[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.72 by pcg, Fri Aug 8 16:48:00 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.115 by root, Thu Jun 30 16:31:00 2016 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013,2016 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
33		33
34	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
35	#include <queue>	35	#include <queue>
36	#include <utility>	36	#include <utility>
37		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
39	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
40	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
42		43
43	#include "conf.h"	44	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	45	#include "slog.h"
		46	#include "crypto.h"
45	#include "device.h"	47	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	48	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	49	#include "connection.h"
		50	#include "hkdf.h"
48		51
49	#include "netcompat.h"	52	#include "netcompat.h"
50		53
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic	54	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
56		55
57	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	56	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
58	#define HLOG 15	57	#define HLOG 15
59	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	58	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
60	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	59	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
63	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	62	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
64		63
65	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	64	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
66	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	65	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
67		66
		67	namespace
		68	{
68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
70	{	71	{
71	w.stop ();	72	w.stop ();
72		73
73	if (rs_queue.empty ())	74	if (rs_queue.empty ())
74	return;	75	return;
75		76
76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
77	if (pid)	78	if (pid)
78	{	79	{
79	w.set (pid);	80	w.set (pid);
80	w.start ();	81	w.start ();
81	}	82	}
82	else	83	else
83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
84		85
85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
86	rs_queue.pop ();	87	rs_queue.pop ();
87	}	88	}
		89	};
88		90
89	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	91	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
90	static void	92	static void
91	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	93	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
92	{	94	{
…		…
101		103
102	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	104	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
103		105
104	struct crypto_ctx	106	struct crypto_ctx
105	{	107	{
106	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	108	cipher cctx;
107	HMAC_CTX hctx;	109	hmac hctx;
108		110
109	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	111	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
110	~crypto_ctx ();	112	~crypto_ctx ();
111	};	113	};
112		114
113	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	115	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
114	{	116	{
		117	ecdh_key s;
		118
		119	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		120
		121	{
		122	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		123	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		124
		125	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		126	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		127	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		128	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		129	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		130
		131	hctx.init (mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST ());
		132	}
		133
		134	{
		135	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		136	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		137
		138	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		139	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		140	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		141	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		142	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		143
115	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	144	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (cctx);
116	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	145	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
117	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	146	}
118	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
119	}	147	}
120		148
121	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	149	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
122	{	150	{
123	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	151	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (cctx));
124	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	152	}
		153
		154	static inline void
		155	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		156	{
		157	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		158	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		159	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		160	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		161
		162	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		163	}
		164
		165	static inline bool
		166	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		167	{
		168	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		169
		170	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		171	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		172	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		173	return 0;
		174
		175	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		176	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		177
		178	return 1;
125	}	179	}
126		180
127	static void	181	static void
128	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	182	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
129	{	183	{
130	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	184	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
131		185	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
132	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	186	kdf.extract_done ();
133	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	187	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
134	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
136	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
137	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
138	}	188	}
139		189
140	struct rsa_entry	190	void
		191	connection::generate_auth_data ()
141	{	192	{
142	tstamp expire;	193	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
143	rsaid id;
144	rsachallenge chg;
145	};
146
147	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
148	{
149	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
150
151	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
152	{
153	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
154	{	194	{
155	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	195	// request data
156	{	196	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
157	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	197	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
158		198
159	erase (i);	199	// eventual response data
160	return true;	200	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
161	}
162	}	201	}
163		202
164	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	203	// every use prolongs the expiry
165	cleaner.again ();
166
167	return false;
168	}
169
170	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
171	{
172	rsa_entry e;
173
174	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
176
177	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	204	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
178	e.id = id;
179	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
180
181	push_back (e);
182
183	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
184	cleaner.again ();
185	}
186
187	rsa_cache ()
188	{
189	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
190	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
191	}
192
193	} rsa_cache;
194
195	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
196	{
197	if (empty ())
198	w.stop ();
199	else
200	{
201	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
202	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
203	i = erase (i);
204	else
205	++i;
206	}
207	}	205	}
208		206
209	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	207	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
210		208
211	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	209	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
225	delete p;	223	delete p;
226		224
227	delete [] queue;	225	delete [] queue;
228	}	226	}
229		227
		228	void
230	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	229	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
231	{	230	{
232	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	231	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
233		232
234	for (;;)	233	for (;;)
235	{	234	{
…		…
246		245
247	delete get ();	246	delete get ();
248	}	247	}
249	}	248	}
250		249
		250	void
251	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	251	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
252	{	252	{
253	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	253	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
254		254
255	// start expiry timer	255	// start expiry timer
256	if (empty ())	256	if (empty ())
…		…
265	queue[i].tstamp = now;	265	queue[i].tstamp = now;
266		266
267	i = ni;	267	i = ni;
268	}	268	}
269		269
270	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	270	net_packet *
		271	pkt_queue::get ()
271	{	272	{
272	if (empty ())	273	if (empty ())
273	return 0;	274	return 0;
274		275
275	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
299		300
300	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
301	bool can (u32 host);	302	bool can (u32 host);
302	};	303	};
303		304
304	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	305	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
305		306
		307	bool
306	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	308	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
307	{	309	{
308	iterator i;	310	iterator i;
309		311
310	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	312	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
311	if (i->host == host)	313	if (i->host == host)
…		…
356	}	358	}
357	}	359	}
358		360
359	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	361	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
360		362
361	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	363	void
362
363	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	364	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx ctx, u8 hmac_digest)
364	{	365	{
365	unsigned int xlen;	366	ctx->hctx.init ();
366		367	ctx->hctx.add (((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
367	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	368	ctx->hctx.digest (hmac_digest);
368
369	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);
370	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
371	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));
372	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
373	}	369	}
374		370
375	void	371	void
376	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	372	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
377	{	373	{
378	hmac_gen (ctx);	374	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
379		375	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
380	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	376	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
381	}	377	}
382		378
383	bool	379	bool
384	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	380	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
385	{	381	{
386	hmac_gen (ctx);	382	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
387		383	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
388	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	384	return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
389	}	385	}
390		386
		387	void
391	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	388	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
392	{	389	{
393	type = type_;	390	type = type_;
394		391
395	int src = THISNODE->id;	392	int src = THISNODE->id;
396		393
…		…
398	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);	395	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);
399	dst1 = dst;	396	dst1 = dst;
400	}	397	}
401		398
402	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	399	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
403	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
404		400
405	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	401	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		402	{
		403	u32 ctr; // seqno
		404	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA];
		405
		406	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		407	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		408
		409	private:
		410	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
406	{	411	{
407	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno	412	// the distance from beginning of packet to data member
408		413	return data - at (0);
409	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
410	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
411	private:
412
413	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
414	{
415	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
416	}
417	};	414	}
		415	};
		416
		417	// expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV
		418	static unsigned char *
		419	expand_iv (u32 ctr)
		420	{
		421	static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4];
		422
		423	require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4);
		424	require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0);
		425
		426	iv[0] =
		427	iv[1] =
		428	iv[2] = ctr;
		429
		430	// I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues,
		431	// but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok,
		432	// and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise
		433	// to 0.
		434	iv[3] = 0;
		435
		436	return (unsigned char *)iv;
		437	}
418		438
419	void	439	void
420	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	440	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
421	{	441	{
422	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	442	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->octx->cctx;
423	int outl = 0, outl2;	443	int outl = 0, outl2;
424	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;	444	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
425		445
426	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	446	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
427	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	447	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
428		448
429	if (conn->features & ENABLE_COMPRESSION)	449	if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
430	{	450	{
431	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);	451	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);
432		452
433	if (cl)	453	if (cl)
434	{	454	{
…		…
440	d[1] = cl;	460	d[1] = cl;
441	}	461	}
442	}	462	}
443	#endif	463	#endif
444		464
		465	ctr = htonl (seqno);
		466
445	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	467	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
446
447	struct {
448	#if RAND_SIZE
449	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
450	#endif
451	u32 seqno;
452	} datahdr;
453
454	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
455	#if RAND_SIZE
456	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
457	#endif
458		468
459	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	469	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
460	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	470	(unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2,
461	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	471	(unsigned char *)d, l));
462	outl += outl2;	472	outl += outl2;
463		473
464	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	474	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
465	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	475	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2));
466	(unsigned char *) d, l));
467	outl += outl2;	476	outl += outl2;
468		477
469	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
470	outl += outl2;
471
472	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();	478	len = data_hdr_size () + outl;
473		479
474	set_hdr (type, dst);	480	set_hdr (type, dst);
475		481
476	hmac_set (conn->octx);	482	hmac_set (conn->octx);
477	}	483	}
478		484
479	tap_packet *	485	tap_packet *
480	vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno)	486	vpndata_packet::unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno)
481	{	487	{
482	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx;	488	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = conn->ictx->cctx;
483	int outl = 0, outl2;	489	int outl = 0, outl2;
484	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	490	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
485	u8 *d;	491	u8 *d;
486	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
487		492
		493	seqno = ntohl (ctr);
		494
488	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	495	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
489		496
490	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	497	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
491	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	498	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
492		499
493	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	500	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
494	d = cdata;	501	d = cdata;
495	else	502	else
496	#endif	503	#endif
497	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	504	d = &(*p)[6 + 6];
498		505
499	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	506	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
500	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	507	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
501	d, &outl2,	508	d, &outl2,
502	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	509	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
503	outl += outl2;	510	outl += outl2;
504		511
		512	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
505	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));	513	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
506	outl += outl2;	514	outl += outl2;
507		515
508	seqno = ntohl ((u32 )(d + RAND_SIZE));
509
510	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);	516	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
511	id2mac (src (), p->src);	517	id2mac (src (), p->src);
512		518
513	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	519	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
514	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	520	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
515	{	521	{
516	u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) \| d[DATAHDR + 1];	522	u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) \| d[1];
517		523
518	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0,	524	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0,
519	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)	525	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)
520	+ 6 + 6;	526	+ 6 + 6;
521	}	527	}
522	else	528	else
523	p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR);	529	p->len = outl + (6 + 6);
524	#endif	530	#endif
525		531
526	return p;	532	return p;
527	}	533	}
528		534
…		…
535	}	541	}
536	};	542	};
537		543
538	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	544	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
539	{	545	{
540	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	546	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
541	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
542	// hmacs simply will not work.
543	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	547	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
544	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	548	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
545	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	549	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
546		550
547	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	551	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
548	bool chk_config () const;	552	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
549		553
550	static u8 get_features ()	554	static u8 get_features ()
551	{	555	{
552	u8 f = 0;	556	u8 f = 0;
553	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	557	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
561	#endif	565	#endif
562	return f;	566	return f;
563	}	567	}
564	};	568	};
565		569
		570	void
566	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	571	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
567	{	572	{
568	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	573	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
569	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	574	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
570	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
571	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
572	flags = 0;	575	flags = 0;
573	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
574	features = get_features ();	576	features = get_features ();
575		577
		578	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		579
576	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	580	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
577	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
578	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	581	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		582	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
579		583
580	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	584	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
581	set_hdr (type, dst);	585	set_hdr (type, dst);
582	}	586	}
583		587
584	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	588	bool
		589	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
585	{	590	{
586	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	591	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
587	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	592	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
588	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	593	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
590	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
591	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
592	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
593	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
594	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	594	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
595	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	595	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
596	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	596	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
597	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
598	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	597	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
599	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	598	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		599	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		600	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		601	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		602	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
600	else	603	else
		604	{
		605	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		606
		607	if (cmp > 0)
		608	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		609	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		610	else if (cmp == 0)
601	return true;	611	return true;
		612	}
602		613
603	return false;	614	return false;
604	}	615	}
605		616
606	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	617	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
607	{	618	{
608	char magic[8];	619	char magic[8];
609	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	620	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
610	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	621	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
611	u8 pad2, pad3;	622	u8 pad2, pad3;
612	rsaid id;	623	auth_encr encr;
613	rsaencrdata encr;
614		624
615	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	625	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
616	{	626	{
617	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	627	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
618	strncpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);	628	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
619	initiate = !!initiate_;	629	initiate = !!initiate_;
620	protocols = protocols_;	630	protocols = protocols_;
621		631
622	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	632	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
623	}	633	}
624	};	634	};
625		635
626	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	636	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
627	{	637	{
628	rsaid id;
629	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
630	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
631	rsaresponse response;	638	auth_response response;
632		639
633	auth_res_packet (int dst)	640	auth_res_packet (int dst)
634	{	641	{
635	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	642	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
636		643
637	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	644	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
638	}	645	}
639	};	646	};
640		647
…		…
670	};	677	};
671		678
672	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	679	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
673		680
674	void	681	void
675	connection::connection_established ()	682	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
676	{	683	{
677	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	684	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		685	return;
678		686
679	if (ictx && octx)	687	si = rsi;
		688	protocol = rsi.prot;
		689
		690	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		691	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		692	vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		693	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		694
		695	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		696	{
		697	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		698	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		699	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
680	{	700	}
		701
		702	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		703	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		704
		705	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		706	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		707
681	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	708	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
682	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);	709	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
683	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);	710	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		711
		712	hmac_error = 0.;
		713
684	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);	714	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
685		715
686	// send queued packets	716	// send queued packets
687	if (ictx && octx)
688	{
689	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())	717	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
690	{	718	{
691	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	719	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
692	delete p;	720	delete p;
693	}	721	}
694		722
695	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())	723	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
696	{	724	{
697	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);	725	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
698	delete p;	726	delete p;
699	}
700	}
701	}	727	}
		728
		729	vpn->connection_established (this);
		730	}
		731
		732	void
		733	connection::reset_si ()
		734	{
		735	if (vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
		736	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->connectable_protocols ());
702	else	737	else
703	{	738	{
704	retry_cnt = 0;
705	establish_connection.start (5);
706	keepalive.stop ();
707	rekey.stop ();
708	}
709	}
710
711	void
712	connection::reset_si ()
713	{
714	protocol = best_protocol (THISNODE->protocols & conf->protocols);
715
716	// mask out endpoints we can't connect to
717	if (!conf->udp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_UDPv4;
718	if (!conf->tcp_port) protocol &= ~PROT_TCPv4;
719	if (!conf->dns_port) protocol &= ~PROT_DNSv4;
720
721	if (protocol
722	&& (!conf->can_direct (THISNODE)
723	\|\| !THISNODE->can_direct (conf)))
724	{
725	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: direct connection denied"), conf->nodename);	739	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
726	protocol = 0;	740	protocol = 0;
727	}	741	}
728		742
729	si.set (conf, protocol);	743	si.set (conf, protocol);
730	}	744	}
…		…
733	const sockinfo &	747	const sockinfo &
734	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const	748	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
735	{	749	{
736	if (!si.valid ())	750	if (!si.valid ())
737	{	751	{
738	connection *r = vpn->find_router ();	752	connection *r = vpn->find_router_for (this);
739		753
740	if (r)	754	if (r)
741	{	755	{
742	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying indirectly through %s (%s)"),	756	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: no common protocol, trying to route through %s."),
743	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename, (const char *)r->si);	757	conf->nodename, r->conf->nodename);
744	return r->si;	758	return r->si;
745	}	759	}
746	else	760	else
747	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol, no router"),	761	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: node unreachable, no common protocol or no router available."),
748	conf->nodename);	762	conf->nodename);
749	}	763	}
750		764
751	return si;	765	return si;
752	}	766	}
753		767
754	void	768	void
755	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)	769	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
756	{	770	{
757	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))	771	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
758	reset_connection ();	772	reset_connection ("packet send error");
759	}	773	}
760		774
761	void	775	void
762	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)	776	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
763	{	777	{
764	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	778	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
765		779
766	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	780	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
		781
		782	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	783	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
768		784
769	delete pkt;	785	delete pkt;
770	}	786	}
771		787
…		…
786	void	802	void
787	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	803	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
788	{	804	{
789	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	805	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
790		806
791	rsachallenge chg;	807	generate_auth_data ();
792	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
793	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	808	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
794		809
795	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	810	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
796
797	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	811	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
798		812
799	delete pkt;	813	delete pkt;
800	}	814	}
801		815
802	void	816	void
803	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	817	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
804	{	818	{
805	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	819	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
806		820
807	pkt->id = id;	821	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
		822	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
808		823
809	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
810
811	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
812
813	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si);	824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
814
815	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	825	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
816		826
817	delete pkt;	827	delete pkt;
818	}	828	}
819		829
820	void	830	void
821	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	831	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
822	{	832	{
823	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s)",	833	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
824	conf->id, rid, (const char *)rsi);	834	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		835	conf->protocols);
825		836
826	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	837	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
827		838
828	r->hmac_set (octx);	839	r->hmac_set (octx);
829	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	840	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
832	}	843	}
833		844
834	inline void	845	inline void
835	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	846	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
836	{	847	{
837	if (!ictx	848	if (!(ictx && octx)
838	&& conf != THISNODE	849	&& conf != THISNODE
839	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	850	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	851	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
841	&& !w.is_active ())	852	&& !w.is_active ())
842	{	853	{
843	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection	854	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
844	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.	855	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
845	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())	856	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
846	{	857	{
847	reset_connection ();	858	reset_connection ("no demand");
848	return;	859	return;
849	}	860	}
850		861
851	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();	862	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
852		863
…		…
854	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1	865	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
855	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));	866	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
856		867
857	reset_si ();	868	reset_si ();
858		869
859	bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW;	870	bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) \|\| (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power);
860		871
861	if (si.prot && !si.host)	872	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
862	{	873	{
863	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: connection request (indirect)"), conf->nodename);
864	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */	874	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
865	w.start (1);	875	w.start (1);
866	vpn->send_connect_request (conf->id);	876	vpn->send_connect_request (this);
867	}	877	}
868	else	878	else
869	{	879	{
870	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: connection request (direct)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	880	if (si.valid ())
		881	slog (L_DEBUG, _("%s: sending direct connection request to %s."),
		882	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
871		883
872	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);	884	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (si);
873		885
874	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);	886	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
875		887
876	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))	888	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
877	{	889	{
878	if (retry_cnt < 4)	890	// use ping after the first few retries
		891	// TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
		892	// TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
		893	if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power))
879	send_auth_request (dsi, true);	894	send_auth_request (dsi, true);
880	else	895	else
881	send_ping (dsi, 0);	896	send_ping (dsi, 0);
882	}	897	}
883	}	898	}
884		899
885	retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9;	900	retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
886		901
887	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)	902	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
888	retry_cnt++;	903	retry_cnt++;
889	else	904	else
890	retry_int = conf->max_retry;	905	retry_int = conf->max_retry;
…		…
892	w.start (retry_int);	907	w.start (retry_int);
893	}	908	}
894	}	909	}
895		910
896	void	911	void
897	connection::reset_connection ()	912	connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
898	{	913	{
899	if (ictx && octx)	914	if (ictx && octx)
900	{	915	{
901	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"),	916	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
902	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	917	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
903		918
904	if (::conf.script_node_down)	919	if (::conf.script_node_down)
905	{	920	{
906	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;	921	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
907	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);	922	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
…		…
909	}	924	}
910	}	925	}
911		926
912	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	927	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
913	delete octx; octx = 0;	928	delete octx; octx = 0;
914	#if ENABLE_DNS
915	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
916	#endif
917		929
918	si.host = 0;	930	si.host = 0;
919		931
		932	have_snd_auth = false;
		933	have_rcv_auth = false;
		934	auth_expire = 0.;
		935
920	last_activity = 0;	936	last_activity = 0.;
		937	//last_si_change = 0.;
921	retry_cnt = 0;	938	retry_cnt = 0;
922		939
923	rekey.stop ();	940	rekey.stop ();
924	keepalive.stop ();	941	keepalive.stop ();
925	establish_connection.stop ();	942	establish_connection.stop ();
…		…
929	connection::shutdown ()	946	connection::shutdown ()
930	{	947	{
931	if (ictx && octx)	948	if (ictx && octx)
932	send_reset (si);	949	send_reset (si);
933		950
934	reset_connection ();	951	reset_connection ("shutdown");
935	}	952	}
936		953
		954	// poor-man's rekeying
937	inline void	955	inline void
938	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	956	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
939	{	957	{
940	reset_connection ();	958	reset_connection ("rekeying");
941	establish_connection ();	959	establish_connection ();
942	}	960	}
943		961
944	void	962	void
945	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)	963	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
…		…
962		980
963	void	981	void
964	connection::post_inject_queue ()	982	connection::post_inject_queue ()
965	{	983	{
966	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)	984	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
967	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary	985	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
968	establish_connection.stop ();	986	establish_connection.stop ();
969		987
970	establish_connection ();	988	establish_connection ();
971	}	989	}
972		990
…		…
980	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	998	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
981	post_inject_queue ();	999	post_inject_queue ();
982	}	1000	}
983	}	1001	}
984		1002
		1003	void
985	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1004	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
986	{	1005	{
987	if (ictx && octx)	1006	if (ictx && octx)
988	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1007	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
989	else	1008	else
990	{	1009	{
…		…
996	void	1015	void
997	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1016	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
998	{	1017	{
999	last_activity = ev_now ();	1018	last_activity = ev_now ();
1000		1019
1001	slog (L_NOISE, "<<%d received packet type %d from %d to %d",	1020	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1002	conf->id, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1021	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1003		1022
1004	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1023	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1005	return;	1024	return;
1006		1025
1007	switch (pkt->typ ())	1026	switch (pkt->typ ())
1008	{	1027	{
1009	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:	1028	case vpn_packet::PT_PING:
		1029	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
		1030
1010	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,	1031	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
1011	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection	1032	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
1012	// when we receive a ping.	1033	// when we receive a ping.
1013	if (!ictx)	1034	if (!ictx)
1014	{	1035	{
1015	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1036	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1016	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1037	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1017	}	1038	}
1018	else	1039	else
		1040	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
		1041	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1019	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1042	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1020		1043
1021	break;	1044	break;
1022		1045
1023	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1046	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
		1047	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1048
		1049	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1050	// about our desire for communication.
		1051	establish_connection ();
1024	break;	1052	break;
1025		1053
1026	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1054	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
		1055	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
		1056
		1057	if (ictx && octx)
1027	{	1058	{
1028	reset_connection ();	1059	reset_connection ("remote reset");
1029		1060
1030	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1061	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1031		1062
1032	if (!p->chk_config ())	1063	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1033	{
1034	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node"),
1035	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1036	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1037	}
1038	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1039	establish_connection ();	1064	establish_connection ();
1040	}	1065	}
		1066
1041	break;	1067	break;
1042		1068
1043	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1069	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1044	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1070	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1045	{	1071	{
1046	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1072	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1047		1073
1048	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate);	1074	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1075	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1076	p->protocols, p->features);
1049		1077
1050	if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))	1078	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1079	{
		1080	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1081	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1082	}
		1083	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1051	{	1084	{
1052	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1085	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1053	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1086	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1054	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1087	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1055	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1088	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1056		1089
1057	if (p->initiate)	1090	if (p->initiate)
		1091	{
1058	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1092	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1059		1093
1060	rsachallenge k;	1094	if (ictx && octx)
		1095	reset_connection ("reconnect");
		1096	}
1061		1097
		1098	auth_data auth;
		1099
1062	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1100	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1063	{	1101	{
1064	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1102	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1065	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1103	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1066	break;
1067	}	1104	}
1068	else	1105	else
1069	{	1106	{
1070	delete octx;	1107	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1071		1108
1072	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1109	rcv_auth = auth;
1073	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1110	have_rcv_auth = true;
1074		1111
		1112	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1113
		1114	if (chg)
		1115	{
1075	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1116	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1076	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1117	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1077		1118
1078	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1079
1080	connection_established ();	1119	connection_established (rsi);
1081
1082	break;	1120	}
1083	}	1121	}
		1122
		1123	break;
1084	}	1124	}
1085	else
1086	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch"),
1087	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1088		1125
1089	send_reset (rsi);	1126	send_reset (rsi);
1090	}	1127	}
1091		1128
1092	break;	1129	break;
1093		1130
1094	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:	1131	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:
1095	{	1132	{
1096	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet ) pkt;	1133	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1097		1134
1098	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id);	1135	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1099		1136
1100	if (p->chk_config ())	1137	auth_mac local_mac;
		1138	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1139
		1140	if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1101	{	1141	{
1102	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1103	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1104	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1105	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1106
1107	rsachallenge chg;
1108
1109	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1110	{
1111	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response ignored"),	1142	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1112	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1143	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1113	break;
1114	}	1144	}
1115	else	1145	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1116	{	1146	{
1117	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1147	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1118		1148
1119	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))	1149	have_snd_auth = true;
1120	{
1121	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1122	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"),
1123	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1124	break;
1125	}
1126	else
1127	{
1128	rsaresponse h;
1129
1130	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1131
1132	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1133	{
1134	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1135
1136	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1137
1138	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1139
1140	si = rsi;
1141	protocol = rsi.prot;
1142
1143	connection_established ();	1150	connection_established (rsi);
1144
1145	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established, protocol version %d.%d"),
1146	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1147	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1148
1149	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1150	{
1151	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1152	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1153	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1154	}
1155
1156	break;
1157	}
1158	else
1159	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match"),
1160	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1161	}
1162
1163	delete cctx;
1164	}
1165	}	1151	}
1166	}	1152	}
1167
1168	send_reset (rsi);
1169	break;	1153	break;
1170		1154
1171	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1155	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1172	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1156	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1173	send_reset (rsi);	1157	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1179	if (ictx && octx)	1163	if (ictx && octx)
1180	{	1164	{
1181	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;	1165	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;
1182		1166
1183	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))	1167	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
		1168	{
		1169	// rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
		1170	// we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
		1171	// and suppress messages and resets during that time.
		1172	//TODO: should be done per source address
		1173	if (!hmac_error)
		1174	{
		1175	hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
		1176	break;
		1177	}
		1178	else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
		1179	break; // silently suppress
		1180	else
		1181	{
1184	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"	1182	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1185	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error"),	1183	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1186	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1184	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1185	// reset
		1186	}
		1187	}
1187	else	1188	else
1188	{	1189	{
1189	u32 seqno;	1190	u32 seqno;
1190	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);	1191	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
		1192	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
1191		1193
1192	if (iseqno.recv_ok (seqno))	1194	hmac_error = 0;
		1195
		1196	if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1193	{	1197	{
1194	vpn->tap->send (d);	1198	vpn->tap->send (d);
1195		1199
1196	if (si != rsi)	1200	if (si != rsi)
1197	{	1201	{
1198	// fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip	1202	// fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip
		1203	//if (last_si_change < ev_now () + 5.)
1199	si = rsi;	1204	// {
1200
1201	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s"),	1205	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),
1202	conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);	1206	conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);
		1207
		1208	si = rsi;
		1209
		1210	if (::conf.script_node_change)
		1211	{
		1212	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		1213	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_change> (this);
		1214	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-change command execution failed, continuing."));
		1215	}
		1216
		1217	// }
		1218	//else
		1219	// slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),
		1220	// conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);
1203	}	1221	}
		1222	}
		1223	else if (seqclass == 1) // far history
		1224	slog (L_ERR, _("received very old packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1225	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication/delay, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1226	else if (seqclass == 2) // in-window duplicate, happens often on wireless
		1227	slog (L_DEBUG, _("received recent duplicated packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1228	"possible replay attack, or just packet duplication, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1229	else if (seqclass == 3) // reset
		1230	{
		1231	slog (L_ERR, _("received out-of-sync (far future) packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
		1232	"probably just massive packet loss, sending reset."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
		1233	send_reset (rsi);
1204	}	1234	}
1205		1235
1206	delete d;	1236	delete d;
1207	break;	1237	break;
1208	}	1238	}
…		…
1212	break;	1242	break;
1213		1243
1214	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:	1244	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:
1215	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1245	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1216	{	1246	{
1217	connect_req_packet p = (connect_req_packet ) pkt;	1247	connect_req_packet p = (connect_req_packet )pkt;
1218		1248
1219	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1249	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1220	{	1250	{
1221	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1251	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1222	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1252	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1223		1253
1224	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]",	1254	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
		1255	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1256	p->protocols,
1225	conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx);	1257	c->ictx && c->octx);
1226		1258
1227	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1259	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1228	{	1260	{
1229	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1261	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1230	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1262	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1253		1285
1254	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1286	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1255	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1287	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1256	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1288	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1257		1289
1258	slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)",	1290	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1259	conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1291	conf->nodename,
		1292	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1293	(const char *)p->si,
		1294	p->protocols,
		1295	protocol,
		1296	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
		1297	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1260		1298
1261	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1299	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1262		1300
1263	if (dsi.valid ())	1301	if (dsi.valid ())
1264	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1302	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1303	else
		1304	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1305	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1306	(const char *)p->si);
1265	}	1307	}
1266	else	1308	else
1267	slog (L_WARN,	1309	slog (L_WARN,
1268	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1310	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1269	p->id);	1311	p->id);
…		…
1278	}	1320	}
1279		1321
1280	inline void	1322	inline void
1281	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1323	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1282	{	1324	{
1283	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30)	1325	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1326
		1327	if (when >= 0)
		1328	w.start (when);
		1329	else if (when < -15)
1284	{	1330	{
1285	reset_connection ();	1331	reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1286	establish_connection ();	1332	establish_connection ();
1287	}	1333	}
1288	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1289	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1290	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1334	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1291	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1335	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1292	{	1336	{
		1337	w.start (3);
1293	send_ping (si);	1338	send_ping (si);
1294	w.start (5);
1295	}	1339	}
1296	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1340	else if (when >= -10)
1297	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1341	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1298	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1342	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1299	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1343	w.start (when + 10);
1300	else	1344	else
1301	reset_connection ();	1345	reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1302	}	1346	}
1303		1347
		1348	void
1304	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1349	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1305	{	1350	{
1306	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1351	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1307		1352
1308	slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d)", conf->id, id);	1353	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
		1354	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1355	THISNODE->protocols);
1309	p->hmac_set (octx);	1356	p->hmac_set (octx);
1310	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1357	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1311		1358
1312	delete p;	1359	delete p;
1313	}	1360	}
1314		1361
		1362	void
1315	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1363	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1316	{	1364	{
1317	char *env;	1365	char *env;
1318	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1366	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1319	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1367	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1320	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1368	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1321	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1369	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1322	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1370	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1323	}	1371	}
1324		1372
		1373	void
1325	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1374	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1326	{	1375	{
1327	vpn->script_init_env ();	1376	vpn->script_init_env ();
1328		1377
1329	char *env;	1378	char *env;
1330	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1379	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
		1380	asprintf (&env, "DESTSI=%s", (const char *)si); putenv (env);
1331	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1381	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1332	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);	1382	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);
1333	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);	1383	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);
1334	}	1384	}
1335		1385
1336	inline const char *	1386	inline const char *
1337	connection::script_node_up ()	1387	connection::script_node_up ()
1338	{	1388	{
…		…
1343	char *filename;	1393	char *filename;
1344	asprintf (&filename,	1394	asprintf (&filename,
1345	"%s/%s",	1395	"%s/%s",
1346	confbase,	1396	confbase,
1347	::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");	1397	::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");
		1398
		1399	return filename;
		1400	}
		1401
		1402	inline const char *
		1403	connection::script_node_change ()
		1404	{
		1405	script_init_connect_env ();
		1406
		1407	putenv ((char *)"STATE=change");
		1408
		1409	char *filename;
		1410	asprintf (&filename,
		1411	"%s/%s",
		1412	confbase,
		1413	::conf.script_node_change ? ::conf.script_node_change : "node-change");
1348		1414
1349	return filename;	1415	return filename;
1350	}	1416	}
1351		1417
1352	inline const char *	1418	inline const char *
…		…
1378	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1444	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1379		1445
1380	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1446	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1381	octx = ictx = 0;	1447	octx = ictx = 0;
1382		1448
1383	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1384	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1385
1386	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1449	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1387		1450
1388	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1451	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1389	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1452	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1390	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1453	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1391		1454
1392	reset_connection ();	1455	reset_connection ("startup");
1393	}	1456	}
1394		1457
1395	connection::~connection ()	1458	connection::~connection ()
1396	{	1459	{
1397	shutdown ();	1460	shutdown ();
1398	}	1461	}
1399		1462
		1463	void
1400	void connection_init ()	1464	connection_init ()
1401	{	1465	{
1402	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1466	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1403	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1467	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1404	}	1468	}
1405		1469

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.72 by pcg, Fri Aug 8 16:48:00 2008 UTC vs. Revision 1.115 by root, Thu Jun 30 16:31:00 2016 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.72 by pcg, Fri Aug 8 16:48:00 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.115 by root, Thu Jun 30 16:31:00 2016 UTC