… | |
… | |
48 | #include "hkdf.h" |
48 | #include "hkdf.h" |
49 | |
49 | |
50 | #include "netcompat.h" |
50 | #include "netcompat.h" |
51 | |
51 | |
52 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
52 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
|
|
53 | #define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D |
53 | |
54 | |
54 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
55 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
55 | #define HLOG 15 |
56 | #define HLOG 15 |
56 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
57 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
57 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
58 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
… | |
… | |
119 | { |
120 | { |
120 | u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE]; |
121 | u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE]; |
121 | static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key"; |
122 | static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key"; |
122 | |
123 | |
123 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
124 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
124 | kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm)); |
|
|
125 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
125 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
126 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
126 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
127 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
127 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
128 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
128 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
129 | |
129 | |
… | |
… | |
134 | { |
134 | { |
135 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
135 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
136 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
136 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
137 | |
137 | |
138 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
138 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
139 | kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm)); |
|
|
140 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key)); |
139 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key)); |
141 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
140 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
142 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
141 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
143 | kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info)); |
142 | kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info)); |
144 | |
143 | |
… | |
… | |
158 | { |
157 | { |
159 | if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa), |
158 | if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa), |
160 | (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, |
159 | (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, |
161 | key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0) |
160 | key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0) |
162 | fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error"); |
161 | fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error"); |
|
|
162 | |
|
|
163 | memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh)); |
163 | } |
164 | } |
164 | |
165 | |
165 | static inline bool |
166 | static inline bool |
166 | auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth) |
167 | auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth) |
167 | { |
168 | { |
… | |
… | |
171 | (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt, |
172 | (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt, |
172 | key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa)) |
173 | key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa)) |
173 | return 0; |
174 | return 0; |
174 | |
175 | |
175 | memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa)); |
176 | memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa)); |
|
|
177 | memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); |
176 | |
178 | |
177 | return 1; |
179 | return 1; |
178 | } |
180 | } |
179 | |
181 | |
180 | static void |
182 | static void |
… | |
… | |
193 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
195 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
194 | { |
196 | { |
195 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
197 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
196 | { |
198 | { |
197 | // request data |
199 | // request data |
198 | RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa); |
200 | rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa); |
199 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
201 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
200 | auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac); |
202 | auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac); |
201 | |
203 | |
202 | // eventual response data |
204 | // eventual response data |
203 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
205 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
… | |
… | |
458 | u32 seqno; |
460 | u32 seqno; |
459 | } datahdr; |
461 | } datahdr; |
460 | |
462 | |
461 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
463 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
462 | #if RAND_SIZE |
464 | #if RAND_SIZE |
463 | RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); |
465 | // NB: a constant (per session) random prefix |
|
|
466 | // is likely enough, but we don't take any chances. |
|
|
467 | conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); |
464 | #endif |
468 | #endif |
465 | |
469 | |
466 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
470 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
467 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
471 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
468 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
472 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
… | |
… | |
499 | |
503 | |
500 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
504 | if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) |
501 | d = cdata; |
505 | d = cdata; |
502 | else |
506 | else |
503 | #endif |
507 | #endif |
504 | d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; |
508 | d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR; |
505 | |
509 | |
506 | /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ |
510 | // we play do evil games with the struct layout atm. |
|
|
511 | // pending better solutions, we at least do some verification. |
|
|
512 | // this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago. |
|
|
513 | require (DATAHDR <= 16); |
|
|
514 | require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]); |
|
|
515 | |
|
|
516 | // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields |
507 | require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, |
517 | require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, |
508 | d, &outl2, |
518 | d, &outl2, |
509 | (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); |
519 | (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); |
510 | outl += outl2; |
520 | outl += outl2; |
511 | |
521 | |
… | |
… | |
542 | } |
552 | } |
543 | }; |
553 | }; |
544 | |
554 | |
545 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
555 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
546 | { |
556 | { |
|
|
557 | u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE]; |
547 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
558 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
548 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
559 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
549 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
560 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
550 | |
561 | |
551 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
562 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
552 | bool chk_config () const; |
563 | bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const; |
553 | |
564 | |
554 | static u8 get_features () |
565 | static u8 get_features () |
555 | { |
566 | { |
556 | u8 f = 0; |
567 | u8 f = 0; |
557 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
568 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
… | |
… | |
574 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
585 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
575 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
586 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
576 | flags = 0; |
587 | flags = 0; |
577 | features = get_features (); |
588 | features = get_features (); |
578 | |
589 | |
|
|
590 | strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
591 | |
579 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
592 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
580 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
593 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
581 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
594 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
582 | |
595 | |
583 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
596 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
584 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
597 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
585 | } |
598 | } |
586 | |
599 | |
587 | bool |
600 | bool |
588 | config_packet::chk_config () const |
601 | config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const |
589 | { |
602 | { |
590 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
603 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
591 | slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
604 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
|
|
605 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
592 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
606 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
593 | slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
607 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
|
|
608 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
594 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
609 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
595 | slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
610 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
611 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
596 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
612 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
597 | slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
613 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
614 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
598 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
615 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
599 | slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
616 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
617 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
600 | else |
618 | else |
|
|
619 | { |
|
|
620 | int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
621 | |
|
|
622 | if (cmp > 0) |
|
|
623 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"), |
|
|
624 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
625 | else if (cmp == 0) |
601 | return true; |
626 | return true; |
|
|
627 | } |
602 | |
628 | |
603 | return false; |
629 | return false; |
604 | } |
630 | } |
605 | |
631 | |
606 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
632 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
… | |
… | |
620 | |
646 | |
621 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
647 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
622 | } |
648 | } |
623 | }; |
649 | }; |
624 | |
650 | |
625 | struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
651 | struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED |
626 | { |
652 | { |
627 | auth_response response; |
653 | auth_response response; |
628 | |
654 | |
629 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
655 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
630 | { |
656 | { |
631 | config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
657 | set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
632 | |
658 | |
633 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
659 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
634 | } |
660 | } |
635 | }; |
661 | }; |
636 | |
662 | |
… | |
… | |
692 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
718 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
693 | |
719 | |
694 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
720 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
695 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
721 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
696 | |
722 | |
|
|
723 | oiv.reset (); |
|
|
724 | |
|
|
725 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
|
|
726 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
|
|
727 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
|
|
728 | |
|
|
729 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
|
|
730 | |
|
|
731 | // send queued packets |
697 | if (ictx && octx) |
732 | if (ictx && octx) |
698 | { |
733 | { |
699 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
734 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
700 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
|
|
701 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
|
|
702 | |
|
|
703 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
|
|
704 | |
|
|
705 | // send queued packets |
|
|
706 | if (ictx && octx) |
|
|
707 | { |
735 | { |
708 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
|
|
709 | { |
|
|
710 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
736 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
711 | delete p; |
737 | delete p; |
712 | } |
|
|
713 | |
|
|
714 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
|
|
715 | { |
|
|
716 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
|
|
717 | delete p; |
|
|
718 | } |
|
|
719 | } |
738 | } |
720 | |
739 | |
|
|
740 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
|
|
741 | { |
|
|
742 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
|
|
743 | delete p; |
|
|
744 | } |
|
|
745 | } |
|
|
746 | |
721 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
747 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
722 | } |
|
|
723 | #if 0 |
|
|
724 | else |
|
|
725 | { |
|
|
726 | retry_cnt = 0; |
|
|
727 | establish_connection.start (5); |
|
|
728 | keepalive.stop (); |
|
|
729 | rekey.stop (); |
|
|
730 | } |
|
|
731 | #endif |
|
|
732 | } |
748 | } |
733 | |
749 | |
734 | void |
750 | void |
735 | connection::reset_si () |
751 | connection::reset_si () |
736 | { |
752 | { |
… | |
… | |
1056 | { |
1072 | { |
1057 | reset_connection (); |
1073 | reset_connection (); |
1058 | |
1074 | |
1059 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1075 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1060 | |
1076 | |
1061 | if (!p->chk_config ()) |
1077 | if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
1062 | { |
|
|
1063 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."), |
|
|
1064 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1065 | connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED; |
|
|
1066 | } |
|
|
1067 | else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
|
|
1068 | establish_connection (); |
1078 | establish_connection (); |
1069 | } |
1079 | } |
1070 | break; |
1080 | break; |
1071 | |
1081 | |
1072 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
1082 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
… | |
… | |
1076 | |
1086 | |
1077 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1087 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1078 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1088 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1079 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1089 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1080 | |
1090 | |
1081 | if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
1091 | if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
|
|
1092 | { |
|
|
1093 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"), |
|
|
1094 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1095 | } |
|
|
1096 | else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi)) |
1082 | { |
1097 | { |
1083 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1098 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1084 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1099 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1085 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1100 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1086 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
1101 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
… | |
… | |
1113 | } |
1128 | } |
1114 | } |
1129 | } |
1115 | |
1130 | |
1116 | break; |
1131 | break; |
1117 | } |
1132 | } |
1118 | else |
|
|
1119 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), |
|
|
1120 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1121 | |
1133 | |
1122 | send_reset (rsi); |
1134 | send_reset (rsi); |
1123 | } |
1135 | } |
1124 | |
1136 | |
1125 | break; |
1137 | break; |
… | |
… | |
1128 | { |
1140 | { |
1129 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1141 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1130 | |
1142 | |
1131 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1143 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1132 | |
1144 | |
1133 | if (p->chk_config ()) |
1145 | if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac))) |
1134 | { |
1146 | { |
1135 | if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac))) |
|
|
1136 | { |
|
|
1137 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1147 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1138 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1148 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1139 | } |
|
|
1140 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
|
|
1141 | { |
|
|
1142 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
|
|
1143 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
|
|
1144 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
|
|
1145 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
|
|
1146 | |
|
|
1147 | prot_minor = p->prot_minor; |
|
|
1148 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b)); |
|
|
1149 | |
|
|
1150 | have_snd_auth = true; |
|
|
1151 | connection_established (rsi); |
|
|
1152 | } |
|
|
1153 | |
|
|
1154 | break; |
|
|
1155 | } |
1149 | } |
|
|
1150 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
|
|
1151 | { |
|
|
1152 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b)); |
|
|
1153 | |
|
|
1154 | have_snd_auth = true; |
|
|
1155 | connection_established (rsi); |
|
|
1156 | } |
|
|
1157 | |
|
|
1158 | break; |
1156 | } |
1159 | } |
1157 | |
1160 | |
1158 | send_reset (rsi); |
1161 | send_reset (rsi); |
1159 | break; |
1162 | break; |
1160 | |
1163 | |