[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.82 by pcg, Fri Aug 15 18:35:24 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.113 by root, Thu Jan 29 00:21:39 2015 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
33		33
34	#include <list>	34	#include <list>
35	#include <queue>	35	#include <queue>
36	#include <utility>	36	#include <utility>
37		37
		38	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
38	#include <openssl/rand.h>	39	#include <openssl/rand.h>
39	#include <openssl/evp.h>	40	#include <openssl/evp.h>
40	#include <openssl/rsa.h>	41	#include <openssl/rsa.h>
41	#include <openssl/err.h>	42	#include <openssl/err.h>
		43
		44	// openssl 0.9.8 compatibility
		45	#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
		46	#define require101(exp) exp
		47	#else
		48	#define require101(exp) require (exp)
		49	#endif
42		50
43	#include "conf.h"	51	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	52	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	53	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	54	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	55	#include "connection.h"
		56	#include "hkdf.h"
48		57
49	#include "netcompat.h"	58	#include "netcompat.h"
50		59
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic	60	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
56		61
57	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	62	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
58	#define HLOG 15	63	#define HLOG 15
59	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	64	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
60	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	65	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
63	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	68	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
64		69
65	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	70	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
66	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	71	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
67		72
		73	namespace
		74	{
68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	75	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	76	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
70	{	77	{
71	w.stop ();	78	w.stop ();
72		79
73	if (rs_queue.empty ())	80	if (rs_queue.empty ())
74	return;	81	return;
75		82
76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	83	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
77	if (pid)	84	if (pid)
78	{	85	{
79	w.set (pid);	86	w.set (pid);
80	w.start ();	87	w.start ();
81	}	88	}
82	else	89	else
83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	90	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
84		91
85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	92	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
86	rs_queue.pop ();	93	rs_queue.pop ();
87	}	94	}
		95	};
88		96
89	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	97	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
90	static void	98	static void
91	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	99	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
92	{	100	{
…		…
104	struct crypto_ctx	112	struct crypto_ctx
105	{	113	{
106	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	114	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
107	HMAC_CTX hctx;	115	HMAC_CTX hctx;
108		116
109	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	117	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
110	~crypto_ctx ();	118	~crypto_ctx ();
111	};	119	};
112		120
113	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	121	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
114	{	122	{
		123	ecdh_key s;
		124
		125	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		126
		127	{
		128	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		129	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		130
		131	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		132	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		133	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		134	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		135	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		136
		137	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		138	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		139	}
		140
		141	{
		142	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		143	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		144
		145	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		146	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		147	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		148	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		149	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		150
115	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	151	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
116	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	152	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
117	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	153	}
118	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
119	}	154	}
120		155
121	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	156	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
122	{	157	{
123	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	158	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
124	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	159	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
125	}	160	}
126		161
		162	static inline void
		163	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		164	{
		165	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		166	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		167	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		168	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		169
		170	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		171	}
		172
		173	static inline bool
		174	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		175	{
		176	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		177
		178	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		179	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		180	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		181	return 0;
		182
		183	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		184	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		185
		186	return 1;
		187	}
		188
127	static void	189	static void
128	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	190	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, const ecdh_key &b, auth_mac &mac)
129	{	191	{
130	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	192	hkdf kdf (b, sizeof b, AUTH_DIGEST ()); // use response ecdh b as salt
131		193	kdf.extract (&auth.rsa, sizeof (auth.rsa));
132	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	194	kdf.extract_done ();
133	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	195	kdf.expand (mac, sizeof mac, auth.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh)); // use challenge ecdh b as info
134	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
136	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));
137	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
138	}	196	}
139		197
140	struct rsa_entry	198	void
		199	connection::generate_auth_data ()
141	{	200	{
142	tstamp expire;	201	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
143	rsaid id;
144	rsachallenge chg;
145	};
146
147	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
148	{
149	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
150
151	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
152	{
153	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
154	{	202	{
155	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	203	// request data
156	{	204	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
157	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	205	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
158		206
159	erase (i);	207	// eventual response data
160	return true;	208	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
161	}
162	}	209	}
163		210
164	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	211	// every use prolongs the expiry
165	cleaner.again ();
166
167	return false;
168	}
169
170	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
171	{
172	rsa_entry e;
173
174	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
176
177	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	212	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
178	e.id = id;
179	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
180
181	push_back (e);
182
183	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
184	cleaner.again ();
185	}
186
187	rsa_cache ()
188	{
189	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
190	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
191	}
192
193	} rsa_cache;
194
195	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
196	{
197	if (empty ())
198	w.stop ();
199	else
200	{
201	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
202	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
203	i = erase (i);
204	else
205	++i;
206	}
207	}	213	}
208		214
209	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	215	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
210		216
211	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	217	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
225	delete p;	231	delete p;
226		232
227	delete [] queue;	233	delete [] queue;
228	}	234	}
229		235
		236	void
230	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	237	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
231	{	238	{
232	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	239	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
233		240
234	for (;;)	241	for (;;)
235	{	242	{
…		…
246		253
247	delete get ();	254	delete get ();
248	}	255	}
249	}	256	}
250		257
		258	void
251	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	259	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
252	{	260	{
253	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	261	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
254		262
255	// start expiry timer	263	// start expiry timer
256	if (empty ())	264	if (empty ())
…		…
265	queue[i].tstamp = now;	273	queue[i].tstamp = now;
266		274
267	i = ni;	275	i = ni;
268	}	276	}
269		277
270	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	278	net_packet *
		279	pkt_queue::get ()
271	{	280	{
272	if (empty ())	281	if (empty ())
273	return 0;	282	return 0;
274		283
275	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	284	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
299		308
300	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	309	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
301	bool can (u32 host);	310	bool can (u32 host);
302	};	311	};
303		312
304	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	313	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
305		314
		315	bool
306	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	316	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
307	{	317	{
308	iterator i;	318	iterator i;
309		319
310	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	320	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
311	if (i->host == host)	321	if (i->host == host)
…		…
356	}	366	}
357	}	367	}
358		368
359	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	369	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
360		370
361	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	371	void
362
363	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	372	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx ctx, u8 hmac_digest)
364	{	373	{
365	unsigned int xlen;
366
367	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	374	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
368		375
369	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	376	require101 (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
370	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	377	require101 (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
371	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	378	require101 (HMAC_Final (hctx, hmac_digest, 0));
372	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);
373	}	379	}
374		380
375	void	381	void
376	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	382	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
377	{	383	{
378	hmac_gen (ctx);	384	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
379		385	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
380	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	386	memcpy (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
381	}	387	}
382		388
383	bool	389	bool
384	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)	390	hmac_packet::hmac_chk (crypto_ctx *ctx)
385	{	391	{
386	hmac_gen (ctx);	392	unsigned char hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
387		393	hmac_gen (ctx, hmac_digest);
388	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	394	return slow_memeq (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
389	}	395	}
390		396
		397	void
391	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	398	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
392	{	399	{
393	type = type_;	400	type = type_;
394		401
395	int src = THISNODE->id;	402	int src = THISNODE->id;
396		403
…		…
398	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);	405	srcdst = ((src >> 8) << 4) \| (dst >> 8);
399	dst1 = dst;	406	dst1 = dst;
400	}	407	}
401		408
402	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	409	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
403	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
404		410
405	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	411	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		412	{
		413	u32 ctr; // seqno
		414	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA];
		415
		416	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		417	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		418
		419	private:
		420	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
406	{	421	{
407	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno	422	// the distance from beginning of packet to data member
408		423	return data - at (0);
409	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
410	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
411	private:
412
413	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
414	{
415	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
416	}
417	};	424	}
		425	};
		426
		427	// expands packet counter (unlike seqno, in network byte order) to counter mode IV
		428	static unsigned char *
		429	expand_iv (u32 ctr)
		430	{
		431	static u32 iv[IV_SIZE (CIPHER) / 4];
		432
		433	require (sizeof (iv) == 4 * 4);
		434	require (IV_SIZE (CIPHER) % 4 == 0);
		435
		436	iv[0] =
		437	iv[1] =
		438	iv[2] = ctr;
		439
		440	// I would reuse ctr here to to avoid potential endianness issues,
		441	// but it seems openssl wraps around. While this would be still ok,
		442	// and I don't even know if its true, let's play safe and initialise
		443	// to 0.
		444	iv[3] = 0;
		445
		446	return (unsigned char *)iv;
		447	}
418		448
419	void	449	void
420	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	450	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
421	{	451	{
422	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	452	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
424	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;	454	ptype type = PT_DATA_UNCOMPRESSED;
425		455
426	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	456	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
427	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	457	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
428		458
429	if (conn->features & ENABLE_COMPRESSION)	459	if (conn->features & FEATURE_COMPRESSION)
430	{	460	{
431	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);	461	u32 cl = lzf_compress (d, l, cdata + 2, (l - 2) & ~7);
432		462
433	if (cl)	463	if (cl)
434	{	464	{
…		…
440	d[1] = cl;	470	d[1] = cl;
441	}	471	}
442	}	472	}
443	#endif	473	#endif
444		474
		475	ctr = htonl (seqno);
		476
445	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	477	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
446
447	struct {
448	#if RAND_SIZE
449	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
450	#endif
451	u32 seqno;
452	} datahdr;
453
454	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
455	#if RAND_SIZE
456	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
457	#endif
458		478
459	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	479	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
460	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	480	(unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2,
461	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	481	(unsigned char *)d, l));
462	outl += outl2;	482	outl += outl2;
463		483
464	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	484	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
465	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	485	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)data + outl, &outl2));
466	(unsigned char *) d, l));
467	outl += outl2;	486	outl += outl2;
468		487
469	require (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2));
470	outl += outl2;
471
472	len = outl + data_hdr_size ();	488	len = data_hdr_size () + outl;
473		489
474	set_hdr (type, dst);	490	set_hdr (type, dst);
475		491
476	hmac_set (conn->octx);	492	hmac_set (conn->octx);
477	}	493	}
…		…
481	{	497	{
482	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx;	498	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->ictx->cctx;
483	int outl = 0, outl2;	499	int outl = 0, outl2;
484	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	500	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
485	u8 *d;	501	u8 *d;
486	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
487		502
		503	seqno = ntohl (ctr);
		504
488	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	505	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, expand_iv (ctr)));
489		506
490	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	507	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
491	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	508	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
492		509
493	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	510	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
494	d = cdata;	511	d = cdata;
495	else	512	else
496	#endif	513	#endif
497	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	514	d = &(*p)[6 + 6];
498		515
499	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	516	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
500	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	517	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
501	d, &outl2,	518	d, &outl2,
502	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	519	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
503	outl += outl2;	520	outl += outl2;
504		521
		522	// it seems this is a nop for us, but we do it anyways
505	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));	523	require (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex (cctx, (unsigned char *)d + outl, &outl2));
506	outl += outl2;	524	outl += outl2;
507		525
508	seqno = ntohl ((u32 )(d + RAND_SIZE));
509
510	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);	526	id2mac (dst () ? dst() : THISNODE->id, p->dst);
511	id2mac (src (), p->src);	527	id2mac (src (), p->src);
512		528
513	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	529	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
514	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	530	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
515	{	531	{
516	u32 cl = (d[DATAHDR] << 8) \| d[DATAHDR + 1];	532	u32 cl = (d[0] << 8) \| d[1];
517		533
518	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + DATAHDR + 2, cl < MAX_MTU ? cl : 0,	534	p->len = lzf_decompress (d + 2, cl < MAX_MTU - 2 ? cl : 0,
519	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)	535	&(*p)[6 + 6], MAX_MTU)
520	+ 6 + 6;	536	+ 6 + 6;
521	}	537	}
522	else	538	else
523	p->len = outl + (6 + 6 - DATAHDR);	539	p->len = outl + (6 + 6);
524	#endif	540	#endif
525		541
526	return p;	542	return p;
527	}	543	}
528		544
…		…
535	}	551	}
536	};	552	};
537		553
538	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	554	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
539	{	555	{
540	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	556	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
541	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
542	// hmacs simply will not work.
543	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
544	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
545	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
546		560
547	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
548	bool chk_config () const;	562	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
549		563
550	static u8 get_features ()	564	static u8 get_features ()
551	{	565	{
552	u8 f = 0;	566	u8 f = 0;
553	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	567	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
561	#endif	575	#endif
562	return f;	576	return f;
563	}	577	}
564	};	578	};
565		579
		580	void
566	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
567	{	582	{
568	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
569	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
570	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
571	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
572	flags = 0;	585	flags = 0;
573	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
574	features = get_features ();	586	features = get_features ();
575		587
		588	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		589
576	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	590	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
577	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
578	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	591	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		592	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
579		593
580	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	594	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
581	set_hdr (type, dst);	595	set_hdr (type, dst);
582	}	596	}
583		597
584	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	598	bool
		599	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
585	{	600	{
586	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	601	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
587	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	602	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
588	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	603	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
590	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
591	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
592	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
593	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
594	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	604	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
595	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	605	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
596	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	606	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
597	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
598	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	607	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
599	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	608	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		609	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		610	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		611	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		612	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
600	else	613	else
		614	{
		615	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		616
		617	if (cmp > 0)
		618	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		619	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		620	else if (cmp == 0)
601	return true;	621	return true;
		622	}
602		623
603	return false;	624	return false;
604	}	625	}
605		626
606	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	627	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
607	{	628	{
608	char magic[8];	629	char magic[8];
609	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	630	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
610	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	631	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
611	u8 pad2, pad3;	632	u8 pad2, pad3;
612	rsaid id;	633	auth_encr encr;
613	rsaencrdata encr;
614		634
615	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	635	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
616	{	636	{
617	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	637	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
618	strncpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);	638	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
619	initiate = !!initiate_;	639	initiate = !!initiate_;
620	protocols = protocols_;	640	protocols = protocols_;
621		641
622	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	642	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
623	}	643	}
624	};	644	};
625		645
626	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	646	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
627	{	647	{
628	rsaid id;
629	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
630	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
631	rsaresponse response;	648	auth_response response;
632		649
633	auth_res_packet (int dst)	650	auth_res_packet (int dst)
634	{	651	{
635	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	652	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
636		653
637	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	654	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
638	}	655	}
639	};	656	};
640		657
…		…
670	};	687	};
671		688
672	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	689	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
673		690
674	void	691	void
675	connection::connection_established ()	692	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
676	{	693	{
677	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	694	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		695	return;
678		696
679	if (ictx && octx)	697	si = rsi;
		698	protocol = rsi.prot;
		699
		700	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		701	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		702	vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf) ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		703	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		704
		705	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		706	{
		707	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		708	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		709	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
680	{	710	}
		711
		712	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		713	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		714
		715	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		716	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		717
681	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	718	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
682	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);	719	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
683	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);	720	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		721
		722	hmac_error = 0.;
		723
684	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);	724	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
685		725
686	// send queued packets	726	// send queued packets
687	if (ictx && octx)
688	{
689	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())	727	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
690	{	728	{
691	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	729	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
692	delete p;	730	delete p;
693	}	731	}
694		732
695	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())	733	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
696	{	734	{
697	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);	735	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
698	delete p;	736	delete p;
699	}	737	}
700	}
701		738
702	vpn->connection_established (this);	739	vpn->connection_established (this);
703	}
704	else
705	{
706	retry_cnt = 0;
707	establish_connection.start (5);
708	keepalive.stop ();
709	rekey.stop ();
710	}
711	}	740	}
712		741
713	void	742	void
714	connection::reset_si ()	743	connection::reset_si ()
715	{	744	{
…		…
720	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);	749	slog (L_TRACE, _("%s: direct connection denied by config."), conf->nodename);
721	protocol = 0;	750	protocol = 0;
722	}	751	}
723		752
724	si.set (conf, protocol);	753	si.set (conf, protocol);
725
726	is_direct = si.valid ();
727	}	754	}
728		755
729	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary	756	// ensure sockinfo is valid, forward if necessary
730	const sockinfo &	757	const sockinfo &
731	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const	758	connection::forward_si (const sockinfo &si) const
…		…
750		777
751	void	778	void
752	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)	779	connection::send_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &si, int tos)
753	{	780	{
754	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))	781	if (!vpn->send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos))
755	reset_connection ();	782	reset_connection ("packet send error");
756	}	783	}
757		784
758	void	785	void
759	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)	786	connection::send_ping (const sockinfo &si, u8 pong)
760	{	787	{
761	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	788	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
762		789
763	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	790	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
764		791
765	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	792	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
766
767	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	793	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
768		794
769	delete pkt;	795	delete pkt;
770	}	796	}
771		797
…		…
786	void	812	void
787	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	813	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
788	{	814	{
789	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	815	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
790		816
791	rsachallenge chg;	817	generate_auth_data ();
792	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
793	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	818	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
794		819
795	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	820	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
796
797	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	821	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
798		822
799	delete pkt;	823	delete pkt;
800	}	824	}
801		825
802	void	826	void
803	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	827	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
804	{	828	{
805	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	829	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
806		830
807	pkt->id = id;	831	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof rcv_ecdh_b);
808		832	auth_hash (rcv_auth, rcv_ecdh_b, pkt->response.mac);
809	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
810
811	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
812		833
813	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	834	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
814
815	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	835	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
816		836
817	delete pkt;	837	delete pkt;
818	}	838	}
819		839
820	void	840	void
821	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	841	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
822	{	842	{
823	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	843	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
824	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	844	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		845	conf->protocols);
825		846
826	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	847	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
827		848
828	r->hmac_set (octx);	849	r->hmac_set (octx);
829	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	850	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
832	}	853	}
833		854
834	inline void	855	inline void
835	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	856	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
836	{	857	{
837	if (!ictx	858	if (!(ictx && octx)
838	&& conf != THISNODE	859	&& conf != THISNODE
839	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	860	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	861	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
841	&& !w.is_active ())	862	&& !w.is_active ())
842	{	863	{
843	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection	864	// a bit hacky, if ondemand, and packets are no longer queued, then reset the connection
844	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.	865	// and stop trying. should probably be handled by a per-connection expire handler.
845	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())	866	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ONDEMAND && vpn_queue.empty () && data_queue.empty ())
846	{	867	{
847	reset_connection ();	868	reset_connection ("no demand");
848	return;	869	return;
849	}	870	}
850		871
851	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();	872	last_establish_attempt = ev_now ();
852		873
…		…
854	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1	875	? (retry_cnt & 3) + 1
855	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));	876	: 1 << (retry_cnt >> 2));
856		877
857	reset_si ();	878	reset_si ();
858		879
859	bool slow = si.prot & PROT_SLOW;	880	bool slow = (si.prot & PROT_SLOW) \|\| (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power);
860		881
861	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))	882	if (si.prot && !si.host && vpn->can_direct (THISNODE, conf))
862	{	883	{
863	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */	884	/TODO/ /* start the timer so we don't recurse endlessly */
864	w.start (1);	885	w.start (1);
…		…
874		895
875	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);	896	slow = slow \|\| (dsi.prot & PROT_SLOW);
876		897
877	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))	898	if (dsi.valid () && auth_rate_limiter.can (dsi))
878	{	899	{
879	if (retry_cnt < 4)	900	// use ping after the first few retries
		901	// TODO: on rekeys, the other node might not interpret ping correctly,
		902	// TODO: as it will still have a valid connection
		903	if (retry_cnt < 4 && (!conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power))
880	send_auth_request (dsi, true);	904	send_auth_request (dsi, true);
881	else	905	else
882	send_ping (dsi, 0);	906	send_ping (dsi, 0);
883	}	907	}
884	}	908	}
885		909
886	retry_int *= slow ? 8. : 0.9;	910	retry_int *= slow ? 4. : 0.9;
887		911
888	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)	912	if (retry_int < conf->max_retry)
889	retry_cnt++;	913	retry_cnt++;
890	else	914	else
891	retry_int = conf->max_retry;	915	retry_int = conf->max_retry;
…		…
893	w.start (retry_int);	917	w.start (retry_int);
894	}	918	}
895	}	919	}
896		920
897	void	921	void
898	connection::reset_connection ()	922	connection::reset_connection (const char *reason)
899	{	923	{
900	if (ictx && octx)	924	if (ictx && octx)
901	{	925	{
902	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost"),	926	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection lost (%s)"),
903	conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	927	conf->nodename, (const char *)si, reason);
904		928
905	if (::conf.script_node_down)	929	if (::conf.script_node_down)
906	{	930	{
907	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;	931	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
908	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);	932	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_down> (this);
…		…
910	}	934	}
911	}	935	}
912		936
913	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	937	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
914	delete octx; octx = 0;	938	delete octx; octx = 0;
915	#if ENABLE_DNS
916	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
917	#endif
918		939
919	si.host = 0;	940	si.host = 0;
		941
		942	have_snd_auth = false;
		943	have_rcv_auth = false;
		944	auth_expire = 0.;
920		945
921	last_activity = 0.;	946	last_activity = 0.;
922	//last_si_change = 0.;	947	//last_si_change = 0.;
923	retry_cnt = 0;	948	retry_cnt = 0;
924		949
…		…
931	connection::shutdown ()	956	connection::shutdown ()
932	{	957	{
933	if (ictx && octx)	958	if (ictx && octx)
934	send_reset (si);	959	send_reset (si);
935		960
936	reset_connection ();	961	reset_connection ("shutdown");
937	}	962	}
938		963
939	// poor-man's rekeying	964	// poor-man's rekeying
940	inline void	965	inline void
941	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	966	connection::rekey_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
942	{	967	{
943	reset_connection ();	968	reset_connection ("rekeying");
944	establish_connection ();	969	establish_connection ();
945	}	970	}
946		971
947	void	972	void
948	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)	973	connection::send_data_packet (tap_packet *pkt)
…		…
965		990
966	void	991	void
967	connection::post_inject_queue ()	992	connection::post_inject_queue ()
968	{	993	{
969	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)	994	// force a connection every now and when when packets are sent (max 1/s)
970	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= 0.95) // arbitrary	995	if (ev_now () - last_establish_attempt >= (conf->low_power \|\| THISNODE->low_power ? 2.95 : 0.95)) // arbitrary
971	establish_connection.stop ();	996	establish_connection.stop ();
972		997
973	establish_connection ();	998	establish_connection ();
974	}	999	}
975		1000
…		…
983	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1008	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
984	post_inject_queue ();	1009	post_inject_queue ();
985	}	1010	}
986	}	1011	}
987		1012
		1013	void
988	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1014	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
989	{	1015	{
990	if (ictx && octx)	1016	if (ictx && octx)
991	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1017	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
992	else	1018	else
993	{	1019	{
…		…
999	void	1025	void
1000	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1026	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1001	{	1027	{
1002	last_activity = ev_now ();	1028	last_activity = ev_now ();
1003		1029
1004	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1030	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1005	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1031	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1006		1032
1007	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1033	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1008	return;	1034	return;
1009		1035
…		…
1019	{	1045	{
1020	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1046	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1021	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1047	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1022	}	1048	}
1023	else	1049	else
1024	// we would love to change thre socket address here, but ping's aren't	1050	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
1025	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.	1051	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1026	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1052	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1027		1053
1028	break;	1054	break;
1029		1055
1030	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1056	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
1031	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);	1057	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1058
		1059	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1060	// about our desire for communication.
		1061	establish_connection ();
1032	break;	1062	break;
1033		1063
1034	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1064	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
		1065	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_RESET", conf->nodename);
		1066
		1067	if (ictx && octx)
1035	{	1068	{
1036	reset_connection ();	1069	reset_connection ("remote reset");
1037		1070
1038	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1071	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1039		1072
1040	if (!p->chk_config ())	1073	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1041	{
1042	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1043	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1044	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1045	}
1046	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1047	establish_connection ();	1074	establish_connection ();
1048	}	1075	}
		1076
1049	break;	1077	break;
1050		1078
1051	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1079	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1052	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1080	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1053	{	1081	{
1054	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1082	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1055		1083
1056	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1084	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1085	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1086	p->protocols, p->features);
1057		1087
1058	if (p->chk_config () && !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))	1088	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1089	{
		1090	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1091	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1092	}
		1093	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1059	{	1094	{
1060	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1095	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1061	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1096	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1062	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1097	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1063	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1098	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1064		1099
1065	if (p->initiate)	1100	if (p->initiate)
		1101	{
1066	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1102	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1067		1103
1068	rsachallenge k;	1104	if (ictx && octx)
		1105	reset_connection ("reconnect");
		1106	}
1069		1107
		1108	auth_data auth;
		1109
1070	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1110	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1071	{	1111	{
1072	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1112	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1073	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1113	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1074	break;
1075	}	1114	}
1076	else	1115	else
1077	{	1116	{
1078	delete octx;	1117	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| !slow_memeq (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1079		1118
1080	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1119	rcv_auth = auth;
1081	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1120	have_rcv_auth = true;
1082		1121
		1122	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1123
		1124	if (chg)
		1125	{
1083	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1126	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1084	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1127	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1085		1128
1086	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1087
1088	connection_established ();	1129	connection_established (rsi);
1089
1090	break;	1130	}
1091	}	1131	}
		1132
		1133	break;
1092	}	1134	}
1093	else
1094	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1095	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1096		1135
1097	send_reset (rsi);	1136	send_reset (rsi);
1098	}	1137	}
1099		1138
1100	break;	1139	break;
…		…
1103	{	1142	{
1104	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;	1143	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1105		1144
1106	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1145	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1107		1146
1108	if (p->chk_config ())	1147	auth_mac local_mac;
		1148	auth_hash (snd_auth, p->response.ecdh, local_mac);
		1149
		1150	if (!slow_memeq (&p->response.mac, local_mac, sizeof local_mac))
1109	{	1151	{
1110	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1111	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1112	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1113	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1114
1115	rsachallenge chg;
1116
1117	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1118	{
1119	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1152	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1120	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1153	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1121	break;
1122	}	1154	}
1123	else	1155	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1124	{	1156	{
1125	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1157	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof snd_ecdh_b);
1126		1158
1127	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))	1159	have_snd_auth = true;
1128	{
1129	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1130	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1131	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1132	break;
1133	}
1134	else
1135	{
1136	rsaresponse h;
1137
1138	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1139
1140	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1141	{
1142	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1143
1144	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1145
1146	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1147
1148	si = rsi;
1149	protocol = rsi.prot;
1150
1151	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1152	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1153	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1154	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1155
1156	connection_established ();	1160	connection_established (rsi);
1157
1158	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1159	{
1160	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1161	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1162	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1163	}
1164
1165	break;
1166	}
1167	else
1168	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1169	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1170	}
1171
1172	delete cctx;
1173	}
1174	}	1161	}
1175	}	1162	}
1176
1177	send_reset (rsi);
1178	break;	1163	break;
1179		1164
1180	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:	1165	case vpn_packet::PT_DATA_COMPRESSED:
1181	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION	1166	#if !ENABLE_COMPRESSION
1182	send_reset (rsi);	1167	send_reset (rsi);
…		…
1188	if (ictx && octx)	1173	if (ictx && octx)
1189	{	1174	{
1190	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;	1175	vpndata_packet p = (vpndata_packet )pkt;
1191		1176
1192	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))	1177	if (!p->hmac_chk (ictx))
		1178	{
		1179	// rekeying often creates temporary hmac auth floods
		1180	// we assume they don't take longer than a few seconds normally,
		1181	// and suppress messages and resets during that time.
		1182	//TODO: should be done per source address
		1183	if (!hmac_error)
		1184	{
		1185	hmac_error = ev_now () + 3;
		1186	break;
		1187	}
		1188	else if (hmac_error >= ev_now ())
		1189	break; // silently suppress
		1190	else
		1191	{
1193	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"	1192	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error, received invalid packet\n"
1194	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),	1193	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1195	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1194	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1195	// reset
		1196	}
		1197	}
1196	else	1198	else
1197	{	1199	{
1198	u32 seqno;	1200	u32 seqno;
1199	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);	1201	tap_packet *d = p->unpack (this, seqno);
1200	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);	1202	int seqclass = iseqno.seqno_classify (seqno);
		1203
		1204	hmac_error = 0;
1201		1205
1202	if (seqclass == 0) // ok	1206	if (seqclass == 0) // ok
1203	{	1207	{
1204	vpn->tap->send (d);	1208	vpn->tap->send (d);
1205		1209
…		…
1210	// {	1214	// {
1211	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),	1215	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): changing socket address to %s."),
1212	conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);	1216	conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);
1213		1217
1214	si = rsi;	1218	si = rsi;
		1219
		1220	if (::conf.script_node_change)
		1221	{
		1222	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		1223	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_change> (this);
		1224	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-change command execution failed, continuing."));
		1225	}
		1226
1215	// }	1227	// }
1216	//else	1228	//else
1217	// slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),	1229	// slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): accepted packet from %s, not (yet) redirecting traffic."),
1218	// conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);	1230	// conf->nodename, (const char )si, (const char )rsi);
1219	}	1231	}
…		…
1240	break;	1252	break;
1241		1253
1242	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:	1254	case vpn_packet::PT_CONNECT_REQ:
1243	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))	1255	if (ictx && octx && rsi == si && pkt->hmac_chk (ictx))
1244	{	1256	{
1245	connect_req_packet p = (connect_req_packet ) pkt;	1257	connect_req_packet p = (connect_req_packet )pkt;
1246		1258
1247	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1259	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1248	{	1260	{
1249	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1261	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1250	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1262	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1251		1263
1252	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1264	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1253	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1265	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1266	p->protocols,
		1267	c->ictx && c->octx);
1254		1268
1255	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1269	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1256	{	1270	{
1257	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1271	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1258	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1272	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1281		1295
1282	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1296	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1283	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1297	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1284	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1298	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1285		1299
1286	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1300	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1301	conf->nodename,
1287	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1302	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1303	(const char *)p->si,
		1304	p->protocols,
		1305	protocol,
		1306	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1288	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1307	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1289		1308
1290	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1309	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1291		1310
1292	if (dsi.valid ())	1311	if (dsi.valid ())
1293	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1312	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1313	else
		1314	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1315	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1316	(const char *)p->si);
1294	}	1317	}
1295	else	1318	else
1296	slog (L_WARN,	1319	slog (L_WARN,
1297	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1320	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1298	p->id);	1321	p->id);
…		…
1307	}	1330	}
1308		1331
1309	inline void	1332	inline void
1310	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1333	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1311	{	1334	{
1312	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 30)	1335	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1336
		1337	if (when >= 0)
		1338	w.start (when);
		1339	else if (when < -15)
1313	{	1340	{
1314	reset_connection ();	1341	reset_connection ("keepalive overdue");
1315	establish_connection ();	1342	establish_connection ();
1316	}	1343	}
1317	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1318	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1319	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1344	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1320	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1345	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1321	{	1346	{
		1347	w.start (3);
1322	send_ping (si);	1348	send_ping (si);
1323	w.start (5);
1324	}	1349	}
1325	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1350	else if (when >= -10)
1326	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1351	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1327	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1352	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1328	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1353	w.start (when + 10);
1329	else	1354	else
1330	reset_connection ();	1355	reset_connection ("keepalive timeout");
1331	}	1356	}
1332		1357
		1358	void
1333	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1359	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1334	{	1360	{
1335	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1361	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1336		1362
1337	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1363	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1338	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1364	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1365	THISNODE->protocols);
1339	p->hmac_set (octx);	1366	p->hmac_set (octx);
1340	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1367	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1341		1368
1342	delete p;	1369	delete p;
1343	}	1370	}
1344		1371
		1372	void
1345	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1373	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1346	{	1374	{
1347	char *env;	1375	char *env;
1348	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1376	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1349	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1377	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1350	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1378	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1351	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1379	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1352	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1380	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1353	}	1381	}
1354		1382
		1383	void
1355	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1384	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1356	{	1385	{
1357	vpn->script_init_env ();	1386	vpn->script_init_env ();
1358		1387
1359	char *env;	1388	char *env;
1360	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1389	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
		1390	asprintf (&env, "DESTSI=%s", (const char *)si); putenv (env);
1361	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1391	asprintf (&env, "DESTNODE=%s", conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1362	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);	1392	asprintf (&env, "DESTIP=%s", si.ntoa ()); putenv (env);
1363	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);	1393	asprintf (&env, "DESTPORT=%d", ntohs (si.port)); putenv (env);
1364	}	1394	}
1365		1395
1366	inline const char *	1396	inline const char *
1367	connection::script_node_up ()	1397	connection::script_node_up ()
1368	{	1398	{
…		…
1373	char *filename;	1403	char *filename;
1374	asprintf (&filename,	1404	asprintf (&filename,
1375	"%s/%s",	1405	"%s/%s",
1376	confbase,	1406	confbase,
1377	::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");	1407	::conf.script_node_up ? ::conf.script_node_up : "node-up");
		1408
		1409	return filename;
		1410	}
		1411
		1412	inline const char *
		1413	connection::script_node_change ()
		1414	{
		1415	script_init_connect_env ();
		1416
		1417	putenv ((char *)"STATE=change");
		1418
		1419	char *filename;
		1420	asprintf (&filename,
		1421	"%s/%s",
		1422	confbase,
		1423	::conf.script_node_change ? ::conf.script_node_change : "node-change");
1378		1424
1379	return filename;	1425	return filename;
1380	}	1426	}
1381		1427
1382	inline const char *	1428	inline const char *
…		…
1408	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1454	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1409		1455
1410	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1456	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1411	octx = ictx = 0;	1457	octx = ictx = 0;
1412		1458
1413	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1414	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1415
1416	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1459	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1417		1460
1418	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1461	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1419	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1462	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1420	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1463	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
1421		1464
1422	reset_connection ();	1465	reset_connection ("startup");
1423	}	1466	}
1424		1467
1425	connection::~connection ()	1468	connection::~connection ()
1426	{	1469	{
1427	shutdown ();	1470	shutdown ();
1428	}	1471	}
1429		1472
		1473	void
1430	void connection_init ()	1474	connection_init ()
1431	{	1475	{
1432	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1476	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1433	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1477	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1434	}	1478	}
1435		1479

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.82 by pcg, Fri Aug 15 18:35:24 2008 UTC vs. Revision 1.113 by root, Thu Jan 29 00:21:39 2015 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.82 by pcg, Fri Aug 15 18:35:24 2008 UTC vs.
Revision 1.113 by root, Thu Jan 29 00:21:39 2015 UTC