[ViewVC] Diff of: cvs/gvpe/src/connection.C

Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.88 by root, Thu Dec 2 07:15:14 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.102 by root, Thu Jul 18 13:35:16 2013 UTC

…		…
1	/*	1	/*
2	connection.C -- manage a single connection	2	connection.C -- manage a single connection
3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>	3	Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4		4
5	This file is part of GVPE.	5	This file is part of GVPE.
6		6
7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it	7	GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the	8	under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
43	#include "conf.h"	43	#include "conf.h"
44	#include "slog.h"	44	#include "slog.h"
45	#include "device.h"	45	#include "device.h"
46	#include "vpn.h"	46	#include "vpn.h"
47	#include "connection.h"	47	#include "connection.h"
		48	#include "hkdf.h"
48		49
49	#include "netcompat.h"	50	#include "netcompat.h"
50		51
51	#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52	# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53	#endif
54
55	#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated)	52	#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
		53	#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57		54
58	#define ULTRA_FAST 1	55	#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59	#define HLOG 15	56	#define HLOG 15
60	#include "lzf/lzf.h"	57	#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"	58	#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
…		…
64	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	61	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
65		62
66	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;	63	static std::queue< std::pair<run_script_cb , const char > > rs_queue;
67	static ev::child rs_child_ev;	64	static ev::child rs_child_ev;
68		65
		66	namespace
		67	{
69	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(	68	void // c++ requires external linkage here, apparently :(
70	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)	69	rs_child_cb (ev::child &w, int revents)
71	{	70	{
72	w.stop ();	71	w.stop ();
73		72
74	if (rs_queue.empty ())	73	if (rs_queue.empty ())
75	return;	74	return;
76		75
77	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);	76	pid_t pid = run_script (*rs_queue.front ().first, false);
78	if (pid)	77	if (pid)
79	{	78	{
80	w.set (pid);	79	w.set (pid);
81	w.start ();	80	w.start ();
82	}	81	}
83	else	82	else
84	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);	83	slog (L_WARN, rs_queue.front ().second);
85		84
86	delete rs_queue.front ().first;	85	delete rs_queue.front ().first;
87	rs_queue.pop ();	86	rs_queue.pop ();
88	}	87	}
		88	};
89		89
90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack	90	// despite the fancy name, this is quite a hack
91	static void	91	static void
92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)	92	run_script_queued (run_script_cb cb, const char warnmsg)
93	{	93	{
…		…
105	struct crypto_ctx	105	struct crypto_ctx
106	{	106	{
107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;	107	EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
108	HMAC_CTX hctx;	108	HMAC_CTX hctx;
109		109
110	crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc);	110	crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
111	~crypto_ctx ();	111	~crypto_ctx ();
112	};	112	};
113		113
114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc)	114	crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
115	{	115	{
		116	ecdh_key s;
		117
		118	curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
		119
		120	{
		121	u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
		122	static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
		123
		124	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		125	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
		126	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		127	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		128	kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
		129
		130	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
		131	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
		132	}
		133
		134	{
		135	u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
		136	static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
		137
		138	hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
		139	kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
		140	kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
		141	kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
		142	kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
		143
116	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);	144	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
117	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc));	145	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
118	HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);	146	}
119	HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
120	}	147	}
121		148
122	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()	149	crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
123	{	150	{
124	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));	151	require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
125	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);	152	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
126	}	153	}
127		154
		155	static inline void
		156	auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
		157	{
		158	if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
		159	(unsigned char )&auth.rsa, (unsigned char )&encr.rsa,
		160	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
		161	fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
		162
		163	memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
		164	}
		165
		166	static inline bool
		167	auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
		168	{
		169	u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
		170
		171	if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
		172	(const unsigned char )&encr.rsa, (unsigned char )rsa_decrypt,
		173	key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
		174	return 0;
		175
		176	memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
		177	memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
		178
		179	return 1;
		180	}
		181
128	static void	182	static void
129	rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h)	183	auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
130	{	184	{
131	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;	185	HMAC_CTX ctx;
132		186
133	EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx);	187	HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
134	require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH));	188	require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
135	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg));	189	require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
136	require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
137	require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0));	190	require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
138	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);	191	HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
139	}	192	}
140		193
141	struct rsa_entry	194	void
		195	connection::generate_auth_data ()
142	{	196	{
143	tstamp expire;	197	if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
144	rsaid id;
145	rsachallenge chg;
146	};
147
148	struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
149	{
150	inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
151
152	bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
153	{
154	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
155	{	198	{
156	if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ())	199	// request data
157	{	200	rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
158	memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg);	201	curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
		202	auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
159		203
160	erase (i);	204	// eventual response data
161	return true;	205	curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
162	}
163	}	206	}
164		207
165	if (!cleaner.is_active ())	208	// every use prolongs the expiry
166	cleaner.again ();
167
168	return false;
169	}
170
171	void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
172	{
173	rsa_entry e;
174
175	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
176	RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
177
178	e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL;	209	auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
179	e.id = id;
180	memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
181
182	push_back (e);
183
184	if (!cleaner.is_active ())
185	cleaner.again ();
186	}
187
188	rsa_cache ()
189	{
190	cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
191	cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
192	}
193
194	} rsa_cache;
195
196	void rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
197	{
198	if (empty ())
199	w.stop ();
200	else
201	{
202	for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
203	if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
204	i = erase (i);
205	else
206	++i;
207	}
208	}	210	}
209		211
210	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	212	//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
211		213
212	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)	214	pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
…		…
226	delete p;	228	delete p;
227		229
228	delete [] queue;	230	delete [] queue;
229	}	231	}
230		232
		233	void
231	void pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	234	pkt_queue::expire_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
232	{	235	{
233	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;	236	ev_tstamp expire = ev_now () - max_ttl;
234		237
235	for (;;)	238	for (;;)
236	{	239	{
…		…
247		250
248	delete get ();	251	delete get ();
249	}	252	}
250	}	253	}
251		254
		255	void
252	void pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)	256	pkt_queue::put (net_packet *p)
253	{	257	{
254	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();	258	ev_tstamp now = ev_now ();
255		259
256	// start expiry timer	260	// start expiry timer
257	if (empty ())	261	if (empty ())
…		…
266	queue[i].tstamp = now;	270	queue[i].tstamp = now;
267		271
268	i = ni;	272	i = ni;
269	}	273	}
270		274
271	net_packet *pkt_queue::get ()	275	net_packet *
		276	pkt_queue::get ()
272	{	277	{
273	if (empty ())	278	if (empty ())
274	return 0;	279	return 0;
275		280
276	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;	281	net_packet *p = queue[j].pkt;
…		…
300		305
301	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }	306	bool can (const sockinfo &si) { return can((u32)si.host); }
302	bool can (u32 host);	307	bool can (u32 host);
303	};	308	};
304		309
305	net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;	310	static net_rate_limiter auth_rate_limiter, reset_rate_limiter;
306		311
		312	bool
307	bool net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)	313	net_rate_limiter::can (u32 host)
308	{	314	{
309	iterator i;	315	iterator i;
310		316
311	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )	317	for (i = begin (); i != end (); )
312	if (i->host == host)	318	if (i->host == host)
…		…
359		365
360	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	366	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
361		367
362	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	368	unsigned char hmac_packet::hmac_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
363		369
		370	void
364	void hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)	371	hmac_packet::hmac_gen (crypto_ctx *ctx)
365	{	372	{
366	unsigned int xlen;	373	unsigned int xlen;
367		374
368	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;	375	HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
369		376
370	HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0);	377	require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
371	HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),	378	require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
372	len - sizeof (hmac_packet));	379	len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
373	HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen);	380	require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
374	}	381	}
375		382
376	void	383	void
377	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)	384	hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
378	{	385	{
…		…
387	hmac_gen (ctx);	394	hmac_gen (ctx);
388		395
389	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);	396	return !memcmp (hmac, hmac_digest, HMACLENGTH);
390	}	397	}
391		398
		399	void
392	void vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)	400	vpn_packet::set_hdr (ptype type_, unsigned int dst)
393	{	401	{
394	type = type_;	402	type = type_;
395		403
396	int src = THISNODE->id;	404	int src = THISNODE->id;
397		405
…		…
402		410
403	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)	411	#define MAXVPNDATA (MAX_MTU - 6 - 6)
404	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)	412	#define DATAHDR (sizeof (u32) + RAND_SIZE)
405		413
406	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet	414	struct vpndata_packet : vpn_packet
		415	{
		416	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
		417
		418	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
		419	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
		420
		421	private:
		422	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
407	{	423	{
408	u8 data[MAXVPNDATA + DATAHDR]; // seqno
409
410	void setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 len, u32 seqno);
411	tap_packet unpack (connection conn, u32 &seqno);
412	private:
413
414	const u32 data_hdr_size () const
415	{
416	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;	424	return sizeof (vpndata_packet) - sizeof (net_packet) - MAXVPNDATA - DATAHDR;
417	}
418	};	425	}
		426	};
419		427
420	void	428	void
421	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)	429	vpndata_packet::setup (connection conn, int dst, u8 d, u32 l, u32 seqno)
422	{	430	{
423	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;	431	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = &conn->octx->cctx;
…		…
441	d[1] = cl;	449	d[1] = cl;
442	}	450	}
443	}	451	}
444	#endif	452	#endif
445		453
446	require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	454	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
447		455
448	struct {	456	struct {
449	#if RAND_SIZE	457	#if RAND_SIZE
450	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];	458	u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
451	#endif	459	#endif
452	u32 seqno;	460	u32 seqno;
453	} datahdr;	461	} datahdr;
454		462
455	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);	463	datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
456	#if RAND_SIZE	464	#if RAND_SIZE
457	RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);	465	// NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
		466	// is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
		467	conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
458	#endif	468	#endif
459		469
460	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,	470	require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
461	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,	471	(unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
462	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));	472	(unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
…		…
484	int outl = 0, outl2;	494	int outl = 0, outl2;
485	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;	495	tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
486	u8 *d;	496	u8 *d;
487	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();	497	u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
488		498
489	require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));	499	require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
490		500
491	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION	501	#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
492	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];	502	u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
493		503
494	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)	504	if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
495	d = cdata;	505	d = cdata;
496	else	506	else
497	#endif	507	#endif
498	d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR];	508	d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
499		509
500	/* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */	510	// we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
		511	// pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
		512	// this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
		513	require (DATAHDR <= 16);
		514	require ((u8 )(&p->len + 1) == &(p)[0]);
		515
		516	// this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
501	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,	517	require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
502	d, &outl2,	518	d, &outl2,
503	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));	519	(unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
504	outl += outl2;	520	outl += outl2;
505		521
…		…
536	}	552	}
537	};	553	};
538		554
539	struct config_packet : vpn_packet	555	struct config_packet : vpn_packet
540	{	556	{
541	// actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
542	// field comes before this data, so peers with other
543	// hmacs simply will not work.
544	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen;	557	u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
545	u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3;	558	u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
546	u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid;	559	u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
547		560
548	void setup (ptype type, int dst);	561	void setup (ptype type, int dst);
549	bool chk_config () const;	562	bool chk_config () const;
550		563
551	static u8 get_features ()	564	static u8 get_features ()
…		…
562	#endif	575	#endif
563	return f;	576	return f;
564	}	577	}
565	};	578	};
566		579
		580	void
567	void config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)	581	config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
568	{	582	{
569	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;	583	prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
570	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;	584	prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
571	randsize = RAND_SIZE;	585	randsize = RAND_SIZE;
572	hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
573	flags = 0;	586	flags = 0;
574	challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
575	features = get_features ();	587	features = get_features ();
576		588
577	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	589	cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
578	digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
579	hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	590	mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		591	auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
580		592
581	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	593	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
582	set_hdr (type, dst);	594	set_hdr (type, dst);
583	}	595	}
584		596
		597	bool
585	bool config_packet::chk_config () const	598	config_packet::chk_config () const
586	{	599	{
587	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)	600	if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
588	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);	601	slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
589	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)	602	else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
590	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);	603	slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
591	else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
592	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
593	else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
594	slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
595	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)))	604	else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
596	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER));	605	slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
597	else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
598	slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
599	else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)))	606	else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
600	slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST));	607	slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
		608	else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
		609	slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
601	else	610	else
602	return true;	611	return true;
603		612
604	return false;	613	return false;
605	}	614	}
606		615
607	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet	616	struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
608	{	617	{
609	char magic[8];	618	char magic[8];
610	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply	619	u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
611	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)	620	u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
612	u8 pad2, pad3;	621	u8 pad2, pad3;
613	rsaid id;	622	auth_encr encr;
614	rsaencrdata encr;
615		623
616	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)	624	auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
617	{	625	{
618	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);	626	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
619	strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8);	627	memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
620	initiate = !!initiate_;	628	initiate = !!initiate_;
621	protocols = protocols_;	629	protocols = protocols_;
622		630
623	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);	631	len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
624	}	632	}
625	};	633	};
626		634
627	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet	635	struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
628	{	636	{
629	rsaid id;
630	u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
631	u8 response_len; // encrypted length
632	rsaresponse response;	637	auth_response response;
633		638
634	auth_res_packet (int dst)	639	auth_res_packet (int dst)
635	{	640	{
636	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);	641	config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
637		642
…		…
671	};	676	};
672		677
673	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////	678	/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
674		679
675	void	680	void
676	connection::connection_established ()	681	connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
677	{	682	{
678	slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx);	683	if (!have_snd_auth \|\| !have_rcv_auth)
		684	return;
679		685
		686	si = rsi;
		687	protocol = rsi.prot;
		688
		689	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
		690	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		691	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
		692	PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
		693
		694	if (::conf.script_node_up)
		695	{
		696	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
		697	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
		698	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
		699	}
		700
		701	delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
		702	iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
		703
		704	delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
		705	oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
		706
		707	oiv.reset ();
		708
		709	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
		710	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
		711	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
		712
		713	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
		714
		715	// send queued packets
680	if (ictx && octx)	716	if (ictx && octx)
681	{	717	{
682	// make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric	718	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
683	ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
684	rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
685	keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
686
687	// send queued packets
688	if (ictx && octx)
689	{	719	{
690	while (tap_packet p = (tap_packet )data_queue.get ())
691	{
692	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);	720	if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
693	delete p;	721	delete p;
694	}
695
696	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
697	{
698	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
699	delete p;
700	}
701	}	722	}
702		723
		724	while (vpn_packet p = (vpn_packet )vpn_queue.get ())
		725	{
		726	if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
		727	delete p;
		728	}
		729	}
		730
703	vpn->connection_established (this);	731	vpn->connection_established (this);
704	}
705	else
706	{
707	retry_cnt = 0;
708	establish_connection.start (5);
709	keepalive.stop ();
710	rekey.stop ();
711	}
712	}	732	}
713		733
714	void	734	void
715	connection::reset_si ()	735	connection::reset_si ()
716	{	736	{
…		…
762	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;	782	ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
763		783
764	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);	784	pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
765		785
766	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);	786	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
767
768	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);	787	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
769		788
770	delete pkt;	789	delete pkt;
771	}	790	}
772		791
…		…
787	void	806	void
788	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)	807	connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
789	{	808	{
790	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);	809	auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
791		810
792	rsachallenge chg;	811	generate_auth_data ();
793	rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
794	rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr);	812	auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
795		813
796	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
797
798	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly	815	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY \| IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
799		816
800	delete pkt;	817	delete pkt;
801	}	818	}
802		819
803	void	820	void
804	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg)	821	connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
805	{	822	{
806	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);	823	auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
807		824
808	pkt->id = id;	825	auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
809		826	memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
810	rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
811
812	pkt->hmac_set (octx);
813		827
814	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);	828	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
815
816	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly	829	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
817		830
818	delete pkt;	831	delete pkt;
819	}	832	}
820		833
821	void	834	void
822	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)	835	connection::send_connect_info (int rid, const sockinfo &rsi, u8 rprotocols)
823	{	836	{
824	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s)", conf->nodename,	837	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x)", conf->nodename,
825	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	838	vpn->conns[rid - 1]->conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
		839	conf->protocols);
826		840
827	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);	841	connect_info_packet *r = new connect_info_packet (conf->id, rid, rsi, rprotocols);
828		842
829	r->hmac_set (octx);	843	r->hmac_set (octx);
830	send_vpn_packet (r, si);	844	send_vpn_packet (r, si);
…		…
833	}	847	}
834		848
835	inline void	849	inline void
836	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	850	connection::establish_connection_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
837	{	851	{
838	if (!ictx	852	if (!(ictx && octx)
839	&& conf != THISNODE	853	&& conf != THISNODE
840	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER	854	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_NEVER
841	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED	855	&& connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED
842	&& !w.is_active ())	856	&& !w.is_active ())
843	{	857	{
…		…
911	}	925	}
912	}	926	}
913		927
914	delete ictx; ictx = 0;	928	delete ictx; ictx = 0;
915	delete octx; octx = 0;	929	delete octx; octx = 0;
916	#if ENABLE_DNS
917	dnsv4_reset_connection ();
918	#endif
919		930
920	si.host = 0;	931	si.host = 0;
		932
		933	have_snd_auth = false;
		934	have_rcv_auth = false;
		935	auth_expire = 0.;
921		936
922	last_activity = 0.;	937	last_activity = 0.;
923	//last_si_change = 0.;	938	//last_si_change = 0.;
924	retry_cnt = 0;	939	retry_cnt = 0;
925		940
…		…
984	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));	999	data_queue.put (new tap_packet (*pkt));
985	post_inject_queue ();	1000	post_inject_queue ();
986	}	1001	}
987	}	1002	}
988		1003
		1004	void
989	void connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)	1005	connection::inject_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, int tos)
990	{	1006	{
991	if (ictx && octx)	1007	if (ictx && octx)
992	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);	1008	send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, tos);
993	else	1009	else
994	{	1010	{
…		…
1000	void	1016	void
1001	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)	1017	connection::recv_vpn_packet (vpn_packet *pkt, const sockinfo &rsi)
1002	{	1018	{
1003	last_activity = ev_now ();	1019	last_activity = ev_now ();
1004		1020
1005	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",	1021	slog (L_NOISE, "%s >> received packet type %d from %d to %d.",
1006	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());	1022	conf->nodename, pkt->typ (), pkt->src (), pkt->dst ());
1007		1023
1008	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1024	if (connectmode == conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1009	return;	1025	return;
1010		1026
…		…
1014	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);	1030	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PING", conf->nodename);
1015		1031
1016	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,	1032	// we send pings instead of auth packets after some retries,
1017	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection	1033	// so reset the retry counter and establish a connection
1018	// when we receive a ping.	1034	// when we receive a ping.
1019	if (!(ictx && octx))	1035	if (!ictx)
1020	{	1036	{
1021	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1037	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1022	send_auth_request (rsi, true);	1038	send_auth_request (rsi, true);
1023	}	1039	}
1024	else	1040	else
1025	// we would love to change thre socket address here, but ping's aren't	1041	// we would love to change the socket address here, but ping's aren't
1026	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.	1042	// authenticated, so we best ignore it.
1027	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong	1043	send_ping (rsi, 1); // pong
1028		1044
1029	break;	1045	break;
1030		1046
1031	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:	1047	case vpn_packet::PT_PONG:
1032	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);	1048	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_PONG", conf->nodename);
		1049
		1050	// a PONG might mean that the other side doesn't really know
		1051	// about our desire for communication.
		1052	establish_connection ();
1033	break;	1053	break;
1034		1054
1035	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:	1055	case vpn_packet::PT_RESET:
1036	{	1056	{
1037	reset_connection ();	1057	reset_connection ();
…		…
1050	break;	1070	break;
1051		1071
1052	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:	1072	case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
1053	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))	1073	if (auth_rate_limiter.can (rsi))
1054	{	1074	{
1055	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet ) pkt;	1075	auth_req_packet p = (auth_req_packet )pkt;
1056		1076
1057	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s)", conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply");	1077	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
		1078	conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
		1079	p->protocols, p->features);
1058		1080
1059	if (p->chk_config ()	1081	if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1060	&& (!strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) \|\| !strncmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1061	{	1082	{
1062	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1083	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1063	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),	1084	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1064	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,	1085	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1065	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);	1086	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1066		1087
1067	if (p->initiate)	1088	if (p->initiate)
1068	send_auth_request (rsi, false);	1089	send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1069		1090
1070	rsachallenge k;	1091	auth_data auth;
1071		1092
1072	if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k))	1093	if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1073	{	1094	{
1074	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),	1095	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1075	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));	1096	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1076	break;
1077	}	1097	}
1078	else	1098	else
1079	{	1099	{
1080	delete octx;	1100	bool chg = !have_rcv_auth \|\| memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1081		1101
1082	octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1);	1102	rcv_auth = auth;
1083	oseqno = ntohl ((u32 )&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff;	1103	have_rcv_auth = true;
1084		1104
		1105	send_auth_response (rsi);
		1106
		1107	if (chg)
		1108	{
1085	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1109	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1086	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();	1110	features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1087		1111
1088	send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1089
1090	connection_established ();	1112	connection_established (rsi);
1091
1092	break;	1113	}
1093	}	1114	}
		1115
		1116	break;
1094	}	1117	}
1095	else	1118	else
1096	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),	1119	slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1097	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1120	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1098		1121
…		…
1107		1130
1108	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);	1131	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1109		1132
1110	if (p->chk_config ())	1133	if (p->chk_config ())
1111	{	1134	{
1112	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)	1135	if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1113	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1114	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1115	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1116
1117	rsachallenge chg;
1118
1119	if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1120	{	1136	{
1121	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."),	1137	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1122	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1138	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1123	break;
1124	}	1139	}
1125	else	1140	else if (!have_snd_auth)
1126	{	1141	{
1127	crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);	1142	if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1128		1143	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1129	if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1130	{
1131	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1132	"could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1133	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);	1144	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1134	break;	1145	PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1135	}
1136	else
1137	{
1138	rsaresponse h;
1139		1146
1140	rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1141
1142	if (!memcmp ((u8 )&h, (u8 )p->response, sizeof h))
1143	{
1144	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;	1147	prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
		1148	memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1145		1149
1146	delete ictx; ictx = cctx;	1150	have_snd_auth = true;
1147
1148	iseqno.reset (ntohl ((u32 )&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1149
1150	si = rsi;
1151	protocol = rsi.prot;
1152
1153	slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1154	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1155	is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1156	p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1157
1158	connection_established ();	1151	connection_established (rsi);
1159
1160	if (::conf.script_node_up)
1161	{
1162	run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1163	cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1164	run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1165	}
1166
1167	break;
1168	}
1169	else
1170	slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1171	conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1172	}
1173
1174	delete cctx;
1175	}	1152	}
		1153
		1154	break;
1176	}	1155	}
1177	}	1156	}
1178		1157
1179	send_reset (rsi);	1158	send_reset (rsi);
1180	break;	1159	break;
…		…
1257	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())	1236	if (p->id > 0 && p->id <= vpn->conns.size ())
1258	{	1237	{
1259	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];	1238	connection *c = vpn->conns[p->id - 1];
1260	conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1239	conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1261		1240
1262	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s) [%d]",	1241	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x) [%d]",
1263	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, c->ictx && c->octx);	1242	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1243	p->protocols,
		1244	c->ictx && c->octx);
1264		1245
1265	if (c->ictx && c->octx)	1246	if (c->ictx && c->octx)
1266	{	1247	{
1267	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is	1248	// send connect_info packets to both sides, in case one is
1268	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)	1249	// behind a nat firewall (or both ;)
…		…
1291		1272
1292	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;	1273	c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1293	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));	1274	protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1294	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);	1275	p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1295		1276
1296	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s) [%d]",	1277	slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
		1278	conf->nodename,
1297	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,	1279	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1280	(const char *)p->si,
		1281	p->protocols,
		1282	protocol,
		1283	p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1298	(const char *)p->si, !c->ictx && !c->octx);	1284	!c->ictx && !c->octx);
1299		1285
1300	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);	1286	const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1301		1287
1302	if (dsi.valid ())	1288	if (dsi.valid ())
1303	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);	1289	c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
		1290	else
		1291	slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
		1292	vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1293	(const char *)p->si);
1304	}	1294	}
1305	else	1295	else
1306	slog (L_WARN,	1296	slog (L_WARN,
1307	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),	1297	_("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1308	p->id);	1298	p->id);
…		…
1317	}	1307	}
1318		1308
1319	inline void	1309	inline void
1320	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)	1310	connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1321	{	1311	{
1322	if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15)	1312	ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
		1313
		1314	if (when >= 0)
		1315	w.start (when);
		1316	else if (when < -15)
1323	{	1317	{
1324	reset_connection ();	1318	reset_connection ();
1325	establish_connection ();	1319	establish_connection ();
1326	}	1320	}
1327	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1328	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1329	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND	1321	else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1330	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)	1322	\|\| THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1331	{	1323	{
		1324	w.start (3);
1332	send_ping (si);	1325	send_ping (si);
1333	w.start (3);
1334	}	1326	}
1335	else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10)	1327	else if (when >= -10)
1336	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer	1328	// hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1337	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)	1329	// should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1338	w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ());	1330	w.start (when + 10);
1339	else	1331	else
1340	reset_connection ();	1332	reset_connection ();
1341	}	1333	}
1342		1334
		1335	void
1343	void connection::send_connect_request (int id)	1336	connection::send_connect_request (int id)
1344	{	1337	{
1345	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, conf->protocols);	1338	connect_req_packet *p = new connect_req_packet (conf->id, id, THISNODE->protocols);
1346		1339
1347	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s)",	1340	slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_CONNECT_REQ(%s,p%02x)",
1348	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename);	1341	conf->nodename, vpn->conns[id - 1]->conf->nodename,
		1342	THISNODE->protocols);
1349	p->hmac_set (octx);	1343	p->hmac_set (octx);
1350	send_vpn_packet (p, si);	1344	send_vpn_packet (p, si);
1351		1345
1352	delete p;	1346	delete p;
1353	}	1347	}
1354		1348
		1349	void
1355	void connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)	1350	connection::script_init_env (const char *ext)
1356	{	1351	{
1357	char *env;	1352	char *env;
1358	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);	1353	asprintf (&env, "IFUPDATA%s=%s", ext, conf->if_up_data); putenv (env);
1359	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);	1354	asprintf (&env, "NODENAME%s=%s", ext, conf->nodename); putenv (env);
1360	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,	1355	asprintf (&env, "MAC%s=%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", ext,
1361	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,	1356	0xfe, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x00, conf->id >> 8,
1362	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);	1357	conf->id & 0xff); putenv (env);
1363	}	1358	}
1364		1359
		1360	void
1365	void connection::script_init_connect_env ()	1361	connection::script_init_connect_env ()
1366	{	1362	{
1367	vpn->script_init_env ();	1363	vpn->script_init_env ();
1368		1364
1369	char *env;	1365	char *env;
1370	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);	1366	asprintf (&env, "DESTID=%d", conf->id); putenv (env);
…		…
1435	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);	1431	establish_connection.set<connection, &connection::establish_connection_cb> (this);
1436		1432
1437	last_establish_attempt = 0.;	1433	last_establish_attempt = 0.;
1438	octx = ictx = 0;	1434	octx = ictx = 0;
1439		1435
1440	if (!conf->protocols) // make sure some protocol is enabled
1441	conf->protocols = PROT_UDPv4;
1442
1443	connectmode = conf->connectmode;	1436	connectmode = conf->connectmode;
1444		1437
1445	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt	1438	// queue a dummy packet to force an initial connection attempt
1446	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)	1439	if (connectmode != conf_node::C_ALWAYS && connectmode != conf_node::C_DISABLED)
1447	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);	1440	vpn_queue.put (new net_packet);
…		…
1452	connection::~connection ()	1445	connection::~connection ()
1453	{	1446	{
1454	shutdown ();	1447	shutdown ();
1455	}	1448	}
1456		1449
		1450	void
1457	void connection_init ()	1451	connection_init ()
1458	{	1452	{
1459	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();	1453	auth_rate_limiter.clear ();
1460	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();	1454	reset_rate_limiter.clear ();
1461	}	1455	}
1462		1456

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents): Revision 1.88 by root, Thu Dec 2 07:15:14 2010 UTC vs. Revision 1.102 by root, Thu Jul 18 13:35:16 2013 UTC

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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.88 by root, Thu Dec 2 07:15:14 2010 UTC vs.
Revision 1.102 by root, Thu Jul 18 13:35:16 2013 UTC