… | |
… | |
33 | |
33 | |
34 | #include <list> |
34 | #include <list> |
35 | #include <queue> |
35 | #include <queue> |
36 | #include <utility> |
36 | #include <utility> |
37 | |
37 | |
|
|
38 | #include <openssl/opensslv.h> |
38 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
39 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
39 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
40 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
40 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
41 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
41 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
42 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
|
|
43 | |
|
|
44 | // openssl 0.9.8 compatibility |
|
|
45 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000 |
|
|
46 | #define require101(exp) exp |
|
|
47 | #else |
|
|
48 | #define require101(exp) require (exp) |
|
|
49 | #endif |
42 | |
50 | |
43 | #include "conf.h" |
51 | #include "conf.h" |
44 | #include "slog.h" |
52 | #include "slog.h" |
45 | #include "device.h" |
53 | #include "device.h" |
46 | #include "vpn.h" |
54 | #include "vpn.h" |
… | |
… | |
48 | #include "hkdf.h" |
56 | #include "hkdf.h" |
49 | |
57 | |
50 | #include "netcompat.h" |
58 | #include "netcompat.h" |
51 | |
59 | |
52 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
60 | #define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic |
53 | #define MAGIC "PORN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D |
|
|
54 | |
61 | |
55 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
62 | #define ULTRA_FAST 1 |
56 | #define HLOG 15 |
63 | #define HLOG 15 |
57 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
64 | #include "lzf/lzf.h" |
58 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
65 | #include "lzf/lzf_c.c" |
… | |
… | |
120 | { |
127 | { |
121 | u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE]; |
128 | u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE]; |
122 | static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key"; |
129 | static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key"; |
123 | |
130 | |
124 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
131 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
125 | kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm)); |
|
|
126 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
132 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key)); |
127 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
133 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
128 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
134 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
129 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
135 | kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info)); |
130 | |
136 | |
131 | HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); |
137 | HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); |
132 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0)); |
138 | require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0)); |
133 | } |
139 | } |
134 | |
140 | |
135 | { |
141 | { |
136 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
142 | u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE]; |
137 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
143 | static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key"; |
138 | |
144 | |
139 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
145 | hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ()); |
140 | kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm)); |
|
|
141 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key)); |
146 | kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key)); |
142 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
147 | kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s)); |
143 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
148 | kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ()); |
144 | kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info)); |
149 | kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info)); |
145 | |
150 | |
… | |
… | |
180 | |
185 | |
181 | return 1; |
186 | return 1; |
182 | } |
187 | } |
183 | |
188 | |
184 | static void |
189 | static void |
185 | auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac) |
190 | auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac) |
186 | { |
191 | { |
187 | HMAC_CTX ctx; |
192 | hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt |
188 | |
193 | kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa)); |
189 | HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx); |
194 | kdf.extract_done (); |
190 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0)); |
195 | kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info |
191 | require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth)); |
|
|
192 | require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0)); |
|
|
193 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); |
|
|
194 | } |
196 | } |
195 | |
197 | |
196 | void |
198 | void |
197 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
199 | connection::generate_auth_data () |
198 | { |
200 | { |
199 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
201 | if (auth_expire < ev_now ()) |
200 | { |
202 | { |
201 | // request data |
203 | // request data |
202 | rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa); |
204 | rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa); |
203 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
205 | curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh); |
204 | auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac); |
|
|
205 | |
206 | |
206 | // eventual response data |
207 | // eventual response data |
207 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
208 | curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b); |
208 | } |
209 | } |
209 | |
210 | |
… | |
… | |
365 | } |
366 | } |
366 | } |
367 | } |
367 | |
368 | |
368 | ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
369 | ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// |
369 | |
370 | |
370 | unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
|
|
371 | |
|
|
372 | void |
371 | void |
373 | hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
372 | hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest) |
374 | { |
373 | { |
375 | unsigned int xlen; |
|
|
376 | |
|
|
377 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; |
374 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; |
378 | |
375 | |
379 | require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); |
376 | require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); |
380 | require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), |
377 | require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet))); |
381 | len - sizeof (hmac_packet))); |
|
|
382 | require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen)); |
378 | require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0)); |
383 | } |
379 | } |
384 | |
380 | |
385 | void |
381 | void |
386 | hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
382 | hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
387 | { |
383 | { |
388 | hmac_gen (ctx); |
384 | unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
389 | |
385 | hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest); |
390 | memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
386 | memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
391 | } |
387 | } |
392 | |
388 | |
393 | bool |
389 | bool |
394 | hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
390 | hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) |
395 | { |
391 | { |
396 | hmac_gen (ctx); |
392 | unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
397 | |
393 | hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest); |
398 | return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
394 | return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); |
399 | } |
395 | } |
400 | |
396 | |
401 | void |
397 | void |
402 | vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) |
398 | vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) |
403 | { |
399 | { |
… | |
… | |
462 | u32 seqno; |
458 | u32 seqno; |
463 | } datahdr; |
459 | } datahdr; |
464 | |
460 | |
465 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
461 | datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); |
466 | #if RAND_SIZE |
462 | #if RAND_SIZE |
467 | require (RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE) >= 0); |
463 | // NB: a constant (per session) random prefix |
|
|
464 | // is likely enough, but we don't take any chances. |
|
|
465 | conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); |
468 | #endif |
466 | #endif |
469 | |
467 | |
470 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
468 | require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, |
471 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
469 | (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, |
472 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
470 | (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); |
… | |
… | |
552 | } |
550 | } |
553 | }; |
551 | }; |
554 | |
552 | |
555 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
553 | struct config_packet : vpn_packet |
556 | { |
554 | { |
|
|
555 | u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE]; |
557 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
556 | u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize; |
558 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
557 | u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8; |
559 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
558 | u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid; |
560 | |
559 | |
561 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
560 | void setup (ptype type, int dst); |
562 | bool chk_config () const; |
561 | bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const; |
563 | |
562 | |
564 | static u8 get_features () |
563 | static u8 get_features () |
565 | { |
564 | { |
566 | u8 f = 0; |
565 | u8 f = 0; |
567 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
566 | #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
… | |
… | |
584 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
583 | prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; |
585 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
584 | randsize = RAND_SIZE; |
586 | flags = 0; |
585 | flags = 0; |
587 | features = get_features (); |
586 | features = get_features (); |
588 | |
587 | |
|
|
588 | strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
589 | |
589 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
590 | cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
590 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
591 | mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
591 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
592 | auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
592 | |
593 | |
593 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
594 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
594 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
595 | set_hdr (type, dst); |
595 | } |
596 | } |
596 | |
597 | |
597 | bool |
598 | bool |
598 | config_packet::chk_config () const |
599 | config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const |
599 | { |
600 | { |
600 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
601 | if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) |
601 | slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
602 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
|
|
603 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); |
602 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
604 | else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) |
603 | slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
605 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), |
|
|
606 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE); |
604 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
607 | else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()))) |
605 | slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
608 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
609 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())); |
606 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
610 | else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()))) |
607 | slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
611 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
612 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())); |
608 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
613 | else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()))) |
609 | slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
614 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), |
|
|
615 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())); |
610 | else |
616 | else |
|
|
617 | { |
|
|
618 | int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial)); |
|
|
619 | |
|
|
620 | if (cmp > 0) |
|
|
621 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"), |
|
|
622 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
623 | else if (cmp == 0) |
611 | return true; |
624 | return true; |
|
|
625 | } |
612 | |
626 | |
613 | return false; |
627 | return false; |
614 | } |
628 | } |
615 | |
629 | |
616 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
630 | struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
… | |
… | |
630 | |
644 | |
631 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
645 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
632 | } |
646 | } |
633 | }; |
647 | }; |
634 | |
648 | |
635 | struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED |
649 | struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED |
636 | { |
650 | { |
637 | auth_response response; |
651 | auth_response response; |
638 | |
652 | |
639 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
653 | auth_res_packet (int dst) |
640 | { |
654 | { |
641 | config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
655 | set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); |
642 | |
656 | |
643 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
657 | len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); |
644 | } |
658 | } |
645 | }; |
659 | }; |
646 | |
660 | |
… | |
… | |
686 | si = rsi; |
700 | si = rsi; |
687 | protocol = rsi.prot; |
701 | protocol = rsi.prot; |
688 | |
702 | |
689 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."), |
703 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."), |
690 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
704 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
691 | is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded", |
705 | vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded", |
692 | PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor); |
706 | PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor); |
693 | |
707 | |
694 | if (::conf.script_node_up) |
708 | if (::conf.script_node_up) |
695 | { |
709 | { |
696 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
710 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
… | |
… | |
702 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
716 | iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff); |
703 | |
717 | |
704 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
718 | delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1); |
705 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
719 | oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff; |
706 | |
720 | |
707 | if (ictx && octx) |
721 | oiv.reset (); |
708 | { |
722 | |
709 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
723 | // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric |
710 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
724 | ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); |
711 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
725 | rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); |
712 | |
726 | |
|
|
727 | hmac_error = 0.; |
|
|
728 | |
713 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
729 | keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); |
714 | |
730 | |
715 | // send queued packets |
731 | // send queued packets |
716 | if (ictx && octx) |
|
|
717 | { |
|
|
718 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
732 | while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) |
719 | { |
733 | { |
720 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
734 | if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); |
721 | delete p; |
735 | delete p; |
722 | } |
736 | } |
723 | |
737 | |
724 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
738 | while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) |
725 | { |
739 | { |
726 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
740 | if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); |
727 | delete p; |
741 | delete p; |
728 | } |
742 | } |
729 | } |
|
|
730 | |
743 | |
731 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
744 | vpn->connection_established (this); |
732 | } |
|
|
733 | #if 0 |
|
|
734 | else |
|
|
735 | { |
|
|
736 | retry_cnt = 0; |
|
|
737 | establish_connection.start (5); |
|
|
738 | keepalive.stop (); |
|
|
739 | rekey.stop (); |
|
|
740 | } |
|
|
741 | #endif |
|
|
742 | } |
745 | } |
743 | |
746 | |
744 | void |
747 | void |
745 | connection::reset_si () |
748 | connection::reset_si () |
746 | { |
749 | { |
… | |
… | |
751 | slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); |
754 | slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); |
752 | protocol = 0; |
755 | protocol = 0; |
753 | } |
756 | } |
754 | |
757 | |
755 | si.set (conf, protocol); |
758 | si.set (conf, protocol); |
756 | |
|
|
757 | is_direct = si.valid (); |
|
|
758 | } |
759 | } |
759 | |
760 | |
760 | // ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary |
761 | // ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary |
761 | const sockinfo & |
762 | const sockinfo & |
762 | connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const |
763 | connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const |
… | |
… | |
781 | |
782 | |
782 | void |
783 | void |
783 | connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) |
784 | connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) |
784 | { |
785 | { |
785 | if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) |
786 | if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) |
786 | reset_connection (); |
787 | reset_connection ("packet send error"); |
787 | } |
788 | } |
788 | |
789 | |
789 | void |
790 | void |
790 | connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) |
791 | connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) |
791 | { |
792 | { |
… | |
… | |
830 | void |
831 | void |
831 | connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si) |
832 | connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si) |
832 | { |
833 | { |
833 | auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); |
834 | auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); |
834 | |
835 | |
835 | auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac); |
|
|
836 | memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b)); |
836 | memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b); |
|
|
837 | auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac); |
837 | |
838 | |
838 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
839 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
839 | send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly |
840 | send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly |
840 | |
841 | |
841 | delete pkt; |
842 | delete pkt; |
… | |
… | |
867 | { |
868 | { |
868 | // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection |
869 | // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection |
869 | // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. |
870 | // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. |
870 | if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) |
871 | if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) |
871 | { |
872 | { |
872 | reset_connection (); |
873 | reset_connection ("no demand"); |
873 | return; |
874 | return; |
874 | } |
875 | } |
875 | |
876 | |
876 | last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); |
877 | last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); |
877 | |
878 | |
… | |
… | |
879 | ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 |
880 | ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 |
880 | : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); |
881 | : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); |
881 | |
882 | |
882 | reset_si (); |
883 | reset_si (); |
883 | |
884 | |
884 | bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW; |
885 | bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) || (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power); |
885 | |
886 | |
886 | if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) |
887 | if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) |
887 | { |
888 | { |
888 | /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ |
889 | /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ |
889 | w.start (1); |
890 | w.start (1); |
… | |
… | |
899 | |
900 | |
900 | slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); |
901 | slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); |
901 | |
902 | |
902 | if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) |
903 | if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) |
903 | { |
904 | { |
904 | if (retry_cnt < 4) |
905 | // use ping after the first few retries |
|
|
906 | // TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly, |
|
|
907 | // TODO: as it will still have a valid connection |
|
|
908 | if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power)) |
905 | send_auth_request (dsi, true); |
909 | send_auth_request (dsi, true); |
906 | else |
910 | else |
907 | send_ping (dsi, 0); |
911 | send_ping (dsi, 0); |
908 | } |
912 | } |
909 | } |
913 | } |
910 | |
914 | |
911 | retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9; |
915 | retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9; |
912 | |
916 | |
913 | if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) |
917 | if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) |
914 | retry_cnt++; |
918 | retry_cnt++; |
915 | else |
919 | else |
916 | retry_int = conf->max_retry; |
920 | retry_int = conf->max_retry; |
… | |
… | |
918 | w.start (retry_int); |
922 | w.start (retry_int); |
919 | } |
923 | } |
920 | } |
924 | } |
921 | |
925 | |
922 | void |
926 | void |
923 | connection::reset_connection () |
927 | connection::reset_connection (const char *reason) |
924 | { |
928 | { |
925 | if (ictx && octx) |
929 | if (ictx && octx) |
926 | { |
930 | { |
927 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"), |
931 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"), |
928 | conf->nodename, (const char *)si); |
932 | conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason); |
929 | |
933 | |
930 | if (::conf.script_node_down) |
934 | if (::conf.script_node_down) |
931 | { |
935 | { |
932 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
936 | run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; |
933 | cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); |
937 | cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); |
… | |
… | |
957 | connection::shutdown () |
961 | connection::shutdown () |
958 | { |
962 | { |
959 | if (ictx && octx) |
963 | if (ictx && octx) |
960 | send_reset (si); |
964 | send_reset (si); |
961 | |
965 | |
962 | reset_connection (); |
966 | reset_connection ("shutdown"); |
963 | } |
967 | } |
964 | |
968 | |
965 | // poor-man's rekeying |
969 | // poor-man's rekeying |
966 | inline void |
970 | inline void |
967 | connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) |
971 | connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) |
968 | { |
972 | { |
969 | reset_connection (); |
973 | reset_connection ("rekeying"); |
970 | establish_connection (); |
974 | establish_connection (); |
971 | } |
975 | } |
972 | |
976 | |
973 | void |
977 | void |
974 | connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) |
978 | connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) |
… | |
… | |
991 | |
995 | |
992 | void |
996 | void |
993 | connection::post_inject_queue () |
997 | connection::post_inject_queue () |
994 | { |
998 | { |
995 | // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) |
999 | // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) |
996 | if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary |
1000 | if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary |
997 | establish_connection.stop (); |
1001 | establish_connection.stop (); |
998 | |
1002 | |
999 | establish_connection (); |
1003 | establish_connection (); |
1000 | } |
1004 | } |
1001 | |
1005 | |
… | |
… | |
1061 | // about our desire for communication. |
1065 | // about our desire for communication. |
1062 | establish_connection (); |
1066 | establish_connection (); |
1063 | break; |
1067 | break; |
1064 | |
1068 | |
1065 | case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: |
1069 | case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: |
|
|
1070 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename); |
|
|
1071 | |
|
|
1072 | if (ictx && octx) |
1066 | { |
1073 | { |
1067 | reset_connection (); |
1074 | reset_connection ("remote reset"); |
1068 | |
1075 | |
1069 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1076 | config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; |
1070 | |
1077 | |
1071 | if (!p->chk_config ()) |
1078 | if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
1072 | { |
|
|
1073 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."), |
|
|
1074 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1075 | connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED; |
|
|
1076 | } |
|
|
1077 | else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) |
|
|
1078 | establish_connection (); |
1079 | establish_connection (); |
1079 | } |
1080 | } |
|
|
1081 | |
1080 | break; |
1082 | break; |
1081 | |
1083 | |
1082 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
1084 | case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: |
1083 | if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) |
1085 | if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) |
1084 | { |
1086 | { |
… | |
… | |
1086 | |
1088 | |
1087 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1089 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", |
1088 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1090 | conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", |
1089 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1091 | p->protocols, p->features); |
1090 | |
1092 | |
1091 | if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
1093 | if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) |
|
|
1094 | { |
|
|
1095 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"), |
|
|
1096 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1097 | } |
|
|
1098 | else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi)) |
1092 | { |
1099 | { |
1093 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1100 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
1094 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1101 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
1095 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1102 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
1096 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
1103 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
1097 | |
1104 | |
1098 | if (p->initiate) |
1105 | if (p->initiate) |
|
|
1106 | { |
1099 | send_auth_request (rsi, false); |
1107 | send_auth_request (rsi, false); |
|
|
1108 | |
|
|
1109 | if (ictx && octx) |
|
|
1110 | reset_connection ("reconnect"); |
|
|
1111 | } |
1100 | |
1112 | |
1101 | auth_data auth; |
1113 | auth_data auth; |
1102 | |
1114 | |
1103 | if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth)) |
1115 | if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth)) |
1104 | { |
1116 | { |
1105 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), |
1117 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), |
1106 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); |
1118 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); |
1107 | } |
1119 | } |
1108 | else |
1120 | else |
1109 | { |
1121 | { |
1110 | bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth); |
1122 | bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth); |
1111 | |
1123 | |
1112 | rcv_auth = auth; |
1124 | rcv_auth = auth; |
1113 | have_rcv_auth = true; |
1125 | have_rcv_auth = true; |
1114 | |
1126 | |
1115 | send_auth_response (rsi); |
1127 | send_auth_response (rsi); |
… | |
… | |
1123 | } |
1135 | } |
1124 | } |
1136 | } |
1125 | |
1137 | |
1126 | break; |
1138 | break; |
1127 | } |
1139 | } |
1128 | else |
|
|
1129 | slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), |
|
|
1130 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1131 | |
1140 | |
1132 | send_reset (rsi); |
1141 | send_reset (rsi); |
1133 | } |
1142 | } |
1134 | |
1143 | |
1135 | break; |
1144 | break; |
… | |
… | |
1138 | { |
1147 | { |
1139 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1148 | auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; |
1140 | |
1149 | |
1141 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1150 | slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); |
1142 | |
1151 | |
1143 | if (p->chk_config ()) |
1152 | auth_mac local_mac; |
|
|
1153 | auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac); |
|
|
1154 | |
|
|
1155 | if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac)) |
1144 | { |
1156 | { |
1145 | if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac))) |
|
|
1146 | { |
|
|
1147 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1157 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."), |
1148 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1158 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1149 | } |
1159 | } |
1150 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
1160 | else if (!have_snd_auth) |
1151 | { |
1161 | { |
1152 | if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) |
|
|
1153 | slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), |
|
|
1154 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, |
|
|
1155 | PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); |
|
|
1156 | |
|
|
1157 | prot_minor = p->prot_minor; |
|
|
1158 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b)); |
1162 | memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b); |
1159 | |
1163 | |
1160 | have_snd_auth = true; |
1164 | have_snd_auth = true; |
1161 | connection_established (rsi); |
1165 | connection_established (rsi); |
1162 | } |
|
|
1163 | |
|
|
1164 | break; |
|
|
1165 | } |
1166 | } |
1166 | } |
1167 | } |
1167 | |
|
|
1168 | send_reset (rsi); |
|
|
1169 | break; |
1168 | break; |
1170 | |
1169 | |
1171 | case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: |
1170 | case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: |
1172 | #if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
1171 | #if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION |
1173 | send_reset (rsi); |
1172 | send_reset (rsi); |
… | |
… | |
1179 | if (ictx && octx) |
1178 | if (ictx && octx) |
1180 | { |
1179 | { |
1181 | vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; |
1180 | vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; |
1182 | |
1181 | |
1183 | if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) |
1182 | if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) |
|
|
1183 | { |
|
|
1184 | // rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods |
|
|
1185 | // we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally, |
|
|
1186 | // and suppress messages and resets during that time. |
|
|
1187 | //TODO: should be done per source address |
|
|
1188 | if (!hmac_error) |
|
|
1189 | { |
|
|
1190 | hmac_error = ev_now () + 3; |
|
|
1191 | break; |
|
|
1192 | } |
|
|
1193 | else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ()) |
|
|
1194 | break; // silently suppress |
|
|
1195 | else |
|
|
1196 | { |
1184 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" |
1197 | slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" |
1185 | "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), |
1198 | "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), |
1186 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
1199 | conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); |
|
|
1200 | // reset |
|
|
1201 | } |
|
|
1202 | } |
1187 | else |
1203 | else |
1188 | { |
1204 | { |
1189 | u32 seqno; |
1205 | u32 seqno; |
1190 | tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); |
1206 | tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); |
1191 | int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); |
1207 | int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); |
|
|
1208 | |
|
|
1209 | hmac_error = 0; |
1192 | |
1210 | |
1193 | if (seqclass == 0) // ok |
1211 | if (seqclass == 0) // ok |
1194 | { |
1212 | { |
1195 | vpn->tap->send (d); |
1213 | vpn->tap->send (d); |
1196 | |
1214 | |
… | |
… | |
1323 | |
1341 | |
1324 | if (when >= 0) |
1342 | if (when >= 0) |
1325 | w.start (when); |
1343 | w.start (when); |
1326 | else if (when < -15) |
1344 | else if (when < -15) |
1327 | { |
1345 | { |
1328 | reset_connection (); |
1346 | reset_connection ("keepalive overdue"); |
1329 | establish_connection (); |
1347 | establish_connection (); |
1330 | } |
1348 | } |
1331 | else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND |
1349 | else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND |
1332 | || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) |
1350 | || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) |
1333 | { |
1351 | { |
… | |
… | |
1337 | else if (when >= -10) |
1355 | else if (when >= -10) |
1338 | // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer |
1356 | // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer |
1339 | // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) |
1357 | // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) |
1340 | w.start (when + 10); |
1358 | w.start (when + 10); |
1341 | else |
1359 | else |
1342 | reset_connection (); |
1360 | reset_connection ("keepalive timeout"); |
1343 | } |
1361 | } |
1344 | |
1362 | |
1345 | void |
1363 | void |
1346 | connection::send_connect_request (int id) |
1364 | connection::send_connect_request (int id) |
1347 | { |
1365 | { |
… | |
… | |
1447 | |
1465 | |
1448 | // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt |
1466 | // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt |
1449 | if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) |
1467 | if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) |
1450 | vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); |
1468 | vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); |
1451 | |
1469 | |
1452 | reset_connection (); |
1470 | reset_connection ("startup"); |
1453 | } |
1471 | } |
1454 | |
1472 | |
1455 | connection::~connection () |
1473 | connection::~connection () |
1456 | { |
1474 | { |
1457 | shutdown (); |
1475 | shutdown (); |