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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.74 by pcg, Sun Aug 10 02:49:21 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.101 by root, Wed Jul 17 16:40:57 2013 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
43#include "conf.h" 43#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 44#include "slog.h"
45#include "device.h" 45#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 46#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 47#include "connection.h"
48#include "hkdf.h"
48 49
49#include "netcompat.h" 50#include "netcompat.h"
50 51
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic 52#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
53#define MAGIC "PORN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
56 54
57#define ULTRA_FAST 1 55#define ULTRA_FAST 1
58#define HLOG 15 56#define HLOG 15
59#include "lzf/lzf.h" 57#include "lzf/lzf.h"
60#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 58#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
63////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 61//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
64 62
65static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb *, const char *> > rs_queue; 63static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb *, const char *> > rs_queue;
66static ev::child rs_child_ev; 64static ev::child rs_child_ev;
67 65
66namespace
67{
68void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :( 68 void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
69rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents) 69 rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
70{ 70 {
71 w.stop (); 71 w.stop ();
72 72
73 if (rs_queue.empty ()) 73 if (rs_queue.empty ())
74 return; 74 return;
75 75
76 pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false); 76 pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
77 if (pid) 77 if (pid)
78 { 78 {
79 w.set (pid); 79 w.set (pid);
80 w.start (); 80 w.start ();
81 } 81 }
82 else 82 else
83 slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second); 83 slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
84 84
85 delete rs_queue.front ().first; 85 delete rs_queue.front ().first;
86 rs_queue.pop (); 86 rs_queue.pop ();
87} 87 }
88};
88 89
89// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack 90// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
90static void 91static void
91run_script_queued (run_script_cb *cb, const char *warnmsg) 92run_script_queued (run_script_cb *cb, const char *warnmsg)
92{ 93{
… …
104struct crypto_ctx 105struct crypto_ctx
105{ 106{
106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 107 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
107 HMAC_CTX hctx; 108 HMAC_CTX hctx;
108 109
109 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 110 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
110 ~crypto_ctx (); 111 ~crypto_ctx ();
111}; 112};
112 113
113crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 114crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
114{ 115{
116 ecdh_key s;
117
118 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
119
120 {
121 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
122 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
123
124 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
125 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
126 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
127 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
128 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
129 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
130
131 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
132 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
133 }
134
135 {
136 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
137 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
138
139 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
140 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
141 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
142 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
143 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
144 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
145
115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 146 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
116 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 147 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
117 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 148 }
118 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
119} 149}
120 150
121crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 151crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
122{ 152{
123 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 153 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
124 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 154 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
125} 155}
126 156
157static inline void
158auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
159{
160 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
161 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
162 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
163 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
164
165 memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
166}
167
168static inline bool
169auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
170{
171 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
172
173 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
174 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
175 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
176 return 0;
177
178 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
179 memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
180
181 return 1;
182}
183
127static void 184static void
128rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 185auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
129{ 186{
130 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 187 HMAC_CTX ctx;
131 188
132 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 189 HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
133 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 190 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
134 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); 191 require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
135 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
136 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); 192 require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
137 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); 193 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
138} 194}
139 195
140struct rsa_entry 196void
197connection::generate_auth_data ()
141{ 198{
142 tstamp expire; 199 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
143 rsaid id;
144 rsachallenge chg;
145};
146
147struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
148{
149 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
150
151 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
152 {
153 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
154 { 200 {
155 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 201 // request data
156 { 202 rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
157 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 203 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
204 auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
158 205
159 erase (i); 206 // eventual response data
160 return true; 207 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
161 }
162 } 208 }
163 209
164 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 210 // every use prolongs the expiry
165 cleaner.again ();
166
167 return false;
168 }
169
170 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
171 {
172 rsa_entry e;
173
174 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
175 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
176
177 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 211 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
178 e.id = id;
179 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 push_back (e);
182
183 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
184 cleaner.again ();
185 }
186
187 rsa_cache ()
188 {
189 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
190 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
191 }
192
193} rsa_cache;
194
195void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
196{
197 if (empty ())
198 w.stop ();
199 else
200 {
201 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
202 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
203 i = erase (i);
204 else
205 ++i;
206 }
207} 212}
208 213
209////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 214//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
210 215
211pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
225 delete p; 230 delete p;
226 231
227 delete [] queue; 232 delete [] queue;
228} 233}
229 234
235void
230void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 236pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
231{ 237{
232 ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl; 238 ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
233 239
234 for (;;) 240 for (;;)
235 { 241 {
… …
246 252
247 delete get (); 253 delete get ();
248 } 254 }
249} 255}
250 256
257void
251void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p) 258pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
252{ 259{
253 ev_tstamp now = ev_now (); 260 ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
254 261
255 // start expiry timer 262 // start expiry timer
256 if (empty ()) 263 if (empty ())
… …
265 queue[i].tstamp = now; 272 queue[i].tstamp = now;
266 273
267 i = ni; 274 i = ni;
268} 275}
269 276
270net_packet *pkt_queue::get () 277net_packet *
278pkt_queue::get ()
271{ 279{
272 if (empty ()) 280 if (empty ())
273 return 0; 281 return 0;
274 282
275 net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt; 283 net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
… …
299 307
300 bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); } 308 bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
301 bool can (u32 host); 309 bool can (u32 host);
302}; 310};
303 311
304net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter; 312static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
305 313
314bool
306bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host) 315net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
307{ 316{
308 iterator i; 317 iterator i;
309 318
310 for (i = begin (); i != end (); ) 319 for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
311 if (i->host == host) 320 if (i->host == host)
… …
358 367
359///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 368/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
360 369
361unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 370unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
362 371
372void
363void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx) 373hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)
364{ 374{
365 unsigned int xlen; 375 unsigned int xlen;
366 376
367 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
368 378
369 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); 379 require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
370 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), 380 require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
371 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); 381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
372 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen); 382 require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
373} 383}
374 384
375void 385void
376hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
377{ 387{
… …
386 hmac_gen (ctx); 396 hmac_gen (ctx);
387 397
388 return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH); 398 return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
389} 399}
390 400
401void
391void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst) 402vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
392{ 403{
393 type = type_; 404 type = type_;
394 405
395 int src = THISNODE->id; 406 int src = THISNODE->id;
396 407
… …
401 412
402#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6) 413#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
403#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE) 414#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
404 415
405struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet 416struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
417{
418 u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
419
420 void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
421 tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
422
423private:
424 const u32 data_hdr_size () const
406 { 425 {
407 u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
408
409 void setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
410 tap_packet *unpack (connection *conn, u32 &seqno);
411private:
412
413 const u32 data_hdr_size () const
414 {
415 return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR; 426 return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
416 }
417 }; 427 }
428};
418 429
419void 430void
420vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno) 431vpndata_packet::setup (connection *conn, int dst, u8 *d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
421{ 432{
422 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx; 433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
… …
424 ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED; 435 ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
425 436
426#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 437#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
427 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 438 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
428 439
429 if (conn->features & ENABLE_COMPRESSION) 440 if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
430 { 441 {
431 u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7); 442 u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);
432 443
433 if (cl) 444 if (cl)
434 { 445 {
… …
440 d[1] = cl; 451 d[1] = cl;
441 } 452 }
442 } 453 }
443#endif 454#endif
444 455
445 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 456 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
446 457
447 struct { 458 struct {
448#if RAND_SIZE 459#if RAND_SIZE
449 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; 460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
450#endif 461#endif
451 u32 seqno; 462 u32 seqno;
452 } datahdr; 463 } datahdr;
453 464
454 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); 465 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
455#if RAND_SIZE 466#if RAND_SIZE
456 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); 467 require (RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE) >= 0);
457#endif 468#endif
458 469
459 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
460 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
461 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); 472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
… …
483 int outl = 0, outl2; 494 int outl = 0, outl2;
484 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
485 u8 *d; 496 u8 *d;
486 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); 497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
487 498
488 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 499 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
489 500
490#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
491 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
492 503
493 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
494 d = cdata; 505 d = cdata;
495 else 506 else
496#endif 507#endif
497 d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; 508 d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
498 509
499 /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ 510 // we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
511 // pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
512 // this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
513 require (DATAHDR <= 16);
514 require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]);
515
516 // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
500 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, 517 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
501 d, &outl2, 518 d, &outl2,
502 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); 519 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
503 outl += outl2; 520 outl += outl2;
504 521
… …
535 } 552 }
536}; 553};
537 554
538struct config_packet : vpn_packet 555struct config_packet : vpn_packet
539{ 556{
540 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
541 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
542 // hmacs simply will not work.
543 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 557 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
544 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 558 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
545 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 559 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
546 560
547 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 561 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
548 bool chk_config () const; 562 bool chk_config () const;
549 563
550 static u8 get_features () 564 static u8 get_features ()
… …
561#endif 575#endif
562 return f; 576 return f;
563 } 577 }
564}; 578};
565 579
580void
566void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 581config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
567{ 582{
568 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 583 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
569 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 584 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
570 randsize = RAND_SIZE; 585 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
571 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
572 flags = 0; 586 flags = 0;
573 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
574 features = get_features (); 587 features = get_features ();
575 588
576 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 589 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
577 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
578 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 590 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
591 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
579 592
580 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 593 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
581 set_hdr (type, dst); 594 set_hdr (type, dst);
582} 595}
583 596
597bool
584bool config_packet::chk_config () const 598config_packet::chk_config () const
585{ 599{
586 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 600 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
587 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 601 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
588 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 602 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
589 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); 603 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
590 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
591 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
592 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
593 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
594 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 604 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
595 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 605 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
596 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
597 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
598 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 606 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
599 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 607 slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
608 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
609 slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
600 else 610 else
601 return true; 611 return true;
602 612
603 return false; 613 return false;
604} 614}
605 615
606struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 616struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
607{ 617{
608 char magic[8]; 618 char magic[8];
609 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 619 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
610 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 620 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
611 u8 pad2, pad3; 621 u8 pad2, pad3;
612 rsaid id; 622 auth_encr encr;
613 rsaencrdata encr;
614 623
615 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 624 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
616 { 625 {
617 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 626 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
618 strncpy (magic, MAGIC, 8); 627 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
619 initiate = !!initiate_; 628 initiate = !!initiate_;
620 protocols = protocols_; 629 protocols = protocols_;
621 630
622 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 631 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
623 } 632 }
624}; 633};
625 634
626struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 635struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
627{ 636{
628 rsaid id;
629 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
630 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
631 rsaresponse response; 637 auth_response response;
632 638
633 auth_res_packet (int dst) 639 auth_res_packet (int dst)
634 { 640 {
635 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 641 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
636 642
… …
670}; 676};
671 677
672///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 678/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
673 679
674void 680void
675connection::connection_established () 681connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
676{ 682{
677 slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 683 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
684 return;
685
686 si = rsi;
687 protocol = rsi.prot;
688
689 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
690 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
691 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
692 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
693
694 if (::conf.script_node_up)
695 {
696 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
697 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
698 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
699 }
700
701 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
702 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
703
704 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
705 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
678 706
679 if (ictx && octx) 707 if (ictx && octx)
680 { 708 {
681 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 709 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
682 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 710 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
683 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); 711 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
712
684 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); 713 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
685 714
686 // send queued packets 715 // send queued packets
687 if (ictx && octx) 716 if (ictx && octx)
688 { 717 {
… …
699 } 728 }
700 } 729 }
701 730
702 vpn->connection_established (this); 731 vpn->connection_established (this);
703 } 732 }
733#if 0
704 else 734 else
705 { 735 {
706 retry_cnt = 0; 736 retry_cnt = 0;
707 establish_connection.start (5); 737 establish_connection.start (5);
708 keepalive.stop (); 738 keepalive.stop ();
709 rekey.stop (); 739 rekey.stop ();
710 } 740 }
741#endif
711} 742}
712 743
713void 744void
714connection::reset_si () 745connection::reset_si ()
715{ 746{
… …
760{ 791{
761 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 792 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
762 793
763 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 794 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
764 795
765 slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d %s [%s]", conf->id, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 796 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
766
767 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 797 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
768 798
769 delete pkt; 799 delete pkt;
770} 800}
771 801
… …
786void 816void
787connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 817connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
788{ 818{
789 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 819 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
790 820
791 rsachallenge chg; 821 generate_auth_data ();
792 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
793 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 822 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
794 823
795 slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si); 824 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
796
797 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 825 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
798 826
799 delete pkt; 827 delete pkt;
800} 828}
801 829
802void 830void
803connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 831connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
804{ 832{
805 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 833 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
806 834
807 pkt->id = id; 835 auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
836 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
808 837
809 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
810
811 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
812
813 slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->id, (const char *)si); 838 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
814
815 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 839 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
816 840
817 delete pkt; 841 delete pkt;
818} 842}
819 843
820void 844void
821connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols) 845connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
822{ 846{
823 slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s)", 847 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
824 conf->id, rid, (const char *)rsi); 848 vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
849 conf->protocols);
825 850
826 connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols); 851 connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
827 852
828 r->hmac_set (octx); 853 r->hmac_set (octx);
829 send_vpn_packet (r, si); 854 send_vpn_packet (r, si);
… …
832} 857}
833 858
834inline void 859inline void
835connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 860connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
836{ 861{
837 if (!ictx 862 if (!(ictx && octx)
838 && conf != THISNODE 863 && conf != THISNODE
839 && connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER 864 && connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
840 && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED 865 && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
841 && !w.is_active ()) 866 && !w.is_active ())
842 { 867 {
… …
910 } 935 }
911 } 936 }
912 937
913 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 938 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
914 delete octx; octx = 0; 939 delete octx; octx = 0;
915#if ENABLE_DNS
916 dnsv4_reset_connection ();
917#endif
918 940
919 si.host = 0; 941 si.host = 0;
942
943 have_snd_auth = false;
944 have_rcv_auth = false;
945 auth_expire = 0.;
920 946
921 last_activity = 0.; 947 last_activity = 0.;
922 //last_si_change = 0.; 948 //last_si_change = 0.;
923 retry_cnt = 0; 949 retry_cnt = 0;
924 950
… …
983 data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt)); 1009 data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
984 post_inject_queue (); 1010 post_inject_queue ();
985 } 1011 }
986} 1012}
987 1013
1014void
988void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos) 1015connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
989{ 1016{
990 if (ictx && octx) 1017 if (ictx && octx)
991 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos); 1018 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
992 else 1019 else
993 { 1020 {
… …
999void 1026void
1000connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi) 1027connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1001{ 1028{
1002 last_activity = ev_now (); 1029 last_activity = ev_now ();
1003 1030
1004 slog (L_NOISE, "<<%d received packet type %d from %d to %d.", 1031 slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1005 conf->id, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ()); 1032 conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1006 1033
1007 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED) 1034 if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1008 return; 1035 return;
1009 1036
1010 switch (pkt->typ ()) 1037 switch (pkt->typ ())
1011 { 1038 {
1012 case vpn_packet::PT_PING: 1039 case vpn_packet::PT_PING:
1040 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
1041
1013 // we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries, 1042 // we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
1014 // so reset the retry counter and establish a connection 1043 // so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
1015 // when we receive a ping. 1044 // when we receive a ping.
1016 if (!ictx) 1045 if (!ictx)
1017 { 1046 {
1018 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) 1047 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1019 send_auth_request (rsi, true); 1048 send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1020 } 1049 }
1021 else 1050 else
1022 // we would love to change thre socket address here, but ping's aren't 1051 // we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
1023 // authenticated, so we best ignore it. 1052 // authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1024 send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong 1053 send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1025 1054
1026 break; 1055 break;
1027 1056
1028 case vpn_packet::PT_PONG: 1057 case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
1058 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
1059
1060 // a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
1061 // about our desire for communication.
1062 establish_connection ();
1029 break; 1063 break;
1030 1064
1031 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET: 1065 case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1032 { 1066 {
1033 reset_connection (); 1067 reset_connection ();
… …
1046 break; 1080 break;
1047 1081
1048 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: 1082 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1049 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi)) 1083 if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1050 { 1084 {
1051 auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *) pkt; 1085 auth_req_packet *p = (auth_req_packet *)pkt;
1052 1086
1053 slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_REQ(%d)", conf->id, p->initiate); 1087 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1088 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1089 p->protocols, p->features);
1054 1090
1055 if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)) 1091 if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1056 { 1092 {
1057 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1093 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1058 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1094 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1059 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1095 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1060 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1096 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1061 1097
1062 if (p->initiate) 1098 if (p->initiate)
1063 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1099 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1064 1100
1065 rsachallenge k; 1101 auth_data auth;
1066 1102
1067 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1103 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1068 { 1104 {
1069 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1105 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1070 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1106 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1071 break;
1072 } 1107 }
1073 else 1108 else
1074 { 1109 {
1075 delete octx; 1110 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1076 1111
1077 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1112 rcv_auth = auth;
1078 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1113 have_rcv_auth = true;
1079 1114
1115 send_auth_response (rsi);
1116
1117 if (chg)
1118 {
1080 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1119 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1081 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1120 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1082 1121
1083 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1084
1085 connection_established (); 1122 connection_established (rsi);
1086
1087 break; 1123 }
1088 } 1124 }
1125
1126 break;
1089 } 1127 }
1090 else 1128 else
1091 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), 1129 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1092 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1130 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1093 1131
… …
1096 1134
1097 break; 1135 break;
1098 1136
1099 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES: 1137 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_RES:
1100 { 1138 {
1101 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *) pkt; 1139 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
1102 1140
1103 slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_AUTH_RES", conf->id); 1141 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1104 1142
1105 if (p->chk_config ()) 1143 if (p->chk_config ())
1106 { 1144 {
1107 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1145 if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1108 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1109 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1110 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1111
1112 rsachallenge chg;
1113
1114 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1115 { 1146 {
1116 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1147 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1117 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1148 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1118 break;
1119 } 1149 }
1120 else 1150 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1121 { 1151 {
1122 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1152 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1123 1153 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1124 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1125 {
1126 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1127 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1128 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1154 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1129 break; 1155 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1130 }
1131 else
1132 {
1133 rsaresponse h;
1134 1156
1135 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1136
1137 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1138 {
1139 prot_minor = p->prot_minor; 1157 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1158 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1140 1159
1141 delete ictx; ictx = cctx; 1160 have_snd_auth = true;
1142
1143 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1144
1145 si = rsi;
1146 protocol = rsi.prot;
1147
1148 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established, protocol version %d.%d."),
1149 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1150 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1151
1152 connection_established (); 1161 connection_established (rsi);
1153
1154 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1155 {
1156 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1157 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1158 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1159 }
1160
1161 break;
1162 }
1163 else
1164 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1165 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1166 }
1167
1168 delete cctx;
1169 } 1162 }
1163
1164 break;
1170 } 1165 }
1171 } 1166 }
1172 1167
1173 send_reset (rsi); 1168 send_reset (rsi);
1174 break; 1169 break;
… …
1202 if (si != rsi) 1197 if (si != rsi)
1203 { 1198 {
1204 // fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip 1199 // fast re-sync on source address changes, useful especially for tcp/ip
1205 //if (last_si_change < ev_now () + 5.) 1200 //if (last_si_change < ev_now () + 5.)
1206 // { 1201 // {
1202 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),
1203 conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);
1204
1207 si = rsi; 1205 si = rsi;
1208 1206
1209 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): socket address changed to %s."), 1207 if (::conf.script_node_change)
1210 conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi); 1208 {
1209 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1210 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_change> (this);
1211 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-change command execution failed, continuing."));
1212 }
1213
1211 // } 1214 // }
1212 //else 1215 //else
1213 // slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."), 1216 // slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),
1214 // conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi); 1217 // conf->nodename, (const char *)si, (const char *)rsi);
1215 } 1218 }
1216 } 1219 }
1217 else if (seqclass == 1) // silently ignore 1220 else if (seqclass == 1) // far history
1221 slog (L_ERR, _("received very old packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
1222 "possible replay attack, or just packet duplication/delay, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
1223 else if (seqclass == 2) // in-window duplicate, happens often on wireless
1218 slog (L_ERR, _("received duplicate packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx)\n" 1224 slog (L_DEBUG, _("received recent duplicated packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
1219 "possible replay attack, or just packet duplication, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1); 1225 "possible replay attack, or just packet duplication, ignoring."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
1220 else if (seqclass == 2) // reset 1226 else if (seqclass == 3) // reset
1221 { 1227 {
1222 slog (L_ERR, _("received duplicate or out-of-sync packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx)\n" 1228 slog (L_ERR, _("received out-of-sync (far future) packet (received %08lx, expected %08lx). "
1223 "possible replay attack, or just massive packet loss, resetting connection."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1); 1229 "probably just massive packet loss, sending reset."), seqno, iseqno.seq + 1);
1224 send_reset (rsi); 1230 send_reset (rsi);
1225 } 1231 }
1226 1232
1227 delete d; 1233 delete d;
1228 break; 1234 break;
… …
1233 break; 1239 break;
1234 1240
1235 case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ: 1241 case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:
1236 if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx)) 1242 if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1237 { 1243 {
1238 connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *) pkt; 1244 connect_req_packet *p = (connect_req_packet *)pkt;
1239 1245
1240 if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ()) 1246 if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1241 { 1247 {
1242 connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1]; 1248 connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1243 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1249 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1244 1250
1245 slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d) [%d]", 1251 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1252 conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1253 p->protocols,
1246 conf->id, p->id, c->ictx && c->octx); 1254 c->ictx && c->octx);
1247 1255
1248 if (c->ictx && c->octx) 1256 if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1249 { 1257 {
1250 // send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is 1258 // send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1251 // behind a nat firewall (or both ;) 1259 // behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
… …
1274 1282
1275 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1283 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1276 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1284 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1277 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1285 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1278 1286
1279 slog (L_TRACE, "<<%d PT_CONNECT_INFO(%d,%s) (%d)", 1287 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1280 conf->id, p->id, (const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1288 conf->nodename,
1289 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1290 (const char *)p->si,
1291 p->protocols,
1292 protocol,
1293 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1294 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1281 1295
1282 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1296 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1283 1297
1284 if (dsi.valid ()) 1298 if (dsi.valid ())
1285 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1299 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1300 else
1301 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1302 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1303 (const char *)p->si);
1286 } 1304 }
1287 else 1305 else
1288 slog (L_WARN, 1306 slog (L_WARN,
1289 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1307 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1290 p->id); 1308 p->id);
… …
1299} 1317}
1300 1318
1301inline void 1319inline void
1302connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1320connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1303{ 1321{
1304 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30) 1322 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1323
1324 if (when >= 0)
1325 w.start (when);
1326 else if (when < -15)
1305 { 1327 {
1306 reset_connection (); 1328 reset_connection ();
1307 establish_connection (); 1329 establish_connection ();
1308 } 1330 }
1309 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1310 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1311 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1331 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1312 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1332 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1313 { 1333 {
1334 w.start (3);
1314 send_ping (si); 1335 send_ping (si);
1315 w.start (5);
1316 } 1336 }
1317 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1337 else if (when >= -10)
1318 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1338 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1319 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1339 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1320 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1340 w.start (when + 10);
1321 else 1341 else
1322 reset_connection (); 1342 reset_connection ();
1323} 1343}
1324 1344
1345void
1325void connection::send_connect_request (int id) 1346connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1326{ 1347{
1327 connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols); 1348 connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1328 1349
1329 slog (L_TRACE, ">>%d PT_CONNECT_REQ(%d)", conf->id, id); 1350 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1351 conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1352 THISNODE->protocols);
1330 p->hmac_set (octx); 1353 p->hmac_set (octx);
1331 send_vpn_packet (p, si); 1354 send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1332 1355
1333 delete p; 1356 delete p;
1334} 1357}
1335 1358
1359void
1336void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext) 1360connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1337{ 1361{
1338 char *env; 1362 char *env;
1339 asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env); 1363 asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1340 asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env); 1364 asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1341 asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext, 1365 asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1342 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8, 1366 0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1343 conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env); 1367 conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1344} 1368}
1345 1369
1370void
1346void connection::script_init_connect_env () 1371connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1347{ 1372{
1348 vpn->script_init_env (); 1373 vpn->script_init_env ();
1349 1374
1350 char *env; 1375 char *env;
1351 asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env); 1376 asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
1377 asprintf (&env, "DESTSI=%s", (const char *)si); putenv (env);
1352 asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env); 1378 asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1353 asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env); 1379 asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);
1354 asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env); 1380 asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);
1355} 1381}
1356 1382
1357inline const char * 1383inline const char *
1358connection::script_node_up () 1384connection::script_node_up ()
1359{ 1385{
… …
1364 char *filename; 1390 char *filename;
1365 asprintf (&filename, 1391 asprintf (&filename,
1366 "%s/%s", 1392 "%s/%s",
1367 confbase, 1393 confbase,
1368 ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up"); 1394 ::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");
1395
1396 return filename;
1397}
1398
1399inline const char *
1400connection::script_node_change ()
1401{
1402 script_init_connect_env ();
1403
1404 putenv ((char *)"STATE=change");
1405
1406 char *filename;
1407 asprintf (&filename,
1408 "%s/%s",
1409 confbase,
1410 ::conf.script_node_change ? ::conf.script_node_change : "node-change");
1369 1411
1370 return filename; 1412 return filename;
1371} 1413}
1372 1414
1373inline const char * 1415inline const char *
… …
1399 establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this); 1441 establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1400 1442
1401 last_establish_attempt = 0.; 1443 last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1402 octx = ictx = 0; 1444 octx = ictx = 0;
1403 1445
1404 if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1405 conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1406
1407 connectmode = conf->connectmode; 1446 connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1408 1447
1409 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt 1448 // queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1410 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED) 1449 if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1411 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet); 1450 vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
… …
1416connection::~connection () 1455connection::~connection ()
1417{ 1456{
1418 shutdown (); 1457 shutdown ();
1419} 1458}
1420 1459
1460void
1421void connection_init () 1461connection_init ()
1422{ 1462{
1423 auth_rate_limiter.clear (); 1463 auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1424 reset_rate_limiter.clear (); 1464 reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1425} 1465}
1426 1466

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