--- gvpe/src/connection.C 2003/04/02 03:25:17 1.2 +++ gvpe/src/connection.C 2003/09/01 21:23:35 1.17 @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct rsa_cache : list { - void cleaner_cb (tstamp &ts); time_watcher cleaner; + void cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w); time_watcher cleaner; bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg) { @@ -131,13 +131,13 @@ } rsa_cache; -void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (tstamp &ts) +void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w) { if (empty ()) - ts = TSTAMP_CANCEL; + w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; else { - ts = NOW + RSA_TTL; + w.at = NOW + RSA_TTL; for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ) if (i->expire <= NOW) @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -void pkt_queue::put (tap_packet *p) +void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p) { if (queue[i]) { @@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ i = (i + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH; } -tap_packet *pkt_queue::get () +net_packet *pkt_queue::get () { - tap_packet *p = queue[j]; + net_packet *p = queue[j]; if (p) { @@ -199,11 +199,12 @@ // but low on resources. struct net_rate_limiter : list { - static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 90.; // allow bursts - static const double CUTOFF = 20.; // one event every CUTOFF seconds - static const double EXPIRE = CUTOFF * 30.; // expire entries after this time + static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 600.; // allow bursts + static const double CUTOFF = 10.; // one event every CUTOFF seconds + static const double EXPIRE = CUTOFF * 30.; // expire entries after this time + static const double MAXDIF = CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - ALPHA)); // maximum diff /count value - bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); } + bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); } bool can (u32 host); }; @@ -227,7 +228,7 @@ ri.host = host; ri.pcnt = 1.; - ri.diff = CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - ALPHA)); + ri.diff = MAXDIF; ri.last = NOW; push_front (ri); @@ -244,9 +245,16 @@ ri.last = NOW; - bool send = ri.diff / ri.pcnt > CUTOFF; + double dif = ri.diff / ri.pcnt; - if (send) + bool send = dif > CUTOFF; + + if (dif > MAXDIF) + { + ri.pcnt = 1.; + ri.diff = MAXDIF; + } + else if (send) ri.pcnt++; push_front (ri); @@ -287,9 +295,9 @@ return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); } -void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type, unsigned int dst) +void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) { - this->type = type; + type = type_; int src = THISNODE->id; @@ -469,14 +477,26 @@ bool config_packet::chk_config () const { - return prot_major == PROTOCOL_MAJOR - && randsize == RAND_SIZE - && hmaclen == HMACLENGTH - && flags == curflags () - && challengelen == sizeof (rsachallenge) - && cipher_nid == htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)) - && digest_nid == htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)) - && hmac_nid == htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); + if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) + slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); + else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) + slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); + else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH) + slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH); + else if (flags != curflags ()) + slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), flags, curflags ()); + else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge)) + slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge)); + else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) + slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); + else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) + slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)); + else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) + slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); + else + return true; + + return false; } struct auth_req_packet : config_packet @@ -548,9 +568,79 @@ ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// void -connection::reset_dstaddr () +connection::connection_established () { - si.set (conf); + if (ictx && octx) + { + connectmode = conf->connectmode; + + rekey.start (NOW + ::conf.rekey); + keepalive.start (NOW + ::conf.keepalive); + + // send queued packets + if (ictx && octx) + { + while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ()) + { + send_data_packet (p); + delete p; + } + + while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ()) + { + send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); + delete p; + } + } + } + else + { + retry_cnt = 0; + establish_connection.start (NOW + 5); + keepalive.reset (); + rekey.reset (); + } +} + +void +connection::reset_si () +{ + protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->protocols); + + // mask out protocols we cannot establish + if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4; + if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4; + + si.set (conf, protocol); +} + +// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary +const sockinfo & +connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const +{ + if (!si.valid ()) + { + connection *r = vpn->find_router (); + + if (r) + { + slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s"), + conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename); + return r->si; + } + else + slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol"), + conf->nodename); + } + + return si; +} + +void +connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) +{ + if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos)) + reset_connection (); } void @@ -583,31 +673,20 @@ { auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); - protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->protocols); + rsachallenge chg; - // mask out protocols we cannot establish - if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4; - if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4; + rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg); - if (protocol) - { - rsachallenge chg; - - rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg); - - if (0 > RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof chg, - (unsigned char *)&chg, (unsigned char *)&pkt->encr, - conf->rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) - fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error"); + if (0 > RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof chg, + (unsigned char *)&chg, (unsigned char *)&pkt->encr, + conf->rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) + fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error"); - slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si); + slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si); - send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly + send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly - delete pkt; - } - else - ; // silently fail + delete pkt; } void @@ -643,34 +722,37 @@ } void -connection::establish_connection_cb (tstamp &ts) +connection::establish_connection_cb (time_watcher &w) { if (ictx || conf == THISNODE || connectmode == conf_node::C_NEVER || connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED) - ts = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - else if (ts <= NOW) + w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; + else if (w.at <= NOW) { double retry_int = double (retry_cnt & 3 ? (retry_cnt & 3) : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)) * 0.6; if (retry_int < 3600 * 8) retry_cnt++; - ts = NOW + retry_int; + w.at = NOW + retry_int; + + reset_si (); - if (conf->hostname) + if (si.prot && !si.host) + vpn->send_connect_request (conf->id); + else { - reset_dstaddr (); - if (si.host && auth_rate_limiter.can (si)) - { - if (retry_cnt < 4) - send_auth_request (si, true); - else - send_ping (si, 0); - } + const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si); + + if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi)) + { + if (retry_cnt < 4) + send_auth_request (dsi, true); + else + send_ping (dsi, 0); + } } - else - vpn->connect_request (conf->id); } } @@ -709,9 +791,9 @@ } void -connection::rekey_cb (tstamp &ts) +connection::rekey_cb (time_watcher &w) { - ts = TSTAMP_CANCEL; + w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; reset_connection (); establish_connection (); @@ -723,6 +805,7 @@ vpndata_packet *p = new vpndata_packet; int tos = 0; + // I am not hilarious about peeking into packets, but so be it. if (conf->inherit_tos && (*pkt)[12] == 0x08 && (*pkt)[13] == 0x00 // IP && ((*pkt)[14] & 0xf0) == 0x40) // IPv4 @@ -745,7 +828,19 @@ else { if (!broadcast)//DDDD - queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt)); + data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt)); + + establish_connection (); + } +} + +void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos) +{ + if (ictx && octx) + send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos); + else + { + vpn_queue.put (new vpn_packet (*pkt)); establish_connection (); } @@ -761,265 +856,268 @@ switch (pkt->typ ()) { - case vpn_packet::PT_PING: - // we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries, - // so reset the retry counter and establish a connection - // when we receive a ping. - if (!ictx) + case vpn_packet::PT_PING: + // we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries, + // so reset the retry counter and establish a connection + // when we receive a ping. + if (!ictx) + { + if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) + send_auth_request (rsi, true); + } + else + send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong + + break; + + case vpn_packet::PT_PONG: + break; + + case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: { - if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) - send_auth_request (rsi, true); + reset_connection (); + + config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; + + if (!p->chk_config ()) + { + slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED; + } + else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) + establish_connection (); } - else - send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong + break; - break; + case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: + if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) + { + auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *) pkt; - case vpn_packet::PT_PONG: - break; + slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate); + + if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) + { + if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) + slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, + PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); + + if (p->initiate) + send_auth_request (rsi, false); + + rsachallenge k; + + if (0 > RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (p->encr), + (unsigned char *)&p->encr, (unsigned char *)&k, + ::conf.rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); + else + { + delete octx; - case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: - { - reset_connection (); + octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); + oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; - config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; + conf->protocols = p->protocols; - if (!p->chk_config ()) - { - slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); - connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED; + send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k); + + connection_established (); + + break; + } + } + else + slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + + send_reset (rsi); } - else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS) - establish_connection (); - } - break; - case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: - if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) + break; + + case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES: { - auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *) pkt; + auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *) pkt; - slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate); + slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id); - if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) + if (p->chk_config ()) { if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); - if (p->initiate) - send_auth_request (rsi, false); - - rsachallenge k; + rsachallenge chg; - if (0 > RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (p->encr), - (unsigned char *)&p->encr, (unsigned char *)&k, - ::conf.rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg)) + { + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + break; + } else { - retry_cnt = 0; - establish_connection.set (NOW + 8); //? ;) - keepalive.reset (); - rekey.reset (); + crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); - delete ictx; - ictx = 0; + if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n" + "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + else + { + rsaresponse h; - delete octx; + rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h); - octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); - oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; + if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h)) + { + prot_minor = p->prot_minor; - conf->protocols = p->protocols; - send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k); + delete ictx; ictx = cctx; - break; + iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid + + si = rsi; + protocol = rsi.prot; + + connection_established (); + + slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established, protocol version %d.%d"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, + p->prot_major, p->prot_minor); + + if (::conf.script_node_up) + run_script (run_script_cb (this, &connection::script_node_up), false); + + break; + } + else + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + } + + delete cctx; } } - - send_reset (rsi); } - break; + send_reset (rsi); + break; - case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES: - { - auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *) pkt; + case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: +#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION + send_reset (rsi); + break; +#endif - slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id); + case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED: - if (p->chk_config ()) + if (ictx && octx) { - if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) - slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, - PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); + vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; - rsachallenge chg; - - if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response"), + if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" + "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); else { - crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); + u32 seqno; + tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); - if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n" - "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); - else + if (iseqno.recv_ok (seqno)) { - rsaresponse h; + vpn->tap->send (d); - rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h); + if (p->dst () == 0) // re-broadcast + for (vpn::conns_vector::iterator i = vpn->conns.begin (); i != vpn->conns.end (); ++i) + { + connection *c = *i; + + if (c->conf != THISNODE && c->conf != conf) + c->inject_data_packet (d); + } - if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h)) + if (si != rsi) { - prot_minor = p->prot_minor; - - delete ictx; ictx = cctx; - - iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid - + // fast re-sync on connection changes, useful especially for tcp/ip si = rsi; - rekey.set (NOW + ::conf.rekey); - keepalive.set (NOW + ::conf.keepalive); - - // send queued packets - while (tap_packet *p = queue.get ()) - { - send_data_packet (p); - delete p; - } - - connectmode = conf->connectmode; - - slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): %s connection established, protocol version %d.%d"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, - strprotocol (protocol), - p->prot_major, p->prot_minor); + slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi); + } - if (::conf.script_node_up) - run_script (run_script_cb (this, &connection::script_node_up), false); + delete d; - break; - } - else - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); + break; } - - delete cctx; } } - } - - send_reset (rsi); - break; - - case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED: -#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION - send_reset (rsi); - break; -#endif - - case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED: - - if (ictx && octx) - { - vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt; - - if (rsi == si) - { - if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" - "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); - else - { - u32 seqno; - tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno); - - if (iseqno.recv_ok (seqno)) - { - vpn->tap->send (d); - - if (p->dst () == 0) // re-broadcast - for (vpn::conns_vector::iterator i = vpn->conns.begin (); i != vpn->conns.end (); ++i) - { - connection *c = *i; - - if (c->conf != THISNODE && c->conf != conf) - c->inject_data_packet (d); - } - delete d; + send_reset (rsi); + break; - break; - } - } - } - else - slog (L_ERR, _("received data packet from unknown source %s"), (const char *)rsi); - } + case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ: + if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx)) + { + connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *) pkt; - send_reset (rsi); - break; + assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything + connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; + conf->protocols = p->protocols; - case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ: - if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx)) - { - connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *) pkt; + slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]\n", + conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx); - assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything - conf->protocols = p->protocols; - connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; + if (c->ictx && c->octx) + { + // send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is + // behind a nat firewall (or both ;) + c->send_connect_info (conf->id, si, conf->protocols); + send_connect_info (c->conf->id, c->si, c->conf->protocols); + } + else + c->establish_connection (); + } - slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]\n", - conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx); + break; - if (c->ictx && c->octx) - { - // send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is - // behind a nat firewall (or both ;) - c->send_connect_info (conf->id, si, conf->protocols); - send_connect_info (c->conf->id, c->si, c->conf->protocols); - } - } + case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO: + if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx)) + { + connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *) pkt; - break; + assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything - case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO: - if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx)) - { - connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *) pkt; + connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; - assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything - conf->protocols = p->protocols; - connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; + c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; + protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); + p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); - slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)", - conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx); + slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)", + conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx); - c->send_auth_request (p->si, true); - } + const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); - break; + if (dsi.valid ()) + c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); + } - default: - send_reset (rsi); - break; + break; + default: + send_reset (rsi); + break; } } -void connection::keepalive_cb (tstamp &ts) +void connection::keepalive_cb (time_watcher &w) { if (NOW >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30) { @@ -1027,18 +1125,22 @@ establish_connection (); } else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive) - ts = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive; + w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive; else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) { send_ping (si); - ts = NOW + 5; + w.at = NOW + 5; } + else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) + // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer + // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) + w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10; else reset_connection (); } -void connection::connect_request (int id) +void connection::send_connect_request (int id) { connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols); @@ -1051,7 +1153,7 @@ void connection::script_node () { - vpn->script_if_up (0); + vpn->script_if_up (); char *env; asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env); @@ -1060,7 +1162,7 @@ asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env); } -const char *connection::script_node_up (int) +const char *connection::script_node_up () { script_node (); @@ -1069,7 +1171,7 @@ return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up"; } -const char *connection::script_node_down (int) +const char *connection::script_node_down () { script_node (); @@ -1078,16 +1180,6 @@ return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_down : "node-down"; } -// send a vpn packet out to other hosts -void -connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos) -{ - if (protocol & PROT_IPv4) - vpn->send_ipv4_packet (pkt, si, tos); - else - vpn->send_udpv4_packet (pkt, si, tos); -} - connection::connection(struct vpn *vpn_) : vpn(vpn_) , rekey (this, &connection::rekey_cb)