connection (); |
1069 | } |
1065 | } |
|
|
1066 | |
1070 | break; |
1067 | break; |
1071 | |
1068 | |
1072 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
1069 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
1073 | if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) |
1070 | if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) |
1074 | { |
1071 | { |
… | |
… | |
1076 | |
1073 | |
1077 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1074 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1078 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1075 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1079 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1076 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1080 | |
1077 | |
1081 | if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
1078 | if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
|
|
1079 | { |
|
|
1080 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"), |
|
|
1081 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1082 | } |
|
|
1083 | else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi)) |
1082 | { |
1084 | { |
1083 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1085 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1084 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1086 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1085 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1087 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1086 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
1088 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
1087 | |
1089 | |
1088 | if (p->initiate) |
1090 | if (p->initiate) |
|
|
1091 | { |
1089 | send_auth_request (rsi, false); |
1092 | send_auth_request (rsi, false); |
|
|
1093 | |
|
|
1094 | if (ictx && octx) |
|
|
1095 | reset_connection ("reconnect"); |
|
|
1096 | } |
1090 | |
1097 | |
1091 | auth_data auth; |
1098 | auth_data auth; |
1092 | |
1099 | |
1093 | if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth)) |
1100 | if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth)) |
1094 | { |
1101 | { |
1095 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), |
1102 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), |
1096 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); |
1103 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); |
1097 | } |
1104 | } |
1098 | else |
1105 | else |
1099 | { |
1106 | { |
1100 | bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth); |
1107 | bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth); |
1101 | |
1108 | |
1102 | rcv_auth = auth; |
1109 | rcv_auth = auth; |
1103 | have_rcv_auth = true; |
1110 | have_rcv_auth = true; |
1104 | |
1111 | |
1105 | send_auth_response (rsi); |
1112 | send_auth_response (rsi); |
… | |
… | |
1113 | } |
1120 | } |
1114 | } |
1121 | } |
1115 | |
1122 | |
1116 | break; |
1123 | break; |
1117 | } |
1124 | } |
1118 | else |
|
|
1119 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), |
|
|
1120 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1121 | |
1125 | |
1122 | send_reset (rsi); |
1126 | send_reset (rsi); |
1123 | } |
1127 | } |
1124 | |
1128 | |
1125 | break; |
1129 | break; |
… | |
… | |
1128 | { |
1132 | { |
1129 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1133 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1130 | |
1134 | |
1131 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1135 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1132 | |
1136 | |
1133 | if (p->chk_config ()) |
1137 | auth_mac local_mac; |
|
|
1138 | auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac); |
|
|
1139 | |
|
|
1140 | if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac)) |
1134 | { |
1141 | { |
1135 | if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac))) |
|
|
1136 | { |
|
|
1137 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1142 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1138 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1143 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1139 | } |
1144 | } |
1140 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
1145 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
1141 | { |
1146 | { |
1142 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
|
|
1143 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
|
|
1144 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
|
|
1145 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
|
|
1146 | |
|
|
1147 | prot_minor = p->prot_minor; |
|
|
1148 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b)); |
1147 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b); |
1149 | |
1148 | |
1150 | have_snd_auth = true; |
1149 | have_snd_auth = true; |
1151 | connection_established (rsi); |
1150 | connection_established (rsi); |
1152 | } |
|
|
1153 | |
|
|
1154 | break; |
|
|
1155 | } |
1151 | } |
1156 | } |
1152 | } |
1157 | |
|
|
1158 | send_reset (rsi); |
|
|
1159 | break; |
1153 | break; |
1160 | |
1154 | |
1161 | case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: |
1155 | case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: |
1162 | #if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
1156 | #if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
1163 | send_reset (rsi); |
1157 | send_reset (rsi); |
… | |
… | |
1169 | if (ictx && octx) |
1163 | if (ictx && octx) |
1170 | { |
1164 | { |
1171 | vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; |
1165 | vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; |
1172 | |
1166 | |
1173 | if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) |
1167 | if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) |
|
|
1168 | { |
|
|
1169 | // rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods |
|
|
1170 | // we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally, |
|
|
1171 | // and suppress messages and resets during that time. |
|
|
1172 | //TODO: should be done per source address |
|
|
1173 | if (!hmac_error) |
|
|
1174 | { |
|
|
1175 | hmac_error = ev_now () + 3; |
|
|
1176 | break; |
|
|
1177 | } |
|
|
1178 | else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ()) |
|
|
1179 | break; // silently suppress |
|
|
1180 | else |
|
|
1181 | { |
1174 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" |
1182 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" |
1175 | "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), |
1183 | "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), |
1176 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1184 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1185 | // reset |
|
|
1186 | } |
|
|
1187 | } |
1177 | else |
1188 | else |
1178 | { |
1189 | { |
1179 | u32 seqno; |
1190 | u32 seqno; |
1180 | tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); |
1191 | tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); |
1181 | int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); |
1192 | int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); |
|
|
1193 | |
|
|
1194 | hmac_error = 0; |
1182 | |
1195 | |
1183 | if (seqclass == 0) // ok |
1196 | if (seqclass == 0) // ok |
1184 | { |
1197 | { |
1185 | vpn->tap->send (d); |
1198 | vpn->tap->send (d); |
1186 | |
1199 | |
… | |
… | |
1313 | |
1326 | |
1314 | if (when >= 0) |
1327 | if (when >= 0) |
1315 | w.start (when); |
1328 | w.start (when); |
1316 | else if (when < -15) |
1329 | else if (when < -15) |
1317 | { |
1330 | { |
1318 | reset_connection (); |
1331 | reset_connection ("keepalive overdue"); |
1319 | establish_connection (); |
1332 | establish_connection (); |
1320 | } |
1333 | } |
1321 | else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND |
1334 | else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND |
1322 | || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) |
1335 | || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) |
1323 | { |
1336 | { |
… | |
… | |
1327 | else if (when >= -10) |
1340 | else if (when >= -10) |
1328 | // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer |
1341 | // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer |
1329 | // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) |
1342 | // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) |
1330 | w.start (when + 10); |
1343 | w.start (when + 10); |
1331 | else |
1344 | else |
1332 | reset_connection (); |
1345 | reset_connection ("keepalive timeout"); |
1333 | } |
1346 | } |
1334 | |
1347 | |
1335 | void |
1348 | void |
1336 | connection::send_connect_request (int id) |
1349 | connection::send_connect_request (int id) |
1337 | { |
1350 | { |
… | |
… | |
1437 | |
1450 | |
1438 | // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt |
1451 | // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt |
1439 | if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) |
1452 | if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) |
1440 | vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); |
1453 | vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); |
1441 | |
1454 | |
1442 | reset_connection (); |
1455 | reset_connection ("startup"); |
1443 | } |
1456 | } |
1444 | |
1457 | |
1445 | connection::~connection () |
1458 | connection::~connection () |
1446 | { |
1459 | { |
1447 | shutdown (); |
1460 | shutdown (); |