ViewVC Help

View File | Revision Log | Show Annotations | Download File

/cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.15 by pcg, Fri Aug 8 10:58:28 2003 UTC vs.
Revision 1.108 by root, Fri Oct 11 04:07:24 2013 UTC

1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
		3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
3		4
		5	This file is part of GVPE.
		6
4	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
5	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
6	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or	9	Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your
7	(at your option) any later version.	10	option) any later version.
8		11
9	This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,	12	This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
10	but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of	13	WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11	MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the	14	MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General
12	GNU General Public License for more details.	15	Public License for more details.
13		16
14	You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License	17	You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
15	along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software	18	with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
16	Foundation, Inc. 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA	19
		20	Additional permission under GNU GPL version 3 section 7
		21
		22	If you modify this Program, or any covered work, by linking or
		23	combining it with the OpenSSL project's OpenSSL library (or a modified
		24	version of that library), containing parts covered by the terms of the
		25	OpenSSL or SSLeay licenses, the licensors of this Program grant you
		26	additional permission to convey the resulting work. Corresponding
		27	Source for a non-source form of such a combination shall include the
		28	source code for the parts of OpenSSL used as well as that of the
		29	covered work.
17	*/	30	*/
18		31
19	#include "config.h"	32	#include "config.h"
20		33
21	extern "C" {
22	# include "lzf/lzf.h"
23	}
24
25	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
		35	#include <queue>
		36	#include <utility>
26		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
27	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
28	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
29	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
30	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
31		43
32	#include "gettext.h"	44	// openssl 0.9.8 compatibility
		45	#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
		46	#define require101(exp) exp
		47	#else
		48	#define require101(exp) equire (exp)
		49	#endif
33		50
34	#include "conf.h"	51	#include "conf.h"
35	#include "slog.h"	52	#include "slog.h"
36	#include "device.h"	53	#include "device.h"
37	#include "vpn.h"	54	#include "vpn.h"
38	#include "connection.h"	55	#include "connection.h"
		56	#include "hkdf.h"
39		57
40	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES	58	#include "netcompat.h"
41	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
42	#endif
43		59
44	#define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic	60	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		61	#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
		62
		63	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
		64	#define HLOG 15
		65	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
		66	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
		67	#include "lzf/lzf_d.c"
		68
		69	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
		70
		71	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb *, const char *> > rs_queue;
		72	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
		73
		74	namespace
		75	{
		76	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
		77	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
		78	{
		79	w.stop ();
		80
		81	if (rs_queue.empty ())
		82	return;
		83
		84	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
		85	if (pid)
		86	{
		87	w.set (pid);
		88	w.start ();
		89	}
		90	else
		91	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
		92
		93	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
		94	rs_queue.pop ();
		95	}
		96	};
		97
		98	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
		99	static void
		100	run_script_queued (run_script_cb *cb, const char *warnmsg)
		101	{
		102	rs_queue.push (std::make_pair (cb, warnmsg));
		103
		104	if (!rs_child_ev.is_active ())
		105	{
		106	rs_child_ev.set<rs_child_cb> ();
		107	rs_child_ev ();
		108	}
		109	}
		110
		111	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
45		112
46	struct crypto_ctx	113	struct crypto_ctx
47	{	114	{
48	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	115	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
49	HMAC_CTX hctx;	116	HMAC_CTX hctx;
50		117
51	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	118	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
52	~crypto_ctx ();	119	~crypto_ctx ();
53	};	120	};
54		121
55	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	122	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
56	{	123	{
		124	ecdh_key s;
		125
		126	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		127
		128	{
		129	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		130	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		131
		132	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		133	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		134	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		135	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		136	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		137
		138	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		139	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		140	}
		141
		142	{
		143	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		144	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		145
		146	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		147	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		148	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		149	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		150	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		151
57	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	152	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
58	EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc);	153	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
59	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	154	}
60	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
61	}	155	}
62		156
63	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	157	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
64	{	158	{
65	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx);	159	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
66	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	160	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
67	}	161	}
68		162
		163	static inline void
		164	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		165	{
		166	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		167	(unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
		168	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		169	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		170
		171	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		172	}
		173
		174	static inline bool
		175	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		176	{
		177	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		178
		179	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		180	(const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
		181	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		182	return 0;
		183
		184	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		185	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		186
		187	return 1;
		188	}
		189
69	static void	190	static void
70	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	191	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
71	{	192	{
72	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	193	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
73		194	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
74	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	195	kdf.extract_done ();
75	EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH);	196	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
76	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg);
77	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id);
78	EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0);
79	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
80	}	197	}
81		198
82	struct rsa_entry {	199	void
83	tstamp expire;	200	connection::generate_auth_data ()
84	rsaid id;
85	rsachallenge chg;
86	};
87
88	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
89	{	201	{
90	void cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w); time_watcher cleaner;	202	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
91
92	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
93	{
94	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
95	{
96	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > NOW)
97	{
98	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);
99
100	erase (i);
101	return true;
102	}
103	}
104
105	if (cleaner.at < NOW)
106	cleaner.start (NOW + RSA_TTL);
107
108	return false;
109	}
110
111	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
112	{
113	rsa_entry e;
114
115	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
116	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
117
118	e.expire = NOW + RSA_TTL;
119	e.id = id;
120	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
121
122	push_back (e);
123
124	if (cleaner.at < NOW)
125	cleaner.start (NOW + RSA_TTL);
126	}
127
128	rsa_cache ()
129	: cleaner (this, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb)
130	{ }	203	{
		204	// request data
		205	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
		206	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
131		207
132	} rsa_cache;	208	// eventual response data
133		209	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
134	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w)
135	{
136	if (empty ())
137	w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL;
138	else
139	{	210	}
140	w.at = NOW + RSA_TTL;
141		211
142	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )	212	// every use prolongs the expiry
143	if (i->expire <= NOW)	213	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
144	i = erase (i);
145	else
146	++i;
147	}
148	}	214	}
149		215
150	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	216	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
151		217
152	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	218	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
		219	: max_ttl (max_ttl), max_queue (max_queue)
153	{	220	{
154	if (queue[i])	221	queue = new pkt [max_queue];
155	{
156	delete queue[i];
157	j = (j + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH;
158	}
159		222
160	queue[i] = p;
161
162	i = (i + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH;
163	}
164
165	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()
166	{
167	net_packet *p = queue[j];
168
169	if (p)
170	{
171	queue[j] = 0;
172	j = (j + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH;
173	}
174
175	return p;
176	}
177
178	pkt_queue::pkt_queue ()
179	{
180	memset (queue, 0, sizeof (queue));
181	i = 0;	223	i = 0;
182	j = 0;	224	j = 0;
		225
		226	expire.set<pkt_queue, &pkt_queue::expire_cb> (this);
183	}	227	}
184		228
185	pkt_queue::~pkt_queue ()	229	pkt_queue::~pkt_queue ()
186	{	230	{
187	for (i = QUEUEDEPTH; --i > 0; )	231	while (net_packet *p = get ())
		232	delete p;
		233
188	delete queue[i];	234	delete [] queue;
189	}	235	}
190		236
		237	void
		238	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
		239	{
		240	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
		241
		242	for (;;)
		243	{
		244	if (empty ())
		245	break;
		246
		247	double diff = queue[j].tstamp - expire;
		248
		249	if (diff >= 0.)
		250	{
		251	w.start (diff > 0.5 ? diff : 0.5);
		252	break;
		253	}
		254
		255	delete get ();
		256	}
		257	}
		258
		259	void
		260	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
		261	{
		262	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
		263
		264	// start expiry timer
		265	if (empty ())
		266	expire.start (max_ttl);
		267
		268	int ni = i + 1 == max_queue ? 0 : i + 1;
		269
		270	if (ni == j)
		271	delete get ();
		272
		273	queue[i].pkt = p;
		274	queue[i].tstamp = now;
		275
		276	i = ni;
		277	}
		278
		279	net_packet *
		280	pkt_queue::get ()
		281	{
		282	if (empty ())
		283	return 0;
		284
		285	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
		286	queue[j].pkt = 0;
		287
		288	j = j + 1 == max_queue ? 0 : j + 1;
		289
		290	return p;
		291	}
		292
191	struct net_rateinfo {	293	struct net_rateinfo
		294	{
192	u32 host;	295	u32 host;
193	double pcnt, diff;	296	double pcnt, diff;
194	tstamp last;	297	tstamp last;
195	};	298	};
196		299
197	// only do action once every x seconds per host whole allowing bursts.	300	// only do action once every x seconds per host whole allowing bursts.
198	// this implementation ("splay list" ;) is inefficient,	301	// this implementation ("splay list" ;) is inefficient,
199	// but low on resources.	302	// but low on resources.
200	struct net_rate_limiter : list<net_rateinfo>	303	struct net_rate_limiter : list<net_rateinfo>
201	{	304	{
202	static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 180.; // allow bursts	305	# define NRL_ALPHA (1. - 1. / 600.) // allow bursts
203	static const double CUTOFF = 10.; // one event every CUTOFF seconds	306	# define NRL_CUTOFF 10. // one event every CUTOFF seconds
204	static const double EXPIRE = CUTOFF * 30.; // expire entries after this time	307	# define NRL_EXPIRE (NRL_CUTOFF * 30.) // expire entries after this time
205	static const double MAXDIF = CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - ALPHA)); // maximum diff /count value	308	# define NRL_MAXDIF (NRL_CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - NRL_ALPHA))) // maximum diff /count value
206		309
207	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	310	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
208	bool can (u32 host);	311	bool can (u32 host);
209	};	312	};
210		313
211	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	314	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
212		315
		316	bool
213	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	317	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
214	{	318	{
215	iterator i;	319	iterator i;
216		320
217	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	321	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
218	if (i->host == host)	322	if (i->host == host)
219	break;	323	break;
220	else if (i->last < NOW - EXPIRE)	324	else if (i->last < ev_now () - NRL_EXPIRE)
221	i = erase (i);	325	i = erase (i);
222	else	326	else
223	i++;	327	i++;
224		328
225	if (i == end ())	329	if (i == end ())
226	{	330	{
227	net_rateinfo ri;	331	net_rateinfo ri;
228		332
229	ri.host = host;	333	ri.host = host;
230	ri.pcnt = 1.;	334	ri.pcnt = 1.;
231	ri.diff = MAXDIF;	335	ri.diff = NRL_MAXDIF;
232	ri.last = NOW;	336	ri.last = ev_now ();
233		337
234	push_front (ri);	338	push_front (ri);
235		339
236	return true;	340	return true;
237	}	341	}
238	else	342	else
239	{	343	{
240	net_rateinfo ri (*i);	344	net_rateinfo ri (*i);
241	erase (i);	345	erase (i);
242		346
243	ri.pcnt = ri.pcnt * ALPHA;	347	ri.pcnt = ri.pcnt * NRL_ALPHA;
244	ri.diff = ri.diff * ALPHA + (NOW - ri.last);	348	ri.diff = ri.diff * NRL_ALPHA + (ev_now () - ri.last);
245		349
246	ri.last = NOW;	350	ri.last = ev_now ();
247		351
248	double dif = ri.diff / ri.pcnt;	352	double dif = ri.diff / ri.pcnt;
249		353
250	bool send = dif > CUTOFF;	354	bool send = dif > NRL_CUTOFF;
251		355
252	if (dif > MAXDIF)	356	if (dif > NRL_MAXDIF)
253	{	357	{
254	ri.pcnt = 1.;	358	ri.pcnt = 1.;
255	ri.diff = MAXDIF;	359	ri.diff = NRL_MAXDIF;
256	}	360	}
257	else if (send)	361	else if (send)
258	ri.pcnt++;	362	ri.pcnt++;
259		363
260	push_front (ri);	364	push_front (ri);
…		…
263	}	367	}
264	}	368	}
265		369
266	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	370	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
267		371
268	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	372	void
269
270	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	373	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest)
271	{	374	{
272	unsigned int xlen;
273
274	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	375	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
275		376
276	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	377	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
277	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	378	require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
278	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	379	require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
279	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
280	}	380	}
281		381
282	void	382	void
283	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	383	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
284	{	384	{
285	hmac_gen (ctx);	385	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
286		386	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
287	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	387	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
288	}	388	}
289		389
290	bool	390	bool
291	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	391	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
292	{	392	{
293	hmac_gen (ctx);	393	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
294		394	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
295	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	395	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
296	}	396	}
297		397
		398	void
298	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	399	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
299	{	400	{
300	type = type_;	401	type = type_;
301		402
302	int src = THISNODE->id;	403	int src = THISNODE->id;
303		404
…		…
307	}	408	}
308		409
309	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	410	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
310	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	411	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
311		412
312	struct vpndata_packet:vpn_packet	413	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		414	{
		415	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		416
		417	void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		418	tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
		419
		420	private:
		421	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
313	{	422	{
314	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
315
316	void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
317	tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
318	private:
319
320	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
321	{
322	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	423	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
323	}
324	};	424	}
		425	};
325		426
326	void	427	void
327	vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	428	vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
328	{	429	{
329	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	430	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
330	int outl = 0, outl2;	431	int outl = 0, outl2;
331	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;	432	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
332		433
333	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	434	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
334	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	435	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
335	u32 cl;
336		436
		437	if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
		438	{
337	cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);	439	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);
		440
338	if (cl)	441	if (cl)
339	{	442	{
340	type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;	443	type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;
341	d = cdata;	444	d = cdata;
342	l = cl + 2;	445	l = cl + 2;
343		446
344	d[0] = cl >> 8;	447	d[0] = cl >> 8;
345	d[1] = cl;	448	d[1] = cl;
		449	}
346	}	450	}
347	#endif	451	#endif
348		452
349	EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	453	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
350		454
351	struct {	455	struct {
352	#if RAND_SIZE	456	#if RAND_SIZE
353	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	457	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
354	#endif	458	#endif
355	u32 seqno;	459	u32 seqno;
356	} datahdr;	460	} datahdr;
357		461
358	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	462	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
359	#if RAND_SIZE	463	#if RAND_SIZE
360	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	464	// NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
		465	// is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
		466	conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
361	#endif	467	#endif
362		468
363	EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	469	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
364	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	470	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
365	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR);	471	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
366	outl += outl2;	472	outl += outl2;
367		473
368	EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	474	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
369	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	475	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
370	(unsigned char *) d, l);	476	(unsigned char *) d, l));
371	outl += outl2;	477	outl += outl2;
372		478
373	EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2);	479	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
374	outl += outl2;	480	outl += outl2;
375		481
376	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();	482	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();
377		483
378	set_hdr (type, dst);	484	set_hdr (type, dst);
…		…
387	int outl = 0, outl2;	493	int outl = 0, outl2;
388	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	494	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
389	u8 *d;	495	u8 *d;
390	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	496	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
391		497
392	EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	498	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
393		499
394	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	500	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
395	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	501	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
396		502
397	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	503	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
398	d = cdata;	504	d = cdata;
399	else	505	else
400	#endif	506	#endif
401	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	507	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
402		508
403	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	509	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		510	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		511	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		512	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		513	require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]);
		514
		515	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
404	EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	516	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
405	d, &outl2,	517	d, &outl2,
406	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ());	518	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
407	outl += outl2;	519	outl += outl2;
408		520
409	EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2);	521	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
410	outl += outl2;	522	outl += outl2;
411		523
412	seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE));	524	seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE));
413		525
414	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);	526	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
…		…
439	}	551	}
440	};	552	};
441		553
442	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	554	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
443	{	555	{
444	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	556	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
445	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
446	// hmacs simply will not work.
447	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
448	u8 flags, challengelen, pad2, pad3;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
449	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
450		560
451	const u8 curflags () const	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
		562	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
		563
		564	static u8 get_features ()
452	{	565	{
		566	u8 f = 0;
		567	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
		568	f |= FEATURE_COMPRESSION;
		569	#endif
		570	#if ENABLE_ROHC
		571	f |= FEATURE_ROHC;
		572	#endif
		573	#if ENABLE_BRIDGING
		574	f |= FEATURE_BRIDGING;
		575	#endif
453	return 0x80	576	return f;
454	| (ENABLE_COMPRESSION ? 0x01 : 0x00);
455	}	577	}
456
457	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
458	bool chk_config () const;
459	};	578	};
460		579
		580	void
461	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
462	{	582	{
463	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
464	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
465	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	585	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
466	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;	586	flags = 0;
467	flags = curflags ();	587	features = get_features ();
468	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
469		588
		589	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		590
470	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	591	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
471	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
472	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	592	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		593	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
473		594
474	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	595	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
475	set_hdr (type, dst);	596	set_hdr (type, dst);
476	}	597	}
477		598
478	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	599	bool
		600	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
479	{	601	{
480	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	602	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
481	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	603	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
		604	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
482	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	605	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
483	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	606	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
484	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)	607	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
485	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
486	else if (flags != curflags ())
487	slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), flags, curflags ());
488	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
489	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
490	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	608	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
491	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	609	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
492	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	610	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
493	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
494	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	611	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
495	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	612	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		613	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		614	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		615	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		616	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
496	else	617	else
		618	{
		619	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		620
		621	if (cmp > 0)
		622	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		623	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		624	else if (cmp == 0)
497	return true;	625	return true;
		626	}
498		627
499	return false;	628	return false;
500	}	629	}
501		630
502	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	631	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
503	{	632	{
504	char magic[8];	633	char magic[8];
505	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	634	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
506	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will get patches on forward)	635	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
507	u8 pad2, pad3;	636	u8 pad2, pad3;
508	rsaid id;	637	auth_encr encr;
509	rsaencrdata encr;
510		638
511	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	639	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
512	{	640	{
513	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	641	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
514	strncpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);	642	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
515	initiate = !!initiate_;	643	initiate = !!initiate_;
516	protocols = protocols_;	644	protocols = protocols_;
517		645
518	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	646	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
519	}	647	}
520	};	648	};
521		649
522	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	650	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
523	{	651	{
524	rsaid id;
525	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
526	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
527	rsaresponse response;	652	auth_response response;
528		653
529	auth_res_packet (int dst)	654	auth_res_packet (int dst)
530	{	655	{
531	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	656	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
532		657
533	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	658	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
534	}	659	}
535	};	660	};
536		661
…		…
566	};	691	};
567		692
568	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	693	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
569		694
570	void	695	void
571	connection::connection_established ()	696	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
572	{	697	{
573	if (ictx && octx)	698	if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
		699	return;
		700
		701	si = rsi;
		702	protocol = rsi.prot;
		703
		704	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		705	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		706	vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		707	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		708
		709	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		710	{
		711	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		712	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		713	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
574	{	714	}
575	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	715
		716	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		717	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
576		718
577	rekey.start (NOW + ::conf.rekey);	719	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		720	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		721
		722	oiv.reset ();
		723
		724	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
		725	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
		726	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		727
		728	hmac_error = 0.;
		729
578	keepalive.start (NOW + ::conf.keepalive);	730	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
579		731
580	// send queued packets	732	// send queued packets
581	if (ictx && octx)
582	{
583	while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())	733	while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
584	{	734	{
585	send_data_packet (p);	735	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
586	delete p;	736	delete p;
587	}	737	}
588		738
589	while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())	739	while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
590	{	740	{
591	send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);	741	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
592	delete p;	742	delete p;
593	}
594	}
595	}	743	}
		744
		745	vpn->connection_established (this);
		746	}
		747
		748	void
		749	connection::reset_si ()
		750	{
		751	if (vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
		752	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->connectable_protocols ());
596	else	753	else
597	{	754	{
598	retry_cnt = 0;	755	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
599	establish_connection.start (NOW + 5);	756	protocol = 0;
600	keepalive.reset ();
601	rekey.reset ();
602	}	757	}
603	}
604
605	void
606	connection::reset_si ()
607	{
608	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->protocols);
609
610	// mask out protocols we cannot establish
611	if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4;
612	if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4;
613		758
614	si.set (conf, protocol);	759	si.set (conf, protocol);
615	}	760	}
616		761
617	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary	762	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
618	const sockinfo &	763	const sockinfo &
619	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const	764	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
620	{	765	{
621	if (!si.valid ())	766	if (!si.valid ())
622	{	767	{
623	connection *r = vpn->find_router ();	768	connection *r = vpn->find_router_for (this);
624		769
625	if (r)	770	if (r)
626	{	771	{
627	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s"),	772	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying to route through %s."),
628	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename);	773	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename);
629	return r->si;	774	return r->si;
630	}	775	}
631	else	776	else
632	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol"),	777	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol or no router available."),
633	conf->nodename);	778	conf->nodename);
634	}	779	}
635		780
636	return si;	781	return si;
637	}	782	}
638		783
639	void	784	void
640	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)	785	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
641	{	786	{
642	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))	787	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
643	reset_connection ();	788	reset_connection ("packet send error");
644	}	789	}
645		790
646	void	791	void
647	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)	792	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
648	{	793	{
649	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	794	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
650		795
651	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	796	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
		797
		798	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
652	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	799	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
653		800
654	delete pkt;	801	delete pkt;
655	}	802	}
656		803
…		…
671	void	818	void
672	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	819	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
673	{	820	{
674	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	821	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
675		822
676	rsachallenge chg;	823	generate_auth_data ();
		824	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
677		825
678	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
679
680	if (0 > RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof chg,
681	(unsigned char *)&chg, (unsigned char *)&pkt->encr,
682	conf->rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING))
683	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
684
685	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	826	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
686
687	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	827	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
688		828
689	delete pkt;	829	delete pkt;
690	}	830	}
691		831
692	void	832	void
693	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	833	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
694	{	834	{
695	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	835	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
696		836
697	pkt->id = id;	837	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
		838	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
698		839
699	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
700
701	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
702
703	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	840	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
704
705	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	841	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
706		842
707	delete pkt;	843	delete pkt;
708	}	844	}
709		845
710	void	846	void
711	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	847	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
712	{	848	{
713	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s)\n",	849	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
714	conf->id, rid, (const char *)rsi);	850	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		851	conf->protocols);
715		852
716	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	853	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
717		854
718	r->hmac_set (octx);	855	r->hmac_set (octx);
719	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	856	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
720		857
721	delete r;	858	delete r;
722	}	859	}
723		860
724	void	861	inline void
725	connection::establish_connection_cb (time_watcher &w)	862	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
726	{	863	{
727	if (ictx || conf == THISNODE	864	if (!(ictx && octx)
		865	&& conf != THISNODE
728	|| connectmode == conf_node::C_NEVER	866	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
729	|| connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	867	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
730	w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL;	868	&& !w.is_active ())
731	else if (w.at <= NOW)
732	{	869	{
733	double retry_int = double (retry_cnt & 3 ? (retry_cnt & 3) : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)) * 0.6;	870	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
734		871	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
735	if (retry_int < 3600 * 8)	872	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
		873	{
		874	reset_connection ("no demand");
736	retry_cnt++;	875	return;
		876	}
737		877
738	w.at = NOW + retry_int;	878	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
		879
		880	ev::tstamp retry_int = ev::tstamp (retry_cnt & 3
		881	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
		882	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
739		883
740	reset_si ();	884	reset_si ();
741		885
742	if (si.prot && !si.host)	886	bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW;
		887
		888	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
		889	{
		890	/*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
		891	w.start (1);
743	vpn->send_connect_request (conf->id);	892	vpn->send_connect_request (this);
		893	}
744	else	894	else
745	{	895	{
		896	if (si.valid ())
		897	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: sending direct connection request to %s."),
		898	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
		899
746	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);	900	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);
		901
		902	slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
747		903
748	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))	904	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
749	{	905	{
750	if (retry_cnt < 4)	906	if (retry_cnt < 4)
751	send_auth_request (dsi, true);	907	send_auth_request (dsi, true);
752	else	908	else
753	send_ping (dsi, 0);	909	send_ping (dsi, 0);
754	}	910	}
755	}	911	}
756	}
757	}
758		912
		913	retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9;
		914
		915	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
		916	retry_cnt++;
		917	else
		918	retry_int = conf->max_retry;
		919
		920	w.start (retry_int);
		921	}
		922	}
		923
759	void	924	void
760	connection::reset_connection ()	925	connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
761	{	926	{
762	if (ictx && octx)	927	if (ictx && octx)
763	{	928	{
764	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"),	929	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
765	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	930	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
766		931
767	if (::conf.script_node_down)	932	if (::conf.script_node_down)
768	run_script (run_script_cb (this, &connection::script_node_down), false);	933	{
		934	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		935	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
		936	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-down command execution failed, continuing."));
		937	}
769	}	938	}
770		939
771	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	940	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
772	delete octx; octx = 0;	941	delete octx; octx = 0;
773		942
774	si.host= 0;	943	si.host = 0;
775		944
		945	have_snd_auth = false;
		946	have_rcv_auth = false;
		947	auth_expire = 0.;
		948
776	last_activity = 0;	949	last_activity = 0.;
		950	//last_si_change = 0.;
777	retry_cnt = 0;	951	retry_cnt = 0;
778		952
779	rekey.reset ();	953	rekey.stop ();
780	keepalive.reset ();	954	keepalive.stop ();
781	establish_connection.reset ();	955	establish_connection.stop ();
782	}	956	}
783		957
784	void	958	void
785	connection::shutdown ()	959	connection::shutdown ()
786	{	960	{
787	if (ictx && octx)	961	if (ictx && octx)
788	send_reset (si);	962	send_reset (si);
789		963
790	reset_connection ();	964	reset_connection ("shutdown");
791	}	965	}
792		966
793	void	967	// poor-man's rekeying
794	connection::rekey_cb (time_watcher &w)	968	inline void
		969	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
795	{	970	{
796	w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL;
797
798	reset_connection ();	971	reset_connection ("rekeying");
799	establish_connection ();	972	establish_connection ();
800	}	973	}
801		974
802	void	975	void
803	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt, bool broadcast)	976	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
804	{	977	{
805	vpndata_packet *p = new vpndata_packet;	978	vpndata_packet *p = new vpndata_packet;
806	int tos = 0;	979	int tos = 0;
807		980
808	// I am not hilarious about peeking into packets, but so be it.	981	// I am not hilarious about peeking into packets, but so be it.
809	if (conf->inherit_tos	982	if (conf->inherit_tos && pkt->is_ipv4 ())
810	&& (*pkt)[12] == 0x08 && (*pkt)[13] == 0x00 // IP
811	&& ((*pkt)[14] & 0xf0) == 0x40) // IPv4
812	tos = (*pkt)[15] & IPTOS_TOS_MASK;	983	tos = (*pkt)[15] & IPTOS_TOS_MASK;
813		984
814	p->setup (this, broadcast ? 0 : conf->id, &((*pkt)[6 + 6]), pkt->len - 6 - 6, ++oseqno); // skip 2 macs	985	p->setup (this, conf->id, &((*pkt)[6 + 6]), pkt->len - 6 - 6, ++oseqno); // skip 2 macs
815	send_vpn_packet (p, si, tos);	986	send_vpn_packet (p, si, tos);
816		987
817	delete p;	988	delete p;
818		989
819	if (oseqno > MAX_SEQNO)	990	if (oseqno > MAX_SEQNO)
820	rekey ();	991	rekey ();
821	}	992	}
822		993
823	void	994	void
		995	connection::post_inject_queue ()
		996	{
		997	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
		998	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary
		999	establish_connection.stop ();
		1000
		1001	establish_connection ();
		1002	}
		1003
		1004	void
824	connection::inject_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt, bool broadcast)	1005	connection::inject_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
825	{	1006	{
826	if (ictx && octx)	1007	if (ictx && octx)
827	send_data_packet (pkt, broadcast);	1008	send_data_packet (pkt);
828	else	1009	else
829	{	1010	{
830	if (!broadcast)//DDDD
831	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1011	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
832		1012	post_inject_queue ();
833	establish_connection ();
834	}	1013	}
835	}	1014	}
836		1015
		1016	void
837	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1017	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
838	{	1018	{
839	if (ictx && octx)	1019	if (ictx && octx)
840	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1020	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
841	else	1021	else
842	{	1022	{
843	vpn_queue.put (new vpn_packet (*pkt));	1023	vpn_queue.put ((vpn_packet *)new data_packet (*(data_packet *)pkt));
844		1024	post_inject_queue ();
845	establish_connection ();
846	}	1025	}
847	}	1026	}
848		1027
849	void	1028	void
850	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1029	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
851	{	1030	{
852	last_activity = NOW;	1031	last_activity = ev_now ();
853		1032
854	slog (L_NOISE, "<<%d received packet type %d from %d to %d",	1033	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
855	conf->id, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1034	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
		1035
		1036	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
		1037	return;
856		1038
857	switch (pkt->typ ())	1039	switch (pkt->typ ())
858	{	1040	{
859	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:	1041	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:
		1042	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
		1043
860	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,	1044	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
861	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection	1045	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
862	// when we receive a ping.	1046	// when we receive a ping.
863	if (!ictx)	1047	if (!ictx)
864	{	1048	{
865	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1049	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
866	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1050	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
867	}	1051	}
868	else	1052	else
		1053	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
		1054	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
869	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1055	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
870		1056
871	break;	1057	break;
872		1058
873	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1059	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
		1060	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1061
		1062	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1063	// about our desire for communication.
		1064	establish_connection ();
874	break;	1065	break;
875		1066
876	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1067	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
		1068	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
		1069
		1070	if (ictx && octx)
877	{	1071	{
878	reset_connection ();	1072	reset_connection ("remote reset");
879		1073
880	config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;	1074	config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;
881		1075
882	if (!p->chk_config ())	1076	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
883	{
884	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node"),
885	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
886	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
887	}
888	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
889	establish_connection ();	1077	establish_connection ();
890	}	1078	}
		1079
891	break;	1080	break;
892		1081
893	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1082	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
894	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1083	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
895	{	1084	{
896	auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *) pkt;	1085	auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *)pkt;
897		1086
898	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate);	1087	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1088	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1089	p->protocols, p->features);
899		1090
900	if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))	1091	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1092	{
		1093	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1094	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1095	}
		1096	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
901	{	1097	{
902	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1098	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
903	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1099	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
904	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1100	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
905	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1101	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
906		1102
907	if (p->initiate)	1103	if (p->initiate)
		1104	{
908	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1105	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
909		1106
910	rsachallenge k;	1107	if (ictx && octx)
		1108	reset_connection ("reconnect");
		1109	}
911		1110
912	if (0 > RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (p->encr),	1111	auth_data auth;
913	(unsigned char *)&p->encr, (unsigned char *)&k,	1112
914	::conf.rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING))	1113	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
		1114	{
915	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted"),	1115	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
916	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1116	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
		1117	}
917	else	1118	else
918	{	1119	{
919	delete octx;	1120	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
920		1121
921	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1122	rcv_auth = auth;
922	oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1123	have_rcv_auth = true;
923		1124
		1125	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1126
		1127	if (chg)
		1128	{
924	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1129	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
		1130	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
925		1131
926	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
927
928	connection_established ();	1132	connection_established (rsi);
929
930	break;	1133	}
931	}	1134	}
		1135
		1136	break;
932	}	1137	}
933	else
934	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch"),
935	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
936		1138
937	send_reset (rsi);	1139	send_reset (rsi);
938	}	1140	}
939		1141
940	break;	1142	break;
941		1143
942	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:	1144	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:
943	{	1145	{
944	auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *) pkt;	1146	auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
945		1147
946	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id);	1148	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
947		1149
948	if (p->chk_config ())	1150	auth_mac local_mac;
		1151	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1152
		1153	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
949	{	1154	{
950	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
951	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
952	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
953	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
954
955	rsachallenge chg;
956
957	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
958	{
959	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response"),	1155	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
960	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1156	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
961	break;
962	}	1157	}
963	else	1158	else if (!have_snd_auth)
964	{	1159	{
965	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1160	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
966		1161
967	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))	1162	have_snd_auth = true;
968	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
969	"could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"),
970	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
971	else
972	{
973	rsaresponse h;
974
975	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
976
977	if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
978	{
979	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
980
981	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
982
983	iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
984
985	si = rsi;
986	protocol = rsi.prot;
987
988	connection_established ();	1163	connection_established (rsi);
989
990	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established, protocol version %d.%d"),
991	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
992	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
993
994	if (::conf.script_node_up)
995	run_script (run_script_cb (this, &connection::script_node_up), false);
996
997	break;
998	}
999	else
1000	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match"),
1001	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1002	}
1003
1004	delete cctx;
1005	}
1006	}	1164	}
1007	}	1165	}
1008
1009	send_reset (rsi);
1010	break;	1166	break;
1011		1167
1012	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1168	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1013	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1169	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1014	send_reset (rsi);	1170	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1020	if (ictx && octx)	1176	if (ictx && octx)
1021	{	1177	{
1022	vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;	1178	vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;
1023		1179
1024	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))	1180	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
		1181	{
		1182	// rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
		1183	// we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
		1184	// and suppress messages and resets during that time.
		1185	//TODO: should be done per source address
		1186	if (!hmac_error)
		1187	{
		1188	hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
		1189	break;
		1190	}
		1191	else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
		1192	break; // silently suppress
		1193	else
		1194	{
1025	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"	1195	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1026	"could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"),	1196	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1027	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1197	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1198	// reset
		1199	}
		1200	}
1028	else	1201	else
1029	{	1202	{
1030	u32 seqno;	1203	u32 seqno;
1031	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);	1204	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
		1205	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1032		1206
1033	if (iseqno.recv_ok (seqno))	1207	hmac_error = 0;
		1208
		1209	if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1034	{	1210	{
1035	vpn->tap->send (d);	1211	vpn->tap->send (d);
1036		1212
1037	if (p->dst () == 0) // re-broadcast
1038	for (vpn::conns_vector::iterator i = vpn->conns.begin (); i != vpn->conns.end (); ++i)
1039	{
1040	connection *c = *i;
1041
1042	if (c->conf != THISNODE && c->conf != conf)
1043	c->inject_data_packet (d);
1044	}
1045
1046	if (si != rsi)	1213	if (si != rsi)
1047	{	1214	{
1048	// fast re-sync on connection changes, useful especially for tcp/ip	1215	// fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip
		1216	//if (last_si_change < ev_now () + 5.)
1049	si = rsi;	1217	// {
1050
1051	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s"),	1218	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),
1052	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);	1219	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);
		1220
		1221	si = rsi;
		1222
		1223	if (::conf.script_node_change)
		1224	{
		1225	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		1226	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_change> (this);
		1227	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-change command execution failed, continuing."));
		1228	}
		1229
		1230	// }
		1231	//else
		1232	// slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),
		1233	// conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);
1053	}	1234	}
1054
1055	delete d;
1056
1057	break;
1058	}	1235	}
		1236	else if (seqclass == 1) // far history
		1237	slog (L_ERR, _("received very old packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1238	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication/delay, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1239	else if (seqclass == 2) // in-window duplicate, happens often on wireless
		1240	slog (L_DEBUG, _("received recent duplicated packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1241	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1242	else if (seqclass == 3) // reset
		1243	{
		1244	slog (L_ERR, _("received out-of-sync (far future) packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1245	"probably just massive packet loss, sending reset."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1246	send_reset (rsi);
		1247	}
		1248
		1249	delete d;
		1250	break;
1059	}	1251	}
1060	}	1252	}
1061		1253
1062	send_reset (rsi);	1254	send_reset (rsi);
1063	break;	1255	break;
1064		1256
1065	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:	1257	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:
1066	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1258	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1067	{	1259	{
1068	connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *) pkt;	1260	connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *)pkt;
1069		1261
1070	assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything	1262	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1071	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1072	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1073
1074	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]\n",
1075	conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx);
1076
1077	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1078	{	1263	{
		1264	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
		1265	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
		1266
		1267	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
		1268	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1269	p->protocols,
		1270	c->ictx && c->octx);
		1271
		1272	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
		1273	{
1079	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1274	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1080	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1275	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
1081	c->send_connect_info (conf->id, si, conf->protocols);	1276	c->send_connect_info (conf->id, si, conf->protocols);
1082	send_connect_info (c->conf->id, c->si, c->conf->protocols);	1277	send_connect_info (c->conf->id, c->si, c->conf->protocols);
		1278	}
		1279	else
		1280	c->establish_connection ();
1083	}	1281	}
1084	else	1282	else
1085	c->establish_connection ();	1283	slog (L_WARN,
		1284	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
		1285	p->id);
1086	}	1286	}
1087		1287
1088	break;	1288	break;
1089		1289
1090	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO:	1290	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO:
1091	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1291	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1092	{	1292	{
1093	connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *) pkt;	1293	connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *)pkt;
1094		1294
1095	assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything	1295	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1096		1296	{
1097	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1297	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1098		1298
1099	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1299	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1100	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1300	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1101	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1301	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1102		1302
1103	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)",	1303	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1104	conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1304	conf->nodename,
		1305	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1306	(const char *)p->si,
		1307	p->protocols,
		1308	protocol,
		1309	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
		1310	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1105		1311
1106	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1312	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1107		1313
1108	if (dsi.valid ())	1314	if (dsi.valid ())
1109	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1315	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1316	else
		1317	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1318	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1319	(const char *)p->si);
		1320	}
		1321	else
		1322	slog (L_WARN,
		1323	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
		1324	p->id);
1110	}	1325	}
1111		1326
1112	break;	1327	break;
1113		1328
1114	default:	1329	default:
1115	send_reset (rsi);	1330	send_reset (rsi);
1116	break;	1331	break;
1117	}	1332	}
1118	}	1333	}
1119		1334
1120	void connection::keepalive_cb (time_watcher &w)	1335	inline void
		1336	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1121	{	1337	{
1122	if (NOW >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30)	1338	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1339
		1340	if (when >= 0)
		1341	w.start (when);
		1342	else if (when < -15)
1123	{	1343	{
1124	reset_connection ();	1344	reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1125	establish_connection ();	1345	establish_connection ();
1126	}	1346	}
1127	else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1128	w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive;
1129	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1347	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1130	|| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1348	|| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1131	{	1349	{
		1350	w.start (3);
1132	send_ping (si);	1351	send_ping (si);
1133	w.at = NOW + 5;
1134	}	1352	}
1135	else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1353	else if (when >= -10)
1136	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1354	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1137	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1355	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1138	w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10;	1356	w.start (when + 10);
1139	else	1357	else
1140	reset_connection ();	1358	reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1141	}	1359	}
1142		1360
		1361	void
1143	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1362	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1144	{	1363	{
1145	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1364	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1146		1365
1147	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d)", conf->id, id);	1366	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
		1367	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1368	THISNODE->protocols);
1148	p->hmac_set (octx);	1369	p->hmac_set (octx);
1149	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1370	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1150		1371
1151	delete p;	1372	delete p;
1152	}	1373	}
1153		1374
1154	void connection::script_node ()	1375	void
		1376	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1155	{	1377	{
1156	vpn->script_if_up ();
1157
1158	char *env;	1378	char *env;
		1379	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
		1380	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
		1381	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
		1382	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
		1383	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
		1384	}
		1385
		1386	void
		1387	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
		1388	{
		1389	vpn->script_init_env ();
		1390
		1391	char *env;
1159	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1392	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
		1393	asprintf (&env, "DESTSI=%s", (const char *)si); putenv (env);
1160	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1394	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1161	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);	1395	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);
1162	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);	1396	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);
1163	}	1397	}
1164		1398
		1399	inline const char *
1165	const char *connection::script_node_up ()	1400	connection::script_node_up ()
1166	{	1401	{
1167	script_node ();	1402	script_init_connect_env ();
1168		1403
1169	putenv ("STATE=up");	1404	putenv ((char *)"STATE=up");
1170		1405
		1406	char *filename;
		1407	asprintf (&filename,
		1408	"%s/%s",
		1409	confbase,
1171	return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up";	1410	::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");
1172	}
1173		1411
		1412	return filename;
		1413	}
		1414
		1415	inline const char *
		1416	connection::script_node_change ()
		1417	{
		1418	script_init_connect_env ();
		1419
		1420	putenv ((char *)"STATE=change");
		1421
		1422	char *filename;
		1423	asprintf (&filename,
		1424	"%s/%s",
		1425	confbase,
		1426	::conf.script_node_change ? ::conf.script_node_change : "node-change");
		1427
		1428	return filename;
		1429	}
		1430
		1431	inline const char *
1174	const char *connection::script_node_down ()	1432	connection::script_node_down ()
1175	{	1433	{
1176	script_node ();	1434	script_init_connect_env ();
1177		1435
1178	putenv ("STATE=down");	1436	putenv ((char *)"STATE=down");
1179		1437
1180	return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_down : "node-down";	1438	char *filename;
1181	}	1439	asprintf (&filename,
		1440	"%s/%s",
		1441	confbase,
		1442	::conf.script_node_down ? ::conf.script_node_down : "node-down");
1182		1443
		1444	return filename;
		1445	}
		1446
1183	connection::connection(struct vpn *vpn_)	1447	connection::connection (struct vpn *vpn, conf_node *conf)
1184	: vpn(vpn_)	1448	: vpn(vpn), conf(conf),
1185	, rekey (this, &connection::rekey_cb)	1449	#if ENABLE_DNS
1186	, keepalive (this, &connection::keepalive_cb)	1450	dns (0),
		1451	#endif
		1452	data_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue + 1),
		1453	vpn_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue + 1)
		1454	{
		1455	rekey .set<connection, &connection::rekey_cb > (this);
		1456	keepalive .set<connection, &connection::keepalive_cb > (this);
1187	, establish_connection (this, &connection::establish_connection_cb)	1457	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1188	{	1458
		1459	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1189	octx = ictx = 0;	1460	octx = ictx = 0;
1190	retry_cnt = 0;
1191		1461
1192	connectmode = conf_node::C_ALWAYS; // initial setting	1462	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
		1463
		1464	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
		1465	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
		1466	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
		1467
1193	reset_connection ();	1468	reset_connection ("startup");
1194	}	1469	}
1195		1470
1196	connection::~connection ()	1471	connection::~connection ()
1197	{	1472	{
1198	shutdown ();	1473	shutdown ();
1199	}	1474	}
1200		1475
		1476	void
1201	void connection_init ()	1477	connection_init ()
1202	{	1478	{
1203	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1479	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1204	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1480	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1205	}	1481	}
1206		1482

Diff Legend

–	Removed lines
+	Added lines
<	Changed lines
>	Changed lines