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Comparing gvpe/src/connection.C (file contents):
Revision 1.93 by root, Tue Feb 15 13:31:23 2011 UTC vs.
Revision 1.98 by root, Tue Jul 16 16:44:36 2013 UTC

1/* 1/*
2 connection.C -- manage a single connection 2 connection.C -- manage a single connection
3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de> 3 Copyright (C) 2003-2008,2010,2011,2013 Marc Lehmann <gvpe@schmorp.de>
4 4
5 This file is part of GVPE. 5 This file is part of GVPE.
6 6
7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it 7 GVPE is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the 8 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
… …
43#include "conf.h" 43#include "conf.h"
44#include "slog.h" 44#include "slog.h"
45#include "device.h" 45#include "device.h"
46#include "vpn.h" 46#include "vpn.h"
47#include "connection.h" 47#include "connection.h"
48#include "hkdf.h"
48 49
49#include "netcompat.h" 50#include "netcompat.h"
50 51
51#if !HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
52# define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
53#endif
54
55#define MAGIC_OLD "vped\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (still used in the protocol)
56#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic (understood but not generated) 52#define MAGIC "gvpe\xbd\xc6\xdb\x82" // 8 bytes of magic
57 53
58#define ULTRA_FAST 1 54#define ULTRA_FAST 1
59#define HLOG 15 55#define HLOG 15
60#include "lzf/lzf.h" 56#include "lzf/lzf.h"
61#include "lzf/lzf_c.c" 57#include "lzf/lzf_c.c"
… …
108struct crypto_ctx 104struct crypto_ctx
109{ 105{
110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx; 106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX cctx;
111 HMAC_CTX hctx; 107 HMAC_CTX hctx;
112 108
113 crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc); 109 crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc);
114 ~crypto_ctx (); 110 ~crypto_ctx ();
115}; 111};
116 112
117crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const rsachallenge &challenge, int enc) 113crypto_ctx::crypto_ctx (const auth_data &auth1, const auth_data &auth2, const ecdh_key &a, const ecdh_key &b, int enc)
118{ 114{
115 ecdh_key s;
116
117 curve25519_combine (a, b, s);
118
119 {
120 u8 mac_key[MAC_KEYSIZE];
121 static const unsigned char mac_info[] = "gvpe mac key";
122
123 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt));
124 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
125 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.mac_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.mac_key));
126 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
127 kdf.extract_done ();
128 kdf.expand (mac_key, sizeof (mac_key), mac_info, sizeof (mac_info));
129
130 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
131 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, mac_key, MAC_KEYSIZE, MAC_DIGEST (), 0));
132 }
133
134 {
135 u8 cipher_key[CIPHER_KEYSIZE];
136 static const unsigned char cipher_info[] = "gvpe cipher key";
137
138 hkdf kdf (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt, sizeof (auth2.rsa.hkdf_salt));
139 kdf.extract (auth2.rsa.ikm, sizeof (auth2.rsa.ikm));
140 kdf.extract (auth1.rsa.cipher_key, sizeof (auth1.rsa.cipher_key));
141 kdf.extract (s, sizeof (s));
142 kdf.extract_done ();
143 kdf.expand (cipher_key, sizeof (cipher_key), cipher_info, sizeof (cipher_info));
144
119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx); 145 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&cctx);
120 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER, 0, &challenge[CHG_CIPHER_KEY], 0, enc)); 146 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (&cctx, CIPHER (), 0, cipher_key, 0, enc));
121 HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx); 147 }
122 HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, &challenge[CHG_HMAC_KEY], HMAC_KEYLEN, DIGEST, 0);
123} 148}
124 149
125crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx () 150crypto_ctx::~crypto_ctx ()
126{ 151{
127 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx)); 152 require (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&cctx));
128 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx); 153 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&hctx);
129} 154}
130 155
156static inline void
157auth_encrypt (RSA *key, const auth_data &auth, auth_encr &encr)
158{
159 if (RSA_public_encrypt (sizeof (auth.rsa),
160 (unsigned char *)&auth.rsa, (unsigned char *)&encr.rsa,
161 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) < 0)
162 fatal ("RSA_public_encrypt error");
163}
164
165static inline bool
166auth_decrypt (RSA *key, const auth_encr &encr, auth_data &auth)
167{
168 u8 rsa_decrypt[RSA_KEYLEN];
169
170 if (RSA_private_decrypt (sizeof (encr.rsa),
171 (const unsigned char *)&encr.rsa, (unsigned char *)rsa_decrypt,
172 key, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) != sizeof (auth.rsa))
173 return 0;
174
175 memcpy (&auth.rsa, rsa_decrypt, sizeof (auth.rsa));
176
177 return 1;
178}
179
131static void 180static void
132rsa_hash (const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg, rsaresponse &h) 181auth_hash (const auth_data &auth, auth_mac &mac)
133{ 182{
134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 183 HMAC_CTX ctx;
135 184
136 EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); 185 HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
137 require (EVP_DigestInit (&ctx, RSA_HASH)); 186 require (HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, auth.rsa.auth_key, sizeof (auth.rsa.auth_key), AUTH_DIGEST (), 0));
138 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &chg, sizeof chg)); 187 require (HMAC_Update (&ctx, (const unsigned char *)&auth, sizeof auth));
139 require (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &id, sizeof id));
140 require (EVP_DigestFinal (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&h, 0)); 188 require (HMAC_Final (&ctx, (unsigned char *)&mac, 0));
141 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); 189 HMAC_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
142} 190}
143 191
144struct rsa_entry 192void
193connection::generate_auth_data ()
145{ 194{
146 tstamp expire; 195 if (auth_expire < ev_now ())
147 rsaid id;
148 rsachallenge chg;
149};
150
151struct rsa_cache : list<rsa_entry>
152{
153 inline void cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents); ev::timer cleaner;
154
155 bool find (const rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
156 {
157 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); ++i)
158 { 196 {
159 if (!memcmp (&id, &i->id, sizeof id) && i->expire > ev_now ()) 197 // request data
160 { 198 RAND_pseudo_bytes ((unsigned char *)&snd_auth.rsa, sizeof snd_auth.rsa);
161 memcpy (&chg, &i->chg, sizeof chg); 199 curve25519_generate (snd_ecdh_a, snd_auth.ecdh);
200 auth_hash (snd_auth, snd_auth_mac);
162 201
163 erase (i); 202 // eventual response data
164 return true; 203 curve25519_generate (rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_ecdh_b);
165 }
166 } 204 }
167 205
168 if (!cleaner.is_active ()) 206 // every use prolongs the expiry
169 cleaner.again ();
170
171 return false;
172 }
173
174 void gen (rsaid &id, rsachallenge &chg)
175 {
176 rsa_entry e;
177
178 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&id, sizeof id);
179 RAND_bytes ((unsigned char *)&chg, sizeof chg);
180
181 e.expire = ev_now () + RSA_TTL; 207 auth_expire = ev_now () + AUTH_TTL;
182 e.id = id;
183 memcpy (&e.chg, &chg, sizeof chg);
184
185 push_back (e);
186
187 if (!cleaner.is_active ())
188 cleaner.again ();
189 }
190
191 rsa_cache ()
192 {
193 cleaner.set<rsa_cache, &rsa_cache::cleaner_cb> (this);
194 cleaner.set (RSA_TTL, RSA_TTL);
195 }
196
197} rsa_cache;
198
199void
200rsa_cache::cleaner_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
201{
202 if (empty ())
203 w.stop ();
204 else
205 {
206 for (iterator i = begin (); i != end (); )
207 if (i->expire <= ev_now ())
208 i = erase (i);
209 else
210 ++i;
211 }
212} 208}
213 209
214////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 210//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
215 211
216pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue) 212pkt_queue::pkt_queue (double max_ttl, int max_queue)
… …
374{ 370{
375 unsigned int xlen; 371 unsigned int xlen;
376 372
377 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx; 373 HMAC_CTX *hctx = &ctx->hctx;
378 374
379 HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0); 375 require (HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, 0, 0, 0, 0));
380 HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet), 376 require (HMAC_Update (hctx, ((unsigned char *) this) + sizeof (hmac_packet),
381 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)); 377 len - sizeof (hmac_packet)));
382 HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen); 378 require (HMAC_Final (hctx, (unsigned char *) &hmac_digest, &xlen));
383} 379}
384 380
385void 381void
386hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx) 382hmac_packet::hmac_set (crypto_ctx *ctx)
387{ 383{
… …
451 d[1] = cl; 447 d[1] = cl;
452 } 448 }
453 } 449 }
454#endif 450#endif
455 451
456 require (EVP_EncryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 452 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1));
457 453
458 struct { 454 struct {
459#if RAND_SIZE 455#if RAND_SIZE
460 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE]; 456 u8 rnd[RAND_SIZE];
461#endif 457#endif
… …
494 int outl = 0, outl2; 490 int outl = 0, outl2;
495 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet; 491 tap_packet *p = new tap_packet;
496 u8 *d; 492 u8 *d;
497 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size (); 493 u32 l = len - data_hdr_size ();
498 494
499 require (EVP_DecryptInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0)); 495 require (EVP_CipherInit_ex (cctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0));
500 496
501#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION 497#if ENABLE_COMPRESSION
502 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU]; 498 u8 cdata[MAX_MTU];
503 499
504 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED) 500 if (type == PT_DATA_COMPRESSED)
… …
546 } 542 }
547}; 543};
548 544
549struct config_packet : vpn_packet 545struct config_packet : vpn_packet
550{ 546{
551 // actually, hmaclen cannot be checked because the hmac
552 // field comes before this data, so peers with other
553 // hmacs simply will not work.
554 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize, hmaclen; 547 u8 prot_major, prot_minor, randsize;
555 u8 flags, challengelen, features, pad3; 548 u8 flags, features, pad6, pad7, pad8;
556 u32 cipher_nid, digest_nid, hmac_nid; 549 u32 cipher_nid, mac_nid, auth_nid;
557 550
558 void setup (ptype type, int dst); 551 void setup (ptype type, int dst);
559 bool chk_config () const; 552 bool chk_config () const;
560 553
561 static u8 get_features () 554 static u8 get_features ()
… …
578config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst) 571config_packet::setup (ptype type, int dst)
579{ 572{
580 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR; 573 prot_major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR;
581 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR; 574 prot_minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR;
582 randsize = RAND_SIZE; 575 randsize = RAND_SIZE;
583 hmaclen = HMACLENGTH;
584 flags = 0; 576 flags = 0;
585 challengelen = sizeof (rsachallenge);
586 features = get_features (); 577 features = get_features ();
587 578
588 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 579 cipher_nid = htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
589 digest_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
590 hmac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 580 mac_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
581 auth_nid = htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
591 582
592 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 583 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
593 set_hdr (type, dst); 584 set_hdr (type, dst);
594} 585}
595 586
… …
598{ 589{
599 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR) 590 if (prot_major != PROTOCOL_MAJOR)
600 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR); 591 slog (L_WARN, _("major version mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), prot_major, PROTOCOL_MAJOR);
601 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE) 592 else if (randsize != RAND_SIZE)
602 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE); 593 slog (L_WARN, _("rand size mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), randsize, RAND_SIZE);
603 else if (hmaclen != HMACLENGTH)
604 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), hmaclen, HMACLENGTH);
605 else if (challengelen != sizeof (rsachallenge))
606 slog (L_WARN, _("challenge length mismatch (remote %d <=> local %d)"), challengelen, sizeof (rsachallenge));
607 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER))) 594 else if (cipher_nid != htonl (EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ())))
608 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER)); 595 slog (L_WARN, _("cipher algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (cipher_nid), EVP_CIPHER_nid (CIPHER ()));
609 else if (digest_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH)))
610 slog (L_WARN, _("digest mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (digest_nid), EVP_MD_type (RSA_HASH));
611 else if (hmac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (DIGEST))) 596 else if (mac_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ())))
612 slog (L_WARN, _("hmac mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (hmac_nid), EVP_MD_type (DIGEST)); 597 slog (L_WARN, _("mac algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (mac_nid), EVP_MD_type (MAC_DIGEST ()));
598 else if (auth_nid != htonl (EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ())))
599 slog (L_WARN, _("auth algo mismatch (remote %x <=> local %x)"), ntohl (auth_nid), EVP_MD_type (AUTH_DIGEST ()));
613 else 600 else
614 return true; 601 return true;
615 602
616 return false; 603 return false;
617} 604}
618 605
619struct auth_req_packet : config_packet 606struct auth_req_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
620{ 607{
621 char magic[8]; 608 char magic[8];
622 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply 609 u8 initiate; // false if this is just an automatic reply
623 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward) 610 u8 protocols; // supported protocols (will be patched on forward)
624 u8 pad2, pad3; 611 u8 pad2, pad3;
625 rsaid id; 612 auth_encr encr;
626 rsaencrdata encr;
627 613
628 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_) 614 auth_req_packet (int dst, bool initiate_, u8 protocols_)
629 { 615 {
630 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst); 616 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_REQ, dst);
631 strncpy (magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8); 617 memcpy (magic, MAGIC, 8);
632 initiate = !!initiate_; 618 initiate = !!initiate_;
633 protocols = protocols_; 619 protocols = protocols_;
634 620
635 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet); 621 len = sizeof (*this) - sizeof (net_packet);
636 } 622 }
637}; 623};
638 624
639struct auth_res_packet : config_packet 625struct auth_res_packet : config_packet // UNPROTECTED
640{ 626{
641 rsaid id;
642 u8 pad1, pad2, pad3;
643 u8 response_len; // encrypted length
644 rsaresponse response; 627 auth_response response;
645 628
646 auth_res_packet (int dst) 629 auth_res_packet (int dst)
647 { 630 {
648 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst); 631 config_packet::setup (PT_AUTH_RES, dst);
649 632
… …
683}; 666};
684 667
685///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 668/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
686 669
687void 670void
688connection::connection_established () 671connection::connection_established (const sockinfo &rsi)
689{ 672{
690 slog (L_NOISE, _("%s: possible connection establish (ictx %d, octx %d)"), conf->nodename, !!ictx, !!octx); 673 if (!have_snd_auth || !have_rcv_auth)
674 return;
675
676 si = rsi;
677 protocol = rsi.prot;
678
679 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
680 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
681 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
682 PROTOCOL_MAJOR, prot_minor);
683
684 if (::conf.script_node_up)
685 {
686 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
687 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
688 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
689 }
690
691 delete ictx; ictx = new crypto_ctx (rcv_auth, snd_auth, rcv_ecdh_a, rcv_auth.ecdh, 0);
692 iseqno.reset (ntohl (rcv_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff);
693
694 delete octx; octx = new crypto_ctx (snd_auth, rcv_auth, snd_ecdh_a, snd_ecdh_b , 1);
695 oseqno = ntohl (snd_auth.rsa.seqno) & 0x7fffffff;
691 696
692 if (ictx && octx) 697 if (ictx && octx)
693 { 698 {
694 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric 699 // make sure rekeying timeouts are slightly asymmetric
695 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0); 700 ev::tstamp rekey_interval = ::conf.rekey + (conf->id > THISNODE->id ? 10 : 0);
696 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval); 701 rekey.start (rekey_interval, rekey_interval);
702
697 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive); 703 keepalive.start (::conf.keepalive);
698 704
699 // send queued packets 705 // send queued packets
700 if (ictx && octx) 706 if (ictx && octx)
701 { 707 {
… …
712 } 718 }
713 } 719 }
714 720
715 vpn->connection_established (this); 721 vpn->connection_established (this);
716 } 722 }
723#if 0
717 else 724 else
718 { 725 {
719 retry_cnt = 0; 726 retry_cnt = 0;
720 establish_connection.start (5); 727 establish_connection.start (5);
721 keepalive.stop (); 728 keepalive.stop ();
722 rekey.stop (); 729 rekey.stop ();
723 } 730 }
731#endif
724} 732}
725 733
726void 734void
727connection::reset_si () 735connection::reset_si ()
728{ 736{
… …
774 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet; 782 ping_packet *pkt = new ping_packet;
775 783
776 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING); 784 pkt->setup (conf->id, pong ? ping_packet::PT_PONG : ping_packet::PT_PING);
777 785
778 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si); 786 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << %s [%s]", conf->nodename, pong ? "PT_PONG" : "PT_PING", (const char *)si);
779
780 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); 787 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_LOWDELAY);
781 788
782 delete pkt; 789 delete pkt;
783} 790}
784 791
… …
799void 806void
800connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate) 807connection::send_auth_request (const sockinfo &si, bool initiate)
801{ 808{
802 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols); 809 auth_req_packet *pkt = new auth_req_packet (conf->id, initiate, THISNODE->protocols);
803 810
804 rsachallenge chg; 811 generate_auth_data ();
805 rsa_cache.gen (pkt->id, chg);
806 rsa_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, chg, pkt->encr); 812 auth_encrypt (conf->rsa_key, snd_auth, pkt->encr);
807 813
808 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 814 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_REQ [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
809
810 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly 815 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY | IPTOS_LOWDELAY); // rsa is very very costly
811 816
812 delete pkt; 817 delete pkt;
813} 818}
814 819
815void 820void
816connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si, const rsaid &id, const rsachallenge &chg) 821connection::send_auth_response (const sockinfo &si)
817{ 822{
818 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id); 823 auth_res_packet *pkt = new auth_res_packet (conf->id);
819 824
820 pkt->id = id; 825 auth_hash (rcv_auth, pkt->response.mac);
821 826 memcpy (pkt->response.ecdh, rcv_ecdh_b, sizeof (rcv_ecdh_b));
822 rsa_hash (id, chg, pkt->response);
823
824 pkt->hmac_set (octx);
825 827
826 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si); 828 slog (L_TRACE, "%s << PT_AUTH_RES [%s]", conf->nodename, (const char *)si);
827
828 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly 829 send_vpn_packet (pkt, si, IPTOS_RELIABILITY); // rsa is very very costly
829 830
830 delete pkt; 831 delete pkt;
831} 832}
832 833
… …
924 } 925 }
925 } 926 }
926 927
927 delete ictx; ictx = 0; 928 delete ictx; ictx = 0;
928 delete octx; octx = 0; 929 delete octx; octx = 0;
929#if ENABLE_DNS
930 dnsv4_reset_connection ();
931#endif
932 930
933 si.host = 0; 931 si.host = 0;
932
933 have_snd_auth = false;
934 have_rcv_auth = false;
935 auth_expire = 0.;
934 936
935 last_activity = 0.; 937 last_activity = 0.;
936 //last_si_change = 0.; 938 //last_si_change = 0.;
937 retry_cnt = 0; 939 retry_cnt = 0;
938 940
… …
1074 1076
1075 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)", 1077 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_REQ(%s,p%02x,f%02x)",
1076 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply", 1078 conf->nodename, p->initiate ? "initiate" : "reply",
1077 p->protocols, p->features); 1079 p->protocols, p->features);
1078 1080
1079 if (p->chk_config () 1081 if (p->chk_config () && !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8))
1080 && (!memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC_OLD, 8) || !memcmp (p->magic, MAGIC, 8)))
1081 { 1082 {
1082 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1083 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1083 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."), 1084 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1084 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, 1085 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1085 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor); 1086 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1086 1087
1087 if (p->initiate) 1088 if (p->initiate)
1088 send_auth_request (rsi, false); 1089 send_auth_request (rsi, false);
1089 1090
1090 rsachallenge k; 1091 auth_data auth;
1091 1092
1092 if (!rsa_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, k)) 1093 if (!auth_decrypt (::conf.rsa_key, p->encr, auth))
1093 { 1094 {
1094 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"), 1095 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): challenge illegal or corrupted (%s). mismatched key or config file?"),
1095 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0)); 1096 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi, ERR_error_string (ERR_get_error (), 0));
1096 break;
1097 } 1097 }
1098 else 1098 else
1099 { 1099 {
1100 delete octx; 1100 bool chg = !have_rcv_auth || memcmp (&rcv_auth, &auth, sizeof auth);
1101 1101
1102 octx = new crypto_ctx (k, 1); 1102 rcv_auth = auth;
1103 oseqno = ntohl (*(u32 *)&k[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff; 1103 have_rcv_auth = true;
1104 1104
1105 send_auth_response (rsi);
1106
1107 if (chg)
1108 {
1105 conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1109 conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1106 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features (); 1110 features = p->features & config_packet::get_features ();
1107 1111
1108 send_auth_response (rsi, p->id, k);
1109
1110 connection_established (); 1112 connection_established (rsi);
1111
1112 break; 1113 }
1113 } 1114 }
1115
1116 break;
1114 } 1117 }
1115 else 1118 else
1116 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."), 1119 slog (L_WARN, _("%s(%s): protocol mismatch."),
1117 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1120 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1118 1121
… …
1127 1130
1128 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename); 1131 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_AUTH_RES", conf->nodename);
1129 1132
1130 if (p->chk_config ()) 1133 if (p->chk_config ())
1131 { 1134 {
1132 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR) 1135 if (memcmp (&p->response.mac, snd_auth_mac, sizeof (snd_auth_mac)))
1133 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1134 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1135 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1136
1137 rsachallenge chg;
1138
1139 if (!rsa_cache.find (p->id, chg))
1140 { 1136 {
1141 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested auth response, ignoring."), 1137 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): unrequested or outdated auth response, ignoring."),
1142 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1138 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1143 break;
1144 } 1139 }
1145 else 1140 else if (!have_snd_auth)
1146 { 1141 {
1147 crypto_ctx *cctx = new crypto_ctx (chg, 0); 1142 if (p->prot_minor != PROTOCOL_MINOR)
1148 1143 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): protocol minor version mismatch: ours is %d, %s's is %d."),
1149 if (!p->hmac_chk (cctx))
1150 {
1151 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): hmac authentication error on auth response, received invalid packet\n"
1152 "could be an attack, or just corruption or a synchronization error."),
1153 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi); 1144 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1154 break; 1145 PROTOCOL_MINOR, conf->nodename, p->prot_minor);
1155 }
1156 else
1157 {
1158 rsaresponse h;
1159 1146
1160 rsa_hash (p->id, chg, h);
1161
1162 if (!memcmp ((u8 *)&h, (u8 *)p->response, sizeof h))
1163 {
1164 prot_minor = p->prot_minor; 1147 prot_minor = p->prot_minor;
1148 memcpy (snd_ecdh_b, p->response.ecdh, sizeof (snd_ecdh_b));
1165 1149
1166 delete ictx; ictx = cctx; 1150 have_snd_auth = true;
1167
1168 iseqno.reset (ntohl (*(u32 *)&chg[CHG_SEQNO]) & 0x7fffffff); // at least 2**31 sequence numbers are valid
1169
1170 si = rsi;
1171 protocol = rsi.prot;
1172
1173 slog (L_INFO, _("%s(%s): connection established (%s), protocol version %d.%d."),
1174 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi,
1175 is_direct ? "direct" : "forwarded",
1176 p->prot_major, p->prot_minor);
1177
1178 connection_established (); 1151 connection_established (rsi);
1179
1180 if (::conf.script_node_up)
1181 {
1182 run_script_cb *cb = new run_script_cb;
1183 cb->set<connection, &connection::script_node_up> (this);
1184 run_script_queued (cb, _("node-up command execution failed, continuing."));
1185 }
1186
1187 break;
1188 }
1189 else
1190 slog (L_ERR, _("%s(%s): sent and received challenge do not match."),
1191 conf->nodename, (const char *)rsi);
1192 }
1193
1194 delete cctx;
1195 } 1152 }
1153
1154 break;
1196 } 1155 }
1197 } 1156 }
1198 1157
1199 send_reset (rsi); 1158 send_reset (rsi);
1200 break; 1159 break;
… …
1313 1272
1314 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols; 1273 c->conf->protocols = p->protocols;
1315 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf)); 1274 protocol = best_protocol (c->conf->protocols & THISNODE->protocols & p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf));
1316 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf); 1275 p->si.upgrade_protocol (protocol, c->conf);
1317 1276
1318 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,p%02x) [%d]", 1277 slog (L_TRACE, "%s >> PT_CONNECT_INFO(%s,%s,protocols=%02x,protocol=%02x,upgradable=%02x) [%d]",
1319 conf->nodename, 1278 conf->nodename,
1320 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename, 1279 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1321 (const char *)p->si, 1280 (const char *)p->si,
1322 p->protocols, 1281 p->protocols,
1282 protocol,
1283 p->si.supported_protocols (c->conf),
1323 !c->ictx && !c->octx); 1284 !c->ictx && !c->octx);
1324 1285
1325 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si); 1286 const sockinfo &dsi = forward_si (p->si);
1326 1287
1327 if (dsi.valid ()) 1288 if (dsi.valid ())
1328 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true); 1289 c->send_auth_request (dsi, true);
1290 else
1291 slog (L_INFO, "connect info for %s received (%s), but still unable to contact.",
1292 vpn->conns[p->id - 1]->conf->nodename,
1293 (const char *)p->si);
1329 } 1294 }
1330 else 1295 else
1331 slog (L_WARN, 1296 slog (L_WARN,
1332 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"), 1297 _("received authenticated connection request from unknown node #%d, config file mismatch?"),
1333 p->id); 1298 p->id);
… …
1342} 1307}
1343 1308
1344inline void 1309inline void
1345connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents) 1310connection::keepalive_cb (ev::timer &w, int revents)
1346{ 1311{
1347 if (ev_now () >= last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 15) 1312 ev_tstamp when = last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ();
1313
1314 if (when >= 0)
1315 w.start (when);
1316 else if (when < -15)
1348 { 1317 {
1349 reset_connection (); 1318 reset_connection ();
1350 establish_connection (); 1319 establish_connection ();
1351 } 1320 }
1352 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive)
1353 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive - ev::now ());
1354 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND 1321 else if (conf->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND
1355 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND) 1322 || THISNODE->connectmode != conf_node::C_ONDEMAND)
1356 { 1323 {
1324 w.start (3);
1357 send_ping (si); 1325 send_ping (si);
1358 w.start (3);
1359 } 1326 }
1360 else if (ev_now () < last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10) 1327 else if (when >= -10)
1361 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer 1328 // hold ondemand connections implicitly a few seconds longer
1362 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;) 1329 // should delete octx, though, or something like that ;)
1363 w.start (last_activity + ::conf.keepalive + 10 - ev::now ()); 1330 w.start (when + 10);
1364 else 1331 else
1365 reset_connection (); 1332 reset_connection ();
1366} 1333}
1367 1334
1368void 1335void

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