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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.97 by root, Tue Dec 4 13:23:17 2012 UTC vs.
Revision 1.98 by root, Tue Jul 16 16:44:36 2013 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
43#include "conf.h" 43#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 44#include "slog.h"
45#include "device.h" 45#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 46#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 47#include "connection.h"
48#include "hkdf.h"
48 49
49#include "netcompat.h" 50#include "netcompat.h"
50 51
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 52#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
57 53
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 54#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 55#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 56#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 57#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
108struct crypto_ctx 104struct crypto_ctx
109{ 105{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 107 HMAC_CTX hctx;
112 108
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 109 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 110 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 111};
116 112
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 113crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 114{
115 ecdh_key s;
116
117 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
118
119 {
120 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
121 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
122
123 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt));
124 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
125 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
126 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
127 kdf.extract_done ();
128 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
129
130 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
131 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
132 }
133
134 {
135 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
136 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
137
138 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt));
139 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
140 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
141 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
142 kdf.extract_done ();
143 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
144
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 145 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 146 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 147 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 148}
124 149
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 150crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 151{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 152 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 153 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
129} 154}
130 155
156static inline void
157auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
158{
159 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
160 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
161 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
162 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
163}
164
165static inline bool
166auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
167{
168 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
169
170 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
171 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
172 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
173 return 0;
174
175 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
176
177 return 1;
178}
179
131static void 180static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 181auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 182{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 183 HMAC_CTX ctx;
135 184
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 185 HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 186 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); 187 require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate (&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); 188 require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); 189 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 190}
143 191
144struct rsa_entry 192void
193connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 194{
146 tstamp expire; 195 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 196 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 197 // request data
160 { 198 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 199 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
200 auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
162 201
163 erase (i); 202 // eventual response data
164 return true; 203 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 204 }
167 205
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 206 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 207 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 208}
213 209
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 210//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 211
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 212pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
374{ 370{
375 unsigned int xlen; 371 unsigned int xlen;
376 372
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 373 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
378 374
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); 375 require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), 376 require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); 377 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen); 378 require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
383} 379}
384 380
385void 381void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 382hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 383{
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 447 d[1] = cl;
452 } 448 }
453 } 449 }
454#endif 450#endif
455 451
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 452 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
457 453
458 struct { 454 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE 455#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; 456 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif 457#endif
… …
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 490 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 491 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 492 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); 493 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 494
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 495 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
500 496
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 497#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 498 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 499
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 500 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
… …
546 } 542 }
547}; 543};
548 544
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 545struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 546{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 547 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 548 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 549 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 550
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 551 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 552 bool chk_config () const;
560 553
561 static u8 get_features () 554 static u8 get_features ()
… …
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 571config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 572{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 573 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 574 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE; 575 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 576 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 577 features = get_features ();
587 578
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 579 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 580 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
581 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 582
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 583 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 584 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 585}
595 586
… …
598{ 589{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 590 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 591 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 592 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); 593 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 594 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 595 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 596 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 597 slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
598 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
599 slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 600 else
614 return true; 601 return true;
615 602
616 return false; 603 return false;
617} 604}
618 605
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 606struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 607{
621 char magic[8]; 608 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 609 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 610 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 611 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 612 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 613
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 614 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 615 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 616 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 617 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 618 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 619 protocols = protocols_;
634 620
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 621 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 622 }
637}; 623};
638 624
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 625struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 626{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 627 auth_response response;
645 628
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 629 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 630 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 631 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 632
… …
683}; 666};
684 667
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 668/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 669
687void 670void
688connection::connection_established () 671connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 672{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 673 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
674 return;
675
676 si = rsi;
677 protocol = rsi.prot;
678
679 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
680 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
681 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
682 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
683
684 if (::conf.script_node_up)
685 {
686 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
687 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
688 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
689 }
690
691 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
692 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
693
694 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
695 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
691 696
692 if (ictx && octx) 697 if (ictx && octx)
693 { 698 {
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 699 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 700 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
… …
713 } 718 }
714 } 719 }
715 720
716 vpn->connection_established (this); 721 vpn->connection_established (this);
717 } 722 }
723#if 0
718 else 724 else
719 { 725 {
720 retry_cnt = 0; 726 retry_cnt = 0;
721 establish_connection.start (5); 727 establish_connection.start (5);
722 keepalive.stop (); 728 keepalive.stop ();
723 rekey.stop (); 729 rekey.stop ();
724 } 730 }
731#endif
725} 732}
726 733
727void 734void
728connection::reset_si () 735connection::reset_si ()
729{ 736{
… …
775 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 782 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
776 783
777 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 784 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
778 785
779 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 786 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
780
781 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 787 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
782 788
783 delete pkt; 789 delete pkt;
784} 790}
785 791
… …
800void 806void
801connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 807connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
802{ 808{
803 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 809 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
804 810
805 rsachallenge chg; 811 generate_auth_data ();
806 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
807 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 812 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
808 813
809 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 814 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
810
811 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 815 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
812 816
813 delete pkt; 817 delete pkt;
814} 818}
815 819
816void 820void
817connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 821connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
818{ 822{
819 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 823 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
820 824
821 pkt->id = id; 825 auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
822 826 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
823 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
824
825 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
826 827
827 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 828 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
828
829 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 829 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
830 830
831 delete pkt; 831 delete pkt;
832} 832}
833 833
… …
927 927
928 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 928 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
929 delete octx; octx = 0; 929 delete octx; octx = 0;
930 930
931 si.host = 0; 931 si.host = 0;
932
933 have_snd_auth = false;
934 have_rcv_auth = false;
935 auth_expire = 0.;
932 936
933 last_activity = 0.; 937 last_activity = 0.;
934 //last_si_change = 0.; 938 //last_si_change = 0.;
935 retry_cnt = 0; 939 retry_cnt = 0;
936 940
… …
1072 1076
1073 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1077 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1074 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1078 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1075 p->protocols, p->features); 1079 p->protocols, p->features);
1076 1080
1077 if (p->chk_config () 1081 if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1078 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1079 { 1082 {
1080 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1083 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1081 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1084 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1082 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1085 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1083 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1086 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1084 1087
1085 if (p->initiate) 1088 if (p->initiate)
1086 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1089 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1087 1090
1088 rsachallenge k; 1091 auth_data auth;
1089 1092
1090 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1093 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1091 { 1094 {
1092 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1095 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1093 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1096 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1094 break;
1095 } 1097 }
1096 else 1098 else
1097 { 1099 {
1098 delete octx; 1100 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1099 1101
1100 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1102 rcv_auth = auth;
1101 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1103 have_rcv_auth = true;
1102 1104
1105 send_auth_response (rsi);
1106
1107 if (chg)
1108 {
1103 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1109 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1104 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1110 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1105 1111
1106 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1107
1108 connection_established (); 1112 connection_established (rsi);
1109
1110 break; 1113 }
1111 } 1114 }
1115
1116 break;
1112 } 1117 }
1113 else 1118 else
1114 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), 1119 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1115 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1120 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1116 1121
… …
1125 1130
1126 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1131 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1127 1132
1128 if (p->chk_config ()) 1133 if (p->chk_config ())
1129 { 1134 {
1130 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1135 if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1131 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1132 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1133 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1134
1135 rsachallenge chg;
1136
1137 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1138 { 1136 {
1139 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1137 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1140 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1138 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1141 break;
1142 } 1139 }
1143 else 1140 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1144 { 1141 {
1145 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1142 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1146 1143 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1147 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1148 {
1149 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1150 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1151 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1144 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1152 break; 1145 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1153 }
1154 else
1155 {
1156 rsaresponse h;
1157 1146
1158 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1159
1160 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1161 {
1162 prot_minor = p->prot_minor; 1147 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1148 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1163 1149
1164 delete ictx; ictx = cctx; 1150 have_snd_auth = true;
1165
1166 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1167
1168 si = rsi;
1169 protocol = rsi.prot;
1170
1171 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1172 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1173 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1174 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1175
1176 connection_established (); 1151 connection_established (rsi);
1177
1178 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1179 {
1180 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1181 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1182 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1183 }
1184
1185 break;
1186 }
1187 else
1188 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1189 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1190 }
1191
1192 delete cctx;
1193 } 1152 }
1153
1154 break;
1194 } 1155 }
1195 } 1156 }
1196 1157
1197 send_reset (rsi); 1158 send_reset (rsi);
1198 break; 1159 break;

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