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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.25 by pcg, Sat Jan 17 01:18:36 2004 UTC vs.
Revision 1.108 by root, Fri Oct 11 04:07:24 2013 UTC

1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Marc Lehmann <pcg@goof.com>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
		5	This file is part of GVPE.
		6
5	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
6	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
7	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or	9	Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your
8	(at your option) any later version.	10	option) any later version.
9		11
10	This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,	12	This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
11	but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of	13	WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
12	MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the	14	MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General
13	GNU General Public License for more details.	15	Public License for more details.
14		16
15	You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License	17	You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
16	along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software	18	with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
17	Foundation, Inc. 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA	19
		20	Additional permission under GNU GPL version 3 section 7
		21
		22	If you modify this Program, or any covered work, by linking or
		23	combining it with the OpenSSL project's OpenSSL library (or a modified
		24	version of that library), containing parts covered by the terms of the
		25	OpenSSL or SSLeay licenses, the licensors of this Program grant you
		26	additional permission to convey the resulting work. Corresponding
		27	Source for a non-source form of such a combination shall include the
		28	source code for the parts of OpenSSL used as well as that of the
		29	covered work.
18	*/	30	*/
19		31
20	#include "config.h"	32	#include "config.h"
21		33
22	extern "C" {
23	# include "lzf/lzf.h"
24	}
25
26	#include <cassert>
27
28	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
		35	#include <queue>
		36	#include <utility>
29		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
30	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
31	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
32	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
33	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
34		43
35	#include "gettext.h"	44	// openssl 0.9.8 compatibility
		45	#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
		46	#define require101(exp) exp
		47	#else
		48	#define require101(exp) equire (exp)
		49	#endif
36		50
37	#include "conf.h"	51	#include "conf.h"
38	#include "slog.h"	52	#include "slog.h"
39	#include "device.h"	53	#include "device.h"
40	#include "vpn.h"	54	#include "vpn.h"
41	#include "connection.h"	55	#include "connection.h"
		56	#include "hkdf.h"
42		57
43	#include "netcompat.h"	58	#include "netcompat.h"
44		59
45	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
46	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
47	#endif
48
49	#define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic	60	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		61	#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
		62
		63	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
		64	#define HLOG 15
		65	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
		66	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
		67	#include "lzf/lzf_d.c"
		68
		69	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
		70
		71	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb *, const char *> > rs_queue;
		72	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
		73
		74	namespace
		75	{
		76	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
		77	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
		78	{
		79	w.stop ();
		80
		81	if (rs_queue.empty ())
		82	return;
		83
		84	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
		85	if (pid)
		86	{
		87	w.set (pid);
		88	w.start ();
		89	}
		90	else
		91	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
		92
		93	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
		94	rs_queue.pop ();
		95	}
		96	};
		97
		98	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
		99	static void
		100	run_script_queued (run_script_cb *cb, const char *warnmsg)
		101	{
		102	rs_queue.push (std::make_pair (cb, warnmsg));
		103
		104	if (!rs_child_ev.is_active ())
		105	{
		106	rs_child_ev.set<rs_child_cb> ();
		107	rs_child_ev ();
		108	}
		109	}
		110
		111	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
50		112
51	struct crypto_ctx	113	struct crypto_ctx
52	{	114	{
53	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	115	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
54	HMAC_CTX hctx;	116	HMAC_CTX hctx;
55		117
56	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	118	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
57	~crypto_ctx ();	119	~crypto_ctx ();
58	};	120	};
59		121
60	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	122	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
61	{	123	{
		124	ecdh_key s;
		125
		126	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		127
		128	{
		129	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		130	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		131
		132	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		133	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		134	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		135	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		136	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		137
		138	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		139	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		140	}
		141
		142	{
		143	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		144	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		145
		146	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		147	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		148	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		149	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		150	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		151
62	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	152	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
63	EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc);	153	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
64	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	154	}
65	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
66	}	155	}
67		156
68	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	157	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
69	{	158	{
70	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx);	159	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
71	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	160	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
72	}	161	}
73		162
		163	static inline void
		164	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		165	{
		166	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		167	(unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
		168	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		169	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		170
		171	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		172	}
		173
		174	static inline bool
		175	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		176	{
		177	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		178
		179	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		180	(const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
		181	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		182	return 0;
		183
		184	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		185	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		186
		187	return 1;
		188	}
		189
74	static void	190	static void
75	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	191	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
76	{	192	{
77	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	193	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
78		194	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
79	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	195	kdf.extract_done ();
80	EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH);	196	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
81	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg);
82	EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id);
83	EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0);
84	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
85	}	197	}
86		198
87	struct rsa_entry {	199	void
88	tstamp expire;	200	connection::generate_auth_data ()
89	rsaid id;
90	rsachallenge chg;
91	};
92
93	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
94	{	201	{
95	void cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w); time_watcher cleaner;	202	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
96
97	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
98	{
99	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
100	{
101	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > NOW)
102	{
103	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);
104
105	erase (i);
106	return true;
107	}
108	}
109
110	if (cleaner.at < NOW)
111	cleaner.start (NOW + RSA_TTL);
112
113	return false;
114	}
115
116	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
117	{
118	rsa_entry e;
119
120	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
121	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
122
123	e.expire = NOW + RSA_TTL;
124	e.id = id;
125	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
126
127	push_back (e);
128
129	if (cleaner.at < NOW)
130	cleaner.start (NOW + RSA_TTL);
131	}
132
133	rsa_cache ()
134	: cleaner (this, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb)
135	{ }	203	{
		204	// request data
		205	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
		206	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
136		207
137	} rsa_cache;	208	// eventual response data
138		209	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
139	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w)
140	{
141	if (!empty ())
142	{	210	}
143	w.start (NOW + RSA_TTL);
144		211
145	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )	212	// every use prolongs the expiry
146	if (i->expire <= NOW)	213	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
147	i = erase (i);
148	else
149	++i;
150	}
151	}	214	}
152		215
153	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	216	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
154		217
155	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	218	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
		219	: max_ttl (max_ttl), max_queue (max_queue)
156	{	220	{
157	if (queue[i])	221	queue = new pkt [max_queue];
158	{
159	delete queue[i];
160	j = (j + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH;
161	}
162		222
163	queue[i] = p;
164
165	i = (i + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH;
166	}
167
168	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()
169	{
170	net_packet *p = queue[j];
171
172	if (p)
173	{
174	queue[j] = 0;
175	j = (j + 1) % QUEUEDEPTH;
176	}
177
178	return p;
179	}
180
181	pkt_queue::pkt_queue ()
182	{
183	memset (queue, 0, sizeof (queue));
184	i = 0;	223	i = 0;
185	j = 0;	224	j = 0;
		225
		226	expire.set<pkt_queue, &pkt_queue::expire_cb> (this);
186	}	227	}
187		228
188	pkt_queue::~pkt_queue ()	229	pkt_queue::~pkt_queue ()
189	{	230	{
190	for (i = QUEUEDEPTH; --i > 0; )	231	while (net_packet *p = get ())
		232	delete p;
		233
191	delete queue[i];	234	delete [] queue;
192	}	235	}
193		236
		237	void
		238	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
		239	{
		240	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
		241
		242	for (;;)
		243	{
		244	if (empty ())
		245	break;
		246
		247	double diff = queue[j].tstamp - expire;
		248
		249	if (diff >= 0.)
		250	{
		251	w.start (diff > 0.5 ? diff : 0.5);
		252	break;
		253	}
		254
		255	delete get ();
		256	}
		257	}
		258
		259	void
		260	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
		261	{
		262	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
		263
		264	// start expiry timer
		265	if (empty ())
		266	expire.start (max_ttl);
		267
		268	int ni = i + 1 == max_queue ? 0 : i + 1;
		269
		270	if (ni == j)
		271	delete get ();
		272
		273	queue[i].pkt = p;
		274	queue[i].tstamp = now;
		275
		276	i = ni;
		277	}
		278
		279	net_packet *
		280	pkt_queue::get ()
		281	{
		282	if (empty ())
		283	return 0;
		284
		285	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
		286	queue[j].pkt = 0;
		287
		288	j = j + 1 == max_queue ? 0 : j + 1;
		289
		290	return p;
		291	}
		292
194	struct net_rateinfo {	293	struct net_rateinfo
		294	{
195	u32 host;	295	u32 host;
196	double pcnt, diff;	296	double pcnt, diff;
197	tstamp last;	297	tstamp last;
198	};	298	};
199		299
200	// only do action once every x seconds per host whole allowing bursts.	300	// only do action once every x seconds per host whole allowing bursts.
201	// this implementation ("splay list" ;) is inefficient,	301	// this implementation ("splay list" ;) is inefficient,
202	// but low on resources.	302	// but low on resources.
203	struct net_rate_limiter : list<net_rateinfo>	303	struct net_rate_limiter : list<net_rateinfo>
204	{	304	{
205	static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 600.; // allow bursts	305	# define NRL_ALPHA (1. - 1. / 600.) // allow bursts
206	static const double CUTOFF = 10.; // one event every CUTOFF seconds	306	# define NRL_CUTOFF 10. // one event every CUTOFF seconds
207	static const double EXPIRE = CUTOFF * 30.; // expire entries after this time	307	# define NRL_EXPIRE (NRL_CUTOFF * 30.) // expire entries after this time
208	static const double MAXDIF = CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - ALPHA)); // maximum diff /count value	308	# define NRL_MAXDIF (NRL_CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - NRL_ALPHA))) // maximum diff /count value
209		309
210	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	310	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
211	bool can (u32 host);	311	bool can (u32 host);
212	};	312	};
213		313
214	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	314	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
215		315
		316	bool
216	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	317	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
217	{	318	{
218	iterator i;	319	iterator i;
219		320
220	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	321	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
221	if (i->host == host)	322	if (i->host == host)
222	break;	323	break;
223	else if (i->last < NOW - EXPIRE)	324	else if (i->last < ev_now () - NRL_EXPIRE)
224	i = erase (i);	325	i = erase (i);
225	else	326	else
226	i++;	327	i++;
227		328
228	if (i == end ())	329	if (i == end ())
229	{	330	{
230	net_rateinfo ri;	331	net_rateinfo ri;
231		332
232	ri.host = host;	333	ri.host = host;
233	ri.pcnt = 1.;	334	ri.pcnt = 1.;
234	ri.diff = MAXDIF;	335	ri.diff = NRL_MAXDIF;
235	ri.last = NOW;	336	ri.last = ev_now ();
236		337
237	push_front (ri);	338	push_front (ri);
238		339
239	return true;	340	return true;
240	}	341	}
241	else	342	else
242	{	343	{
243	net_rateinfo ri (*i);	344	net_rateinfo ri (*i);
244	erase (i);	345	erase (i);
245		346
246	ri.pcnt = ri.pcnt * ALPHA;	347	ri.pcnt = ri.pcnt * NRL_ALPHA;
247	ri.diff = ri.diff * ALPHA + (NOW - ri.last);	348	ri.diff = ri.diff * NRL_ALPHA + (ev_now () - ri.last);
248		349
249	ri.last = NOW;	350	ri.last = ev_now ();
250		351
251	double dif = ri.diff / ri.pcnt;	352	double dif = ri.diff / ri.pcnt;
252		353
253	bool send = dif > CUTOFF;	354	bool send = dif > NRL_CUTOFF;
254		355
255	if (dif > MAXDIF)	356	if (dif > NRL_MAXDIF)
256	{	357	{
257	ri.pcnt = 1.;	358	ri.pcnt = 1.;
258	ri.diff = MAXDIF;	359	ri.diff = NRL_MAXDIF;
259	}	360	}
260	else if (send)	361	else if (send)
261	ri.pcnt++;	362	ri.pcnt++;
262		363
263	push_front (ri);	364	push_front (ri);
…		…
266	}	367	}
267	}	368	}
268		369
269	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	370	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
270		371
271	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	372	void
272
273	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	373	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx, u8 *hmac_digest)
274	{	374	{
275	unsigned int xlen;
276
277	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	375	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
278		376
279	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	377	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
280	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	378	require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
281	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	379	require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
282	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
283	}	380	}
284		381
285	void	382	void
286	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	383	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
287	{	384	{
288	hmac_gen (ctx);	385	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
289		386	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
290	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	387	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
291	}	388	}
292		389
293	bool	390	bool
294	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	391	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
295	{	392	{
296	hmac_gen (ctx);	393	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
297		394	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
298	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	395	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
299	}	396	}
300		397
		398	void
301	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	399	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
302	{	400	{
303	type = type_;	401	type = type_;
304		402
305	int src = THISNODE->id;	403	int src = THISNODE->id;
306		404
…		…
310	}	408	}
311		409
312	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	410	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
313	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	411	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
314		412
315	struct vpndata_packet:vpn_packet	413	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		414	{
		415	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		416
		417	void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		418	tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
		419
		420	private:
		421	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
316	{	422	{
317	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
318
319	void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
320	tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
321	private:
322
323	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
324	{
325	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	423	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
326	}
327	};	424	}
		425	};
328		426
329	void	427	void
330	vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	428	vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
331	{	429	{
332	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	430	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
333	int outl = 0, outl2;	431	int outl = 0, outl2;
334	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;	432	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
335		433
336	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	434	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
337	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	435	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
338	u32 cl;
339		436
		437	if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
		438	{
340	cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);	439	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);
		440
341	if (cl)	441	if (cl)
342	{	442	{
343	type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;	443	type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;
344	d = cdata;	444	d = cdata;
345	l = cl + 2;	445	l = cl + 2;
346		446
347	d[0] = cl >> 8;	447	d[0] = cl >> 8;
348	d[1] = cl;	448	d[1] = cl;
		449	}
349	}	450	}
350	#endif	451	#endif
351		452
352	EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	453	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
353		454
354	struct {	455	struct {
355	#if RAND_SIZE	456	#if RAND_SIZE
356	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	457	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
357	#endif	458	#endif
358	u32 seqno;	459	u32 seqno;
359	} datahdr;	460	} datahdr;
360		461
361	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	462	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
362	#if RAND_SIZE	463	#if RAND_SIZE
363	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	464	// NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
		465	// is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
		466	conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
364	#endif	467	#endif
365		468
366	EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	469	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
367	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	470	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
368	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR);	471	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
369	outl += outl2;	472	outl += outl2;
370		473
371	EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	474	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
372	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	475	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
373	(unsigned char *) d, l);	476	(unsigned char *) d, l));
374	outl += outl2;	477	outl += outl2;
375		478
376	EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2);	479	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
377	outl += outl2;	480	outl += outl2;
378		481
379	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();	482	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();
380		483
381	set_hdr (type, dst);	484	set_hdr (type, dst);
…		…
390	int outl = 0, outl2;	493	int outl = 0, outl2;
391	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	494	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
392	u8 *d;	495	u8 *d;
393	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	496	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
394		497
395	EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	498	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
396		499
397	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	500	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
398	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	501	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
399		502
400	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	503	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
401	d = cdata;	504	d = cdata;
402	else	505	else
403	#endif	506	#endif
404	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	507	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
405		508
406	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	509	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		510	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		511	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		512	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		513	require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]);
		514
		515	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
407	EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	516	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
408	d, &outl2,	517	d, &outl2,
409	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ());	518	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
410	outl += outl2;	519	outl += outl2;
411		520
412	EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2);	521	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
413	outl += outl2;	522	outl += outl2;
414		523
415	seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE));	524	seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE));
416		525
417	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);	526	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
…		…
442	}	551	}
443	};	552	};
444		553
445	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	554	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
446	{	555	{
447	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	556	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
448	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
449	// hmacs simply will not work.
450	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
451	u8 flags, challengelen, pad2, pad3;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
452	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
453		560
454	const u8 curflags () const	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
		562	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
		563
		564	static u8 get_features ()
455	{	565	{
		566	u8 f = 0;
		567	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
		568	f |= FEATURE_COMPRESSION;
		569	#endif
		570	#if ENABLE_ROHC
		571	f |= FEATURE_ROHC;
		572	#endif
		573	#if ENABLE_BRIDGING
		574	f |= FEATURE_BRIDGING;
		575	#endif
456	return 0x80	576	return f;
457	| (ENABLE_COMPRESSION ? 0x01 : 0x00);
458	}	577	}
459
460	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
461	bool chk_config () const;
462	};	578	};
463		579
		580	void
464	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
465	{	582	{
466	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
467	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
468	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	585	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
469	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;	586	flags = 0;
470	flags = curflags ();	587	features = get_features ();
471	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
472		588
		589	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		590
473	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	591	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
474	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
475	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	592	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		593	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
476		594
477	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	595	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
478	set_hdr (type, dst);	596	set_hdr (type, dst);
479	}	597	}
480		598
481	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	599	bool
		600	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
482	{	601	{
483	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	602	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
484	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	603	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
		604	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
485	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	605	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
486	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	606	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
487	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)	607	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
488	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
489	else if (flags != curflags ())
490	slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), flags, curflags ());
491	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
492	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
493	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	608	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
494	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	609	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
495	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	610	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
496	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
497	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	611	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
498	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	612	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		613	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		614	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		615	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		616	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
499	else	617	else
		618	{
		619	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		620
		621	if (cmp > 0)
		622	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		623	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		624	else if (cmp == 0)
500	return true;	625	return true;
		626	}
501		627
502	return false;	628	return false;
503	}	629	}
504		630
505	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	631	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
506	{	632	{
507	char magic[8];	633	char magic[8];
508	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	634	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
509	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will get patches on forward)	635	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
510	u8 pad2, pad3;	636	u8 pad2, pad3;
511	rsaid id;	637	auth_encr encr;
512	rsaencrdata encr;
513		638
514	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	639	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
515	{	640	{
516	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	641	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
517	strncpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);	642	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
518	initiate = !!initiate_;	643	initiate = !!initiate_;
519	protocols = protocols_;	644	protocols = protocols_;
520		645
521	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	646	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
522	}	647	}
523	};	648	};
524		649
525	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	650	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
526	{	651	{
527	rsaid id;
528	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
529	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
530	rsaresponse response;	652	auth_response response;
531		653
532	auth_res_packet (int dst)	654	auth_res_packet (int dst)
533	{	655	{
534	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	656	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
535		657
536	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	658	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
537	}	659	}
538	};	660	};
539		661
…		…
569	};	691	};
570		692
571	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	693	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
572		694
573	void	695	void
574	connection::connection_established ()	696	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
575	{	697	{
576	if (ictx && octx)	698	if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
		699	return;
		700
		701	si = rsi;
		702	protocol = rsi.prot;
		703
		704	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		705	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		706	vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		707	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		708
		709	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		710	{
		711	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		712	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		713	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
577	{	714	}
578	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	715
		716	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		717	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
579		718
580	rekey.start (NOW + ::conf.rekey);	719	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		720	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		721
		722	oiv.reset ();
		723
		724	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
		725	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
		726	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		727
		728	hmac_error = 0.;
		729
581	keepalive.start (NOW + ::conf.keepalive);	730	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
582		731
583	// send queued packets	732	// send queued packets
584	if (ictx && octx)
585	{
586	while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())	733	while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
587	{	734	{
588	send_data_packet (p);	735	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
589	delete p;	736	delete p;
590	}	737	}
591		738
592	while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())	739	while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
593	{	740	{
594	send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);	741	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
595	delete p;	742	delete p;
596	}
597	}
598	}	743	}
		744
		745	vpn->connection_established (this);
		746	}
		747
		748	void
		749	connection::reset_si ()
		750	{
		751	if (vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
		752	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->connectable_protocols ());
599	else	753	else
600	{	754	{
601	retry_cnt = 0;	755	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
602	establish_connection.start (NOW + 5);	756	protocol = 0;
603	keepalive.stop ();
604	rekey.stop ();
605	}	757	}
606	}
607
608	void
609	connection::reset_si ()
610	{
611	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->protocols);
612
613	// mask out protocols we cannot establish
614	if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4;
615	if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4;
616		758
617	si.set (conf, protocol);	759	si.set (conf, protocol);
618	}	760	}
619		761
620	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary	762	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
621	const sockinfo &	763	const sockinfo &
622	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const	764	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
623	{	765	{
624	if (!si.valid ())	766	if (!si.valid ())
625	{	767	{
626	connection *r = vpn->find_router ();	768	connection *r = vpn->find_router_for (this);
627		769
628	if (r)	770	if (r)
629	{	771	{
630	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s"),	772	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying to route through %s."),
631	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename);	773	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename);
632	return r->si;	774	return r->si;
633	}	775	}
634	else	776	else
635	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol"),	777	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol or no router available."),
636	conf->nodename);	778	conf->nodename);
637	}	779	}
638		780
639	return si;	781	return si;
640	}	782	}
641		783
642	void	784	void
643	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)	785	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
644	{	786	{
645	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))	787	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
646	reset_connection ();	788	reset_connection ("packet send error");
647	}	789	}
648		790
649	void	791	void
650	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)	792	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
651	{	793	{
652	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	794	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
653		795
654	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	796	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
		797
		798	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
655	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	799	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
656		800
657	delete pkt;	801	delete pkt;
658	}	802	}
659		803
…		…
674	void	818	void
675	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	819	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
676	{	820	{
677	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	821	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
678		822
679	rsachallenge chg;	823	generate_auth_data ();
680	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
681	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	824	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
682		825
683	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	826	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
684
685	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	827	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
686		828
687	delete pkt;	829	delete pkt;
688	}	830	}
689		831
690	void	832	void
691	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	833	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
692	{	834	{
693	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	835	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
694		836
695	pkt->id = id;	837	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
		838	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
696		839
697	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
698
699	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
700
701	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	840	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
702
703	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	841	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
704		842
705	delete pkt;	843	delete pkt;
706	}	844	}
707		845
708	void	846	void
709	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	847	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
710	{	848	{
711	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s)\n",	849	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
712	conf->id, rid, (const char *)rsi);	850	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		851	conf->protocols);
713		852
714	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	853	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
715		854
716	r->hmac_set (octx);	855	r->hmac_set (octx);
717	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	856	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
718		857
719	delete r;	858	delete r;
720	}	859	}
721		860
722	void	861	inline void
723	connection::establish_connection_cb (time_watcher &w)	862	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
724	{	863	{
725	if (!ictx	864	if (!(ictx && octx)
726	&& conf != THISNODE	865	&& conf != THISNODE
727	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	866	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
728	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	867	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
729	&& w.at <= NOW)	868	&& !w.is_active ())
730	{	869	{
731	double retry_int = double (retry_cnt & 3 ? (retry_cnt & 3) : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)) * 0.6;	870	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
732		871	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
733	if (retry_int < 3600 * 8)	872	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
		873	{
		874	reset_connection ("no demand");
734	retry_cnt++;	875	return;
		876	}
735		877
736	w.start (NOW + retry_int);	878	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
		879
		880	ev::tstamp retry_int = ev::tstamp (retry_cnt & 3
		881	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
		882	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
737		883
738	reset_si ();	884	reset_si ();
739		885
740	if (si.prot && !si.host)	886	bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW;
		887
		888	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
		889	{
		890	/*TODO*/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
		891	w.start (1);
741	vpn->send_connect_request (conf->id);	892	vpn->send_connect_request (this);
		893	}
742	else	894	else
743	{	895	{
		896	if (si.valid ())
		897	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: sending direct connection request to %s."),
		898	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
		899
744	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);	900	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);
		901
		902	slow = slow || (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
745		903
746	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))	904	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
747	{	905	{
748	if (retry_cnt < 4)	906	if (retry_cnt < 4)
749	send_auth_request (dsi, true);	907	send_auth_request (dsi, true);
750	else	908	else
751	send_ping (dsi, 0);	909	send_ping (dsi, 0);
752	}	910	}
753	}	911	}
754	}
755	}
756		912
		913	retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9;
		914
		915	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
		916	retry_cnt++;
		917	else
		918	retry_int = conf->max_retry;
		919
		920	w.start (retry_int);
		921	}
		922	}
		923
757	void	924	void
758	connection::reset_connection ()	925	connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
759	{	926	{
760	if (ictx && octx)	927	if (ictx && octx)
761	{	928	{
762	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"),	929	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
763	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	930	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
764		931
765	if (::conf.script_node_down)	932	if (::conf.script_node_down)
766	run_script (run_script_cb (this, &connection::script_node_down), false);	933	{
		934	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		935	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
		936	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-down command execution failed, continuing."));
		937	}
767	}	938	}
768		939
769	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	940	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
770	delete octx; octx = 0;	941	delete octx; octx = 0;
771		942
772	si.host= 0;	943	si.host = 0;
773		944
		945	have_snd_auth = false;
		946	have_rcv_auth = false;
		947	auth_expire = 0.;
		948
774	last_activity = 0;	949	last_activity = 0.;
		950	//last_si_change = 0.;
775	retry_cnt = 0;	951	retry_cnt = 0;
776		952
777	rekey.stop ();	953	rekey.stop ();
778	keepalive.stop ();	954	keepalive.stop ();
779	establish_connection.stop ();	955	establish_connection.stop ();
…		…
783	connection::shutdown ()	959	connection::shutdown ()
784	{	960	{
785	if (ictx && octx)	961	if (ictx && octx)
786	send_reset (si);	962	send_reset (si);
787		963
788	reset_connection ();	964	reset_connection ("shutdown");
789	}	965	}
790		966
791	void	967	// poor-man's rekeying
792	connection::rekey_cb (time_watcher &w)	968	inline void
		969	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
793	{	970	{
794	reset_connection ();	971	reset_connection ("rekeying");
795	establish_connection ();	972	establish_connection ();
796	}	973	}
797		974
798	void	975	void
799	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)	976	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
…		…
813	if (oseqno > MAX_SEQNO)	990	if (oseqno > MAX_SEQNO)
814	rekey ();	991	rekey ();
815	}	992	}
816		993
817	void	994	void
		995	connection::post_inject_queue ()
		996	{
		997	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
		998	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary
		999	establish_connection.stop ();
		1000
		1001	establish_connection ();
		1002	}
		1003
		1004	void
818	connection::inject_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt, bool broadcast/*TODO DDD*/)	1005	connection::inject_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
819	{	1006	{
820	if (ictx && octx)	1007	if (ictx && octx)
821	send_data_packet (pkt);	1008	send_data_packet (pkt);
822	else	1009	else
823	{	1010	{
824	if (!broadcast)//DDDD
825	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1011	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
826		1012	post_inject_queue ();
827	establish_connection ();
828	}	1013	}
829	}	1014	}
830		1015
		1016	void
831	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1017	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
832	{	1018	{
833	if (ictx && octx)	1019	if (ictx && octx)
834	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1020	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
835	else	1021	else
836	{	1022	{
837	vpn_queue.put (new vpn_packet (*pkt));	1023	vpn_queue.put ((vpn_packet *)new data_packet (*(data_packet *)pkt));
838		1024	post_inject_queue ();
839	establish_connection ();
840	}	1025	}
841	}	1026	}
842		1027
843	void	1028	void
844	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1029	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
845	{	1030	{
846	last_activity = NOW;	1031	last_activity = ev_now ();
847		1032
848	slog (L_NOISE, "<<%d received packet type %d from %d to %d",	1033	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
849	conf->id, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1034	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
		1035
		1036	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
		1037	return;
850		1038
851	switch (pkt->typ ())	1039	switch (pkt->typ ())
852	{	1040	{
853	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:	1041	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:
		1042	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
		1043
854	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,	1044	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
855	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection	1045	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
856	// when we receive a ping.	1046	// when we receive a ping.
857	if (!ictx)	1047	if (!ictx)
858	{	1048	{
859	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1049	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
860	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1050	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
861	}	1051	}
862	else	1052	else
		1053	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
		1054	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
863	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1055	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
864		1056
865	break;	1057	break;
866		1058
867	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1059	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
		1060	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1061
		1062	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1063	// about our desire for communication.
		1064	establish_connection ();
868	break;	1065	break;
869		1066
870	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1067	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
		1068	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
		1069
		1070	if (ictx && octx)
871	{	1071	{
872	reset_connection ();	1072	reset_connection ("remote reset");
873		1073
874	config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;	1074	config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;
875		1075
876	if (!p->chk_config ())	1076	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
877	{
878	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node"),
879	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
880	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
881	}
882	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
883	establish_connection ();	1077	establish_connection ();
884	}	1078	}
		1079
885	break;	1080	break;
886		1081
887	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1082	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
888	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1083	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
889	{	1084	{
890	auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *) pkt;	1085	auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *)pkt;
891		1086
892	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate);	1087	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1088	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1089	p->protocols, p->features);
893		1090
894	if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))	1091	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1092	{
		1093	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1094	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1095	}
		1096	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
895	{	1097	{
896	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1098	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
897	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1099	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
898	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1100	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
899	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1101	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
900		1102
901	if (p->initiate)	1103	if (p->initiate)
		1104	{
902	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1105	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
903		1106
904	rsachallenge k;	1107	if (ictx && octx)
		1108	reset_connection ("reconnect");
		1109	}
905		1110
		1111	auth_data auth;
		1112
906	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1113	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
907	{	1114	{
908	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1115	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
909	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1116	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
910	break;
911	}	1117	}
912	else	1118	else
913	{	1119	{
914	delete octx;	1120	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
915		1121
916	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1122	rcv_auth = auth;
917	oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1123	have_rcv_auth = true;
918		1124
		1125	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1126
		1127	if (chg)
		1128	{
919	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1129	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
		1130	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
920		1131
921	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
922
923	connection_established ();	1132	connection_established (rsi);
924
925	break;	1133	}
926	}	1134	}
		1135
		1136	break;
927	}	1137	}
928	else
929	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch"),
930	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
931		1138
932	send_reset (rsi);	1139	send_reset (rsi);
933	}	1140	}
934		1141
935	break;	1142	break;
936		1143
937	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:	1144	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:
938	{	1145	{
939	auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *) pkt;	1146	auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
940		1147
941	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id);	1148	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
942		1149
943	if (p->chk_config ())	1150	auth_mac local_mac;
		1151	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1152
		1153	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
944	{	1154	{
945	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
946	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
947	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
948	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
949
950	rsachallenge chg;
951
952	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
953	{
954	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response ignored"),	1155	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
955	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1156	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
956	break;
957	}	1157	}
958	else	1158	else if (!have_snd_auth)
959	{	1159	{
960	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1160	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
961		1161
962	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))	1162	have_snd_auth = true;
963	{
964	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
965	"could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"),
966	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
967	break;
968	}
969	else
970	{
971	rsaresponse h;
972
973	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
974
975	if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
976	{
977	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
978
979	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
980
981	iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
982
983	si = rsi;
984	protocol = rsi.prot;
985
986	connection_established ();	1163	connection_established (rsi);
987
988	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established, protocol version %d.%d"),
989	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
990	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
991
992	if (::conf.script_node_up)
993	run_script (run_script_cb (this, &connection::script_node_up), false);
994
995	break;
996	}
997	else
998	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match"),
999	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1000	}
1001
1002	delete cctx;
1003	}
1004	}	1164	}
1005	}	1165	}
1006
1007	send_reset (rsi);
1008	break;	1166	break;
1009		1167
1010	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1168	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1011	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1169	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1012	send_reset (rsi);	1170	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1018	if (ictx && octx)	1176	if (ictx && octx)
1019	{	1177	{
1020	vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;	1178	vpndata_packet *p = (vpndata_packet *)pkt;
1021		1179
1022	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))	1180	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
		1181	{
		1182	// rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
		1183	// we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
		1184	// and suppress messages and resets during that time.
		1185	//TODO: should be done per source address
		1186	if (!hmac_error)
		1187	{
		1188	hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
		1189	break;
		1190	}
		1191	else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
		1192	break; // silently suppress
		1193	else
		1194	{
1023	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"	1195	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1024	"could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"),	1196	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1025	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1197	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1198	// reset
		1199	}
		1200	}
1026	else	1201	else
1027	{	1202	{
1028	u32 seqno;	1203	u32 seqno;
1029	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);	1204	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
		1205	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1030		1206
1031	if (iseqno.recv_ok (seqno))	1207	hmac_error = 0;
		1208
		1209	if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1032	{	1210	{
1033	vpn->tap->send (d);	1211	vpn->tap->send (d);
1034		1212
1035	if (si != rsi)	1213	if (si != rsi)
1036	{	1214	{
1037	// fast re-sync on connection changes, useful especially for tcp/ip	1215	// fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip
		1216	//if (last_si_change < ev_now () + 5.)
1038	si = rsi;	1217	// {
1039
1040	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s"),	1218	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),
1041	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);	1219	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);
		1220
		1221	si = rsi;
		1222
		1223	if (::conf.script_node_change)
		1224	{
		1225	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		1226	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_change> (this);
		1227	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-change command execution failed, continuing."));
		1228	}
		1229
		1230	// }
		1231	//else
		1232	// slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),
		1233	// conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);
1042	}	1234	}
1043
1044	delete d;
1045
1046	break;
1047	}	1235	}
		1236	else if (seqclass == 1) // far history
		1237	slog (L_ERR, _("received very old packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1238	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication/delay, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1239	else if (seqclass == 2) // in-window duplicate, happens often on wireless
		1240	slog (L_DEBUG, _("received recent duplicated packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1241	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1242	else if (seqclass == 3) // reset
		1243	{
		1244	slog (L_ERR, _("received out-of-sync (far future) packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1245	"probably just massive packet loss, sending reset."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1246	send_reset (rsi);
		1247	}
		1248
		1249	delete d;
		1250	break;
1048	}	1251	}
1049	}	1252	}
1050		1253
1051	send_reset (rsi);	1254	send_reset (rsi);
1052	break;	1255	break;
1053		1256
1054	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:	1257	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:
1055	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1258	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1056	{	1259	{
1057	connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *) pkt;	1260	connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *)pkt;
1058		1261
1059	assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything	1262	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1060	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1061	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1062
1063	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]\n",
1064	conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx);
1065
1066	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1067	{	1263	{
		1264	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
		1265	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
		1266
		1267	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
		1268	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1269	p->protocols,
		1270	c->ictx && c->octx);
		1271
		1272	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
		1273	{
1068	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1274	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1069	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1275	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
1070	c->send_connect_info (conf->id, si, conf->protocols);	1276	c->send_connect_info (conf->id, si, conf->protocols);
1071	send_connect_info (c->conf->id, c->si, c->conf->protocols);	1277	send_connect_info (c->conf->id, c->si, c->conf->protocols);
		1278	}
		1279	else
		1280	c->establish_connection ();
1072	}	1281	}
1073	else	1282	else
1074	c->establish_connection ();	1283	slog (L_WARN,
		1284	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
		1285	p->id);
1075	}	1286	}
1076		1287
1077	break;	1288	break;
1078		1289
1079	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO:	1290	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO:
1080	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1291	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1081	{	1292	{
1082	connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *) pkt;	1293	connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *)pkt;
1083		1294
1084	assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything	1295	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1085		1296	{
1086	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1297	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1087		1298
1088	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1299	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1089	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1300	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1090	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1301	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1091		1302
1092	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)",	1303	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1093	conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1304	conf->nodename,
		1305	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1306	(const char *)p->si,
		1307	p->protocols,
		1308	protocol,
		1309	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
		1310	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1094		1311
1095	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1312	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1096		1313
1097	if (dsi.valid ())	1314	if (dsi.valid ())
1098	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1315	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1316	else
		1317	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1318	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1319	(const char *)p->si);
		1320	}
		1321	else
		1322	slog (L_WARN,
		1323	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
		1324	p->id);
1099	}	1325	}
1100		1326
1101	break;	1327	break;
1102		1328
1103	default:	1329	default:
1104	send_reset (rsi);	1330	send_reset (rsi);
1105	break;	1331	break;
1106	}	1332	}
1107	}	1333	}
1108		1334
1109	void connection::keepalive_cb (time_watcher &w)	1335	inline void
		1336	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1110	{	1337	{
1111	if (NOW >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30)	1338	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1339
		1340	if (when >= 0)
		1341	w.start (when);
		1342	else if (when < -15)
1112	{	1343	{
1113	reset_connection ();	1344	reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1114	establish_connection ();	1345	establish_connection ();
1115	}	1346	}
1116	else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1117	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive);
1118	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1347	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1119	|| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1348	|| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1120	{	1349	{
		1350	w.start (3);
1121	send_ping (si);	1351	send_ping (si);
1122	w.start (NOW + 5);
1123	}	1352	}
1124	else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1353	else if (when >= -10)
1125	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1354	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1126	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1355	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1127	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10);	1356	w.start (when + 10);
1128	else	1357	else
1129	reset_connection ();	1358	reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1130	}	1359	}
1131		1360
		1361	void
1132	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1362	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1133	{	1363	{
1134	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1364	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1135		1365
1136	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d)", conf->id, id);	1366	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
		1367	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1368	THISNODE->protocols);
1137	p->hmac_set (octx);	1369	p->hmac_set (octx);
1138	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1370	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1139		1371
1140	delete p;	1372	delete p;
1141	}	1373	}
1142		1374
1143	void connection::script_node ()	1375	void
		1376	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1144	{	1377	{
1145	vpn->script_if_up ();
1146
1147	char *env;	1378	char *env;
		1379	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
		1380	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
		1381	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
		1382	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
		1383	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
		1384	}
		1385
		1386	void
		1387	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
		1388	{
		1389	vpn->script_init_env ();
		1390
		1391	char *env;
1148	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1392	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
		1393	asprintf (&env, "DESTSI=%s", (const char *)si); putenv (env);
1149	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1394	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1150	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);	1395	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);
1151	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);	1396	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);
1152	}	1397	}
1153		1398
		1399	inline const char *
1154	const char *connection::script_node_up ()	1400	connection::script_node_up ()
1155	{	1401	{
1156	script_node ();	1402	script_init_connect_env ();
1157		1403
1158	putenv ("STATE=up");	1404	putenv ((char *)"STATE=up");
1159		1405
		1406	char *filename;
		1407	asprintf (&filename,
		1408	"%s/%s",
		1409	confbase,
1160	return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up";	1410	::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");
1161	}
1162		1411
		1412	return filename;
		1413	}
		1414
		1415	inline const char *
		1416	connection::script_node_change ()
		1417	{
		1418	script_init_connect_env ();
		1419
		1420	putenv ((char *)"STATE=change");
		1421
		1422	char *filename;
		1423	asprintf (&filename,
		1424	"%s/%s",
		1425	confbase,
		1426	::conf.script_node_change ? ::conf.script_node_change : "node-change");
		1427
		1428	return filename;
		1429	}
		1430
		1431	inline const char *
1163	const char *connection::script_node_down ()	1432	connection::script_node_down ()
1164	{	1433	{
1165	script_node ();	1434	script_init_connect_env ();
1166		1435
1167	putenv ("STATE=down");	1436	putenv ((char *)"STATE=down");
1168		1437
1169	return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_down : "node-down";	1438	char *filename;
1170	}	1439	asprintf (&filename,
		1440	"%s/%s",
		1441	confbase,
		1442	::conf.script_node_down ? ::conf.script_node_down : "node-down");
1171		1443
		1444	return filename;
		1445	}
		1446
1172	connection::connection(struct vpn *vpn_)	1447	connection::connection (struct vpn *vpn, conf_node *conf)
1173	: vpn(vpn_)	1448	: vpn(vpn), conf(conf),
1174	, rekey (this, &connection::rekey_cb)	1449	#if ENABLE_DNS
1175	, keepalive (this, &connection::keepalive_cb)	1450	dns (0),
		1451	#endif
		1452	data_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue + 1),
		1453	vpn_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue + 1)
		1454	{
		1455	rekey .set<connection, &connection::rekey_cb > (this);
		1456	keepalive .set<connection, &connection::keepalive_cb > (this);
1176	, establish_connection (this, &connection::establish_connection_cb)	1457	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1177	{	1458
		1459	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1178	octx = ictx = 0;	1460	octx = ictx = 0;
1179	retry_cnt = 0;
1180		1461
1181	connectmode = conf_node::C_ALWAYS; // initial setting	1462	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
		1463
		1464	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
		1465	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
		1466	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
		1467
1182	reset_connection ();	1468	reset_connection ("startup");
1183	}	1469	}
1184		1470
1185	connection::~connection ()	1471	connection::~connection ()
1186	{	1472	{
1187	shutdown ();	1473	shutdown ();
1188	}	1474	}
1189		1475
		1476	void
1190	void connection_init ()	1477	connection_init ()
1191	{	1478	{
1192	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1479	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1193	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1480	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1194	}	1481	}
1195		1482

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