[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.89 by root, Thu Dec 2 08:15:09 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.104 by root, Fri Jul 19 18:18:27 2013 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
43	#include "conf.h"	43	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	44	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	45	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	46	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	47	#include "connection.h"
		48	#include "hkdf.h"
48		49
49	#include "netcompat.h"	50	#include "netcompat.h"
50		51
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated)	52	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		53	#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57		54
58	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	55	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59	#define HLOG 15	56	#define HLOG 15
60	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	57	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	58	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
64	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	61	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65		62
66	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	63	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
67	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	64	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
68		65
		66	namespace
		67	{
69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
71	{	70	{
72	w.stop ();	71	w.stop ();
73		72
74	if (rs_queue.empty ())	73	if (rs_queue.empty ())
75	return;	74	return;
76		75
77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
78	if (pid)	77	if (pid)
79	{	78	{
80	w.set (pid);	79	w.set (pid);
81	w.start ();	80	w.start ();
82	}	81	}
83	else	82	else
84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
85		84
86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
87	rs_queue.pop ();	86	rs_queue.pop ();
88	}	87	}
		88	};
89		89
90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
91	static void	91	static void
92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
93	{	93	{
…		…
105	struct crypto_ctx	105	struct crypto_ctx
106	{	106	{
107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
108	HMAC_CTX hctx;	108	HMAC_CTX hctx;
109		109
110	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	110	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
111	~crypto_ctx ();	111	~crypto_ctx ();
112	};	112	};
113		113
114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
115	{	115	{
		116	ecdh_key s;
		117
		118	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		119
		120	{
		121	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		122	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		123
		124	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		125	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		126	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		127	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		128	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		129
		130	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		131	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		132	}
		133
		134	{
		135	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		136	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		137
		138	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		139	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		140	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		141	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		142	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		143
116	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	144	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
117	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	145	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
118	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	146	}
119	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
120	}	147	}
121		148
122	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	149	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
123	{	150	{
124	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	151	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
125	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	152	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
126	}	153	}
127		154
		155	static inline void
		156	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		157	{
		158	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		159	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		160	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		161	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		162
		163	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		164	}
		165
		166	static inline bool
		167	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		168	{
		169	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		170
		171	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		172	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		173	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		174	return 0;
		175
		176	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		177	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		178
		179	return 1;
		180	}
		181
128	static void	182	static void
129	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	183	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
130	{	184	{
131	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	185	hkdf kdf (&auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh), AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use remote ecdh b as salt
132		186	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
133	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	187	kdf.extract_done ();
134	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	188	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, b, sizeof b); // use response ecdh b as info
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
136	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
137	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
138	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
139	}	189	}
140		190
141	struct rsa_entry	191	void
		192	connection::generate_auth_data ()
142	{	193	{
143	tstamp expire;	194	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
144	rsaid id;
145	rsachallenge chg;
146	};
147
148	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
149	{
150	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
151
152	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
153	{
154	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
155	{	195	{
156	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	196	// request data
157	{	197	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
158	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	198	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
159		199
160	erase (i);	200	// eventual response data
161	return true;	201	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
162	}
163	}	202	}
164		203
165	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	204	// every use prolongs the expiry
166	cleaner.again ();
167
168	return false;
169	}
170
171	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
172	{
173	rsa_entry e;
174
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
176	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
177
178	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	205	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
179	e.id = id;
180	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
181
182	push_back (e);
183
184	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
185	cleaner.again ();
186	}
187
188	rsa_cache ()
189	{
190	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
191	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
192	}
193
194	} rsa_cache;
195
196	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
197	{
198	if (empty ())
199	w.stop ();
200	else
201	{
202	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
203	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
204	i = erase (i);
205	else
206	++i;
207	}
208	}	206	}
209		207
210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	208	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
211		209
212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	210	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
226	delete p;	224	delete p;
227		225
228	delete [] queue;	226	delete [] queue;
229	}	227	}
230		228
		229	void
231	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	230	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
232	{	231	{
233	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	232	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
234		233
235	for (;;)	234	for (;;)
236	{	235	{
…		…
247		246
248	delete get ();	247	delete get ();
249	}	248	}
250	}	249	}
251		250
		251	void
252	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	252	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
253	{	253	{
254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
255		255
256	// start expiry timer	256	// start expiry timer
257	if (empty ())	257	if (empty ())
…		…
266	queue[i].tstamp = now;	266	queue[i].tstamp = now;
267		267
268	i = ni;	268	i = ni;
269	}	269	}
270		270
271	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	271	net_packet *
		272	pkt_queue::get ()
272	{	273	{
273	if (empty ())	274	if (empty ())
274	return 0;	275	return 0;
275		276
276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	277	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
300		301
301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	302	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
302	bool can (u32 host);	303	bool can (u32 host);
303	};	304	};
304		305
305	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	306	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
306		307
		308	bool
307	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	309	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
308	{	310	{
309	iterator i;	311	iterator i;
310		312
311	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	313	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
312	if (i->host == host)	314	if (i->host == host)
…		…
357	}	359	}
358	}	360	}
359		361
360	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	362	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
361		363
362	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	364	void
363
364	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	365	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx ctx, u8 hmac_digest)
365	{	366	{
366	unsigned int xlen;
367
368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	367	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
369		368
370	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	369	require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
371	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	370	require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
372	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	371	require (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
373	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
374	}	372	}
375		373
376	void	374	void
377	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	375	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
378	{	376	{
379	hmac_gen (ctx);	377	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
380		378	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
381	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	379	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
382	}	380	}
383		381
384	bool	382	bool
385	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	383	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
386	{	384	{
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	385	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
388		386	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
389	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	387	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	388	}
391		389
		390	void
392	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	391	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
393	{	392	{
394	type = type_;	393	type = type_;
395		394
396	int src = THISNODE->id;	395	int src = THISNODE->id;
397		396
…		…
402		401
403	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	402	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
404	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	403	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
405		404
406	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	405	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		406	{
		407	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		408
		409	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		410	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		411
		412	private:
		413	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
407	{	414	{
408	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
409
410	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
411	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
412	private:
413
414	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
415	{
416	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	415	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
417	}
418	};	416	}
		417	};
419		418
420	void	419	void
421	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	420	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
422	{	421	{
423	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	422	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
441	d[1] = cl;	440	d[1] = cl;
442	}	441	}
443	}	442	}
444	#endif	443	#endif
445		444
446	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	445	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
447		446
448	struct {	447	struct {
449	#if RAND_SIZE	448	#if RAND_SIZE
450	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	449	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
451	#endif	450	#endif
452	u32 seqno;	451	u32 seqno;
453	} datahdr;	452	} datahdr;
454		453
455	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	454	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
456	#if RAND_SIZE	455	#if RAND_SIZE
457	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	456	// NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
		457	// is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
		458	conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
458	#endif	459	#endif
459		460
460	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	461	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
461	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	462	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
462	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	463	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
…		…
484	int outl = 0, outl2;	485	int outl = 0, outl2;
485	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	486	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
486	u8 *d;	487	u8 *d;
487	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	488	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
488		489
489	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	490	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
490		491
491	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	492	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
492	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	493	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
493		494
494	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	495	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
495	d = cdata;	496	d = cdata;
496	else	497	else
497	#endif	498	#endif
498	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	499	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
499		500
500	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	501	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		502	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		503	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		504	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		505	require ((u8 )(&p->len + 1) == &(p)[0]);
		506
		507	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
501	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	508	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
502	d, &outl2,	509	d, &outl2,
503	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	510	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
504	outl += outl2;	511	outl += outl2;
505		512
…		…
536	}	543	}
537	};	544	};
538		545
539	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	546	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
540	{	547	{
541	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	548	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
542	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
543	// hmacs simply will not work.
544	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	549	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
545	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	550	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
546	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	551	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
547		552
548	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	553	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
549	bool chk_config () const;	554	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
550		555
551	static u8 get_features ()	556	static u8 get_features ()
552	{	557	{
553	u8 f = 0;	558	u8 f = 0;
554	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	559	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
562	#endif	567	#endif
563	return f;	568	return f;
564	}	569	}
565	};	570	};
566		571
		572	void
567	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	573	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
568	{	574	{
569	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	575	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
570	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	576	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
571	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	577	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
572	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
573	flags = 0;	578	flags = 0;
574	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
575	features = get_features ();	579	features = get_features ();
576		580
		581	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		582
577	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	583	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
578	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
579	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	584	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		585	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
580		586
581	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	587	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
582	set_hdr (type, dst);	588	set_hdr (type, dst);
583	}	589	}
584		590
585	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	591	bool
		592	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
586	{	593	{
587	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	594	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
588	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	595	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
		596	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	597	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
590	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	598	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
591	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)	599	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
592	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
593	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
594	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
595	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	600	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
596	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	601	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
597	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	602	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
598	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
599	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	603	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	604	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		605	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		606	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		607	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		608	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
601	else	609	else
		610	{
		611	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		612
		613	if (cmp > 0)
		614	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		615	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		616	else if (cmp == 0)
602	return true;	617	return true;
		618	}
603		619
604	return false;	620	return false;
605	}	621	}
606		622
607	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	623	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
608	{	624	{
609	char magic[8];	625	char magic[8];
610	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	626	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
611	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	627	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
612	u8 pad2, pad3;	628	u8 pad2, pad3;
613	rsaid id;	629	auth_encr encr;
614	rsaencrdata encr;
615		630
616	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	631	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
617	{	632	{
618	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	633	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
619	strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8);	634	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
620	initiate = !!initiate_;	635	initiate = !!initiate_;
621	protocols = protocols_;	636	protocols = protocols_;
622		637
623	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	638	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
624	}	639	}
625	};	640	};
626		641
627	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	642	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
628	{	643	{
629	rsaid id;
630	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
631	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
632	rsaresponse response;	644	auth_response response;
633		645
634	auth_res_packet (int dst)	646	auth_res_packet (int dst)
635	{	647	{
636	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	648	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
637		649
638	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	650	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
639	}	651	}
640	};	652	};
641		653
…		…
671	};	683	};
672		684
673	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	685	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
674		686
675	void	687	void
676	connection::connection_established ()	688	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
677	{	689	{
678	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	690	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		691	return;
679		692
		693	si = rsi;
		694	protocol = rsi.prot;
		695
		696	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		697	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		698	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		699	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		700
		701	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		702	{
		703	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		704	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		705	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
		706	}
		707
		708	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		709	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		710
		711	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		712	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		713
		714	oiv.reset ();
		715
		716	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
		717	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
		718	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		719
		720	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
		721
		722	// send queued packets
680	if (ictx && octx)	723	if (ictx && octx)
681	{	724	{
682	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	725	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
683	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
684	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
685	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
686
687	// send queued packets
688	if (ictx && octx)
689	{	726	{
690	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
691	{
692	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	727	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
693	delete p;	728	delete p;
694	}
695
696	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
697	{
698	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
699	delete p;
700	}
701	}	729	}
702		730
		731	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
		732	{
		733	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
		734	delete p;
		735	}
		736	}
		737
703	vpn->connection_established (this);	738	vpn->connection_established (this);
704	}
705	else
706	{
707	retry_cnt = 0;
708	establish_connection.start (5);
709	keepalive.stop ();
710	rekey.stop ();
711	}
712	}	739	}
713		740
714	void	741	void
715	connection::reset_si ()	742	connection::reset_si ()
716	{	743	{
…		…
762	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	789	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
763		790
764	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	791	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
765		792
766	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	793	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767
768	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	794	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
769		795
770	delete pkt;	796	delete pkt;
771	}	797	}
772		798
…		…
787	void	813	void
788	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	814	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
789	{	815	{
790	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	816	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
791		817
792	rsachallenge chg;	818	generate_auth_data ();
793	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
794	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	819	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
795		820
796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	821	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
797
798	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	822	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
799		823
800	delete pkt;	824	delete pkt;
801	}	825	}
802		826
803	void	827	void
804	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	828	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
805	{	829	{
806	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	830	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
807		831
808	pkt->id = id;	832	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
809		833	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
810	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
811
812	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
813		834
814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	835	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
815
816	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	836	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
817		837
818	delete pkt;	838	delete pkt;
819	}	839	}
820		840
821	void	841	void
822	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	842	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
823	{	843	{
824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	844	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
825	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	845	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		846	conf->protocols);
826		847
827	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	848	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
828		849
829	r->hmac_set (octx);	850	r->hmac_set (octx);
830	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	851	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
833	}	854	}
834		855
835	inline void	856	inline void
836	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	857	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
837	{	858	{
838	if (!ictx	859	if (!(ictx && octx)
839	&& conf != THISNODE	860	&& conf != THISNODE
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	861	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
841	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	862	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
842	&& !w.is_active ())	863	&& !w.is_active ())
843	{	864	{
…		…
911	}	932	}
912	}	933	}
913		934
914	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	935	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
915	delete octx; octx = 0;	936	delete octx; octx = 0;
916	#if ENABLE_DNS
917	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
918	#endif
919		937
920	si.host = 0;	938	si.host = 0;
		939
		940	have_snd_auth = false;
		941	have_rcv_auth = false;
		942	auth_expire = 0.;
921		943
922	last_activity = 0.;	944	last_activity = 0.;
923	//last_si_change = 0.;	945	//last_si_change = 0.;
924	retry_cnt = 0;	946	retry_cnt = 0;
925		947
…		…
984	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1006	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
985	post_inject_queue ();	1007	post_inject_queue ();
986	}	1008	}
987	}	1009	}
988		1010
		1011	void
989	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1012	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
990	{	1013	{
991	if (ictx && octx)	1014	if (ictx && octx)
992	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1015	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
993	else	1016	else
994	{	1017	{
…		…
1000	void	1023	void
1001	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1024	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1002	{	1025	{
1003	last_activity = ev_now ();	1026	last_activity = ev_now ();
1004		1027
1005	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1028	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1006	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1029	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1007		1030
1008	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1031	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1009	return;	1032	return;
1010		1033
…		…
1040	{	1063	{
1041	reset_connection ();	1064	reset_connection ();
1042		1065
1043	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1066	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1044		1067
1045	if (!p->chk_config ())	1068	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1046	{
1047	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1048	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1049	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1050	}
1051	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1052	establish_connection ();	1069	establish_connection ();
1053	}	1070	}
1054	break;	1071	break;
1055		1072
1056	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1073	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1057	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1074	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1058	{	1075	{
1059	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1076	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1060		1077
1061	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1078	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1079	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1080	p->protocols, p->features);
1062		1081
		1082	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1083	{
		1084	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1085	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1086	}
1063	if (p->chk_config ()	1087	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1064	&& (!strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) \|\| !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1065	{	1088	{
1066	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1089	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1067	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1090	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1068	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1091	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1069	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1092	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1070		1093
1071	if (p->initiate)	1094	if (p->initiate)
1072	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1095	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1073		1096
1074	rsachallenge k;	1097	auth_data auth;
1075		1098
1076	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1099	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1077	{	1100	{
1078	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1101	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1079	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1102	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1080	break;
1081	}	1103	}
1082	else	1104	else
1083	{	1105	{
1084	delete octx;	1106	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1085		1107
1086	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1108	rcv_auth = auth;
1087	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1109	have_rcv_auth = true;
1088		1110
		1111	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1112
		1113	if (chg)
		1114	{
1089	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1115	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1090	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1116	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1091		1117
1092	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1093
1094	connection_established ();	1118	connection_established (rsi);
1095
1096	break;	1119	}
1097	}	1120	}
		1121
		1122	break;
1098	}	1123	}
1099	else
1100	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1101	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1102		1124
1103	send_reset (rsi);	1125	send_reset (rsi);
1104	}	1126	}
1105		1127
1106	break;	1128	break;
…		…
1109	{	1131	{
1110	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;	1132	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1111		1133
1112	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1134	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1113		1135
1114	if (p->chk_config ())	1136	auth_mac local_mac;
		1137	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1138
		1139	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1115	{	1140	{
1116	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1117	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1118	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1119	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1120
1121	rsachallenge chg;
1122
1123	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1124	{
1125	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1141	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1126	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1142	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1127	break;
1128	}
1129	else
1130	{
1131	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);
1132
1133	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1134	{
1135	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1136	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1137	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1138	break;
1139	}
1140	else
1141	{
1142	rsaresponse h;
1143
1144	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1145
1146	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1147	{
1148	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1149
1150	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1151
1152	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1153
1154	si = rsi;
1155	protocol = rsi.prot;
1156
1157	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1158	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1159	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1160	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1161
1162	connection_established ();
1163
1164	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1165	{
1166	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1167	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1168	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1169	}
1170
1171	break;
1172	}
1173	else
1174	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1175	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1176	}
1177
1178	delete cctx;
1179	}
1180	}	1143	}
		1144	else if (!have_snd_auth)
		1145	{
		1146	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
		1147
		1148	have_snd_auth = true;
		1149	connection_established (rsi);
		1150	}
		1151
		1152	break;
1181	}	1153	}
1182		1154
1183	send_reset (rsi);	1155	send_reset (rsi);
1184	break;	1156	break;
1185		1157
…		…
1261	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1233	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1262	{	1234	{
1263	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1235	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1264	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1236	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1265		1237
1266	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1238	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1267	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1239	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1240	p->protocols,
		1241	c->ictx && c->octx);
1268		1242
1269	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1243	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1270	{	1244	{
1271	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1245	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1272	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1246	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1295		1269
1296	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1270	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1297	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1271	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1298	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1272	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1299		1273
1300	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1274	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1275	conf->nodename,
1301	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1276	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1277	(const char *)p->si,
		1278	p->protocols,
		1279	protocol,
		1280	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1302	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1281	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1303		1282
1304	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1283	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1305		1284
1306	if (dsi.valid ())	1285	if (dsi.valid ())
1307	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1286	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1287	else
		1288	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1289	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1290	(const char *)p->si);
1308	}	1291	}
1309	else	1292	else
1310	slog (L_WARN,	1293	slog (L_WARN,
1311	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1294	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1312	p->id);	1295	p->id);
…		…
1321	}	1304	}
1322		1305
1323	inline void	1306	inline void
1324	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1307	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1325	{	1308	{
1326	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15)	1309	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1310
		1311	if (when >= 0)
		1312	w.start (when);
		1313	else if (when < -15)
1327	{	1314	{
1328	reset_connection ();	1315	reset_connection ();
1329	establish_connection ();	1316	establish_connection ();
1330	}	1317	}
1331	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1332	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1333	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1318	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1334	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1319	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1335	{	1320	{
		1321	w.start (3);
1336	send_ping (si);	1322	send_ping (si);
1337	w.start (3);
1338	}	1323	}
1339	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1324	else if (when >= -10)
1340	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1325	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1341	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1326	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1342	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1327	w.start (when + 10);
1343	else	1328	else
1344	reset_connection ();	1329	reset_connection ();
1345	}	1330	}
1346		1331
		1332	void
1347	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1333	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1348	{	1334	{
1349	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1335	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1350		1336
1351	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1337	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1352	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1338	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1339	THISNODE->protocols);
1353	p->hmac_set (octx);	1340	p->hmac_set (octx);
1354	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1341	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1355		1342
1356	delete p;	1343	delete p;
1357	}	1344	}
1358		1345
		1346	void
1359	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1347	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1360	{	1348	{
1361	char *env;	1349	char *env;
1362	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1350	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1363	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1351	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1364	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1352	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1365	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1353	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1366	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1354	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1367	}	1355	}
1368		1356
		1357	void
1369	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1358	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1370	{	1359	{
1371	vpn->script_init_env ();	1360	vpn->script_init_env ();
1372		1361
1373	char *env;	1362	char *env;
1374	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1363	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
…		…
1439	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1428	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1440		1429
1441	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1430	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1442	octx = ictx = 0;	1431	octx = ictx = 0;
1443		1432
1444	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1445	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1446
1447	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1433	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1448		1434
1449	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1435	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1450	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1436	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1451	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1437	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
…		…
1456	connection::~connection ()	1442	connection::~connection ()
1457	{	1443	{
1458	shutdown ();	1444	shutdown ();
1459	}	1445	}
1460		1446
		1447	void
1461	void connection_init ()	1448	connection_init ()
1462	{	1449	{
1463	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1450	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1464	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1451	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1465	}	1452	}
1466		1453

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.89 by root, Thu Dec 2 08:15:09 2010 UTC vs. Revision 1.104 by root, Fri Jul 19 18:18:27 2013 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.89 by root, Thu Dec 2 08:15:09 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.104 by root, Fri Jul 19 18:18:27 2013 UTC