--- gvpe/src/connection.C 2003/08/08 10:58:28 1.15 +++ gvpe/src/connection.C 2004/01/29 18:55:10 1.29 @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* connection.C -- manage a single connection + Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Marc Lehmann This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -22,6 +23,8 @@ # include "lzf/lzf.h" } +#include + #include #include @@ -37,6 +40,8 @@ #include "vpn.h" #include "connection.h" +#include "netcompat.h" + #if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES # define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes #endif @@ -55,14 +60,14 @@ crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); - EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc); + require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0); } crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx); + require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); } @@ -72,10 +77,10 @@ EVP_MD_CTX ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); - EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id); - EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0); + require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); + require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); + require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id)); + require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); } @@ -133,11 +138,9 @@ void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w) { - if (empty ()) - w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - else + if (!empty ()) { - w.at = NOW + RSA_TTL; + w.start (NOW + RSA_TTL); for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ) if (i->expire <= NOW) @@ -199,12 +202,12 @@ // but low on resources. struct net_rate_limiter : list { - static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 180.; // allow bursts + static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 600.; // allow bursts static const double CUTOFF = 10.; // one event every CUTOFF seconds static const double EXPIRE = CUTOFF * 30.; // expire entries after this time static const double MAXDIF = CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - ALPHA)); // maximum diff /count value - bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); } + bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); } bool can (u32 host); }; @@ -309,7 +312,7 @@ #define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) #define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE) -struct vpndata_packet:vpn_packet +struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet { u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno @@ -346,7 +349,7 @@ } #endif - EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); + require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); struct { #if RAND_SIZE @@ -360,17 +363,17 @@ RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); #endif - EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, + require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, - (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR); + (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); outl += outl2; - EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, + require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, - (unsigned char *) d, l); + (unsigned char *) d, l)); outl += outl2; - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2); + require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2)); outl += outl2; len = outl + data_hdr_size (); @@ -389,7 +392,7 @@ u8 *d; u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); + require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; @@ -401,12 +404,12 @@ d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ - EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, + require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, d, &outl2, - (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()); + (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); outl += outl2; - EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2); + require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2)); outl += outl2; seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE)); @@ -478,21 +481,21 @@ bool config_packet::chk_config () const { if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) - slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); + slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) - slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); + slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH) - slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH); + slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH); else if (flags != curflags ()) - slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), flags, curflags ()); + slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), flags, curflags ()); else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge)) - slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge)); + slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge)); else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) - slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); + slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) - slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)); + slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)); else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) - slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); + slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); else return true; @@ -503,7 +506,7 @@ { char magic[8]; u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply - u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will get patches on forward) + u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) u8 pad2, pad3; rsaid id; rsaencrdata encr; @@ -597,8 +600,8 @@ { retry_cnt = 0; establish_connection.start (NOW + 5); - keepalive.reset (); - rekey.reset (); + keepalive.stop (); + rekey.stop (); } } @@ -674,13 +677,8 @@ auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); rsachallenge chg; - rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg); - - if (0 > RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof chg, - (unsigned char *)&chg, (unsigned char *)&pkt->encr, - conf->rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) - fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error"); + rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si); @@ -724,18 +722,18 @@ void connection::establish_connection_cb (time_watcher &w) { - if (ictx || conf == THISNODE - || connectmode == conf_node::C_NEVER - || connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED) - w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - else if (w.at <= NOW) + if (!ictx + && conf != THISNODE + && connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER + && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED + && NOW > w.at) { double retry_int = double (retry_cnt & 3 ? (retry_cnt & 3) : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)) * 0.6; if (retry_int < 3600 * 8) retry_cnt++; - w.at = NOW + retry_int; + w.start (NOW + retry_int); reset_si (); @@ -776,9 +774,9 @@ last_activity = 0; retry_cnt = 0; - rekey.reset (); - keepalive.reset (); - establish_connection.reset (); + rekey.stop (); + keepalive.stop (); + establish_connection.stop (); } void @@ -793,25 +791,21 @@ void connection::rekey_cb (time_watcher &w) { - w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - reset_connection (); establish_connection (); } void -connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt, bool broadcast) +connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt) { vpndata_packet *p = new vpndata_packet; int tos = 0; // I am not hilarious about peeking into packets, but so be it. - if (conf->inherit_tos - && (*pkt)[12] == 0x08 && (*pkt)[13] == 0x00 // IP - && ((*pkt)[14] & 0xf0) == 0x40) // IPv4 + if (conf->inherit_tos && pkt->is_ipv4 ()) tos = (*pkt)[15] & IPTOS_TOS_MASK; - p->setup (this, broadcast ? 0 : conf->id, &((*pkt)[6 + 6]), pkt->len - 6 - 6, ++oseqno); // skip 2 macs + p->setup (this, conf->id, &((*pkt)[6 + 6]), pkt->len - 6 - 6, ++oseqno); // skip 2 macs send_vpn_packet (p, si, tos); delete p; @@ -821,10 +815,10 @@ } void -connection::inject_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt, bool broadcast) +connection::inject_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt, bool broadcast/*TODO DDD*/) { if (ictx && octx) - send_data_packet (pkt, broadcast); + send_data_packet (pkt); else { if (!broadcast)//DDDD @@ -840,7 +834,7 @@ send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos); else { - vpn_queue.put (new vpn_packet (*pkt)); + vpn_queue.put ((vpn_packet *)new data_packet (*(data_packet *)pkt)); establish_connection (); } @@ -909,11 +903,12 @@ rsachallenge k; - if (0 > RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (p->encr), - (unsigned char *)&p->encr, (unsigned char *)&k, - ::conf.rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) + { + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); + break; + } else { delete octx; @@ -956,7 +951,7 @@ if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg)) { - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response"), + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response ignored"), conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); break; } @@ -965,9 +960,12 @@ crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n" - "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + { + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n" + "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + break; + } else { rsaresponse h; @@ -1023,7 +1021,7 @@ if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" - "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), + "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"), conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); else { @@ -1034,15 +1032,6 @@ { vpn->tap->send (d); - if (p->dst () == 0) // re-broadcast - for (vpn::conns_vector::iterator i = vpn->conns.begin (); i != vpn->conns.end (); ++i) - { - connection *c = *i; - - if (c->conf != THISNODE && c->conf != conf) - c->inject_data_packet (d); - } - if (si != rsi) { // fast re-sync on connection changes, useful especially for tcp/ip @@ -1125,17 +1114,17 @@ establish_connection (); } else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive) - w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive; + w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive); else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) { send_ping (si); - w.at = NOW + 5; + w.start (NOW + 5); } else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) - w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10; + w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10); else reset_connection (); }