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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.93 by root, Tue Feb 15 13:31:23 2011 UTC vs.
Revision 1.110 by root, Thu Jan 9 08:15:05 2014 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
33 33
34#include <list> 34#include <list>
35#include <queue> 35#include <queue>
36#include <utility> 36#include <utility>
37 37
38#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38#include <openssl/rand.h> 39#include <openssl/rand.h>
39#include <openssl/evp.h> 40#include <openssl/evp.h>
40#include <openssl/rsa.h> 41#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41#include <openssl/err.h> 42#include <openssl/err.h>
43
44// openssl 0.9.8 compatibility
45#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
46 #define require101(exp) exp
47#else
48 #define require101(exp) equire (exp)
49#endif
42 50
43#include "conf.h" 51#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 52#include "slog.h"
45#include "device.h" 53#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 54#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 55#include "connection.h"
56#include "hkdf.h"
48 57
49#include "netcompat.h" 58#include "netcompat.h"
50 59
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 60#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
61#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57 62
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 63#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 64#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 65#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 66#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
108struct crypto_ctx 113struct crypto_ctx
109{ 114{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 116 HMAC_CTX hctx;
112 117
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 118 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 119 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 120};
116 121
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 122crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 123{
124 ecdh_key s;
125
126 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
127
128 {
129 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
130 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
131
132 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
133 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
134 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
135 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
136 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
137
138 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
139 require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
140 }
141
142 {
143 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
144 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
145
146 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
147 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
148 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
149 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
150 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
151
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 152 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 153 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 154 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 155}
124 156
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 157crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 158{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 159 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 160 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
129} 161}
130 162
163static inline void
164auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
165{
166 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
167 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
168 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
169 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
170
171 memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
172}
173
174static inline bool
175auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
176{
177 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
178
179 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
180 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
181 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
182 return 0;
183
184 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
185 memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
186
187 return 1;
188}
189
131static void 190static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 191auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 192{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 193 hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
135 194 kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 195 kdf.extract_done ();
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 196 kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 197}
143 198
144struct rsa_entry 199void
200connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 201{
146 tstamp expire; 202 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 203 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 204 // request data
160 { 205 rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 206 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
162 207
163 erase (i); 208 // eventual response data
164 return true; 209 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 210 }
167 211
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 212 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 213 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 214}
213 215
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 216//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 217
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 218pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
365 } 367 }
366} 368}
367 369
368///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 370/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
369 371
370unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
371
372void 372void
373hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) 373hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest)
374{ 374{
375 unsigned int xlen;
376
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 375 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
378 376
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); 377 require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), 378 require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); 379 require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
383} 380}
384 381
385void 382void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 383hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 384{
388 hmac_gen (ctx); 385 unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
389 386 hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
390 memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 387 memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
391} 388}
392 389
393bool 390bool
394hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) 391hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
395{ 392{
396 hmac_gen (ctx); 393 unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
397 394 hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
398 return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 395 return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
399} 396}
400 397
401void 398void
402vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) 399vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
403{ 400{
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 448 d[1] = cl;
452 } 449 }
453 } 450 }
454#endif 451#endif
455 452
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 453 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
457 454
458 struct { 455 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE 456#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; 457 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif 458#endif
462 u32 seqno; 459 u32 seqno;
463 } datahdr; 460 } datahdr;
464 461
465 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); 462 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
466#if RAND_SIZE 463#if RAND_SIZE
467 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); 464 // NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
465 // is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
466 conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
468#endif 467#endif
469 468
470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 469 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 470 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); 471 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
… …
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 493 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 494 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 495 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); 496 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 497
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 498 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
500 499
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 500#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 501 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 502
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 503 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
505 d = cdata; 504 d = cdata;
506 else 505 else
507#endif 506#endif
508 d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; 507 d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
509 508
510 /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ 509 // we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
510 // pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
511 // this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
512 require (DATAHDR <= 16);
513 require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]);
514
515 // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
511 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, 516 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
512 d, &outl2, 517 d, &outl2,
513 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); 518 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
514 outl += outl2; 519 outl += outl2;
515 520
… …
546 } 551 }
547}; 552};
548 553
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 554struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 555{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac 556 u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 557 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 558 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 559 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 560
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 561 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 562 bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
560 563
561 static u8 get_features () 564 static u8 get_features ()
562 { 565 {
563 u8 f = 0; 566 u8 f = 0;
564#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 567#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
… …
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 581config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 582{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 583 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 584 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE; 585 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 586 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 587 features = get_features ();
587 588
589 strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
590
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 591 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 592 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
593 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 594
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 595 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 596 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 597}
595 598
596bool 599bool
597config_packet::chk_config () const 600config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
598{ 601{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 602 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 603 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
604 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 605 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); 606 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH) 607 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 608 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 609 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) 610 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 611 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 612 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
613 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
614 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
615 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
616 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 617 else
618 {
619 int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
620
621 if (cmp > 0)
622 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
623 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
624 else if (cmp == 0)
614 return true; 625 return true;
626 }
615 627
616 return false; 628 return false;
617} 629}
618 630
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 631struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 632{
621 char magic[8]; 633 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 634 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 635 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 636 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 637 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 638
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 639 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 640 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 641 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 642 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 643 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 644 protocols = protocols_;
634 645
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 646 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 647 }
637}; 648};
638 649
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 650struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 651{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 652 auth_response response;
645 653
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 654 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 655 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 656 set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 657
650 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 658 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
651 } 659 }
652}; 660};
653 661
… …
683}; 691};
684 692
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 693/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 694
687void 695void
688connection::connection_established () 696connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 697{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 698 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
699 return;
691 700
692 if (ictx && octx) 701 si = rsi;
702 protocol = rsi.prot;
703
704 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
705 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
706 vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
707 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
708
709 if (::conf.script_node_up)
710 {
711 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
712 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
713 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
693 { 714 }
715
716 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
717 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
718
719 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
720 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
721
722 oiv.reset ();
723
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 724 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 725 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
696 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); 726 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
727
728 hmac_error = 0.;
729
697 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); 730 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
698 731
699 // send queued packets 732 // send queued packets
700 if (ictx && octx)
701 {
702 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) 733 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
703 { 734 {
704 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); 735 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
705 delete p; 736 delete p;
706 } 737 }
707 738
708 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) 739 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
709 { 740 {
710 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); 741 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
711 delete p; 742 delete p;
712 } 743 }
713 }
714 744
715 vpn->connection_established (this); 745 vpn->connection_established (this);
716 }
717 else
718 {
719 retry_cnt = 0;
720 establish_connection.start (5);
721 keepalive.stop ();
722 rekey.stop ();
723 }
724} 746}
725 747
726void 748void
727connection::reset_si () 749connection::reset_si ()
728{ 750{
… …
733 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); 755 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
734 protocol = 0; 756 protocol = 0;
735 } 757 }
736 758
737 si.set (conf, protocol); 759 si.set (conf, protocol);
738
739 is_direct = si.valid ();
740} 760}
741 761
742// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary 762// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
743const sockinfo & 763const sockinfo &
744connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const 764connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
… …
763 783
764void 784void
765connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) 785connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
766{ 786{
767 if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) 787 if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
768 reset_connection (); 788 reset_connection ("packet send error");
769} 789}
770 790
771void 791void
772connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) 792connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
773{ 793{
774 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 794 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
775 795
776 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 796 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
777 797
778 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 798 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
779
780 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 799 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
781 800
782 delete pkt; 801 delete pkt;
783} 802}
784 803
… …
799void 818void
800connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 819connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
801{ 820{
802 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 821 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
803 822
804 rsachallenge chg; 823 generate_auth_data ();
805 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
806 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 824 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
807 825
808 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
809
810 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 827 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
811 828
812 delete pkt; 829 delete pkt;
813} 830}
814 831
815void 832void
816connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 833connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
817{ 834{
818 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 835 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
819 836
820 pkt->id = id; 837 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
821 838 auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
822 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
823
824 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
825 839
826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 840 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
827
828 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 841 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
829 842
830 delete pkt; 843 delete pkt;
831} 844}
832 845
… …
856 { 869 {
857 // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection 870 // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
858 // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. 871 // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
859 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) 872 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
860 { 873 {
861 reset_connection (); 874 reset_connection ("no demand");
862 return; 875 return;
863 } 876 }
864 877
865 last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); 878 last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
866 879
… …
868 ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 881 ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
869 : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); 882 : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
870 883
871 reset_si (); 884 reset_si ();
872 885
873 bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW; 886 bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) || (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power);
874 887
875 if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) 888 if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
876 { 889 {
877 /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ 890 /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
878 w.start (1); 891 w.start (1);
… …
888 901
889 slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); 902 slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
890 903
891 if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) 904 if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
892 { 905 {
893 if (retry_cnt < 4) 906 // use ping after the first few retries
907 // TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
908 // TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
909 if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power))
894 send_auth_request (dsi, true); 910 send_auth_request (dsi, true);
895 else 911 else
896 send_ping (dsi, 0); 912 send_ping (dsi, 0);
897 } 913 }
898 } 914 }
899 915
900 retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9; 916 retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
901 917
902 if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) 918 if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
903 retry_cnt++; 919 retry_cnt++;
904 else 920 else
905 retry_int = conf->max_retry; 921 retry_int = conf->max_retry;
… …
907 w.start (retry_int); 923 w.start (retry_int);
908 } 924 }
909} 925}
910 926
911void 927void
912connection::reset_connection () 928connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
913{ 929{
914 if (ictx && octx) 930 if (ictx && octx)
915 { 931 {
916 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"), 932 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
917 conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 933 conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
918 934
919 if (::conf.script_node_down) 935 if (::conf.script_node_down)
920 { 936 {
921 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; 937 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
922 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); 938 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
… …
924 } 940 }
925 } 941 }
926 942
927 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 943 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
928 delete octx; octx = 0; 944 delete octx; octx = 0;
929#if ENABLE_DNS
930 dnsv4_reset_connection ();
931#endif
932 945
933 si.host = 0; 946 si.host = 0;
947
948 have_snd_auth = false;
949 have_rcv_auth = false;
950 auth_expire = 0.;
934 951
935 last_activity = 0.; 952 last_activity = 0.;
936 //last_si_change = 0.; 953 //last_si_change = 0.;
937 retry_cnt = 0; 954 retry_cnt = 0;
938 955
… …
945connection::shutdown () 962connection::shutdown ()
946{ 963{
947 if (ictx && octx) 964 if (ictx && octx)
948 send_reset (si); 965 send_reset (si);
949 966
950 reset_connection (); 967 reset_connection ("shutdown");
951} 968}
952 969
953// poor-man's rekeying 970// poor-man's rekeying
954inline void 971inline void
955connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 972connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
956{ 973{
957 reset_connection (); 974 reset_connection ("rekeying");
958 establish_connection (); 975 establish_connection ();
959} 976}
960 977
961void 978void
962connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) 979connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
… …
979 996
980void 997void
981connection::post_inject_queue () 998connection::post_inject_queue ()
982{ 999{
983 // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) 1000 // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
984 if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary 1001 if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
985 establish_connection.stop (); 1002 establish_connection.stop ();
986 1003
987 establish_connection (); 1004 establish_connection ();
988} 1005}
989 1006
… …
1049 // about our desire for communication. 1066 // about our desire for communication.
1050 establish_connection (); 1067 establish_connection ();
1051 break; 1068 break;
1052 1069
1053 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: 1070 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1071 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
1072
1073 if (ictx && octx)
1054 { 1074 {
1055 reset_connection (); 1075 reset_connection ("remote reset");
1056 1076
1057 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; 1077 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;
1058 1078
1059 if (!p->chk_config ()) 1079 if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1060 {
1061 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1062 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1063 connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1064 }
1065 else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1066 establish_connection (); 1080 establish_connection ();
1067 } 1081 }
1082
1068 break; 1083 break;
1069 1084
1070 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: 1085 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1071 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) 1086 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1072 { 1087 {
… …
1074 1089
1075 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1090 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1076 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1091 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1077 p->protocols, p->features); 1092 p->protocols, p->features);
1078 1093
1094 if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1095 {
1096 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
1097 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1098 }
1079 if (p->chk_config () 1099 else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1080 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1081 { 1100 {
1082 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1101 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1083 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1102 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1084 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1103 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1085 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1104 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1086 1105
1087 if (p->initiate) 1106 if (p->initiate)
1107 {
1088 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1108 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1089 1109
1090 rsachallenge k; 1110 if (ictx && octx)
1111 reset_connection ("reconnect");
1112 }
1091 1113
1114 auth_data auth;
1115
1092 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1116 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1093 { 1117 {
1094 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1118 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1095 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1119 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1096 break;
1097 } 1120 }
1098 else 1121 else
1099 { 1122 {
1100 delete octx; 1123 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1101 1124
1102 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1125 rcv_auth = auth;
1103 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1126 have_rcv_auth = true;
1104 1127
1128 send_auth_response (rsi);
1129
1130 if (chg)
1131 {
1105 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1132 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1106 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1133 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1107 1134
1108 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1109
1110 connection_established (); 1135 connection_established (rsi);
1111
1112 break; 1136 }
1113 } 1137 }
1138
1139 break;
1114 } 1140 }
1115 else
1116 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1117 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1118 1141
1119 send_reset (rsi); 1142 send_reset (rsi);
1120 } 1143 }
1121 1144
1122 break; 1145 break;
… …
1125 { 1148 {
1126 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; 1149 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
1127 1150
1128 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1151 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1129 1152
1130 if (p->chk_config ()) 1153 auth_mac local_mac;
1154 auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
1155
1156 if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1131 { 1157 {
1132 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1133 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1134 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1135 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1136
1137 rsachallenge chg;
1138
1139 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1140 {
1141 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1158 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1142 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1159 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1143 break;
1144 } 1160 }
1145 else 1161 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1146 { 1162 {
1147 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1163 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1148 1164
1149 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) 1165 have_snd_auth = true;
1150 {
1151 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1152 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1153 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1154 break;
1155 }
1156 else
1157 {
1158 rsaresponse h;
1159
1160 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1161
1162 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1163 {
1164 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1165
1166 delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1167
1168 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1169
1170 si = rsi;
1171 protocol = rsi.prot;
1172
1173 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1174 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1175 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1176 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1177
1178 connection_established (); 1166 connection_established (rsi);
1179
1180 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1181 {
1182 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1183 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1184 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1185 }
1186
1187 break;
1188 }
1189 else
1190 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1191 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1192 }
1193
1194 delete cctx;
1195 }
1196 } 1167 }
1197 } 1168 }
1198
1199 send_reset (rsi);
1200 break; 1169 break;
1201 1170
1202 case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: 1171 case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1203#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION 1172#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1204 send_reset (rsi); 1173 send_reset (rsi);
… …
1210 if (ictx && octx) 1179 if (ictx && octx)
1211 { 1180 {
1212 vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; 1181 vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;
1213 1182
1214 if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) 1183 if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
1184 {
1185 // rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
1186 // we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
1187 // and suppress messages and resets during that time.
1188 //TODO: should be done per source address
1189 if (!hmac_error)
1190 {
1191 hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
1192 break;
1193 }
1194 else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
1195 break; // silently suppress
1196 else
1197 {
1215 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" 1198 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1216 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), 1199 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1217 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1200 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1201 // reset
1202 }
1203 }
1218 else 1204 else
1219 { 1205 {
1220 u32 seqno; 1206 u32 seqno;
1221 tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); 1207 tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
1222 int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); 1208 int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1209
1210 hmac_error = 0;
1223 1211
1224 if (seqclass == 0) // ok 1212 if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1225 { 1213 {
1226 vpn->tap->send (d); 1214 vpn->tap->send (d);
1227 1215
… …
1313 1301
1314 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1302 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1315 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1303 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1316 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1304 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1317 1305
1318 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x) [%d]", 1306 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1319 conf->nodename, 1307 conf->nodename,
1320 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, 1308 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1321 (const char *)p->si, 1309 (const char *)p->si,
1322 p->protocols, 1310 p->protocols,
1311 protocol,
1312 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1323 !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1313 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1324 1314
1325 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1315 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1326 1316
1327 if (dsi.valid ()) 1317 if (dsi.valid ())
1328 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1318 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1319 else
1320 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1321 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1322 (const char *)p->si);
1329 } 1323 }
1330 else 1324 else
1331 slog (L_WARN, 1325 slog (L_WARN,
1332 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1326 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1333 p->id); 1327 p->id);
… …
1342} 1336}
1343 1337
1344inline void 1338inline void
1345connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1339connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1346{ 1340{
1347 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15) 1341 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1342
1343 if (when >= 0)
1344 w.start (when);
1345 else if (when < -15)
1348 { 1346 {
1349 reset_connection (); 1347 reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1350 establish_connection (); 1348 establish_connection ();
1351 } 1349 }
1352 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1353 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1354 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1350 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1355 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1351 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1356 { 1352 {
1353 w.start (3);
1357 send_ping (si); 1354 send_ping (si);
1358 w.start (3);
1359 } 1355 }
1360 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1356 else if (when >= -10)
1361 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1357 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1362 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1358 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1363 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1359 w.start (when + 10);
1364 else 1360 else
1365 reset_connection (); 1361 reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1366} 1362}
1367 1363
1368void 1364void
1369connection::send_connect_request (int id) 1365connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1370{ 1366{
… …
1470 1466
1471 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt 1467 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1472 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) 1468 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1473 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); 1469 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1474 1470
1475 reset_connection (); 1471 reset_connection ("startup");
1476} 1472}
1477 1473
1478connection::~connection () 1474connection::~connection ()
1479{ 1475{
1480 shutdown (); 1476 shutdown ();

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