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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.95 by root, Tue Mar 8 17:33:30 2011 UTC vs.
Revision 1.103 by root, Thu Jul 18 17:35:10 2013 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
43#include "conf.h" 43#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 44#include "slog.h"
45#include "device.h" 45#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 46#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 47#include "connection.h"
48#include "hkdf.h"
48 49
49#include "netcompat.h" 50#include "netcompat.h"
50 51
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 52#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
53#define MAGIC "HUHN\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic//D
57 54
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 55#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 56#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 57#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 58#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
108struct crypto_ctx 105struct crypto_ctx
109{ 106{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 107 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 108 HMAC_CTX hctx;
112 109
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 110 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 111 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 112};
116 113
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 114crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 115{
116 ecdh_key s;
117
118 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
119
120 {
121 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
122 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
123
124 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
125 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
126 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
127 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
128 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
129
130 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
131 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
132 }
133
134 {
135 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
136 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
137
138 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt), HKDF_XTR_HASH ());
139 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
140 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
141 kdf.extract_done (HKDF_PRF_HASH ());
142 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
143
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 145 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 146 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 147}
124 148
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 149crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 150{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 151 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 152 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
129} 153}
130 154
155static inline void
156auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
157{
158 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
159 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
160 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
161 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
162
163 memcpy (&encr.ecdh, &auth.ecdh, sizeof (encr.ecdh));
164}
165
166static inline bool
167auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
168{
169 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
170
171 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
172 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
173 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
174 return 0;
175
176 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
177 memcpy (&auth.ecdh, &encr.ecdh, sizeof (auth.ecdh));
178
179 return 1;
180}
181
131static void 182static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 183auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 184{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 185 HMAC_CTX ctx;
135 186
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 187 HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 188 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); 189 require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); 190 require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); 191 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 192}
143 193
144struct rsa_entry 194void
195connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 196{
146 tstamp expire; 197 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 198 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 199 // request data
160 { 200 rand_fill (snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 201 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
202 auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
162 203
163 erase (i); 204 // eventual response data
164 return true; 205 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 206 }
167 207
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 208 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 209 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 210}
213 211
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 212//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 213
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 214pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
374{ 372{
375 unsigned int xlen; 373 unsigned int xlen;
376 374
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 375 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
378 376
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); 377 require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), 378 require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); 379 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen); 380 require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
383} 381}
384 382
385void 383void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 384hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 385{
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 449 d[1] = cl;
452 } 450 }
453 } 451 }
454#endif 452#endif
455 453
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 454 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
457 455
458 struct { 456 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE 457#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; 458 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif 459#endif
462 u32 seqno; 460 u32 seqno;
463 } datahdr; 461 } datahdr;
464 462
465 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno); 463 datahdr.seqno = ntohl (seqno);
466#if RAND_SIZE 464#if RAND_SIZE
467 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *) datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE); 465 // NB: a constant (per session) random prefix
466 // is likely enough, but we don't take any chances.
467 conn->oiv.get (datahdr.rnd, RAND_SIZE);
468#endif 468#endif
469 469
470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx, 470 require (EVP_EncryptUpdate (cctx,
471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2, 471 (unsigned char *) data + outl, &outl2,
472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR)); 472 (unsigned char *) &datahdr, DATAHDR));
… …
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 494 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 496 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); 497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 498
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 499 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
500 500
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 503
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
505 d = cdata; 505 d = cdata;
506 else 506 else
507#endif 507#endif
508 d = &(*p)[6 + 6 - DATAHDR]; 508 d = &(*p)[6 + 6] - DATAHDR;
509 509
510 /* this overwrites part of the src mac, but we fix that later */ 510 // we play do evil games with the struct layout atm.
511 // pending better solutions, we at least do some verification.
512 // this is fine, as we left ISO territory long ago.
513 require (DATAHDR <= 16);
514 require ((u8 *)(&p->len + 1) == &(*p)[0]);
515
516 // this can overwrite the len/dst/src fields
511 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx, 517 require (EVP_DecryptUpdate (cctx,
512 d, &outl2, 518 d, &outl2,
513 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ())); 519 (unsigned char *)&data, len - data_hdr_size ()));
514 outl += outl2; 520 outl += outl2;
515 521
… …
546 } 552 }
547}; 553};
548 554
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 555struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 556{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac 557 u8 serial[SERIAL_SIZE];
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 558 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 559 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 560 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 561
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 562 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 563 bool chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const;
560 564
561 static u8 get_features () 565 static u8 get_features ()
562 { 566 {
563 u8 f = 0; 567 u8 f = 0;
564#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 568#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
… …
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 582config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 583{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 584 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 585 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE; 586 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 587 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 588 features = get_features ();
587 589
590 strncpy ((char *)serial, conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
591
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 592 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 593 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
594 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 595
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 596 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 597 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 598}
595 599
596bool 600bool
597config_packet::chk_config () const 601config_packet::chk_config (const conf_node *conf, const sockinfo &rsi) const
598{ 602{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 603 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 604 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
605 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 606 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); 607 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"),
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH) 608 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, randsize, RAND_SIZE);
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 609 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 610 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH))) 611 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 612 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 613 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
614 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
615 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
616 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"),
617 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 618 else
619 {
620 int cmp = memcmp (serial, ::conf.serial, sizeof (serial));
621
622 if (cmp > 0)
623 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): remote serial newer than local serial - outdated config?"),
624 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
625 else if (cmp == 0)
614 return true; 626 return true;
627 }
615 628
616 return false; 629 return false;
617} 630}
618 631
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 632struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 633{
621 char magic[8]; 634 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 635 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 636 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 637 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 638 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 639
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 640 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 641 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 642 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 643 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 644 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 645 protocols = protocols_;
634 646
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 647 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 648 }
637}; 649};
638 650
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 651struct auth_res_packet : vpn_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 652{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 653 auth_response response;
645 654
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 655 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 656 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 657 set_hdr (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 658
650 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 659 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
651 } 660 }
652}; 661};
653 662
… …
683}; 692};
684 693
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 694/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 695
687void 696void
688connection::connection_established () 697connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 698{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 699 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
700 return;
691 701
702 si = rsi;
703 protocol = rsi.prot;
704
705 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
706 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
707 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
708 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
709
710 if (::conf.script_node_up)
711 {
712 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
713 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
714 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
715 }
716
717 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
718 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
719
720 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
721 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
722
723 oiv.reset ();
724
725 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
726 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
727 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
728
729 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
730
731 // send queued packets
692 if (ictx && octx) 732 if (ictx && octx)
693 { 733 {
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 734 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
696 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
697 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
698
699 // send queued packets
700 if (ictx && octx)
701 { 735 {
702 while (tap_packet *p = (tap_packet *)data_queue.get ())
703 {
704 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p); 736 if (p->len) send_data_packet (p);
705 delete p; 737 delete p;
706 }
707
708 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
709 {
710 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
711 delete p;
712 }
713 } 738 }
714 739
740 while (vpn_packet *p = (vpn_packet *)vpn_queue.get ())
741 {
742 if (p->len) send_vpn_packet (p, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY);
743 delete p;
744 }
745 }
746
715 vpn->connection_established (this); 747 vpn->connection_established (this);
716 }
717 else
718 {
719 retry_cnt = 0;
720 establish_connection.start (5);
721 keepalive.stop ();
722 rekey.stop ();
723 }
724} 748}
725 749
726void 750void
727connection::reset_si () 751connection::reset_si ()
728{ 752{
… …
774 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 798 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
775 799
776 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 800 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
777 801
778 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 802 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
779
780 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 803 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
781 804
782 delete pkt; 805 delete pkt;
783} 806}
784 807
… …
799void 822void
800connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 823connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
801{ 824{
802 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 825 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
803 826
804 rsachallenge chg; 827 generate_auth_data ();
805 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
806 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 828 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
807 829
808 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 830 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
809
810 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 831 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
811 832
812 delete pkt; 833 delete pkt;
813} 834}
814 835
815void 836void
816connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 837connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
817{ 838{
818 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 839 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
819 840
820 pkt->id = id; 841 auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
821 842 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
822 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
823
824 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
825 843
826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 844 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
827
828 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 845 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
829 846
830 delete pkt; 847 delete pkt;
831} 848}
832 849
… …
926 943
927 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 944 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
928 delete octx; octx = 0; 945 delete octx; octx = 0;
929 946
930 si.host = 0; 947 si.host = 0;
948
949 have_snd_auth = false;
950 have_rcv_auth = false;
951 auth_expire = 0.;
931 952
932 last_activity = 0.; 953 last_activity = 0.;
933 //last_si_change = 0.; 954 //last_si_change = 0.;
934 retry_cnt = 0; 955 retry_cnt = 0;
935 956
… …
1051 { 1072 {
1052 reset_connection (); 1073 reset_connection ();
1053 1074
1054 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt; 1075 config_packet *p = (config_packet *) pkt;
1055 1076
1056 if (!p->chk_config ()) 1077 if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi) && connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1057 {
1058 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch, disabling node."),
1059 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1060 connectmode = conf_node::C_DISABLED;
1061 }
1062 else if (connectmode == conf_node::C_ALWAYS)
1063 establish_connection (); 1078 establish_connection ();
1064 } 1079 }
1065 break; 1080 break;
1066 1081
1067 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ: 1082 case vpn_packet::PT_AUTH_REQ:
… …
1071 1086
1072 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1087 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1073 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1088 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1074 p->protocols, p->features); 1089 p->protocols, p->features);
1075 1090
1091 if (memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1092 {
1093 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol magic mismatch - stray packet?"),
1094 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1095 }
1076 if (p->chk_config () 1096 else if (p->chk_config (conf, rsi))
1077 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1078 { 1097 {
1079 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1098 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1080 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1099 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1081 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1100 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1082 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1101 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1083 1102
1084 if (p->initiate) 1103 if (p->initiate)
1085 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1104 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1086 1105
1087 rsachallenge k; 1106 auth_data auth;
1088 1107
1089 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1108 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1090 { 1109 {
1091 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1110 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1092 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1111 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1093 break;
1094 } 1112 }
1095 else 1113 else
1096 { 1114 {
1097 delete octx; 1115 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1098 1116
1099 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1117 rcv_auth = auth;
1100 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1118 have_rcv_auth = true;
1101 1119
1120 send_auth_response (rsi);
1121
1122 if (chg)
1123 {
1102 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1124 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1103 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1125 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1104 1126
1105 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1106
1107 connection_established (); 1127 connection_established (rsi);
1108
1109 break; 1128 }
1110 } 1129 }
1130
1131 break;
1111 } 1132 }
1112 else
1113 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1114 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1115 1133
1116 send_reset (rsi); 1134 send_reset (rsi);
1117 } 1135 }
1118 1136
1119 break; 1137 break;
… …
1122 { 1140 {
1123 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt; 1141 auth_res_packet *p = (auth_res_packet *)pkt;
1124 1142
1125 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1143 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1126 1144
1127 if (p->chk_config ()) 1145 if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1128 { 1146 {
1129 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1130 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1131 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1132 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1133
1134 rsachallenge chg;
1135
1136 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1137 {
1138 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1147 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1139 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1148 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1140 break;
1141 }
1142 else
1143 {
1144 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0);
1145
1146 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1147 {
1148 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1149 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1150 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1151 break;
1152 }
1153 else
1154 {
1155 rsaresponse h;
1156
1157 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1158
1159 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1160 {
1161 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1162
1163 delete ictx; ictx = cctx;
1164
1165 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1166
1167 si = rsi;
1168 protocol = rsi.prot;
1169
1170 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1171 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1172 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1173 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1174
1175 connection_established ();
1176
1177 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1178 {
1179 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1180 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1181 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1182 }
1183
1184 break;
1185 }
1186 else
1187 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1188 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1189 }
1190
1191 delete cctx;
1192 }
1193 } 1149 }
1150 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1151 {
1152 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1153
1154 have_snd_auth = true;
1155 connection_established (rsi);
1156 }
1157
1158 break;
1194 } 1159 }
1195 1160
1196 send_reset (rsi); 1161 send_reset (rsi);
1197 break; 1162 break;
1198 1163
… …
1310 1275
1311 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1276 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1312 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1277 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1313 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1278 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1314 1279
1315 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x) [%d]", 1280 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1316 conf->nodename, 1281 conf->nodename,
1317 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, 1282 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1318 (const char *)p->si, 1283 (const char *)p->si,
1319 p->protocols, 1284 p->protocols,
1285 protocol,
1286 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1320 !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1287 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1321 1288
1322 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1289 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1323 1290
1324 if (dsi.valid ()) 1291 if (dsi.valid ())
1325 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1292 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1293 else
1294 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1295 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1296 (const char *)p->si);
1326 } 1297 }
1327 else 1298 else
1328 slog (L_WARN, 1299 slog (L_WARN,
1329 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1300 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1330 p->id); 1301 p->id);
… …
1339} 1310}
1340 1311
1341inline void 1312inline void
1342connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1313connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1343{ 1314{
1344 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15) 1315 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1316
1317 if (when >= 0)
1318 w.start (when);
1319 else if (when < -15)
1345 { 1320 {
1346 reset_connection (); 1321 reset_connection ();
1347 establish_connection (); 1322 establish_connection ();
1348 } 1323 }
1349 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1350 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1351 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1324 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1352 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1325 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1353 { 1326 {
1327 w.start (3);
1354 send_ping (si); 1328 send_ping (si);
1355 w.start (3);
1356 } 1329 }
1357 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1330 else if (when >= -10)
1358 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1331 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1359 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1332 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1360 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1333 w.start (when + 10);
1361 else 1334 else
1362 reset_connection (); 1335 reset_connection ();
1363} 1336}
1364 1337
1365void 1338void

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