--- gvpe/src/connection.C 2003/10/16 02:28:36 1.21 +++ gvpe/src/connection.C 2005/03/05 19:13:15 1.46 @@ -1,7 +1,10 @@ /* connection.C -- manage a single connection + Copyright (C) 2003-2005 Marc Lehmann - This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + This file is part of GVPE. + + GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. @@ -12,15 +15,13 @@ GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + along with gvpe; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc. 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA */ #include "config.h" -extern "C" { -# include "lzf/lzf.h" -} +#include #include @@ -45,6 +46,12 @@ #define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic +#define ULTRA_FAST 1 +#define HLOG 15 +#include "lzf/lzf.h" +#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" +#include "lzf/lzf_d.c" + struct crypto_ctx { EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; @@ -57,14 +64,14 @@ crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); - EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc); + require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0); } crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx); + require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); } @@ -74,10 +81,10 @@ EVP_MD_CTX ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); - EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id); - EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0); + require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); + require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); + require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id)); + require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); } @@ -135,11 +142,9 @@ void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (time_watcher &w) { - if (empty ()) - w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - else + if (!empty ()) { - w.at = NOW + RSA_TTL; + w.start (NOW + RSA_TTL); for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ) if (i->expire <= NOW) @@ -201,10 +206,10 @@ // but low on resources. struct net_rate_limiter : list { - static const double ALPHA = 1. - 1. / 600.; // allow bursts - static const double CUTOFF = 10.; // one event every CUTOFF seconds - static const double EXPIRE = CUTOFF * 30.; // expire entries after this time - static const double MAXDIF = CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - ALPHA)); // maximum diff /count value +# define NRL_ALPHA (1. - 1. / 600.) // allow bursts +# define NRL_CUTOFF 10. // one event every CUTOFF seconds +# define NRL_EXPIRE (NRL_CUTOFF * 30.) // expire entries after this time +# define NRL_MAXDIF (NRL_CUTOFF * (1. / (1. - NRL_ALPHA))) // maximum diff /count value bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); } bool can (u32 host); @@ -219,7 +224,7 @@ for (i = begin (); i != end (); ) if (i->host == host) break; - else if (i->last < NOW - EXPIRE) + else if (i->last < NOW - NRL_EXPIRE) i = erase (i); else i++; @@ -230,7 +235,7 @@ ri.host = host; ri.pcnt = 1.; - ri.diff = MAXDIF; + ri.diff = NRL_MAXDIF; ri.last = NOW; push_front (ri); @@ -242,19 +247,19 @@ net_rateinfo ri (*i); erase (i); - ri.pcnt = ri.pcnt * ALPHA; - ri.diff = ri.diff * ALPHA + (NOW - ri.last); + ri.pcnt = ri.pcnt * NRL_ALPHA; + ri.diff = ri.diff * NRL_ALPHA + (NOW - ri.last); ri.last = NOW; double dif = ri.diff / ri.pcnt; - bool send = dif > CUTOFF; + bool send = dif > NRL_CUTOFF; - if (dif > MAXDIF) + if (dif > NRL_MAXDIF) { ri.pcnt = 1.; - ri.diff = MAXDIF; + ri.diff = NRL_MAXDIF; } else if (send) ri.pcnt++; @@ -311,7 +316,7 @@ #define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) #define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE) -struct vpndata_packet:vpn_packet +struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet { u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno @@ -334,21 +339,24 @@ #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; - u32 cl; - cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7); - if (cl) + if (conn->features & ENABLE_COMPRESSION) { - type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED; - d = cdata; - l = cl + 2; + u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7); + + if (cl) + { + type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED; + d = cdata; + l = cl + 2; - d[0] = cl >> 8; - d[1] = cl; + d[0] = cl >> 8; + d[1] = cl; + } } #endif - EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); + require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); struct { #if RAND_SIZE @@ -362,17 +370,17 @@ RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); #endif - EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, + require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, - (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR); + (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); outl += outl2; - EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, + require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, - (unsigned char *) d, l); + (unsigned char *) d, l)); outl += outl2; - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2); + require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2)); outl += outl2; len = outl + data_hdr_size (); @@ -391,7 +399,7 @@ u8 *d; u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); + require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); #if ENABLE_COMPRESSION u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; @@ -403,12 +411,12 @@ d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ - EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, + require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, d, &outl2, - (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()); + (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); outl += outl2; - EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2); + require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2)); outl += outl2; seqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)(d + RAND_SIZE)); @@ -447,17 +455,23 @@ // field comes before this data, so peers with other // hmacs simply will not work. u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; - u8 flags, challengelen, pad2, pad3; + u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; - const u8 curflags () const - { - return 0x80 - | (ENABLE_COMPRESSION ? 0x01 : 0x00); - } - void setup (ptype type, int dst); bool chk_config () const; + + static u8 get_features () + { + u8 f = 0; +#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION + f |= FEATURE_COMPRESSION; +#endif +#if ENABLE_ROHC + f |= FEATURE_ROHC; +#endif + return f; + } }; void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) @@ -466,8 +480,9 @@ prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; randsize = RAND_SIZE; hmaclen = HMACLENGTH; - flags = curflags (); + flags = ENABLE_COMPRESSION ? 0x81 : 0x80; challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge); + features = get_features (); cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)); @@ -480,21 +495,23 @@ bool config_packet::chk_config () const { if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) - slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); + slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) - slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); + slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH) - slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH); + slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH); +#if 0 // this implementation should handle all flag settings else if (flags != curflags ()) - slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), flags, curflags ()); + slog (L_WARN, _("flag mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), flags, curflags ()); +#endif else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge)) - slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (%d <=> %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge)); + slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge)); else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) - slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); + slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) - slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)); + slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)); else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) - slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (%x <=> %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); + slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); else return true; @@ -505,7 +522,7 @@ { char magic[8]; u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply - u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will get patches on forward) + u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) u8 pad2, pad3; rsaid id; rsaencrdata encr; @@ -576,7 +593,9 @@ { connectmode = conf->connectmode; - rekey.start (NOW + ::conf.rekey); + // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric + rekey.start (NOW + ::conf.rekey + + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0)); keepalive.start (NOW + ::conf.keepalive); // send queued packets @@ -599,8 +618,8 @@ { retry_cnt = 0; establish_connection.start (NOW + 5); - keepalive.reset (); - rekey.reset (); + keepalive.stop (); + rekey.stop (); } } @@ -612,6 +631,7 @@ // mask out protocols we cannot establish if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4; if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4; + if (!conf->dns_port) protocol &= ~PROT_DNSv4; si.set (conf, protocol); } @@ -626,8 +646,8 @@ if (r) { - slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s"), - conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename); + slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s (%s)"), + conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename, (const char *)r->si); return r->si; } else @@ -676,13 +696,8 @@ auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); rsachallenge chg; - rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg); - - if (0 > RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof chg, - (unsigned char *)&chg, (unsigned char *)&pkt->encr, - conf->rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) - fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error"); + rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si); @@ -726,18 +741,20 @@ void connection::establish_connection_cb (time_watcher &w) { - if (ictx || conf == THISNODE - || connectmode == conf_node::C_NEVER - || connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED) - w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - else if (w.at <= NOW) + if (!ictx + && conf != THISNODE + && connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER + && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED + && NOW > w.at) { double retry_int = double (retry_cnt & 3 ? (retry_cnt & 3) : 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2)) * 0.6; - if (retry_int < 3600 * 8) + if (retry_int < conf->max_retry) retry_cnt++; + else + retry_int = conf->max_retry; - w.at = NOW + retry_int; + w.start (NOW + retry_int); reset_si (); @@ -772,15 +789,18 @@ delete ictx; ictx = 0; delete octx; octx = 0; +#if ENABLE_DNS + dnsv4_reset_connection (); +#endif - si.host= 0; + si.host = 0; last_activity = 0; retry_cnt = 0; - rekey.reset (); - keepalive.reset (); - establish_connection.reset (); + rekey.stop (); + keepalive.stop (); + establish_connection.stop (); } void @@ -795,8 +815,6 @@ void connection::rekey_cb (time_watcher &w) { - w.at = TSTAMP_CANCEL; - reset_connection (); establish_connection (); } @@ -840,7 +858,7 @@ send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos); else { - vpn_queue.put (new vpn_packet (*pkt)); + vpn_queue.put ((vpn_packet *)new data_packet (*(data_packet *)pkt)); establish_connection (); } @@ -909,11 +927,12 @@ rsachallenge k; - if (0 > RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (p->encr), - (unsigned char *)&p->encr, (unsigned char *)&k, - ::conf.rsa_key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING)) - slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), - conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); + if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) + { + slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), + conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); + break; + } else { delete octx; @@ -921,7 +940,11 @@ octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; + // compatibility code, remove when no longer required + if (p->flags & 1) p->features |= FEATURE_COMPRESSION; + conf->protocols = p->protocols; + features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k); @@ -967,7 +990,7 @@ if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx)) { slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n" - "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), + "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"), conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); break; } @@ -1026,7 +1049,7 @@ if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx)) slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n" - "could be an attack, or just corruption or an synchronization error"), + "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"), conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); else { @@ -1045,11 +1068,10 @@ slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s"), conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi); } - - delete d; - - break; } + + delete d; + break; } } @@ -1084,23 +1106,24 @@ case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_INFO: if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx)) { - connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *) pkt; + connect_info_packet *p = (connect_info_packet *)pkt; - assert (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()); // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything - - connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; + if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()) // hmac-auth does not mean we accept anything + { + connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; - c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; - protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); - p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); + c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; + protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); + p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); - slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)", - conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx); + slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)", + conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx); - const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); + const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); - if (dsi.valid ()) - c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); + if (dsi.valid ()) + c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); + } } break; @@ -1119,17 +1142,17 @@ establish_connection (); } else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive) - w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive; + w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive); else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) { send_ping (si); - w.at = NOW + 5; + w.start (NOW + 5); } else if (NOW < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) - w.at = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10; + w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10); else reset_connection (); } @@ -1174,15 +1197,21 @@ return ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_down : "node-down"; } -connection::connection(struct vpn *vpn_) -: vpn(vpn_) +connection::connection (struct vpn *vpn, conf_node *conf) +: vpn(vpn), conf(conf) , rekey (this, &connection::rekey_cb) , keepalive (this, &connection::keepalive_cb) , establish_connection (this, &connection::establish_connection_cb) +#if ENABLE_DNS +, dns (0) +#endif { octx = ictx = 0; retry_cnt = 0; + if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled + conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4; + connectmode = conf_node::C_ALWAYS; // initial setting reset_connection (); }