[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.86 by pcg, Thu Jan 21 04:30:32 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.103 by root, Thu Jul 18 17:35:10 2013 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
43	#include "conf.h"	43	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	44	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	45	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	46	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	47	#include "connection.h"
		48	#include "hkdf.h"
48		49
49	#include "netcompat.h"	50	#include "netcompat.h"
50		51
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated)	52	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		53	#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57		54
58	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	55	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59	#define HLOG 15	56	#define HLOG 15
60	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	57	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	58	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
64	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	61	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65		62
66	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	63	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
67	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	64	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
68		65
		66	namespace
		67	{
69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
71	{	70	{
72	w.stop ();	71	w.stop ();
73		72
74	if (rs_queue.empty ())	73	if (rs_queue.empty ())
75	return;	74	return;
76		75
77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
78	if (pid)	77	if (pid)
79	{	78	{
80	w.set (pid);	79	w.set (pid);
81	w.start ();	80	w.start ();
82	}	81	}
83	else	82	else
84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
85		84
86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
87	rs_queue.pop ();	86	rs_queue.pop ();
88	}	87	}
		88	};
89		89
90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
91	static void	91	static void
92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
93	{	93	{
…		…
105	struct crypto_ctx	105	struct crypto_ctx
106	{	106	{
107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
108	HMAC_CTX hctx;	108	HMAC_CTX hctx;
109		109
110	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	110	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
111	~crypto_ctx ();	111	~crypto_ctx ();
112	};	112	};
113		113
114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
115	{	115	{
		116	ecdh_key s;
		117
		118	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		119
		120	{
		121	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		122	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		123
		124	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		125	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		126	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		127	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		128	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		129
		130	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		131	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		132	}
		133
		134	{
		135	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		136	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		137
		138	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		139	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		140	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		141	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		142	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		143
116	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	144	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
117	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	145	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
118	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	146	}
119	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
120	}	147	}
121		148
122	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	149	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
123	{	150	{
124	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	151	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
125	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	152	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
126	}	153	}
127		154
		155	static inline void
		156	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		157	{
		158	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		159	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		160	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		161	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		162
		163	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		164	}
		165
		166	static inline bool
		167	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		168	{
		169	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		170
		171	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		172	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		173	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		174	return 0;
		175
		176	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		177	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		178
		179	return 1;
		180	}
		181
128	static void	182	static void
129	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	183	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
130	{	184	{
131	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	185	HMAC_CTX ctx;
132		186
133	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	187	HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
134	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	188	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));	189	require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
136	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
137	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));	190	require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
138	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);	191	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
139	}	192	}
140		193
141	struct rsa_entry	194	void
		195	connection::generate_auth_data ()
142	{	196	{
143	tstamp expire;	197	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
144	rsaid id;
145	rsachallenge chg;
146	};
147
148	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
149	{
150	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
151
152	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
153	{
154	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
155	{	198	{
156	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	199	// request data
157	{	200	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
158	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	201	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
		202	auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
159		203
160	erase (i);	204	// eventual response data
161	return true;	205	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
162	}
163	}	206	}
164		207
165	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	208	// every use prolongs the expiry
166	cleaner.again ();
167
168	return false;
169	}
170
171	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
172	{
173	rsa_entry e;
174
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
176	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
177
178	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	209	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
179	e.id = id;
180	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
181
182	push_back (e);
183
184	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
185	cleaner.again ();
186	}
187
188	rsa_cache ()
189	{
190	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
191	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
192	}
193
194	} rsa_cache;
195
196	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
197	{
198	if (empty ())
199	w.stop ();
200	else
201	{
202	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
203	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
204	i = erase (i);
205	else
206	++i;
207	}
208	}	210	}
209		211
210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	212	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
211		213
212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	214	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
226	delete p;	228	delete p;
227		229
228	delete [] queue;	230	delete [] queue;
229	}	231	}
230		232
		233	void
231	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	234	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
232	{	235	{
233	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	236	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
234		237
235	for (;;)	238	for (;;)
236	{	239	{
…		…
247		250
248	delete get ();	251	delete get ();
249	}	252	}
250	}	253	}
251		254
		255	void
252	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	256	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
253	{	257	{
254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	258	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
255		259
256	// start expiry timer	260	// start expiry timer
257	if (empty ())	261	if (empty ())
…		…
266	queue[i].tstamp = now;	270	queue[i].tstamp = now;
267		271
268	i = ni;	272	i = ni;
269	}	273	}
270		274
271	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	275	net_packet *
		276	pkt_queue::get ()
272	{	277	{
273	if (empty ())	278	if (empty ())
274	return 0;	279	return 0;
275		280
276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	281	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
300		305
301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	306	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
302	bool can (u32 host);	307	bool can (u32 host);
303	};	308	};
304		309
305	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	310	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
306		311
		312	bool
307	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	313	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
308	{	314	{
309	iterator i;	315	iterator i;
310		316
311	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	317	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
312	if (i->host == host)	318	if (i->host == host)
…		…
359		365
360	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	366	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
361		367
362	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	368	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
363		369
		370	void
364	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	371	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)
365	{	372	{
366	unsigned int xlen;	373	unsigned int xlen;
367		374
368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	375	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
369		376
370	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	377	require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
371	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	378	require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
372	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	379	len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
373	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);	380	require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
374	}	381	}
375		382
376	void	383	void
377	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	384	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
378	{	385	{
…		…
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	394	hmac_gen (ctx);
388		395
389	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	396	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	397	}
391		398
		399	void
392	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	400	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
393	{	401	{
394	type = type_;	402	type = type_;
395		403
396	int src = THISNODE->id;	404	int src = THISNODE->id;
397		405
…		…
402		410
403	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	411	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
404	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	412	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
405		413
406	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	414	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		415	{
		416	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		417
		418	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		419	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		420
		421	private:
		422	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
407	{	423	{
408	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
409
410	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
411	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
412	private:
413
414	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
415	{
416	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	424	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
417	}
418	};	425	}
		426	};
419		427
420	void	428	void
421	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	429	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
422	{	430	{
423	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	431	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
441	d[1] = cl;	449	d[1] = cl;
442	}	450	}
443	}	451	}
444	#endif	452	#endif
445		453
446	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	454	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
447		455
448	struct {	456	struct {
449	#if RAND_SIZE	457	#if RAND_SIZE
450	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	458	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
451	#endif	459	#endif
452	u32 seqno;	460	u32 seqno;
453	} datahdr;	461	} datahdr;
454		462
455	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	463	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
456	#if RAND_SIZE	464	#if RAND_SIZE
457	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	465	// NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
		466	// is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
		467	conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
458	#endif	468	#endif
459		469
460	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	470	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
461	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	471	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
462	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	472	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
…		…
484	int outl = 0, outl2;	494	int outl = 0, outl2;
485	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	495	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
486	u8 *d;	496	u8 *d;
487	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	497	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
488		498
489	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	499	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
490		500
491	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	501	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
492	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	502	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
493		503
494	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	504	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
495	d = cdata;	505	d = cdata;
496	else	506	else
497	#endif	507	#endif
498	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	508	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
499		509
500	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	510	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		511	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		512	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		513	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		514	require ((u8 )(&p->len + 1) == &(p)[0]);
		515
		516	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
501	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	517	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
502	d, &outl2,	518	d, &outl2,
503	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	519	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
504	outl += outl2;	520	outl += outl2;
505		521
…		…
536	}	552	}
537	};	553	};
538		554
539	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	555	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
540	{	556	{
541	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac	557	u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
542	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
543	// hmacs simply will not work.
544	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	558	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
545	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	559	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
546	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	560	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
547		561
548	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	562	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
549	bool chk_config () const;	563	bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
550		564
551	static u8 get_features ()	565	static u8 get_features ()
552	{	566	{
553	u8 f = 0;	567	u8 f = 0;
554	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	568	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
…		…
562	#endif	576	#endif
563	return f;	577	return f;
564	}	578	}
565	};	579	};
566		580
		581	void
567	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	582	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
568	{	583	{
569	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	584	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
570	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	585	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
571	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	586	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
572	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
573	flags = 0;	587	flags = 0;
574	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
575	features = get_features ();	588	features = get_features ();
576		589
		590	strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		591
577	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	592	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
578	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
579	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	593	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		594	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
580		595
581	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	596	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
582	set_hdr (type, dst);	597	set_hdr (type, dst);
583	}	598	}
584		599
585	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	600	bool
		601	config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
586	{	602	{
587	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	603	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
588	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	604	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
		605	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	606	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
590	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	607	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
591	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)	608	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
592	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
593	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
594	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
595	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	609	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
596	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	610	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
597	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))	611	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
598	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
599	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	612	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	613	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		614	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		615	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		616	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
		617	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
601	else	618	else
		619	{
		620	int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
		621
		622	if (cmp > 0)
		623	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
		624	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		625	else if (cmp == 0)
602	return true;	626	return true;
		627	}
603		628
604	return false;	629	return false;
605	}	630	}
606		631
607	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	632	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
608	{	633	{
609	char magic[8];	634	char magic[8];
610	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	635	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
611	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	636	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
612	u8 pad2, pad3;	637	u8 pad2, pad3;
613	rsaid id;	638	auth_encr encr;
614	rsaencrdata encr;
615		639
616	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	640	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
617	{	641	{
618	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	642	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
619	strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8);	643	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
620	initiate = !!initiate_;	644	initiate = !!initiate_;
621	protocols = protocols_;	645	protocols = protocols_;
622		646
623	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	647	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
624	}	648	}
625	};	649	};
626		650
627	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	651	struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
628	{	652	{
629	rsaid id;
630	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
631	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
632	rsaresponse response;	653	auth_response response;
633		654
634	auth_res_packet (int dst)	655	auth_res_packet (int dst)
635	{	656	{
636	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	657	set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
637		658
638	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	659	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
639	}	660	}
640	};	661	};
641		662
…		…
671	};	692	};
672		693
673	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	694	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
674		695
675	void	696	void
676	connection::connection_established ()	697	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
677	{	698	{
678	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	699	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		700	return;
679		701
		702	si = rsi;
		703	protocol = rsi.prot;
		704
		705	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		706	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		707	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		708	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		709
		710	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		711	{
		712	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		713	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		714	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
		715	}
		716
		717	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		718	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		719
		720	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		721	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		722
		723	oiv.reset ();
		724
		725	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
		726	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
		727	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		728
		729	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
		730
		731	// send queued packets
680	if (ictx && octx)	732	if (ictx && octx)
681	{	733	{
682	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	734	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
683	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
684	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
685	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
686
687	// send queued packets
688	if (ictx && octx)
689	{	735	{
690	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
691	{
692	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	736	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
693	delete p;	737	delete p;
694	}
695
696	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
697	{
698	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
699	delete p;
700	}
701	}	738	}
702		739
		740	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
		741	{
		742	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
		743	delete p;
		744	}
		745	}
		746
703	vpn->connection_established (this);	747	vpn->connection_established (this);
704	}
705	else
706	{
707	retry_cnt = 0;
708	establish_connection.start (5);
709	keepalive.stop ();
710	rekey.stop ();
711	}
712	}	748	}
713		749
714	void	750	void
715	connection::reset_si ()	751	connection::reset_si ()
716	{	752	{
…		…
762	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	798	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
763		799
764	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	800	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
765		801
766	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	802	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767
768	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	803	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
769		804
770	delete pkt;	805	delete pkt;
771	}	806	}
772		807
…		…
787	void	822	void
788	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	823	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
789	{	824	{
790	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	825	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
791		826
792	rsachallenge chg;	827	generate_auth_data ();
793	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
794	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	828	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
795		829
796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	830	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
797
798	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	831	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
799		832
800	delete pkt;	833	delete pkt;
801	}	834	}
802		835
803	void	836	void
804	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	837	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
805	{	838	{
806	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	839	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
807		840
808	pkt->id = id;	841	auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
809		842	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
810	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
811
812	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
813		843
814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	844	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
815
816	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	845	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
817		846
818	delete pkt;	847	delete pkt;
819	}	848	}
820		849
821	void	850	void
822	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	851	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
823	{	852	{
824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	853	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
825	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	854	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		855	conf->protocols);
826		856
827	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	857	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
828		858
829	r->hmac_set (octx);	859	r->hmac_set (octx);
830	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	860	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
833	}	863	}
834		864
835	inline void	865	inline void
836	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	866	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
837	{	867	{
838	if (!ictx	868	if (!(ictx && octx)
839	&& conf != THISNODE	869	&& conf != THISNODE
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	870	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
841	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	871	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
842	&& !w.is_active ())	872	&& !w.is_active ())
843	{	873	{
…		…
911	}	941	}
912	}	942	}
913		943
914	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	944	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
915	delete octx; octx = 0;	945	delete octx; octx = 0;
916	#if ENABLE_DNS
917	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
918	#endif
919		946
920	si.host = 0;	947	si.host = 0;
		948
		949	have_snd_auth = false;
		950	have_rcv_auth = false;
		951	auth_expire = 0.;
921		952
922	last_activity = 0.;	953	last_activity = 0.;
923	//last_si_change = 0.;	954	//last_si_change = 0.;
924	retry_cnt = 0;	955	retry_cnt = 0;
925		956
…		…
984	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	1015	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
985	post_inject_queue ();	1016	post_inject_queue ();
986	}	1017	}
987	}	1018	}
988		1019
		1020	void
989	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1021	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
990	{	1022	{
991	if (ictx && octx)	1023	if (ictx && octx)
992	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1024	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
993	else	1025	else
994	{	1026	{
…		…
1000	void	1032	void
1001	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1033	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1002	{	1034	{
1003	last_activity = ev_now ();	1035	last_activity = ev_now ();
1004		1036
1005	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1037	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1006	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1038	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1007		1039
1008	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1040	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1009	return;	1041	return;
1010		1042
…		…
1020	{	1052	{
1021	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1053	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1022	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1054	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1023	}	1055	}
1024	else	1056	else
1025	// we would love to change thre socket address here, but ping's aren't	1057	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
1026	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.	1058	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1027	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1059	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1028		1060
1029	break;	1061	break;
1030		1062
1031	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1063	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
1032	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);	1064	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1065
		1066	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1067	// about our desire for communication.
		1068	establish_connection ();
1033	break;	1069	break;
1034		1070
1035	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1071	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1036	{	1072	{
1037	reset_connection ();	1073	reset_connection ();
1038		1074
1039	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;	1075	config_packet p = (config_packet ) pkt;
1040		1076
1041	if (!p->chk_config ())	1077	if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1042	{
1043	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1044	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1045	connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1046	}
1047	else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1048	establish_connection ();	1078	establish_connection ();
1049	}	1079	}
1050	break;	1080	break;
1051		1081
1052	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1082	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1053	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1083	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1054	{	1084	{
1055	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1085	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1056		1086
1057	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1087	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1088	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1089	p->protocols, p->features);
1058		1090
		1091	if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
		1092	{
		1093	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
		1094	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
		1095	}
1059	if (p->chk_config ()	1096	else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1060	&& (!strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) \|\| !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1061	{	1097	{
1062	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1098	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1063	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1099	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1064	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1100	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1065	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1101	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1066		1102
1067	if (p->initiate)	1103	if (p->initiate)
1068	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1104	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1069		1105
1070	rsachallenge k;	1106	auth_data auth;
1071		1107
1072	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1108	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1073	{	1109	{
1074	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1110	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1075	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1111	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1076	break;
1077	}	1112	}
1078	else	1113	else
1079	{	1114	{
1080	delete octx;	1115	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1081		1116
1082	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1117	rcv_auth = auth;
1083	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1118	have_rcv_auth = true;
1084		1119
		1120	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1121
		1122	if (chg)
		1123	{
1085	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1124	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1086	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1125	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1087		1126
1088	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1089
1090	connection_established ();	1127	connection_established (rsi);
1091
1092	break;	1128	}
1093	}	1129	}
		1130
		1131	break;
1094	}	1132	}
1095	else
1096	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1097	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1098		1133
1099	send_reset (rsi);	1134	send_reset (rsi);
1100	}	1135	}
1101		1136
1102	break;	1137	break;
…		…
1105	{	1140	{
1106	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;	1141	auth_res_packet p = (auth_res_packet )pkt;
1107		1142
1108	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1143	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1109		1144
1110	if (p->chk_config ())	1145	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1111	{	1146	{
1112	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1113	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1114	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1115	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1116
1117	rsachallenge chg;
1118
1119	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1120	{
1121	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1147	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1122	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1148	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1123	break;
1124	}
1125	else
1126	{
1127	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);
1128
1129	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1130	{
1131	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1132	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1133	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1134	break;
1135	}
1136	else
1137	{
1138	rsaresponse h;
1139
1140	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1141
1142	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1143	{
1144	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1145
1146	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1147
1148	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1149
1150	si = rsi;
1151	protocol = rsi.prot;
1152
1153	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1154	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1155	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1156	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1157
1158	connection_established ();
1159
1160	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1161	{
1162	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1163	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1164	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1165	}
1166
1167	break;
1168	}
1169	else
1170	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1171	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1172	}
1173
1174	delete cctx;
1175	}
1176	}	1149	}
		1150	else if (!have_snd_auth)
		1151	{
		1152	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
		1153
		1154	have_snd_auth = true;
		1155	connection_established (rsi);
		1156	}
		1157
		1158	break;
1177	}	1159	}
1178		1160
1179	send_reset (rsi);	1161	send_reset (rsi);
1180	break;	1162	break;
1181		1163
…		…
1257	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1239	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1258	{	1240	{
1259	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1241	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1260	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1242	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1261		1243
1262	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1244	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1263	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1245	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1246	p->protocols,
		1247	c->ictx && c->octx);
1264		1248
1265	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1249	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1266	{	1250	{
1267	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1251	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1268	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1252	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1291		1275
1292	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1276	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1293	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1277	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1294	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1278	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1295		1279
1296	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1280	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1281	conf->nodename,
1297	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1282	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1283	(const char *)p->si,
		1284	p->protocols,
		1285	protocol,
		1286	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1298	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1287	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1299		1288
1300	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1289	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1301		1290
1302	if (dsi.valid ())	1291	if (dsi.valid ())
1303	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1292	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1293	else
		1294	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1295	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1296	(const char *)p->si);
1304	}	1297	}
1305	else	1298	else
1306	slog (L_WARN,	1299	slog (L_WARN,
1307	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1300	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1308	p->id);	1301	p->id);
…		…
1317	}	1310	}
1318		1311
1319	inline void	1312	inline void
1320	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1313	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1321	{	1314	{
1322	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15)	1315	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1316
		1317	if (when >= 0)
		1318	w.start (when);
		1319	else if (when < -15)
1323	{	1320	{
1324	reset_connection ();	1321	reset_connection ();
1325	establish_connection ();	1322	establish_connection ();
1326	}	1323	}
1327	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1328	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1329	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1324	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1330	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1325	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1331	{	1326	{
		1327	w.start (3);
1332	send_ping (si);	1328	send_ping (si);
1333	w.start (3);
1334	}	1329	}
1335	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1330	else if (when >= -10)
1336	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1331	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1337	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1332	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1338	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1333	w.start (when + 10);
1339	else	1334	else
1340	reset_connection ();	1335	reset_connection ();
1341	}	1336	}
1342		1337
		1338	void
1343	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1339	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1344	{	1340	{
1345	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1341	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1346		1342
1347	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1343	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1348	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1344	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1345	THISNODE->protocols);
1349	p->hmac_set (octx);	1346	p->hmac_set (octx);
1350	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1347	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1351		1348
1352	delete p;	1349	delete p;
1353	}	1350	}
1354		1351
		1352	void
1355	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1353	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1356	{	1354	{
1357	char *env;	1355	char *env;
1358	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1356	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1359	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1357	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1360	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1358	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1361	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1359	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1362	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1360	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1363	}	1361	}
1364		1362
		1363	void
1365	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1364	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1366	{	1365	{
1367	vpn->script_init_env ();	1366	vpn->script_init_env ();
1368		1367
1369	char *env;	1368	char *env;
1370	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1369	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
…		…
1435	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1434	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1436		1435
1437	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1436	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1438	octx = ictx = 0;	1437	octx = ictx = 0;
1439		1438
1440	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1441	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1442
1443	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1439	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1444		1440
1445	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1441	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1446	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1442	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1447	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1443	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
…		…
1452	connection::~connection ()	1448	connection::~connection ()
1453	{	1449	{
1454	shutdown ();	1450	shutdown ();
1455	}	1451	}
1456		1452
		1453	void
1457	void connection_init ()	1454	connection_init ()
1458	{	1455	{
1459	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1456	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1460	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1457	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1461	}	1458	}
1462		1459

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.86 by pcg, Thu Jan 21 04:30:32 2010 UTC vs. Revision 1.103 by root, Thu Jul 18 17:35:10 2013 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.86 by pcg, Thu Jan 21 04:30:32 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.103 by root, Thu Jul 18 17:35:10 2013 UTC