[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.70 by pcg, Thu Aug 7 19:07:02 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.116 by root, Mon Apr 1 03:10:26 2019 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013,2016 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
33		33
34	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
35	#include <queue>	35	#include <queue>
36	#include <utility>	36	#include <utility>
37		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
39	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
40	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
42		43
43	#include "conf.h"	44	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	45	#include "slog.h"
		46	#include "crypto.h"
45	#include "device.h"	47	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	48	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	49	#include "connection.h"
		50	#include "hkdf.h"
48		51
49	#include "netcompat.h"	52	#include "netcompat.h"
50		53
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic	54	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
56		55
		56	#define LZF_STATE_ARG 1
57	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	57	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
58	#define HLOG 15	58	#define HLOG 15
59	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	59	#define INIT_HTAB 0
60	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	60	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_d.c"	61	#include "lzf/lzf_d.c"
62		62
63	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	63	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
64		64
65	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	65	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
66	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	66	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
67		67
		68	namespace
		69	{
68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	70	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	71	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
70	{	72	{
71	w.stop ();	73	w.stop ();
72		74
73	if (rs_queue.empty ())	75	if (rs_queue.empty ())
74	return;	76	return;
75		77
76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	78	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
77	if (pid)	79	if (pid)
78	{	80	{
79	w.set (pid);	81	w.set (pid);
80	w.start ();	82	w.start ();
81	}	83	}
82	else	84	else
83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	85	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
84		86
85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	87	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
86	rs_queue.pop ();	88	rs_queue.pop ();
87	}	89	}
		90	};
88		91
89	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	92	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
90	static void	93	static void
91	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	94	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
92	{	95	{
…		…
101		104
102	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	105	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
103		106
104	struct crypto_ctx	107	struct crypto_ctx
105	{	108	{
106	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	109	cipher cctx;
107	HMAC_CTX hctx;	110	hmac hctx;
108		111
109	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	112	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
110	~crypto_ctx ();	113	~crypto_ctx ();
111	};	114	};
112		115
113	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	116	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
114	{	117	{
		118	ecdh_key s;
		119
		120	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		121
		122	{
		123	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		124	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		125
		126	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		127	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		128	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		129	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		130	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		131
		132	hctx.init (mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST ());
		133	}
		134
		135	{
		136	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		137	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		138
		139	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		140	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		141	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		142	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		143	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		144
115	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	145	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (cctx);
116	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	146	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
117	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	147	}
118	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
119	}	148	}
120		149
121	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	150	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
122	{	151	{
123	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	152	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (cctx));
124	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	153	}
		154
		155	static inline void
		156	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		157	{
		158	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		159	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		160	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		161	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		162
		163	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		164	}
		165
		166	static inline bool
		167	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		168	{
		169	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		170
		171	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		172	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		173	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		174	return 0;
		175
		176	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		177	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		178
		179	return 1;
125	}	180	}
126		181
127	static void	182	static void
128	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	183	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
129	{	184	{
130	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	185	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
131		186	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
132	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	187	kdf.extract_done ();
133	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	188	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
134	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
136	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
137	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
138	}	189	}
139		190
140	struct rsa_entry	191	void
		192	connection::generate_auth_data ()
141	{	193	{
142	tstamp expire;	194	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
143	rsaid id;
144	rsachallenge chg;
145	};
146
147	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
148	{
149	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
150
151	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
152	{
153	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
154	{	195	{
155	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	196	// request data
156	{	197	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
157	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	198	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
158		199
159	erase (i);	200	// eventual response data
160	return true;	201	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
161	}
162	}	202	}
163		203
164	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	204	// every use prolongs the expiry
165	cleaner.again ();
166
167	return false;
168	}
169
170	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
171	{
172	rsa_entry e;
173
174	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
176
177	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	205	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
178	e.id = id;
179	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
180
181	push_back (e);
182
183	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
184	cleaner.again ();
185	}
186
187	rsa_cache ()
188	{
189	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
190	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
191	}
192
193	} rsa_cache;
194
195	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
196	{
197	if (empty ())
198	w.stop ();
199	else
200	{
201	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
202	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
203	i = erase (i);
204	else
205	++i;
206	}
207	}	206	}
208		207
209	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	208	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
210		209
211	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	210	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
225	delete p;	224	delete p;
226		225
227	delete [] queue;	226	delete [] queue;
228	}	227	}
229		228
		229	void
230	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	230	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
231	{	231	{
232	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	232	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
233		233
234	for (;;)	234	for (;;)
235	{	235	{
…		…
246		246
247	delete get ();	247	delete get ();
248	}	248	}
249	}	249	}
250		250
		251	void
251	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	252	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
252	{	253	{
253	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
254		255
255	// start expiry timer	256	// start expiry timer
256	if (empty ())	257	if (empty ())
…		…
265	queue[i].tstamp = now;	266	queue[i].tstamp = now;
266		267
267	i = ni;	268	i = ni;
268	}	269	}
269		270
270	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	271	net_packet *
		272	pkt_queue::get ()
271	{	273	{
272	if (empty ())	274	if (empty ())
273	return 0;	275	return 0;
274		276
275	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	277	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
299		301
300	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	302	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
301	bool can (u32 host);	303	bool can (u32 host);
302	};	304	};
303		305
304	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	306	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
305		307
		308	bool
306	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	309	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
307	{	310	{
308	iterator i;	311	iterator i;
309		312
310	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	313	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
311	if (i->host == host)	314	if (i->host == host)
…		…
356	}	359	}
357	}	360	}
358		361
359	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	362	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
360		363
361	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	364	void
362
363	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	365	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx ctx, u8 hmac_digest)
364	{	366	{
365	unsigned int xlen;	367	ctx->hctx.init ();
366		368	ctx->hctx.add (((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
367	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	369	ctx->hctx.digest (hmac_digest);
368
369	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);
370	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
371	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
372	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
373	}	370	}
374		371
375	void	372	void
376	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	373	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
377	{	374	{
378	hmac_gen (ctx);	375	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
379		376	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
380	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	377	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
381	}	378	}
382		379
383	bool	380	bool
384	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	381	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
385	{	382	{
386	hmac_gen (ctx);	383	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
387		384	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
388	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	385	return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
389	}	386	}
390		387
		388	void
391	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	389	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
392	{	390	{
393	type = type_;	391	type = type_;
394		392
395	int src = THISNODE->id;	393	int src = THISNODE->id;
396		394
…		…
398	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);	396	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);
399	dst1 = dst;	397	dst1 = dst;
400	}	398	}
401		399
402	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	400	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
403	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
404		401
405	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	402	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		403	{
		404	u32 ctr; // seqno
		405	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA];
		406
		407	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		408	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		409
		410	private:
		411	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
406	{	412	{
407	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno	413	// the distance from beginning of packet to data member
408		414	return data - at (0);
409	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
410	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
411	private:
412
413	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
414	{
415	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
416	}
417	};	415	}
		416	};
		417
		418	// expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV
		419	static unsigned char *
		420	expand_iv (u32 ctr)
		421	{
		422	static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4];
		423
		424	require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4);
		425	require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0);
		426
		427	iv[0] =
		428	iv[1] =
		429	iv[2] = ctr;
		430
		431	// I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues,
		432	// but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok,
		433	// and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise
		434	// to 0.
		435	iv[3] = 0;
		436
		437	return (unsigned char *)iv;
		438	}
418		439
419	void	440	void
420	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	441	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
421	{	442	{
422	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	443	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->octx->cctx;
423	int outl = 0, outl2;	444	int outl = 0, outl2;
424	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;	445	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
425		446
426	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	447	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
427	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	448	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
428		449
429	if (conn->features & ENABLE_COMPRESSION)	450	if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
430	{	451	{
		452	static LZF_STATE lzf_state;
431	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);	453	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7, lzf_state);
432		454
433	if (cl)	455	if (cl)
434	{	456	{
435	type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;	457	type = PT_DATA_COMPRESSED;
436	d = cdata;	458	d = cdata;
…		…
440	d[1] = cl;	462	d[1] = cl;
441	}	463	}
442	}	464	}
443	#endif	465	#endif
444		466
		467	ctr = htonl (seqno);
		468
445	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	469	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
446
447	struct {
448	#if RAND_SIZE
449	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
450	#endif
451	u32 seqno;
452	} datahdr;
453
454	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
455	#if RAND_SIZE
456	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
457	#endif
458		470
459	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	471	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
460	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	472	(unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2,
461	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	473	(unsigned char *)d, l));
462	outl += outl2;	474	outl += outl2;
463		475
464	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	476	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
465	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	477	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2));
466	(unsigned char *) d, l));
467	outl += outl2;	478	outl += outl2;
468		479
469	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
470	outl += outl2;
471
472	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();	480	len = data_hdr_size () + outl;
473		481
474	set_hdr (type, dst);	482	set_hdr (type, dst);
475		483
476	hmac_set (conn->octx);	484	hmac_set (conn->octx);
477	}	485	}
478		486
479	tap_packet *	487	tap_packet *
480	vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno)	488	vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno)
481	{	489	{
482	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx;	490	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->ictx->cctx;
483	int outl = 0, outl2;	491	int outl = 0, outl2;
484	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	492	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
485	u8 *d;	493	u8 *d;
486	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
487		494
		495	seqno = ntohl (ctr);
		496
488	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	497	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
489		498
490	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	499	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
491	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	500	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
492		501
493	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	502	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
494	d = cdata;	503	d = cdata;
495	else	504	else
496	#endif	505	#endif
497	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	506	d = &(*p)[6 + 6];
498		507
499	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	508	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
500	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	509	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
501	d, &outl2,	510	d, &outl2,
502	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	511	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
503	outl += outl2;	512	outl += outl2;
504		513
		514	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
505	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));	515	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
506	outl += outl2;	516	outl += outl2;
507		517
508	seqno = ntohl ((u32 )(d + RAND_SIZE));
509
510	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);	518	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
511	id2mac (src (), p->src);	519	id2mac (src (), p->src);
512		520
513	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	521	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
514	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	522	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
515	{	523	{
516	u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) \| d[DATAHDR + 1];	524	u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) \| d[1];
517		525
518	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0,	526	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0,
519	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)	527	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)
520	+ 6 + 6;	528	+ 6 + 6;
521	}	529	}
522	else	530	else
523	p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR);	531	p->len = outl + (6 + 6);
524	#endif	532	#endif
525		533
526	return p;	534	return p;
527	}	535	}
528		536
…		…
535	}	543	}
536	};	544	};
537		545
538	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	546	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
539	{	547	{
540	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	548	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
541	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
542	// hmacs simply will not work.
543	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	549	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
544	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	550	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
545	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	551	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
546		552
547	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	553	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
548	bool chk_config () const;	554	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
549		555
550	static u8 get_features ()	556	static u8 get_features ()
551	{	557	{
552	u8 f = 0;	558	u8 f = 0;
553	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	559	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
561	#endif	567	#endif
562	return f;	568	return f;
563	}	569	}
564	};	570	};
565		571
		572	void
566	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	573	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
567	{	574	{
568	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	575	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
569	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	576	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
570	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
571	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
572	flags = 0;	577	flags = 0;
573	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
574	features = get_features ();	578	features = get_features ();
575		579
		580	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		581
576	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	582	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
577	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
578	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	583	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		584	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
579		585
580	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	586	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
581	set_hdr (type, dst);	587	set_hdr (type, dst);
582	}	588	}
583		589
584	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	590	bool
		591	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
585	{	592	{
586	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	593	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
587	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	594	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
588	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	595	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
590	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
591	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
592	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
593	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
594	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	596	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
595	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	597	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
596	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	598	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
597	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
598	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	599	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
599	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	600	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		601	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		602	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		603	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		604	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
600	else	605	else
		606	{
		607	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		608
		609	if (cmp > 0)
		610	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		611	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		612	else if (cmp == 0)
601	return true;	613	return true;
		614	}
602		615
603	return false;	616	return false;
604	}	617	}
605		618
606	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	619	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
607	{	620	{
608	char magic[8];	621	char magic[8];
609	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	622	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
610	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	623	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
611	u8 pad2, pad3;	624	u8 pad2, pad3;
612	rsaid id;	625	auth_encr encr;
613	rsaencrdata encr;
614		626
615	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	627	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
616	{	628	{
617	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	629	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
618	strncpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);	630	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
619	initiate = !!initiate_;	631	initiate = !!initiate_;
620	protocols = protocols_;	632	protocols = protocols_;
621		633
622	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	634	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
623	}	635	}
624	};	636	};
625		637
626	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	638	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
627	{	639	{
628	rsaid id;
629	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
630	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
631	rsaresponse response;	640	auth_response response;
632		641
633	auth_res_packet (int dst)	642	auth_res_packet (int dst)
634	{	643	{
635	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	644	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
636		645
637	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	646	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
638	}	647	}
639	};	648	};
640		649
…		…
670	};	679	};
671		680
672	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	681	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
673		682
674	void	683	void
675	connection::connection_established ()	684	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
676	{	685	{
677	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	686	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		687	return;
678		688
679	if (ictx && octx)	689	si = rsi;
		690	protocol = rsi.prot;
		691
		692	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		693	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		694	vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		695	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		696
		697	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		698	{
		699	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		700	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		701	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
680	{	702	}
		703
		704	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		705	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		706
		707	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		708	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		709
681	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	710	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
682	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);	711	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
683	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);	712	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		713
		714	hmac_error = 0.;
		715
684	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);	716	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
685		717
686	// send queued packets	718	// send queued packets
687	if (ictx && octx)
688	{
689	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())	719	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
690	{	720	{
691	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	721	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
692	delete p;	722	delete p;
693	}	723	}
694		724
695	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())	725	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
696	{	726	{
697	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);	727	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
698	delete p;	728	delete p;
699	}
700	}
701	}	729	}
		730
		731	vpn->connection_established (this);
		732	}
		733
		734	void
		735	connection::reset_si ()
		736	{
		737	if (vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
		738	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->connectable_protocols ());
702	else	739	else
703	{	740	{
704	retry_cnt = 0;
705	establish_connection.start (5);
706	keepalive.stop ();
707	rekey.stop ();
708	}
709	}
710
711	void
712	connection::reset_si ()
713	{
714	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->protocols);
715
716	// mask out protocols we cannot establish
717	if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4;
718	if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4;
719	if (!conf->dns_port) protocol &= ~PROT_DNSv4;
720
721	if (protocol
722	&& (!conf->can_direct (THISNODE)
723	\|\| !THISNODE->can_direct (conf)))
724	{
725	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: direct connection denied"), conf->nodename);	741	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
726	protocol = 0;	742	protocol = 0;
727	}	743	}
728		744
729	si.set (conf, protocol);	745	si.set (conf, protocol);
730	}	746	}
…		…
733	const sockinfo &	749	const sockinfo &
734	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const	750	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
735	{	751	{
736	if (!si.valid ())	752	if (!si.valid ())
737	{	753	{
738	connection *r = vpn->find_router ();	754	connection *r = vpn->find_router_for (this);
739		755
740	if (r)	756	if (r)
741	{	757	{
742	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s (%s)"),	758	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying to route through %s."),
743	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename, (const char *)r->si);	759	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename);
744	return r->si;	760	return r->si;
745	}	761	}
746	else	762	else
747	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol"),	763	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol or no router available."),
748	conf->nodename);	764	conf->nodename);
749	}	765	}
750		766
751	return si;	767	return si;
752	}	768	}
753		769
754	void	770	void
755	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)	771	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
756	{	772	{
757	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))	773	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
758	reset_connection ();	774	reset_connection ("packet send error");
759	}	775	}
760		776
761	void	777	void
762	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)	778	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
763	{	779	{
764	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	780	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
765		781
766	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	782	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
		783
		784	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	785	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
768		786
769	delete pkt;	787	delete pkt;
770	}	788	}
771		789
…		…
786	void	804	void
787	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	805	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
788	{	806	{
789	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	807	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
790		808
791	rsachallenge chg;	809	generate_auth_data ();
792	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
793	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	810	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
794		811
795	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	812	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
796
797	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	813	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
798		814
799	delete pkt;	815	delete pkt;
800	}	816	}
801		817
802	void	818	void
803	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	819	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
804	{	820	{
805	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	821	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
806		822
807	pkt->id = id;	823	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
		824	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
808		825
809	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
810
811	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
812
813	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	826	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
814
815	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	827	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
816		828
817	delete pkt;	829	delete pkt;
818	}	830	}
819		831
820	void	832	void
821	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	833	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
822	{	834	{
823	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s)",	835	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
824	conf->id, rid, (const char *)rsi);	836	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		837	conf->protocols);
825		838
826	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	839	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
827		840
828	r->hmac_set (octx);	841	r->hmac_set (octx);
829	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	842	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
832	}	845	}
833		846
834	inline void	847	inline void
835	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	848	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
836	{	849	{
837	if (!ictx	850	if (!(ictx && octx)
838	&& conf != THISNODE	851	&& conf != THISNODE
839	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	852	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	853	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
841	&& !w.is_active ())	854	&& !w.is_active ())
842	{	855	{
843	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection	856	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
844	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.	857	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
845	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())	858	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
846	{	859	{
847	reset_connection ();	860	reset_connection ("no demand");
848	return;	861	return;
849	}	862	}
850		863
851	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();	864	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
852		865
…		…
854	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1	867	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
855	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));	868	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
856		869
857	reset_si ();	870	reset_si ();
858		871
859	bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW;	872	bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) \|\| (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power);
860		873
861	if (si.prot && !si.host)	874	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
862	{	875	{
863	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: connection request (indirect)"), conf->nodename);
864	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */	876	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
865	w.start (1);	877	w.start (1);
866	vpn->send_connect_request (conf->id);	878	vpn->send_connect_request (this);
867	}	879	}
868	else	880	else
869	{	881	{
870	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: connection request (direct)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	882	if (si.valid ())
		883	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: sending direct connection request to %s."),
		884	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
871		885
872	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);	886	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);
873		887
874	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);	888	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
875		889
876	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))	890	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
877	{	891	{
878	if (retry_cnt < 4)	892	// use ping after the first few retries
		893	// TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
		894	// TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
		895	if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power))
879	send_auth_request (dsi, true);	896	send_auth_request (dsi, true);
880	else	897	else
881	send_ping (dsi, 0);	898	send_ping (dsi, 0);
882	}	899	}
883	}	900	}
884		901
885	retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9;	902	retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
886		903
887	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)	904	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
888	retry_cnt++;	905	retry_cnt++;
889	else	906	else
890	retry_int = conf->max_retry;	907	retry_int = conf->max_retry;
…		…
892	w.start (retry_int);	909	w.start (retry_int);
893	}	910	}
894	}	911	}
895		912
896	void	913	void
897	connection::reset_connection ()	914	connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
898	{	915	{
899	if (ictx && octx)	916	if (ictx && octx)
900	{	917	{
901	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"),	918	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
902	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	919	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
903		920
904	if (::conf.script_node_down)	921	if (::conf.script_node_down)
905	{	922	{
906	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;	923	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
907	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);	924	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
…		…
909	}	926	}
910	}	927	}
911		928
912	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	929	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
913	delete octx; octx = 0;	930	delete octx; octx = 0;
914	#if ENABLE_DNS
915	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
916	#endif
917		931
918	si.host = 0;	932	si.host = 0;
919		933
		934	have_snd_auth = false;
		935	have_rcv_auth = false;
		936	auth_expire = 0.;
		937
920	last_activity = 0;	938	last_activity = 0.;
		939	//last_si_change = 0.;
921	retry_cnt = 0;	940	retry_cnt = 0;
922		941
923	rekey.stop ();	942	rekey.stop ();
924	keepalive.stop ();	943	keepalive.stop ();
925	establish_connection.stop ();	944	establish_connection.stop ();
…		…
929	connection::shutdown ()	948	connection::shutdown ()
930	{	949	{
931	if (ictx && octx)	950	if (ictx && octx)
932	send_reset (si);	951	send_reset (si);
933		952
934	reset_connection ();	953	reset_connection ("shutdown");
935	}	954	}
936		955
		956	// poor-man's rekeying
937	inline void	957	inline void
938	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	958	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
939	{	959	{
940	reset_connection ();	960	reset_connection ("rekeying");
941	establish_connection ();	961	establish_connection ();
942	}	962	}
943		963
944	void	964	void
945	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)	965	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
…		…
962		982
963	void	983	void
964	connection::post_inject_queue ()	984	connection::post_inject_queue ()
965	{	985	{
966	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)	986	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
967	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary	987	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
968	establish_connection.stop ();	988	establish_connection.stop ();
969		989
970	establish_connection ();	990	establish_connection ();
971	}	991	}
972		992
…		…
980	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1000	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
981	post_inject_queue ();	1001	post_inject_queue ();
982	}	1002	}
983	}	1003	}
984		1004
		1005	void
985	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1006	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
986	{	1007	{
987	if (ictx && octx)	1008	if (ictx && octx)
988	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1009	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
989	else	1010	else
990	{	1011	{
…		…
996	void	1017	void
997	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1018	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
998	{	1019	{
999	last_activity = ev_now ();	1020	last_activity = ev_now ();
1000		1021
1001	slog (L_NOISE, "<<%d received packet type %d from %d to %d",	1022	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1002	conf->id, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1023	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1003		1024
1004	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1025	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1005	return;	1026	return;
1006		1027
1007	switch (pkt->typ ())	1028	switch (pkt->typ ())
1008	{	1029	{
1009	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:	1030	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:
		1031	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
		1032
1010	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,	1033	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
1011	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection	1034	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
1012	// when we receive a ping.	1035	// when we receive a ping.
1013	if (!ictx)	1036	if (!ictx)
1014	{	1037	{
1015	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1038	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1016	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1039	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1017	}	1040	}
1018	else	1041	else
		1042	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
		1043	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1019	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1044	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1020		1045
1021	break;	1046	break;
1022		1047
1023	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1048	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
		1049	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1050
		1051	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1052	// about our desire for communication.
		1053	establish_connection ();
1024	break;	1054	break;
1025		1055
1026	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1056	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
		1057	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
		1058
		1059	if (ictx && octx)
1027	{	1060	{
1028	reset_connection ();	1061	reset_connection ("remote reset");
1029		1062
1030	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1063	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1031		1064
1032	if (!p->chk_config ())	1065	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1033	{
1034	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node"),
1035	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1036	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1037	}
1038	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1039	establish_connection ();	1066	establish_connection ();
1040	}	1067	}
		1068
1041	break;	1069	break;
1042		1070
1043	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1071	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1044	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1072	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1045	{	1073	{
1046	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1074	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1047		1075
1048	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate);	1076	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1077	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1078	p->protocols, p->features);
1049		1079
1050	if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))	1080	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1081	{
		1082	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1083	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1084	}
		1085	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1051	{	1086	{
1052	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1087	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1053	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1088	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1054	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1089	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1055	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1090	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1056		1091
1057	if (p->initiate)	1092	if (p->initiate)
		1093	{
1058	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1094	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1059		1095
1060	rsachallenge k;	1096	if (ictx && octx)
		1097	reset_connection ("reconnect");
		1098	}
1061		1099
		1100	auth_data auth;
		1101
1062	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1102	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1063	{	1103	{
1064	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1104	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1065	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1105	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1066	break;
1067	}	1106	}
1068	else	1107	else
1069	{	1108	{
1070	delete octx;	1109	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1071		1110
1072	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1111	rcv_auth = auth;
1073	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1112	have_rcv_auth = true;
1074		1113
		1114	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1115
		1116	if (chg)
		1117	{
1075	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1118	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1076	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1119	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1077		1120
1078	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1079
1080	connection_established ();	1121	connection_established (rsi);
1081
1082	break;	1122	}
1083	}	1123	}
		1124
		1125	break;
1084	}	1126	}
1085	else
1086	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch"),
1087	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1088		1127
1089	send_reset (rsi);	1128	send_reset (rsi);
1090	}	1129	}
1091		1130
1092	break;	1131	break;
1093		1132
1094	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:	1133	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:
1095	{	1134	{
1096	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet ) pkt;	1135	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1097		1136
1098	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id);	1137	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1099		1138
1100	if (p->chk_config ())	1139	auth_mac local_mac;
		1140	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1141
		1142	if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1101	{	1143	{
1102	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1103	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1104	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1105	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1106
1107	rsachallenge chg;
1108
1109	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1110	{
1111	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response ignored"),	1144	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1112	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1145	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1113	break;
1114	}	1146	}
1115	else	1147	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1116	{	1148	{
1117	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1149	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1118		1150
1119	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))	1151	have_snd_auth = true;
1120	{
1121	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1122	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"),
1123	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1124	break;
1125	}
1126	else
1127	{
1128	rsaresponse h;
1129
1130	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1131
1132	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1133	{
1134	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1135
1136	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1137
1138	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1139
1140	si = rsi;
1141	protocol = rsi.prot;
1142
1143	connection_established ();	1152	connection_established (rsi);
1144
1145	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established, protocol version %d.%d"),
1146	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1147	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1148
1149	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1150	{
1151	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1152	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1153	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1154	}
1155
1156	break;
1157	}
1158	else
1159	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match"),
1160	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1161	}
1162
1163	delete cctx;
1164	}
1165	}	1153	}
1166	}	1154	}
1167
1168	send_reset (rsi);
1169	break;	1155	break;
1170		1156
1171	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1157	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1172	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1158	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1173	send_reset (rsi);	1159	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1179	if (ictx && octx)	1165	if (ictx && octx)
1180	{	1166	{
1181	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;	1167	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;
1182		1168
1183	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))	1169	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
		1170	{
		1171	// rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
		1172	// we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
		1173	// and suppress messages and resets during that time.
		1174	//TODO: should be done per source address
		1175	if (!hmac_error)
		1176	{
		1177	hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
		1178	break;
		1179	}
		1180	else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
		1181	break; // silently suppress
		1182	else
		1183	{
1184	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"	1184	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1185	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"),	1185	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1186	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1186	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1187	// reset
		1188	}
		1189	}
1187	else	1190	else
1188	{	1191	{
1189	u32 seqno;	1192	u32 seqno;
1190	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);	1193	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
		1194	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1191		1195
1192	if (iseqno.recv_ok (seqno))	1196	hmac_error = 0;
		1197
		1198	if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1193	{	1199	{
1194	vpn->tap->send (d);	1200	vpn->tap->send (d);
1195		1201
1196	if (si != rsi)	1202	if (si != rsi)
1197	{	1203	{
1198	// fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip	1204	// fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip
		1205	//if (last_si_change < ev_now () + 5.)
1199	si = rsi;	1206	// {
1200
1201	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s"),	1207	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),
1202	conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);	1208	conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);
		1209
		1210	si = rsi;
		1211
		1212	if (::conf.script_node_change)
		1213	{
		1214	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		1215	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_change> (this);
		1216	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-change command execution failed, continuing."));
		1217	}
		1218
		1219	// }
		1220	//else
		1221	// slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),
		1222	// conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);
1203	}	1223	}
		1224	}
		1225	else if (seqclass == 1) // far history
		1226	slog (L_ERR, _("received very old packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1227	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication/delay, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1228	else if (seqclass == 2) // in-window duplicate, happens often on wireless
		1229	slog (L_DEBUG, _("received recent duplicated packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1230	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1231	else if (seqclass == 3) // reset
		1232	{
		1233	slog (L_ERR, _("received out-of-sync (far future) packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1234	"probably just massive packet loss, sending reset."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1235	send_reset (rsi);
1204	}	1236	}
1205		1237
1206	delete d;	1238	delete d;
1207	break;	1239	break;
1208	}	1240	}
…		…
1212	break;	1244	break;
1213		1245
1214	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:	1246	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:
1215	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1247	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1216	{	1248	{
1217	connect_req_packet p = (connect_req_packet ) pkt;	1249	connect_req_packet p = (connect_req_packet )pkt;
1218		1250
1219	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1251	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1220	{	1252	{
1221	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1253	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1222	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1254	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1223		1255
1224	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]",	1256	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
		1257	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1258	p->protocols,
1225	conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx);	1259	c->ictx && c->octx);
1226		1260
1227	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1261	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1228	{	1262	{
1229	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1263	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1230	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1264	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1253		1287
1254	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1288	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1255	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1289	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1256	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1290	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1257		1291
1258	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)",	1292	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1259	conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1293	conf->nodename,
		1294	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1295	(const char *)p->si,
		1296	p->protocols,
		1297	protocol,
		1298	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
		1299	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1260		1300
1261	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1301	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1262		1302
1263	if (dsi.valid ())	1303	if (dsi.valid ())
1264	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1304	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1305	else
		1306	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1307	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1308	(const char *)p->si);
1265	}	1309	}
1266	else	1310	else
1267	slog (L_WARN,	1311	slog (L_WARN,
1268	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1312	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1269	p->id);	1313	p->id);
…		…
1278	}	1322	}
1279		1323
1280	inline void	1324	inline void
1281	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1325	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1282	{	1326	{
1283	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30)	1327	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1328
		1329	if (when >= 0)
		1330	w.start (when);
		1331	else if (when < -15)
1284	{	1332	{
1285	reset_connection ();	1333	reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1286	establish_connection ();	1334	establish_connection ();
1287	}	1335	}
1288	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1289	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1290	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1336	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1291	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1337	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1292	{	1338	{
		1339	w.start (3);
1293	send_ping (si);	1340	send_ping (si);
1294	w.start (5);
1295	}	1341	}
1296	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1342	else if (when >= -10)
1297	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1343	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1298	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1344	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1299	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1345	w.start (when + 10);
1300	else	1346	else
1301	reset_connection ();	1347	reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1302	}	1348	}
1303		1349
		1350	void
1304	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1351	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1305	{	1352	{
1306	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1353	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1307		1354
1308	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d)", conf->id, id);	1355	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
		1356	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1357	THISNODE->protocols);
1309	p->hmac_set (octx);	1358	p->hmac_set (octx);
1310	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1359	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1311		1360
1312	delete p;	1361	delete p;
1313	}	1362	}
1314		1363
		1364	void
1315	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1365	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1316	{	1366	{
1317	char *env;	1367	char *env;
1318	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1368	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1319	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1369	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1320	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1370	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1321	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1371	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1322	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1372	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1323	}	1373	}
1324		1374
		1375	void
1325	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1376	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1326	{	1377	{
1327	vpn->script_init_env ();	1378	vpn->script_init_env ();
1328		1379
1329	char *env;	1380	char *env;
1330	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1381	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
		1382	asprintf (&env, "DESTSI=%s", (const char *)si); putenv (env);
1331	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1383	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1332	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);	1384	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);
1333	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);	1385	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);
1334	}	1386	}
1335		1387
1336	inline const char *	1388	inline const char *
1337	connection::script_node_up ()	1389	connection::script_node_up ()
1338	{	1390	{
…		…
1348		1400
1349	return filename;	1401	return filename;
1350	}	1402	}
1351		1403
1352	inline const char *	1404	inline const char *
		1405	connection::script_node_change ()
		1406	{
		1407	script_init_connect_env ();
		1408
		1409	putenv ((char *)"STATE=change");
		1410
		1411	char *filename;
		1412	asprintf (&filename,
		1413	"%s/%s",
		1414	confbase,
		1415	::conf.script_node_change ? ::conf.script_node_change : "node-change");
		1416
		1417	return filename;
		1418	}
		1419
		1420	inline const char *
1353	connection::script_node_down ()	1421	connection::script_node_down ()
1354	{	1422	{
1355	script_init_connect_env ();	1423	script_init_connect_env ();
1356		1424
1357	putenv ((char *)"STATE=down");	1425	putenv ((char *)"STATE=down");
…		…
1368	connection::connection (struct vpn vpn, conf_node conf)	1436	connection::connection (struct vpn vpn, conf_node conf)
1369	: vpn(vpn), conf(conf),	1437	: vpn(vpn), conf(conf),
1370	#if ENABLE_DNS	1438	#if ENABLE_DNS
1371	dns (0),	1439	dns (0),
1372	#endif	1440	#endif
1373	data_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue),	1441	data_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue + 1),
1374	vpn_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue)	1442	vpn_queue(conf->max_ttl, conf->max_queue + 1)
1375	{	1443	{
1376	rekey .set<connection, &connection::rekey_cb > (this);	1444	rekey .set<connection, &connection::rekey_cb > (this);
1377	keepalive .set<connection, &connection::keepalive_cb > (this);	1445	keepalive .set<connection, &connection::keepalive_cb > (this);
1378	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1446	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1379		1447
1380	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1448	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1381	octx = ictx = 0;	1449	octx = ictx = 0;
1382		1450
1383	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1384	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1385
1386	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1451	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1387		1452
1388	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1453	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1389	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1454	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1390	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1455	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1391		1456
1392	reset_connection ();	1457	reset_connection ("startup");
1393	}	1458	}
1394		1459
1395	connection::~connection ()	1460	connection::~connection ()
1396	{	1461	{
1397	shutdown ();	1462	shutdown ();
1398	}	1463	}
1399		1464
		1465	void
1400	void connection_init ()	1466	connection_init ()
1401	{	1467	{
1402	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1468	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1403	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1469	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1404	}	1470	}
1405		1471

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.70 by pcg, Thu Aug 7 19:07:02 2008 UTC vs. Revision 1.116 by root, Mon Apr 1 03:10:26 2019 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.70 by pcg, Thu Aug 7 19:07:02 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.116 by root, Mon Apr 1 03:10:26 2019 UTC