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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.94 by root, Sun Mar 6 19:40:28 2011 UTC vs.
Revision 1.116 by root, Mon Apr 1 03:10:26 2019 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013,2016 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
33 33
34#include <list> 34#include <list>
35#include <queue> 35#include <queue>
36#include <utility> 36#include <utility>
37 37
38#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38#include <openssl/rand.h> 39#include <openssl/rand.h>
39#include <openssl/evp.h> 40#include <openssl/evp.h>
40#include <openssl/rsa.h> 41#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41#include <openssl/err.h> 42#include <openssl/err.h>
42 43
43#include "conf.h" 44#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 45#include "slog.h"
46#include "crypto.h"
45#include "device.h" 47#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 48#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 49#include "connection.h"
50#include "hkdf.h"
48 51
49#include "netcompat.h" 52#include "netcompat.h"
50 53
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 54#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
57 55
56#define LZF_STATE_ARG 1
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 57#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 58#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 59#define INIT_HTAB 0
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 60#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
62#include "lzf/lzf_d.c" 61#include "lzf/lzf_d.c"
63 62
64////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 63//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65 64
… …
105 104
106////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 105//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
107 106
108struct crypto_ctx 107struct crypto_ctx
109{ 108{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 109 cipher cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 110 hmac hctx;
112 111
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 112 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 113 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 114};
116 115
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 116crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 117{
118 ecdh_key s;
119
120 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
121
122 {
123 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
124 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
125
126 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
127 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
128 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
129 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
130 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
131
132 hctx.init (mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST ());
133 }
134
135 {
136 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
137 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
138
139 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
140 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
141 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
142 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
143 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
144
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 145 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 146 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 147 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 148}
124 149
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 150crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 151{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 152 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 153}
154
155static inline void
156auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
157{
158 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
159 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
160 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
161 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
162
163 memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
164}
165
166static inline bool
167auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
168{
169 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
170
171 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
172 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
173 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
174 return 0;
175
176 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
177 memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
178
179 return 1;
129} 180}
130 181
131static void 182static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 183auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 184{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 185 hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
135 186 kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 187 kdf.extract_done ();
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 188 kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 189}
143 190
144struct rsa_entry 191void
192connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 193{
146 tstamp expire; 194 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 195 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 196 // request data
160 { 197 rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 198 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
162 199
163 erase (i); 200 // eventual response data
164 return true; 201 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 202 }
167 203
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 204 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 205 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 206}
213 207
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 208//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 209
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 210pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
365 } 359 }
366} 360}
367 361
368///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 362/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
369 363
370unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
371
372void 364void
373hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) 365hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest)
374{ 366{
375 unsigned int xlen; 367 ctx->hctx.init ();
376 368 ctx->hctx.add (((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 369 ctx->hctx.digest (hmac_digest);
378
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
383} 370}
384 371
385void 372void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 373hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 374{
388 hmac_gen (ctx); 375 unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
389 376 hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
390 memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 377 memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
391} 378}
392 379
393bool 380bool
394hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx) 381hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
395{ 382{
396 hmac_gen (ctx); 383 unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
397 384 hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
398 return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 385 return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
399} 386}
400 387
401void 388void
402vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) 389vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
403{ 390{
… …
409 srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) | (dst >> 8); 396 srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) | (dst >> 8);
410 dst1 = dst; 397 dst1 = dst;
411} 398}
412 399
413#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) 400#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
414#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
415 401
416struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet 402struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
417{ 403{
418 u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno 404 u32 ctr; // seqno
405 u8 data[MAXVPNDATA];
419 406
420 void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno); 407 void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
421 tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno); 408 tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
422 409
423private: 410private:
424 const u32 data_hdr_size () const 411 const u32 data_hdr_size () const
425 { 412 {
426 return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR; 413 // the distance from beginning of packet to data member
414 return data - at (0);
427 } 415 }
428}; 416};
429 417
418// expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV
419static unsigned char *
420expand_iv (u32 ctr)
421{
422 static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4];
423
424 require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4);
425 require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0);
426
427 iv[0] =
428 iv[1] =
429 iv[2] = ctr;
430
431 // I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues,
432 // but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok,
433 // and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise
434 // to 0.
435 iv[3] = 0;
436
437 return (unsigned char *)iv;
438}
439
430void 440void
431vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno) 441vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
432{ 442{
433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx; 443 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->octx->cctx;
434 int outl = 0, outl2; 444 int outl = 0, outl2;
435 ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED; 445 ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
436 446
437#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 447#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
438 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 448 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
439 449
440 if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION) 450 if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
441 { 451 {
452 static LZF_STATE lzf_state;
442 u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7); 453 u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7, lzf_state);
443 454
444 if (cl) 455 if (cl)
445 { 456 {
446 type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED; 457 type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;
447 d = cdata; 458 d = cdata;
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 462 d[1] = cl;
452 } 463 }
453 } 464 }
454#endif 465#endif
455 466
467 ctr = htonl (seqno);
468
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 469 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
457
458 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif
462 u32 seqno;
463 } datahdr;
464
465 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
466#if RAND_SIZE
467 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
468#endif
469 470
470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 471 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 472 (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2,
472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); 473 (unsigned char *)d, l));
473 outl += outl2; 474 outl += outl2;
474 475
475 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 476 // it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
476 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 477 require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2));
477 (unsigned char *) d, l));
478 outl += outl2; 478 outl += outl2;
479 479
480 require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
481 outl += outl2;
482
483 len = outl + data_hdr_size (); 480 len = data_hdr_size () + outl;
484 481
485 set_hdr (type, dst); 482 set_hdr (type, dst);
486 483
487 hmac_set (conn->octx); 484 hmac_set (conn->octx);
488} 485}
489 486
490tap_packet * 487tap_packet *
491vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno) 488vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno)
492{ 489{
493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx; 490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->ictx->cctx;
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 491 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 492 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 493 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 494
495 seqno = ntohl (ctr);
496
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 497 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
500 498
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 499#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 500 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 501
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 502 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
505 d = cdata; 503 d = cdata;
506 else 504 else
507#endif 505#endif
508 d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; 506 d = &(*p)[6 + 6];
509 507
510 /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ 508 // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
511 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, 509 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
512 d, &outl2, 510 d, &outl2,
513 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); 511 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
514 outl += outl2; 512 outl += outl2;
515 513
514 // it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
516 require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2)); 515 require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
517 outl += outl2; 516 outl += outl2;
518 517
519 seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE));
520
521 id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst); 518 id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
522 id2mac (src (), p->src); 519 id2mac (src (), p->src);
523 520
524#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 521#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
525 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 522 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
526 { 523 {
527 u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) | d[DATAHDR + 1]; 524 u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) | d[1];
528 525
529 p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0, 526 p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0,
530 &(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU) 527 &(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)
531 + 6 + 6; 528 + 6 + 6;
532 } 529 }
533 else 530 else
534 p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR); 531 p->len = outl + (6 + 6);
535#endif 532#endif
536 533
537 return p; 534 return p;
538} 535}
539 536
… …
546 } 543 }
547}; 544};
548 545
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 546struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 547{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac 548 u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 549 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 550 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 551 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 552
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 553 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 554 bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
560 555
561 static u8 get_features () 556 static u8 get_features ()
562 { 557 {
563 u8 f = 0; 558 u8 f = 0;
564#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 559#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
… …
577void 572void
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 573config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 574{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 575 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 576 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 577 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 578 features = get_features ();
587 579
580 strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
581
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 582 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 583 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
584 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 585
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 586 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 587 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 588}
595 589
596bool 590bool
597config_packet::chk_config () const 591config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
598{ 592{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 593 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 594 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 595 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 596 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 597 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) 598 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 599 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 600 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
601 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
602 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
603 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
604 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 605 else
606 {
607 int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
608
609 if (cmp > 0)
610 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
611 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
612 else if (cmp == 0)
614 return true; 613 return true;
614 }
615 615
616 return false; 616 return false;
617} 617}
618 618
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 620{
621 char magic[8]; 621 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 624 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 625 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 626
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 627 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 628 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 629 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 630 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 631 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 632 protocols = protocols_;
634 633
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 634 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 635 }
637}; 636};
638 637
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 638struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 639{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 640 auth_response response;
645 641
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 642 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 643 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 644 set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 645
650 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 646 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
651 } 647 }
652}; 648};
653 649
… …
683}; 679};
684 680
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 681/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 682
687void 683void
688connection::connection_established () 684connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 685{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 686 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
687 return;
691 688
692 if (ictx && octx) 689 si = rsi;
690 protocol = rsi.prot;
691
692 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
693 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
694 vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
695 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
696
697 if (::conf.script_node_up)
698 {
699 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
700 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
701 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
693 { 702 }
703
704 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
705 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
706
707 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
708 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
709
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 710 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 711 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
696 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); 712 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
713
714 hmac_error = 0.;
715
697 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); 716 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
698 717
699 // send queued packets 718 // send queued packets
700 if (ictx && octx)
701 {
702 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) 719 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
703 { 720 {
704 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); 721 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
705 delete p; 722 delete p;
706 } 723 }
707 724
708 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) 725 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
709 { 726 {
710 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); 727 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
711 delete p; 728 delete p;
712 } 729 }
713 }
714 730
715 vpn->connection_established (this); 731 vpn->connection_established (this);
716 }
717 else
718 {
719 retry_cnt = 0;
720 establish_connection.start (5);
721 keepalive.stop ();
722 rekey.stop ();
723 }
724} 732}
725 733
726void 734void
727connection::reset_si () 735connection::reset_si ()
728{ 736{
… …
733 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename); 741 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
734 protocol = 0; 742 protocol = 0;
735 } 743 }
736 744
737 si.set (conf, protocol); 745 si.set (conf, protocol);
738
739 is_direct = si.valid ();
740} 746}
741 747
742// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary 748// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
743const sockinfo & 749const sockinfo &
744connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const 750connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
… …
763 769
764void 770void
765connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) 771connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
766{ 772{
767 if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) 773 if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
768 reset_connection (); 774 reset_connection ("packet send error");
769} 775}
770 776
771void 777void
772connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong) 778connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
773{ 779{
774 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 780 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
775 781
776 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 782 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
777 783
778 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 784 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
779
780 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 785 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
781 786
782 delete pkt; 787 delete pkt;
783} 788}
784 789
… …
799void 804void
800connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 805connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
801{ 806{
802 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 807 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
803 808
804 rsachallenge chg; 809 generate_auth_data ();
805 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
806 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 810 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
807 811
808 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 812 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
809
810 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 813 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
811 814
812 delete pkt; 815 delete pkt;
813} 816}
814 817
815void 818void
816connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 819connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
817{ 820{
818 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 821 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
819 822
820 pkt->id = id; 823 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
821 824 auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
822 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
823
824 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
825 825
826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
827
828 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 827 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
829 828
830 delete pkt; 829 delete pkt;
831} 830}
832 831
… …
856 { 855 {
857 // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection 856 // a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
858 // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler. 857 // and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
859 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ()) 858 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
860 { 859 {
861 reset_connection (); 860 reset_connection ("no demand");
862 return; 861 return;
863 } 862 }
864 863
865 last_establish_attempt = ev_now (); 864 last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
866 865
… …
868 ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1 867 ? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
869 : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)); 868 : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
870 869
871 reset_si (); 870 reset_si ();
872 871
873 bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW; 872 bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) || (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power);
874 873
875 if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf)) 874 if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
876 { 875 {
877 /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */ 876 /*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
878 w.start (1); 877 w.start (1);
… …
888 887
889 slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW); 888 slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
890 889
891 if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) 890 if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
892 { 891 {
893 if (retry_cnt < 4) 892 // use ping after the first few retries
893 // TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
894 // TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
895 if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power))
894 send_auth_request (dsi, true); 896 send_auth_request (dsi, true);
895 else 897 else
896 send_ping (dsi, 0); 898 send_ping (dsi, 0);
897 } 899 }
898 } 900 }
899 901
900 retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9; 902 retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
901 903
902 if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) 904 if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
903 retry_cnt++; 905 retry_cnt++;
904 else 906 else
905 retry_int = conf->max_retry; 907 retry_int = conf->max_retry;
… …
907 w.start (retry_int); 909 w.start (retry_int);
908 } 910 }
909} 911}
910 912
911void 913void
912connection::reset_connection () 914connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
913{ 915{
914 if (ictx && octx) 916 if (ictx && octx)
915 { 917 {
916 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"), 918 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
917 conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 919 conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
918 920
919 if (::conf.script_node_down) 921 if (::conf.script_node_down)
920 { 922 {
921 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb; 923 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
922 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this); 924 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
… …
927 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 929 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
928 delete octx; octx = 0; 930 delete octx; octx = 0;
929 931
930 si.host = 0; 932 si.host = 0;
931 933
934 have_snd_auth = false;
935 have_rcv_auth = false;
936 auth_expire = 0.;
937
932 last_activity = 0.; 938 last_activity = 0.;
933 //last_si_change = 0.; 939 //last_si_change = 0.;
934 retry_cnt = 0; 940 retry_cnt = 0;
935 941
936 rekey.stop (); 942 rekey.stop ();
… …
942connection::shutdown () 948connection::shutdown ()
943{ 949{
944 if (ictx && octx) 950 if (ictx && octx)
945 send_reset (si); 951 send_reset (si);
946 952
947 reset_connection (); 953 reset_connection ("shutdown");
948} 954}
949 955
950// poor-man's rekeying 956// poor-man's rekeying
951inline void 957inline void
952connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 958connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
953{ 959{
954 reset_connection (); 960 reset_connection ("rekeying");
955 establish_connection (); 961 establish_connection ();
956} 962}
957 963
958void 964void
959connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) 965connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
… …
976 982
977void 983void
978connection::post_inject_queue () 984connection::post_inject_queue ()
979{ 985{
980 // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s) 986 // force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
981 if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary 987 if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power || THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
982 establish_connection.stop (); 988 establish_connection.stop ();
983 989
984 establish_connection (); 990 establish_connection ();
985} 991}
986 992
… …
1046 // about our desire for communication. 1052 // about our desire for communication.
1047 establish_connection (); 1053 establish_connection ();
1048 break; 1054 break;
1049 1055
1050 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: 1056 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1057 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
1058
1059 if (ictx && octx)
1051 { 1060 {
1052 reset_connection (); 1061 reset_connection ("remote reset");
1053 1062
1054 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; 1063 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;
1055 1064
1056 if (!p->chk_config ()) 1065 if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1057 {
1058 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1059 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1060 connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1061 }
1062 else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1063 establish_connection (); 1066 establish_connection ();
1064 } 1067 }
1068
1065 break; 1069 break;
1066 1070
1067 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: 1071 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1068 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) 1072 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1069 { 1073 {
… …
1071 1075
1072 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1076 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1073 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1077 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1074 p->protocols, p->features); 1078 p->protocols, p->features);
1075 1079
1080 if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1081 {
1082 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
1083 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1084 }
1076 if (p->chk_config () 1085 else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1077 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1078 { 1086 {
1079 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1087 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1080 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1088 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1081 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1089 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1082 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1090 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1083 1091
1084 if (p->initiate) 1092 if (p->initiate)
1093 {
1085 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1094 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1086 1095
1087 rsachallenge k; 1096 if (ictx && octx)
1097 reset_connection ("reconnect");
1098 }
1088 1099
1100 auth_data auth;
1101
1089 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1102 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1090 { 1103 {
1091 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1104 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1092 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1105 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1093 break;
1094 } 1106 }
1095 else 1107 else
1096 { 1108 {
1097 delete octx; 1109 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1098 1110
1099 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1111 rcv_auth = auth;
1100 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1112 have_rcv_auth = true;
1101 1113
1114 send_auth_response (rsi);
1115
1116 if (chg)
1117 {
1102 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1118 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1103 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1119 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1104 1120
1105 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1106
1107 connection_established (); 1121 connection_established (rsi);
1108
1109 break; 1122 }
1110 } 1123 }
1124
1125 break;
1111 } 1126 }
1112 else
1113 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1114 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1115 1127
1116 send_reset (rsi); 1128 send_reset (rsi);
1117 } 1129 }
1118 1130
1119 break; 1131 break;
… …
1122 { 1134 {
1123 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; 1135 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
1124 1136
1125 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1137 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1126 1138
1127 if (p->chk_config ()) 1139 auth_mac local_mac;
1140 auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
1141
1142 if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1128 { 1143 {
1129 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1130 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1131 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1132 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1133
1134 rsachallenge chg;
1135
1136 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1137 {
1138 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1144 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1139 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1145 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1140 break;
1141 } 1146 }
1142 else 1147 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1143 { 1148 {
1144 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1149 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1145 1150
1146 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) 1151 have_snd_auth = true;
1147 {
1148 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1149 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1150 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1151 break;
1152 }
1153 else
1154 {
1155 rsaresponse h;
1156
1157 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1158
1159 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1160 {
1161 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1162
1163 delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1164
1165 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1166
1167 si = rsi;
1168 protocol = rsi.prot;
1169
1170 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1171 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1172 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1173 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1174
1175 connection_established (); 1152 connection_established (rsi);
1176
1177 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1178 {
1179 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1180 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1181 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1182 }
1183
1184 break;
1185 }
1186 else
1187 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1188 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1189 }
1190
1191 delete cctx;
1192 }
1193 } 1153 }
1194 } 1154 }
1195
1196 send_reset (rsi);
1197 break; 1155 break;
1198 1156
1199 case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: 1157 case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1200#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION 1158#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1201 send_reset (rsi); 1159 send_reset (rsi);
… …
1207 if (ictx && octx) 1165 if (ictx && octx)
1208 { 1166 {
1209 vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; 1167 vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;
1210 1168
1211 if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) 1169 if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
1170 {
1171 // rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
1172 // we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
1173 // and suppress messages and resets during that time.
1174 //TODO: should be done per source address
1175 if (!hmac_error)
1176 {
1177 hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
1178 break;
1179 }
1180 else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
1181 break; // silently suppress
1182 else
1183 {
1212 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" 1184 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1213 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."), 1185 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1214 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1186 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1187 // reset
1188 }
1189 }
1215 else 1190 else
1216 { 1191 {
1217 u32 seqno; 1192 u32 seqno;
1218 tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); 1193 tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
1219 int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno); 1194 int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1195
1196 hmac_error = 0;
1220 1197
1221 if (seqclass == 0) // ok 1198 if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1222 { 1199 {
1223 vpn->tap->send (d); 1200 vpn->tap->send (d);
1224 1201
… …
1310 1287
1311 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1288 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1312 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1289 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1313 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1290 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1314 1291
1315 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x) [%d]", 1292 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1316 conf->nodename, 1293 conf->nodename,
1317 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, 1294 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1318 (const char *)p->si, 1295 (const char *)p->si,
1319 p->protocols, 1296 p->protocols,
1297 protocol,
1298 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1320 !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1299 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1321 1300
1322 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1301 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1323 1302
1324 if (dsi.valid ()) 1303 if (dsi.valid ())
1325 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1304 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1305 else
1306 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1307 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1308 (const char *)p->si);
1326 } 1309 }
1327 else 1310 else
1328 slog (L_WARN, 1311 slog (L_WARN,
1329 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1312 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1330 p->id); 1313 p->id);
… …
1339} 1322}
1340 1323
1341inline void 1324inline void
1342connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1325connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1343{ 1326{
1344 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15) 1327 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1328
1329 if (when >= 0)
1330 w.start (when);
1331 else if (when < -15)
1345 { 1332 {
1346 reset_connection (); 1333 reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1347 establish_connection (); 1334 establish_connection ();
1348 } 1335 }
1349 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1350 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1351 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1336 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1352 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1337 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1353 { 1338 {
1339 w.start (3);
1354 send_ping (si); 1340 send_ping (si);
1355 w.start (3);
1356 } 1341 }
1357 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1342 else if (when >= -10)
1358 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1343 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1359 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1344 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1360 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1345 w.start (when + 10);
1361 else 1346 else
1362 reset_connection (); 1347 reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1363} 1348}
1364 1349
1365void 1350void
1366connection::send_connect_request (int id) 1351connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1367{ 1352{
… …
1467 1452
1468 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt 1453 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1469 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) 1454 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1470 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); 1455 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1471 1456
1472 reset_connection (); 1457 reset_connection ("startup");
1473} 1458}
1474 1459
1475connection::~connection () 1460connection::~connection ()
1476{ 1461{
1477 shutdown (); 1462 shutdown ();

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