[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.89 by root, Thu Dec 2 08:15:09 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.107 by root, Fri Sep 20 11:57:03 2013 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
33		33
34	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
35	#include <queue>	35	#include <queue>
36	#include <utility>	36	#include <utility>
37		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
39	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
40	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
		43
		44	// openssl 0.9.8 compatibility
		45	#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
		46	#define require101(exp) exp
		47	#else
		48	#define require101(exp) equire (exp)
		49	#endif
42		50
43	#include "conf.h"	51	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	52	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	53	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	54	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	55	#include "connection.h"
		56	#include "hkdf.h"
48		57
49	#include "netcompat.h"	58	#include "netcompat.h"
50		59
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated)	60	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		61	#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57		62
58	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	63	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59	#define HLOG 15	64	#define HLOG 15
60	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	65	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	66	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
64	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	69	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65		70
66	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	71	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
67	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	72	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
68		73
		74	namespace
		75	{
69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	76	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	77	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
71	{	78	{
72	w.stop ();	79	w.stop ();
73		80
74	if (rs_queue.empty ())	81	if (rs_queue.empty ())
75	return;	82	return;
76		83
77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	84	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
78	if (pid)	85	if (pid)
79	{	86	{
80	w.set (pid);	87	w.set (pid);
81	w.start ();	88	w.start ();
82	}	89	}
83	else	90	else
84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	91	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
85		92
86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	93	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
87	rs_queue.pop ();	94	rs_queue.pop ();
88	}	95	}
		96	};
89		97
90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	98	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
91	static void	99	static void
92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	100	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
93	{	101	{
…		…
105	struct crypto_ctx	113	struct crypto_ctx
106	{	114	{
107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	115	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
108	HMAC_CTX hctx;	116	HMAC_CTX hctx;
109		117
110	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	118	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
111	~crypto_ctx ();	119	~crypto_ctx ();
112	};	120	};
113		121
114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	122	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
115	{	123	{
		124	ecdh_key s;
		125
		126	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		127
		128	{
		129	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		130	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		131
		132	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		133	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		134	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		135	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		136	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		137
		138	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		139	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		140	}
		141
		142	{
		143	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		144	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		145
		146	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		147	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		148	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		149	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		150	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		151
116	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	152	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
117	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	153	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
118	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	154	}
119	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
120	}	155	}
121		156
122	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	157	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
123	{	158	{
124	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	159	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
125	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	160	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
126	}	161	}
127		162
		163	static inline void
		164	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		165	{
		166	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		167	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		168	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		169	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		170
		171	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		172	}
		173
		174	static inline bool
		175	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		176	{
		177	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		178
		179	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		180	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		181	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		182	return 0;
		183
		184	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		185	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		186
		187	return 1;
		188	}
		189
128	static void	190	static void
129	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	191	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
130	{	192	{
131	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	193	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
132		194	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
133	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	195	kdf.extract_done ();
134	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	196	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
136	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
137	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
138	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
139	}	197	}
140		198
141	struct rsa_entry	199	void
		200	connection::generate_auth_data ()
142	{	201	{
143	tstamp expire;	202	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
144	rsaid id;
145	rsachallenge chg;
146	};
147
148	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
149	{
150	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
151
152	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
153	{
154	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
155	{	203	{
156	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	204	// request data
157	{	205	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
158	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	206	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
159		207
160	erase (i);	208	// eventual response data
161	return true;	209	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
162	}
163	}	210	}
164		211
165	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	212	// every use prolongs the expiry
166	cleaner.again ();
167
168	return false;
169	}
170
171	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
172	{
173	rsa_entry e;
174
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
176	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
177
178	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	213	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
179	e.id = id;
180	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
181
182	push_back (e);
183
184	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
185	cleaner.again ();
186	}
187
188	rsa_cache ()
189	{
190	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
191	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
192	}
193
194	} rsa_cache;
195
196	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
197	{
198	if (empty ())
199	w.stop ();
200	else
201	{
202	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
203	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
204	i = erase (i);
205	else
206	++i;
207	}
208	}	214	}
209		215
210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	216	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
211		217
212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	218	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
226	delete p;	232	delete p;
227		233
228	delete [] queue;	234	delete [] queue;
229	}	235	}
230		236
		237	void
231	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	238	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
232	{	239	{
233	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	240	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
234		241
235	for (;;)	242	for (;;)
236	{	243	{
…		…
247		254
248	delete get ();	255	delete get ();
249	}	256	}
250	}	257	}
251		258
		259	void
252	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	260	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
253	{	261	{
254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	262	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
255		263
256	// start expiry timer	264	// start expiry timer
257	if (empty ())	265	if (empty ())
…		…
266	queue[i].tstamp = now;	274	queue[i].tstamp = now;
267		275
268	i = ni;	276	i = ni;
269	}	277	}
270		278
271	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	279	net_packet *
		280	pkt_queue::get ()
272	{	281	{
273	if (empty ())	282	if (empty ())
274	return 0;	283	return 0;
275		284
276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	285	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
300		309
301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	310	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
302	bool can (u32 host);	311	bool can (u32 host);
303	};	312	};
304		313
305	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	314	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
306		315
		316	bool
307	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	317	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
308	{	318	{
309	iterator i;	319	iterator i;
310		320
311	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	321	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
312	if (i->host == host)	322	if (i->host == host)
…		…
357	}	367	}
358	}	368	}
359		369
360	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	370	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
361		371
362	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	372	void
363
364	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	373	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx ctx, u8 hmac_digest)
365	{	374	{
366	unsigned int xlen;
367
368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	375	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
369		376
370	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	377	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
371	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	378	require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
372	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	379	require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
373	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
374	}	380	}
375		381
376	void	382	void
377	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	383	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
378	{	384	{
379	hmac_gen (ctx);	385	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
380		386	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
381	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	387	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
382	}	388	}
383		389
384	bool	390	bool
385	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	391	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
386	{	392	{
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	393	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
388		394	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
389	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	395	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	396	}
391		397
		398	void
392	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	399	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
393	{	400	{
394	type = type_;	401	type = type_;
395		402
396	int src = THISNODE->id;	403	int src = THISNODE->id;
397		404
…		…
402		409
403	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	410	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
404	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	411	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
405		412
406	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	413	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		414	{
		415	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		416
		417	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		418	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		419
		420	private:
		421	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
407	{	422	{
408	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
409
410	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
411	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
412	private:
413
414	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
415	{
416	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	423	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
417	}
418	};	424	}
		425	};
419		426
420	void	427	void
421	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	428	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
422	{	429	{
423	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	430	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
441	d[1] = cl;	448	d[1] = cl;
442	}	449	}
443	}	450	}
444	#endif	451	#endif
445		452
446	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	453	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
447		454
448	struct {	455	struct {
449	#if RAND_SIZE	456	#if RAND_SIZE
450	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	457	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
451	#endif	458	#endif
452	u32 seqno;	459	u32 seqno;
453	} datahdr;	460	} datahdr;
454		461
455	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	462	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
456	#if RAND_SIZE	463	#if RAND_SIZE
457	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	464	// NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
		465	// is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
		466	conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
458	#endif	467	#endif
459		468
460	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	469	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
461	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	470	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
462	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	471	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
…		…
484	int outl = 0, outl2;	493	int outl = 0, outl2;
485	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	494	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
486	u8 *d;	495	u8 *d;
487	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	496	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
488		497
489	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	498	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
490		499
491	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	500	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
492	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	501	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
493		502
494	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	503	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
495	d = cdata;	504	d = cdata;
496	else	505	else
497	#endif	506	#endif
498	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	507	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
499		508
500	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	509	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		510	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		511	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		512	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		513	require ((u8 )(&p->len + 1) == &(p)[0]);
		514
		515	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
501	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	516	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
502	d, &outl2,	517	d, &outl2,
503	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	518	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
504	outl += outl2;	519	outl += outl2;
505		520
…		…
536	}	551	}
537	};	552	};
538		553
539	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	554	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
540	{	555	{
541	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	556	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
542	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
543	// hmacs simply will not work.
544	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
545	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
546	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
547		560
548	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
549	bool chk_config () const;	562	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
550		563
551	static u8 get_features ()	564	static u8 get_features ()
552	{	565	{
553	u8 f = 0;	566	u8 f = 0;
554	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	567	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
562	#endif	575	#endif
563	return f;	576	return f;
564	}	577	}
565	};	578	};
566		579
		580	void
567	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
568	{	582	{
569	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
570	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
571	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	585	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
572	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
573	flags = 0;	586	flags = 0;
574	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
575	features = get_features ();	587	features = get_features ();
576		588
		589	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		590
577	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	591	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
578	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
579	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	592	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		593	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
580		594
581	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	595	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
582	set_hdr (type, dst);	596	set_hdr (type, dst);
583	}	597	}
584		598
585	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	599	bool
		600	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
586	{	601	{
587	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	602	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
588	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	603	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
		604	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	605	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
590	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	606	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
591	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)	607	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
592	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
593	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
594	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
595	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	608	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
596	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	609	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
597	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	610	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
598	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
599	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	611	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	612	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		613	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		614	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		615	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		616	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
601	else	617	else
		618	{
		619	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		620
		621	if (cmp > 0)
		622	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		623	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		624	else if (cmp == 0)
602	return true;	625	return true;
		626	}
603		627
604	return false;	628	return false;
605	}	629	}
606		630
607	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	631	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
608	{	632	{
609	char magic[8];	633	char magic[8];
610	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	634	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
611	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	635	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
612	u8 pad2, pad3;	636	u8 pad2, pad3;
613	rsaid id;	637	auth_encr encr;
614	rsaencrdata encr;
615		638
616	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	639	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
617	{	640	{
618	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	641	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
619	strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8);	642	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
620	initiate = !!initiate_;	643	initiate = !!initiate_;
621	protocols = protocols_;	644	protocols = protocols_;
622		645
623	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	646	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
624	}	647	}
625	};	648	};
626		649
627	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	650	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
628	{	651	{
629	rsaid id;
630	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
631	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
632	rsaresponse response;	652	auth_response response;
633		653
634	auth_res_packet (int dst)	654	auth_res_packet (int dst)
635	{	655	{
636	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	656	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
637		657
638	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	658	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
639	}	659	}
640	};	660	};
641		661
…		…
671	};	691	};
672		692
673	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	693	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
674		694
675	void	695	void
676	connection::connection_established ()	696	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
677	{	697	{
678	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	698	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		699	return;
679		700
		701	si = rsi;
		702	protocol = rsi.prot;
		703
		704	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		705	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		706	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		707	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		708
		709	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		710	{
		711	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		712	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		713	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
		714	}
		715
		716	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		717	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		718
		719	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		720	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		721
		722	oiv.reset ();
		723
		724	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
		725	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
		726	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		727
		728	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
		729
		730	// send queued packets
680	if (ictx && octx)	731	if (ictx && octx)
681	{	732	{
682	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	733	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
683	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
684	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
685	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
686
687	// send queued packets
688	if (ictx && octx)
689	{	734	{
690	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
691	{
692	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	735	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
693	delete p;	736	delete p;
694	}
695
696	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
697	{
698	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
699	delete p;
700	}
701	}	737	}
702		738
		739	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
		740	{
		741	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
		742	delete p;
		743	}
		744	}
		745
703	vpn->connection_established (this);	746	vpn->connection_established (this);
704	}
705	else
706	{
707	retry_cnt = 0;
708	establish_connection.start (5);
709	keepalive.stop ();
710	rekey.stop ();
711	}
712	}	747	}
713		748
714	void	749	void
715	connection::reset_si ()	750	connection::reset_si ()
716	{	751	{
…		…
762	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	797	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
763		798
764	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	799	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
765		800
766	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	801	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767
768	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	802	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
769		803
770	delete pkt;	804	delete pkt;
771	}	805	}
772		806
…		…
787	void	821	void
788	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	822	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
789	{	823	{
790	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	824	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
791		825
792	rsachallenge chg;	826	generate_auth_data ();
793	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
794	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	827	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
795		828
796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	829	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
797
798	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	830	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
799		831
800	delete pkt;	832	delete pkt;
801	}	833	}
802		834
803	void	835	void
804	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	836	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
805	{	837	{
806	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	838	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
807		839
808	pkt->id = id;	840	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
809		841	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
810	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
811
812	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
813		842
814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	843	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
815
816	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	844	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
817		845
818	delete pkt;	846	delete pkt;
819	}	847	}
820		848
821	void	849	void
822	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	850	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
823	{	851	{
824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	852	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
825	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	853	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		854	conf->protocols);
826		855
827	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	856	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
828		857
829	r->hmac_set (octx);	858	r->hmac_set (octx);
830	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	859	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
833	}	862	}
834		863
835	inline void	864	inline void
836	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	865	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
837	{	866	{
838	if (!ictx	867	if (!(ictx && octx)
839	&& conf != THISNODE	868	&& conf != THISNODE
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	869	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
841	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	870	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
842	&& !w.is_active ())	871	&& !w.is_active ())
843	{	872	{
…		…
911	}	940	}
912	}	941	}
913		942
914	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	943	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
915	delete octx; octx = 0;	944	delete octx; octx = 0;
916	#if ENABLE_DNS
917	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
918	#endif
919		945
920	si.host = 0;	946	si.host = 0;
		947
		948	have_snd_auth = false;
		949	have_rcv_auth = false;
		950	auth_expire = 0.;
921		951
922	last_activity = 0.;	952	last_activity = 0.;
923	//last_si_change = 0.;	953	//last_si_change = 0.;
924	retry_cnt = 0;	954	retry_cnt = 0;
925		955
…		…
984	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1014	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
985	post_inject_queue ();	1015	post_inject_queue ();
986	}	1016	}
987	}	1017	}
988		1018
		1019	void
989	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1020	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
990	{	1021	{
991	if (ictx && octx)	1022	if (ictx && octx)
992	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1023	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
993	else	1024	else
994	{	1025	{
…		…
1000	void	1031	void
1001	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1032	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1002	{	1033	{
1003	last_activity = ev_now ();	1034	last_activity = ev_now ();
1004		1035
1005	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1036	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1006	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1037	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1007		1038
1008	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1039	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1009	return;	1040	return;
1010		1041
…		…
1040	{	1071	{
1041	reset_connection ();	1072	reset_connection ();
1042		1073
1043	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1074	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1044		1075
1045	if (!p->chk_config ())	1076	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1046	{
1047	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1048	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1049	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1050	}
1051	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1052	establish_connection ();	1077	establish_connection ();
1053	}	1078	}
1054	break;	1079	break;
1055		1080
1056	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1081	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1057	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1082	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1058	{	1083	{
1059	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1084	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1060		1085
1061	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1086	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1087	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1088	p->protocols, p->features);
1062		1089
		1090	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1091	{
		1092	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1093	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1094	}
1063	if (p->chk_config ()	1095	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1064	&& (!strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) \|\| !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1065	{	1096	{
1066	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1097	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1067	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1098	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1068	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1099	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1069	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1100	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1070		1101
1071	if (p->initiate)	1102	if (p->initiate)
1072	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1103	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1073		1104
1074	rsachallenge k;	1105	auth_data auth;
1075		1106
1076	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1107	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1077	{	1108	{
1078	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1109	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1079	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1110	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1080	break;
1081	}	1111	}
1082	else	1112	else
1083	{	1113	{
1084	delete octx;	1114	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1085		1115
1086	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1116	rcv_auth = auth;
1087	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1117	have_rcv_auth = true;
1088		1118
		1119	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1120
		1121	if (chg)
		1122	{
1089	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1123	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1090	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1124	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1091		1125
1092	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1093
1094	connection_established ();	1126	connection_established (rsi);
1095
1096	break;	1127	}
1097	}	1128	}
		1129
		1130	break;
1098	}	1131	}
1099	else
1100	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1101	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1102		1132
1103	send_reset (rsi);	1133	send_reset (rsi);
1104	}	1134	}
1105		1135
1106	break;	1136	break;
…		…
1109	{	1139	{
1110	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;	1140	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1111		1141
1112	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1142	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1113		1143
1114	if (p->chk_config ())	1144	auth_mac local_mac;
		1145	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1146
		1147	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1115	{	1148	{
1116	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1117	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1118	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1119	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1120
1121	rsachallenge chg;
1122
1123	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1124	{
1125	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1149	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1126	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1150	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1127	break;
1128	}	1151	}
1129	else	1152	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1130	{	1153	{
1131	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1154	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1132		1155
1133	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))	1156	have_snd_auth = true;
1134	{
1135	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1136	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1137	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1138	break;
1139	}
1140	else
1141	{
1142	rsaresponse h;
1143
1144	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1145
1146	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1147	{
1148	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1149
1150	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1151
1152	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1153
1154	si = rsi;
1155	protocol = rsi.prot;
1156
1157	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1158	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1159	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1160	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1161
1162	connection_established ();	1157	connection_established (rsi);
1163
1164	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1165	{
1166	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1167	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1168	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1169	}
1170
1171	break;
1172	}
1173	else
1174	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1175	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1176	}
1177
1178	delete cctx;
1179	}
1180	}	1158	}
1181	}	1159	}
1182
1183	send_reset (rsi);
1184	break;	1160	break;
1185		1161
1186	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1162	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1187	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1163	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1188	send_reset (rsi);	1164	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1261	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1237	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1262	{	1238	{
1263	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1239	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1264	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1240	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1265		1241
1266	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1242	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1267	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1243	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1244	p->protocols,
		1245	c->ictx && c->octx);
1268		1246
1269	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1247	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1270	{	1248	{
1271	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1249	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1272	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1250	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1295		1273
1296	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1274	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1297	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1275	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1298	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1276	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1299		1277
1300	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1278	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1279	conf->nodename,
1301	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1280	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1281	(const char *)p->si,
		1282	p->protocols,
		1283	protocol,
		1284	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1302	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1285	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1303		1286
1304	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1287	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1305		1288
1306	if (dsi.valid ())	1289	if (dsi.valid ())
1307	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1290	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1291	else
		1292	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1293	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1294	(const char *)p->si);
1308	}	1295	}
1309	else	1296	else
1310	slog (L_WARN,	1297	slog (L_WARN,
1311	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1298	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1312	p->id);	1299	p->id);
…		…
1321	}	1308	}
1322		1309
1323	inline void	1310	inline void
1324	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1311	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1325	{	1312	{
1326	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15)	1313	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1314
		1315	if (when >= 0)
		1316	w.start (when);
		1317	else if (when < -15)
1327	{	1318	{
1328	reset_connection ();	1319	reset_connection ();
1329	establish_connection ();	1320	establish_connection ();
1330	}	1321	}
1331	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1332	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1333	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1322	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1334	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1323	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1335	{	1324	{
		1325	w.start (3);
1336	send_ping (si);	1326	send_ping (si);
1337	w.start (3);
1338	}	1327	}
1339	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1328	else if (when >= -10)
1340	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1329	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1341	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1330	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1342	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1331	w.start (when + 10);
1343	else	1332	else
1344	reset_connection ();	1333	reset_connection ();
1345	}	1334	}
1346		1335
		1336	void
1347	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1337	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1348	{	1338	{
1349	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1339	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1350		1340
1351	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1341	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1352	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1342	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1343	THISNODE->protocols);
1353	p->hmac_set (octx);	1344	p->hmac_set (octx);
1354	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1345	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1355		1346
1356	delete p;	1347	delete p;
1357	}	1348	}
1358		1349
		1350	void
1359	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1351	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1360	{	1352	{
1361	char *env;	1353	char *env;
1362	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1354	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1363	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1355	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1364	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1356	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1365	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1357	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1366	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1358	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1367	}	1359	}
1368		1360
		1361	void
1369	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1362	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1370	{	1363	{
1371	vpn->script_init_env ();	1364	vpn->script_init_env ();
1372		1365
1373	char *env;	1366	char *env;
1374	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1367	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
…		…
1439	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1432	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1440		1433
1441	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1434	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1442	octx = ictx = 0;	1435	octx = ictx = 0;
1443		1436
1444	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1445	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1446
1447	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1437	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1448		1438
1449	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1439	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1450	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1440	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1451	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1441	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
…		…
1456	connection::~connection ()	1446	connection::~connection ()
1457	{	1447	{
1458	shutdown ();	1448	shutdown ();
1459	}	1449	}
1460		1450
		1451	void
1461	void connection_init ()	1452	connection_init ()
1462	{	1453	{
1463	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1454	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1464	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1455	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1465	}	1456	}
1466		1457

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.89 by root, Thu Dec 2 08:15:09 2010 UTC vs. Revision 1.107 by root, Fri Sep 20 11:57:03 2013 UTC

Diff Legend

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.89 by root, Thu Dec 2 08:15:09 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.107 by root, Fri Sep 20 11:57:03 2013 UTC