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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.95 by root, Tue Mar 8 17:33:30 2011 UTC vs.
Revision 1.115 by root, Thu Jun 30 16:31:00 2016 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013,2016 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
33 33
34#include <list> 34#include <list>
35#include <queue> 35#include <queue>
36#include <utility> 36#include <utility>
37 37
38#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38#include <openssl/rand.h> 39#include <openssl/rand.h>
39#include <openssl/evp.h> 40#include <openssl/evp.h>
40#include <openssl/rsa.h> 41#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41#include <openssl/err.h> 42#include <openssl/err.h>
42 43
43#include "conf.h" 44#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 45#include "slog.h"
46#include "crypto.h"
45#include "device.h" 47#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 48#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 49#include "connection.h"
50#include "hkdf.h"
48 51
49#include "netcompat.h" 52#include "netcompat.h"
50 53
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 54#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
57 55
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 56#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 57#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 58#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 59#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
105 103
106////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 104//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
107 105
108struct crypto_ctx 106struct crypto_ctx
109{ 107{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 108 cipher cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 109 hmac hctx;
112 110
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 111 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 112 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 113};
116 114
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 115crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 116{
117 ecdh_key s;
118
119 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
120
121 {
122 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
123 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
124
125 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
126 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
127 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
128 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
129 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
130
131 hctx.init (mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST ());
132 }
133
134 {
135 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
136 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
137
138 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
139 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
140 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
141 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
142 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
143
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 145 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 146 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 147}
124 148
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 149crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 150{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 151 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 152}
153
154static inline void
155auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
156{
157 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
158 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
159 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
160 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
161
162 memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
163}
164
165static inline bool
166auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
167{
168 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
169
170 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
171 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
172 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
173 return 0;
174
175 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
176 memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
177
178 return 1;
129} 179}
130 180
131static void 181static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 182auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 183{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 184 hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
135 185 kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 186 kdf.extract_done ();
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 187 kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 188}
143 189
144struct rsa_entry 190void
191connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 192{
146 tstamp expire; 193 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 194 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 195 // request data
160 { 196 rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 197 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
162 198
163 erase (i); 199 // eventual response data
164 return true; 200 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 201 }
167 202
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 203 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 204 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 205}
213 206
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 207//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 208
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 209pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
365 } 358 }
366} 359}
367 360
368///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 361/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
369 362
370unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
371
372void 363void
373hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) 364hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest)
374{ 365{
375 unsigned int xlen; 366 ctx->hctx.init ();
376 367 ctx->hctx.add (((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 368 ctx->hctx.digest (hmac_digest);
378
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
383} 369}
384 370
385void 371void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 372hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 373{
388 hmac_gen (ctx); 374 unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
389 375 hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
390 memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 376 memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
391} 377}
392 378
393bool 379bool
394hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) 380hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
395{ 381{
396 hmac_gen (ctx); 382 unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
397 383 hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
398 return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 384 return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
399} 385}
400 386
401void 387void
402vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) 388vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
403{ 389{
… …
409 srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) | (dst >> 8); 395 srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) | (dst >> 8);
410 dst1 = dst; 396 dst1 = dst;
411} 397}
412 398
413#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) 399#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
414#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
415 400
416struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet 401struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
417{ 402{
418 u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno 403 u32 ctr; // seqno
404 u8 data[MAXVPNDATA];
419 405
420 void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno); 406 void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
421 tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno); 407 tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
422 408
423private: 409private:
424 const u32 data_hdr_size () const 410 const u32 data_hdr_size () const
425 { 411 {
426 return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR; 412 // the distance from beginning of packet to data member
413 return data - at (0);
427 } 414 }
428}; 415};
429 416
417// expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV
418static unsigned char *
419expand_iv (u32 ctr)
420{
421 static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4];
422
423 require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4);
424 require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0);
425
426 iv[0] =
427 iv[1] =
428 iv[2] = ctr;
429
430 // I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues,
431 // but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok,
432 // and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise
433 // to 0.
434 iv[3] = 0;
435
436 return (unsigned char *)iv;
437}
438
430void 439void
431vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno) 440vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
432{ 441{
433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx; 442 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->octx->cctx;
434 int outl = 0, outl2; 443 int outl = 0, outl2;
435 ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED; 444 ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
436 445
437#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 446#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
438 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 447 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 460 d[1] = cl;
452 } 461 }
453 } 462 }
454#endif 463#endif
455 464
465 ctr = htonl (seqno);
466
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 467 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
457
458 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif
462 u32 seqno;
463 } datahdr;
464
465 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
466#if RAND_SIZE
467 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
468#endif
469 468
470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 469 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 470 (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2,
472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); 471 (unsigned char *)d, l));
473 outl += outl2; 472 outl += outl2;
474 473
475 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 474 // it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
476 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 475 require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2));
477 (unsigned char *) d, l));
478 outl += outl2; 476 outl += outl2;
479 477
480 require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
481 outl += outl2;
482
483 len = outl + data_hdr_size (); 478 len = data_hdr_size () + outl;
484 479
485 set_hdr (type, dst); 480 set_hdr (type, dst);
486 481
487 hmac_set (conn->octx); 482 hmac_set (conn->octx);
488} 483}
489 484
490tap_packet * 485tap_packet *
491vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno) 486vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno)
492{ 487{
493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx; 488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->ictx->cctx;
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 489 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 490 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 491 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 492
493 seqno = ntohl (ctr);
494
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 495 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
500 496
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 497#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 498 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 499
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 500 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
505 d = cdata; 501 d = cdata;
506 else 502 else
507#endif 503#endif
508 d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; 504 d = &(*p)[6 + 6];
509 505
510 /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ 506 // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
511 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, 507 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
512 d, &outl2, 508 d, &outl2,
513 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); 509 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
514 outl += outl2; 510 outl += outl2;
515 511
512 // it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
516 require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2)); 513 require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
517 outl += outl2; 514 outl += outl2;
518 515
519 seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE));
520
521 id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst); 516 id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
522 id2mac (src (), p->src); 517 id2mac (src (), p->src);
523 518
524#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 519#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
525 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 520 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
526 { 521 {
527 u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) | d[DATAHDR + 1]; 522 u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) | d[1];
528 523
529 p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0, 524 p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0,
530 &(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU) 525 &(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)
531 + 6 + 6; 526 + 6 + 6;
532 } 527 }
533 else 528 else
534 p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR); 529 p->len = outl + (6 + 6);
535#endif 530#endif
536 531
537 return p; 532 return p;
538} 533}
539 534
… …
546 } 541 }
547}; 542};
548 543
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 544struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 545{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac 546 u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 547 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 548 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 549 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 550
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 551 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 552 bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
560 553
561 static u8 get_features () 554 static u8 get_features ()
562 { 555 {
563 u8 f = 0; 556 u8 f = 0;
564#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 557#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
… …
577void 570void
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 571config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 572{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 573 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 574 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 575 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 576 features = get_features ();
587 577
578 strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
579
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 580 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 581 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
582 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 583
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 584 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 585 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 586}
595 587
596bool 588bool
597config_packet::chk_config () const 589config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
598{ 590{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 591 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 592 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 593 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 594 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 595 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) 596 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 597 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 598 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
599 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
600 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
601 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
602 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 603 else
604 {
605 int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
606
607 if (cmp > 0)
608 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
609 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
610 else if (cmp == 0)
614 return true; 611 return true;
612 }
615 613
616 return false; 614 return false;
617} 615}
618 616
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 617struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 618{
621 char magic[8]; 619 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 620 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 621 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 622 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 623 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 624
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 625 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 626 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 627 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 628 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 629 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 630 protocols = protocols_;
634 631
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 632 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 633 }
637}; 634};
638 635
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 636struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 637{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 638 auth_response response;
645 639
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 640 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 641 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 642 set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 643
650 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 644 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
651 } 645 }
652}; 646};
653 647
… …
683}; 677};
684 678
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 679/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 680
687void 681void
688connection::connection_established () 682connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 683{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 684 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
685 return;
691 686
692 if (ictx && octx) 687 si = rsi;
688 protocol = rsi.prot;
689
690 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
691 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
692 vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
693 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
694
695 if (::conf.script_node_up)
696 {
697 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
698 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
699 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
693 { 700 }
701
702 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
703 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
704
705 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
706 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
707
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 708 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 709 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
696 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); 710 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
711
712 hmac_error = 0.;
713
697 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); 714 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
698 715
699 // send queued packets 716 // send queued packets
700 if (ictx && octx)
701 {
702 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) 717 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
703 { 718 {
704 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); 719 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
705 delete p; 720 delete p;
706 } 721 }
707 722
708 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) 723 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
709 { 724 {
710 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); 725 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
711 delete p; 726 delete p;
712 } 727 }
713 }
714 728
715 vpn->connection_established (this); 729 vpn->connection_established (this);
716 }
717 else
718 {
719 retry_cnt = 0;
720 establish_connection.start (5);
721 keepalive.stop ();
722 rekey.stop ();
723 }
724} 730}
725 731
726void 732void
727connection::reset_si () 733connection::reset_si ()
728{ 734{
… …
733 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); 739 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
734 protocol = 0; 740 protocol = 0;
735 } 741 }
736 742
737 si.set (conf, protocol); 743 si.set (conf, protocol);
738
739 is_direct = si.valid ();
740} 744}
741 745
742// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary 746// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
743const sockinfo & 747const sockinfo &
744connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const 748connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
… …
763 767
764void 768void
765connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) 769connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
766{ 770{
767 if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) 771 if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
768 reset_connection (); 772 reset_connection ("packet send error");
769} 773}
770 774
771void 775void
772connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) 776connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
773{ 777{
774 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 778 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
775 779
776 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 780 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
777 781
778 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 782 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
779
780 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 783 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
781 784
782 delete pkt; 785 delete pkt;
783} 786}
784 787
… …
799void 802void
800connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 803connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
801{ 804{
802 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 805 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
803 806
804 rsachallenge chg; 807 generate_auth_data ();
805 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
806 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 808 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
807 809
808 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 810 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
809
810 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 811 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
811 812
812 delete pkt; 813 delete pkt;
813} 814}
814 815
815void 816void
816connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 817connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
817{ 818{
818 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 819 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
819 820
820 pkt->id = id; 821 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
821 822 auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
822 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
823
824 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
825 823
826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 824 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
827
828 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 825 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
829 826
830 delete pkt; 827 delete pkt;
831} 828}
832 829
… …
856 { 853 {
857 // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection 854 // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
858 // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. 855 // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
859 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) 856 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
860 { 857 {
861 reset_connection (); 858 reset_connection ("no demand");
862 return; 859 return;
863 } 860 }
864 861
865 last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); 862 last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
866 863
… …
868 ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 865 ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
869 : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); 866 : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
870 867
871 reset_si (); 868 reset_si ();
872 869
873 bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW; 870 bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) || (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power);
874 871
875 if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) 872 if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
876 { 873 {
877 /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ 874 /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
878 w.start (1); 875 w.start (1);
… …
888 885
889 slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); 886 slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
890 887
891 if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) 888 if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
892 { 889 {
893 if (retry_cnt < 4) 890 // use ping after the first few retries
891 // TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
892 // TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
893 if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power))
894 send_auth_request (dsi, true); 894 send_auth_request (dsi, true);
895 else 895 else
896 send_ping (dsi, 0); 896 send_ping (dsi, 0);
897 } 897 }
898 } 898 }
899 899
900 retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9; 900 retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
901 901
902 if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) 902 if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
903 retry_cnt++; 903 retry_cnt++;
904 else 904 else
905 retry_int = conf->max_retry; 905 retry_int = conf->max_retry;
… …
907 w.start (retry_int); 907 w.start (retry_int);
908 } 908 }
909} 909}
910 910
911void 911void
912connection::reset_connection () 912connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
913{ 913{
914 if (ictx && octx) 914 if (ictx && octx)
915 { 915 {
916 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"), 916 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
917 conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 917 conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
918 918
919 if (::conf.script_node_down) 919 if (::conf.script_node_down)
920 { 920 {
921 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; 921 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
922 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); 922 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
… …
927 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 927 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
928 delete octx; octx = 0; 928 delete octx; octx = 0;
929 929
930 si.host = 0; 930 si.host = 0;
931 931
932 have_snd_auth = false;
933 have_rcv_auth = false;
934 auth_expire = 0.;
935
932 last_activity = 0.; 936 last_activity = 0.;
933 //last_si_change = 0.; 937 //last_si_change = 0.;
934 retry_cnt = 0; 938 retry_cnt = 0;
935 939
936 rekey.stop (); 940 rekey.stop ();
… …
942connection::shutdown () 946connection::shutdown ()
943{ 947{
944 if (ictx && octx) 948 if (ictx && octx)
945 send_reset (si); 949 send_reset (si);
946 950
947 reset_connection (); 951 reset_connection ("shutdown");
948} 952}
949 953
950// poor-man's rekeying 954// poor-man's rekeying
951inline void 955inline void
952connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 956connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
953{ 957{
954 reset_connection (); 958 reset_connection ("rekeying");
955 establish_connection (); 959 establish_connection ();
956} 960}
957 961
958void 962void
959connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) 963connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
… …
976 980
977void 981void
978connection::post_inject_queue () 982connection::post_inject_queue ()
979{ 983{
980 // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) 984 // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
981 if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary 985 if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
982 establish_connection.stop (); 986 establish_connection.stop ();
983 987
984 establish_connection (); 988 establish_connection ();
985} 989}
986 990
… …
1046 // about our desire for communication. 1050 // about our desire for communication.
1047 establish_connection (); 1051 establish_connection ();
1048 break; 1052 break;
1049 1053
1050 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: 1054 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1055 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
1056
1057 if (ictx && octx)
1051 { 1058 {
1052 reset_connection (); 1059 reset_connection ("remote reset");
1053 1060
1054 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; 1061 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;
1055 1062
1056 if (!p->chk_config ()) 1063 if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1057 {
1058 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1059 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1060 connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1061 }
1062 else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1063 establish_connection (); 1064 establish_connection ();
1064 } 1065 }
1066
1065 break; 1067 break;
1066 1068
1067 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: 1069 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1068 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) 1070 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1069 { 1071 {
… …
1071 1073
1072 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1074 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1073 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1075 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1074 p->protocols, p->features); 1076 p->protocols, p->features);
1075 1077
1078 if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1079 {
1080 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
1081 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1082 }
1076 if (p->chk_config () 1083 else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1077 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1078 { 1084 {
1079 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1085 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1080 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1086 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1081 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1087 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1082 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1088 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1083 1089
1084 if (p->initiate) 1090 if (p->initiate)
1091 {
1085 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1092 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1086 1093
1087 rsachallenge k; 1094 if (ictx && octx)
1095 reset_connection ("reconnect");
1096 }
1088 1097
1098 auth_data auth;
1099
1089 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1100 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1090 { 1101 {
1091 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1102 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1092 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1103 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1093 break;
1094 } 1104 }
1095 else 1105 else
1096 { 1106 {
1097 delete octx; 1107 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1098 1108
1099 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1109 rcv_auth = auth;
1100 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1110 have_rcv_auth = true;
1101 1111
1112 send_auth_response (rsi);
1113
1114 if (chg)
1115 {
1102 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1116 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1103 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1117 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1104 1118
1105 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1106
1107 connection_established (); 1119 connection_established (rsi);
1108
1109 break; 1120 }
1110 } 1121 }
1122
1123 break;
1111 } 1124 }
1112 else
1113 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1114 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1115 1125
1116 send_reset (rsi); 1126 send_reset (rsi);
1117 } 1127 }
1118 1128
1119 break; 1129 break;
… …
1122 { 1132 {
1123 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; 1133 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
1124 1134
1125 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1135 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1126 1136
1127 if (p->chk_config ()) 1137 auth_mac local_mac;
1138 auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
1139
1140 if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1128 { 1141 {
1129 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1130 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1131 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1132 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1133
1134 rsachallenge chg;
1135
1136 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1137 {
1138 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1142 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1139 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1143 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1140 break;
1141 } 1144 }
1142 else 1145 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1143 { 1146 {
1144 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1147 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1145 1148
1146 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) 1149 have_snd_auth = true;
1147 {
1148 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1149 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1150 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1151 break;
1152 }
1153 else
1154 {
1155 rsaresponse h;
1156
1157 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1158
1159 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1160 {
1161 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1162
1163 delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1164
1165 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1166
1167 si = rsi;
1168 protocol = rsi.prot;
1169
1170 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1171 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1172 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1173 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1174
1175 connection_established (); 1150 connection_established (rsi);
1176
1177 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1178 {
1179 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1180 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1181 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1182 }
1183
1184 break;
1185 }
1186 else
1187 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1188 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1189 }
1190
1191 delete cctx;
1192 }
1193 } 1151 }
1194 } 1152 }
1195
1196 send_reset (rsi);
1197 break; 1153 break;
1198 1154
1199 case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: 1155 case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1200#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION 1156#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1201 send_reset (rsi); 1157 send_reset (rsi);
… …
1207 if (ictx && octx) 1163 if (ictx && octx)
1208 { 1164 {
1209 vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; 1165 vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;
1210 1166
1211 if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) 1167 if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
1168 {
1169 // rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
1170 // we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
1171 // and suppress messages and resets during that time.
1172 //TODO: should be done per source address
1173 if (!hmac_error)
1174 {
1175 hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
1176 break;
1177 }
1178 else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
1179 break; // silently suppress
1180 else
1181 {
1212 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" 1182 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1213 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), 1183 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1214 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1184 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1185 // reset
1186 }
1187 }
1215 else 1188 else
1216 { 1189 {
1217 u32 seqno; 1190 u32 seqno;
1218 tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); 1191 tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
1219 int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); 1192 int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1193
1194 hmac_error = 0;
1220 1195
1221 if (seqclass == 0) // ok 1196 if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1222 { 1197 {
1223 vpn->tap->send (d); 1198 vpn->tap->send (d);
1224 1199
… …
1310 1285
1311 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1286 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1312 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1287 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1313 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1288 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1314 1289
1315 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x) [%d]", 1290 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1316 conf->nodename, 1291 conf->nodename,
1317 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, 1292 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1318 (const char *)p->si, 1293 (const char *)p->si,
1319 p->protocols, 1294 p->protocols,
1295 protocol,
1296 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1320 !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1297 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1321 1298
1322 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1299 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1323 1300
1324 if (dsi.valid ()) 1301 if (dsi.valid ())
1325 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1302 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1303 else
1304 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1305 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1306 (const char *)p->si);
1326 } 1307 }
1327 else 1308 else
1328 slog (L_WARN, 1309 slog (L_WARN,
1329 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1310 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1330 p->id); 1311 p->id);
… …
1339} 1320}
1340 1321
1341inline void 1322inline void
1342connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1323connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1343{ 1324{
1344 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15) 1325 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1326
1327 if (when >= 0)
1328 w.start (when);
1329 else if (when < -15)
1345 { 1330 {
1346 reset_connection (); 1331 reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1347 establish_connection (); 1332 establish_connection ();
1348 } 1333 }
1349 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1350 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1351 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1334 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1352 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1335 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1353 { 1336 {
1337 w.start (3);
1354 send_ping (si); 1338 send_ping (si);
1355 w.start (3);
1356 } 1339 }
1357 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1340 else if (when >= -10)
1358 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1341 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1359 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1342 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1360 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1343 w.start (when + 10);
1361 else 1344 else
1362 reset_connection (); 1345 reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1363} 1346}
1364 1347
1365void 1348void
1366connection::send_connect_request (int id) 1349connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1367{ 1350{
… …
1467 1450
1468 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt 1451 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1469 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) 1452 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1470 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); 1453 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1471 1454
1472 reset_connection (); 1455 reset_connection ("startup");
1473} 1456}
1474 1457
1475connection::~connection () 1458connection::~connection ()
1476{ 1459{
1477 shutdown (); 1460 shutdown ();

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